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 It may not look like it, but I have had a lot of help writing this book. In 
January 2009, I sat with two friends, Rose Kelanic and Lindsey O’Rourke, at 
the University of Chicago’s business school cafeteria to discuss my ideas. 
I knew I wanted to focus on why states are so reluctant to cede territory to 
separatists, and I knew existing research was not satisfactory, but that was 
about all I knew. The prospect of outlining even a question, let alone an 
answer, was daunting. Over panini and chips, Lindsey piped up and said 
(something to the effect of): “Why don’t you focus on how state repression 
is caused by the external threat of the movement?” Why don’t I, indeed. 
 The eight years since have been devoted to sorting out how, why, and the 
extent to which state strategies against separatist movements are tied to 
security concerns. In those eight years, I have been fortunate to receive gen-
erous support from the Mellon Foundation, the American Council of 
Learned Societies, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and the Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. 
It is diffi cult to write without adequate fi nancial support, and these institu-
tions ensured I had it. 
 While money was important, the people who helped me write this book 
were more so. At Chicago, I was fortunate to fi nd people who challenged, 
cajoled, intimidated, and inspired me. John Mearsheimer was the father 
fi gure I could never satisfy (not alone there—just ask any Chicago student 
from the past thirty years), Paul Staniland the older cousin whom I wanted 
to emulate (good luck with that), and Duncan Snidal the friendly uncle 
from Canada (unsolicited advice for graduate students: have at least one 
good cop on your committee). I will never be able to repay their attention to 
me and my work, from reading chapters to socializing me in the ways of 
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academia, from providing guidance to putting the fear of god—or the job 
market—in me. I do hope, however, that a copy of this book suffi ces as a 
token. 
 I was also lucky to be surrounded by brilliant and generous students at 
Chicago. Whether it was reading a draft before a workshop presentation, or 
drowning shame and humiliation at Jimmy’s after such a presentation, 
I consider myself fortunate that my time at Chicago overlapped with Adam 
Dean, Gene Gerzhoy, Eric Hundman, Burak Kadercan, Morgan Kaplan, 
Rose Kelanic, Adam Levine-Weinberg, Chad Levinson, Sarah Parkinson, 
Negeen Pegahi, and Lindsey O’Rourke. They were great colleagues but 
even better friends. Finally, Kathy Anderson was a pillar not just for me but 
for all graduate students in the department—a source of information, guid-
ance, strategy, and warmth. 
 Two separate sojourns at the Harvard Kennedy School, one in 2011–12 
and another in 2014–15, helped me complete this book manuscript. At Har-
vard, I received valuable mentorship from Sean Lynn-Jones, Martin Malin, 
Steve Miller, and Stephen Walt, while Susan Lynch taught me the true 
meaning of administrative effi ciency. I was also surrounded by some of the 
best and brightest in IR and security studies. I especially learned from, and 
enjoyed the company of, Aisha Ahmad, Michael Beckley, Sarah Bush, Jen-
nifer Dixon, Trevor Findlay, Kelly Greenhill, Jennifer Keister, Peter Krause, 
Josh Shrifi nson, and Melissa Willard-Foster. 
 Since arriving at George Mason University in 2012, I have received tre-
mendous support from leaders in my academic unit, whether it was Pris-
cilla Regan at the erstwhile Department of Public and International Affairs, 
or Ming Wan and Mark Rozell at the Schar School of Policy and Govern-
ment. Each of them has done everything possible to help me conduct and 
disseminate research. My GMU colleagues such as Colin Dueck, Mike Hun-
zeker, Mark Katz, Greg Koblentz, and Ed Rhodes in IR, or Bassam Haddad, 
Mariely Lopez-Santana, Peter Mandaville, Eric McGlinchey, Robert 
McGrath, Matt Scherer, and Jennifer Victor from the school at large, have 
helped create a fi rst-rate research environment and made me feel at home. I 
have also been fortunate to have the likes of Janice Cohen and other staff 
ensure that I am never  too confused about administrative procedures. 
 Aside from those at Chicago, Harvard, and George Mason, several 
friends and colleagues kindly read drafts of chapters, offered critiques, and 
pointed ways forward. I am grateful for the time and attention of Christo-
pher Clary, Arman Grigoryan, Umair Javed, Shashank Joshi, Sameer Lal-
wani, Janet Lewis, Farooq Nomani, Paul Poast, Shahid Saeed, and Niloufer 
Siddiqui. I owe an especially weighty debt to Robert Art, Kathleen Cun-
ningham, Harris Mylonas, and Manny Teitelbaum, who attended my book 
workshop in the fall of 2014 and set me on the track I needed to be on; their 
fi ngerprints, I hope they can see, are all over this book. Audiences at the 
annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, the Interna-
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tional Studies Association, and the Midwest Political Science Association, 
as well as seminars at Chicago, Harvard, Lehigh, MIT, Tufts, and USIP, 
played a crucial role in hammering my ideas into shape. 
 Research for this book led me to talk to and learn from many people, not 
just scholars in my fi eld. I cannot possibly list each of my interviewees here, 
not least because some spoke off the record, but I want to underline how 
crucial each one of those conversations was, and how immensely grateful I 
am to all the journalists, analysts, students, academics, artists, politicians, 
party workers, ex-cops, ex-soldiers, bureaucrats, businessmen, diplomats, 
negotiators, and activists who made time to talk to me. Having my world-
view and scholarship shaped by those infi nitely more knowledgeable was 
one of the most rewarding experiences of writing this book. Alongside 
these interviews, my archival work in the periodicals room at the Library of 
Congress in Washington, DC, as well as the National Archives in College 
Park, Maryland, could not have been possible without the patience and 
kindness of the staff. I never felt more like a scholar than when I was at the 
LOC or the archives. 
 Transforming this book from an imperfect submission to a less-imperfect 
publication was entirely down to the tireless efforts of the reviewers and 
editors at Cornell University Press. I am especially grateful to the anony-
mous reviewers whose incisive and careful criticisms helped me deliver a 
signifi cantly better scholarly product. I also consider myself very fortunate 
to have had the opportunity to work with Roger Haydon and experience 
fi rsthand his patience, aid, and responsiveness, while Karen Hwa’s edito-
rial attention left me both deeply impressed and soundly confi dent that my 
work was in good hands. As a fi rst-time author, I could not have asked for 
a better team to work, or be affi liated, with. 
 Finally, this book simply would not have been possible without the love 
and support of my family. For as long as I can remember, Amma and Abba 
have emphasized the value of education. They gave me everything. Abid, 
my brother, and Maheen, my sister-in-law, are our family’s rocks, regard-
less of how many waves crash into them. My wife, Insiya, is the strongest 
person I know. No matter how much, or how many times, I wanted to quit, 
she would not let me. She is my best friend and my whole world, and this 
book exists only because I had her to lean on for the entire time I wrote it. 
 And then there is my brother Asim. No one was prouder of me. He 
painted, he said, to create what it is he wanted to see, to fi ll an absence in 
the world. But what of the void he left? I dedicate this book to his memory, 
crushed that he will never read it. 





 Ins and Outs of Separatist War 
 On the night of March 25, 1971, thousands of soldiers fanned out in Dhaka 
and other population centers of East Pakistan, the Pakistan military intent 
on crushing the Bengali movement for independence. Operation Search-
light targeted political leaders, students and radicals, unarmed civilians, 
even women and children. Soldiers attacked universities, raided news-
paper offi ces, and wiped out entire villages. The Pakistan military’s brutal 
repression, designed to keep East Pakistan within the bounds of the state, 
accomplished precisely the opposite: a grinding nine-month civil war, 
resulting in the deaths of many hundreds of thousands and the birth of an 
independent Bangladesh.  1  
 Just two decades later, the world witnessed a very different divorce. Slo-
vaks in what was then Czechoslovakia began clamoring for their own state, 
making their preferences clear in the 1992 election. Rather than use force, 
however, Czech politicians and leaders politely stepped aside in the face of 
Slovak nationalism and negotiated the secession of the Slovak Republic 
without a single shot being fi red.  2  In contrast to the extremely high levels of 
violence that characterize other separatist disputes, the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia was almost bizarrely peaceful. 
 A puzzle then presents itself: why do some states resist independence-
seeking movements with repression and violence—such as Sri Lanka in its 
northern Tamil areas and the Ottoman Empire in Armenia—while others 
respond with a metaphorical shrug of the shoulders and territorial conces-
sions, seen in the Velvet Divorce of Czechoslovakia or the separation of 
Norway from Sweden early in the twentieth century? Moreover, why do 
we see variation  within states as they calibrate their responses to various 
independence movements? For instance, why did the Indian state treat 
Kashmiri separatism more harshly than secessionism in Assam in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and why was it more violent in Punjab after 1987 than before? 
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Why deal with some secessionists with the proverbial pen, others with 
the all-too-literal gun? In this book, I explain states’ particular strategies—
chosen from a menu of options, ranging from negotiations and concessions, 
to policing and counterinsurgency, to large-scale violence and repression—
when dealing with separatist movements. 
 I argue that the external security implications of a secessionist move-
ment determine a state’s strategy, guiding whether, and how much, it 
coerces separatists. The choice of coercion turns on the state’s fear of 
future war, or lack thereof. Future war worries states because secession 
negatively alters the balance of power, with respect to both the secession-
ist ethnic group and existing state rivals. The ethnic group poses a greater 
threat to the state after secession than before because of the military, eco-
nomic, demographic, and legal benefi ts of statehood. Meanwhile, existing 
states pose a greater threat after the redrawing of a state’s borders because 
its loss of territory and population axiomatically mean it possesses less 
material power than before. These large and rapid power shifts set up a 
commitment problem: why risk graver threats tomorrow if the state is 
stronger today? As such, if a state fears future war, it will adopt coercion 
against the secessionists to foreclose the possibility of such threats. Con-
versely, sanguinity about the future is necessary for the state to consider 
peaceful concessions, including the granting of full independence. 
Whether a state coerces separatists, then, depends on whether it believes 
it will face future war, which in turn depends on two factors. With respect 
to the seceded ethnic group, the state concludes future war is likely if 
there is a deep identity division between the group and the central state. 
With respect to the existing rivals, the state assesses future war as likely if 
its regional neighborhood has a militarized history, marked by confl ict 
and war. 
 If the state chooses coercion based on either of these “trip wires,” the 
extent of third-party support for the secessionists determines how much 
violence the state employs, for both materialist and emotional reasons. 
Materially, external backing makes the rebel movement stronger, increasing 
the amount of violence required to defeat it. Emotionally, deep alliances 
with rivals of the state can lead to pathological violence, fueled by a sense 
of betrayal. External security, then, is key to understanding both whether, 
and how much, states coerce secessionists. 
 Why We Need a Theory of Secessionist Confl ict 
 Most wars today are civil wars, and most civil wars are fought between 
central governments, on the one hand, and ethno-nationalist groups 
seeking autonomy or independence, on the other. In the last seven decades, 
there have been about twice as many nationalist civil wars (ninety-fi ve) as 
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interstate wars of any kind (forty-six),  3  leading to the conclusion that such 
wars are the “chief source of violence in the world today.”  4  Indeed, between 
1946 and 2005, the world saw, on average, over twenty-fi ve such confl icts in 
any given year.  5  
 Even within the general category of civil wars, separatist confl icts are 
deadliest.  6  The primary distinction between so-called ideological and 
secessionist civil wars is that the latter feature an ethnic and territorial com-
ponent, in which borders are contested.  7  The central question fought over 
in ideological wars is: which groups are in power? The corresponding ques-
tion in separatist wars is: which groups are in the state? Peacefully resolv-
ing either is a challenging task, but on average, separatist wars tend to last 
longer.  8  Additionally, they occur slightly more frequently than ideological 
civil wars.  9  The bottom line is that if scholars and analysts are interested in 
explaining confl ict in international politics, they could do worse than begin 
with secessionist violence, “one of the central puzzles surrounding civil 
war,”  10  or indeed war more generally. 
 War, it goes without saying, is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, 
and explaining its trajectory over time is a herculean task. The challenge in 
studying war—indeed in social science more generally—lies in drawing 
general lessons about a phenomenon that hinges on a series of contingent 
factors. We make grand pronouncements about the lessons of World War II, 
but would we understand the pitfalls of aggressive expansionism differ-
ently had Hitler simply obeyed his generals and advanced straight to Mos-
cow upon reaching the Dvina and Dnieper rivers, rather than toward 
Ukraine and Leningrad? Alternatively, would we remember the Great War 
as exemplifying trench warfare had the Germans wheeled east rather than 
west of Paris in the early stages of the Schlieffen Plan’s execution, exposing 
their fl ank to the French? The overarching point, one that luminaries from 
Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have noted, is that war is a brutally complex pro-
cess, and theorizing about its dynamics is devilishly diffi cult. Conse-
quently, one needs a simplifying approach, and the one I adopt in this book 
is to focus on the critical junctures in the process that is war.  11  Specifi cally, 
I pay special attention to how states respond to separatists at what I term 
“secessionist moments,” when a group’s secessionism is made explicit to 
the central state. 
 I defi ne secessionism as demands by an ethno-nationalist group for either 
independence from, or signifi cant regional autonomy within, a modern 
nation-state.  12  There are two main reasons we would want to cast our defi -
nitional net to catch both “full” secessionist as well as regional autonomist 
movements. First, movements often vacillate between demands for state-
hood and autonomy based on short-term tactical considerations.  13  Second, 
gaining signifi cant autonomy, such as when a region has its own police and 
military forces, or independent economic policy-making power, often 
proves a very long step toward establishing statehood.  14  Thus state 
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decision makers—and scholars analyzing them—should treat demands for 
independence as essentially synonymous with those for signifi cant 
autonomy. 
 A secessionist moment is when an ethno-nationalist group’s demands 
are expressed in no uncertain terms to the central government. Such seces-
sionist moments can take the form, among others, of an ethnic or regional-
ist political party winning a landslide election victory; a massive rally, riot, 
or demonstration that compels fence-sitters to choose sides in favor of those 
demanding independence; or an assassination, murder, or kidnapping that 
unites the opposition. A secessionist moment, at bottom, is when an ethno-
nationalist group’s demands have crystallized into a widely held collective 
desire for signifi cantly greater autonomy or independence. It forces the 
incumbent government to make a decision: how do we respond to this? 
 It is that decision which I investigate. The reason for this focus is that 
states themselves determine to a large extent—and certainly to a larger 
extent than the ethno-nationalists—whether a secessionist struggle will be 
peaceful, violent, or genocidal. About half (75/163, or 46 percent) of all 
secessionist movements lead to full-blown war.  15  In other situations, states 
use lighter forms of coercion. In yet others, they may not use force at all. 
The range of actions available to states, owing to their institutional, legal, 
political, and military power, is simply wider than it is for nonstate actors. 
This is not to say that the preferences, constraints, tactics, and goals of the 
secessionist group are unimportant.  16  Rather, I claim simply that how 
states respond initially at secessionist moments has great import for how 
those secessionist movements proceed. If they offer negotiations or conces-
sions, there is little likelihood that the secessionists will escalate to more 
violence. If they respond with violence, odds are the secessionists will too, 
setting a spiral in motion. Even the category of “violence” is much too 
wide. States can use largely discriminate or largely indiscriminate tactics; 
they can use strategies that rely more on the military than the police or vice 
versa, each with its own set of implications for a confl ict’s trajectory. Thus 
we can learn a great deal about the outbreak and development of ethno-
nationalist civil wars by understanding states’ decision-making at these 
secessionist moments. And, in turn, we can learn a great deal about states’ 
decision-making by examining the external security implications of the 
secessionist movement. 
 My argument that the international system exerts a tremendous pull on 
state strategy against secessionists rests on two core insights in interna-
tional relations (IR). First, the international environment has systematic 
effects on states’ domestic politics.  17  Second, and more directly, states mired 
in security rivalries worry a great deal about shifts in the balance of power.  18  
Indeed, as I emphasize throughout this book, the mere potential for shifts 
in the future balance of power can cause war.  19  
INS AND OUTS OF SEPARATIST WAR
5
 This theory builds on the explosion in research on civil war in the last 
two decades in IR, comparative politics, and security studies. Generally 
speaking, civil war researchers exploring violence break down into three 
camps: those who focus on structural conditions, others who concentrate 
on rebels and insurgents, and yet others who examine the state, as I do. 
Each type of scholarship is crucial to understand the whole picture of vio-
lence in civil wars. 
 Structural arguments point to factors correlated with the incidence and 
dynamics of civil war. These studies identify the broad patterns of internal 
confl ict, explaining which types of states and territories are most likely to 
experience such wars and why actors’ incentives in such contexts often 
encourage them to use violence.  20  Scholars of rebels and insurgents, mean-
while, study why their use of violence may vary across time and space. For 
instance, some have argued that civil wars that feature opportunist fi ght-
ers, motivated by the promise of a share of natural resources or signifi cant 
state sponsorship, are more likely to see indiscriminate violence than those 
that are fought by more ideologically committed fi ghters, since the latter 
are better placed to practice internal discipline.  21  Others argue that the 
resources on offer are not singularly determinative; rather, the precise 
social-organizational context in which insurgents enjoy resource endow-
ments determines their use of violence.  22  Still others examine how move-
ments, organizations, and insurgencies can splinter and how such internal 
splits can generate violence.  23  Notably, even these scholars that focus on 
the rebel side of the civil war equation underline the importance of the 
state, particularly in the most gruesome confl icts.  24  For their part, scholars 
who focus on states offer different explanations for the circumstances 
under which states become intensely violent. Some point to state despera-
tion and a lack of viable alternatives as factors that push states to victimize 
large numbers of people.  25  Others argue that states “see” certain spaces 
and peoples in particular ways that render some more prone to violence 
than others.  26  Yet others investigate the role democratic institutions play in 
curtailing repression against citizens.  27  
 Within this broad area of civil war research, several scholars have 
attempted to theorize state response to secessionism, my central explana-
tory task in this book. This research, however, overwhelmingly focuses on 
domestic factors. One dominant school of thought explains the reaction(s) 
of states to ethno-nationalists with reference to the concepts of reputation, 
signaling, and deterrence.  28  Scholars from this school argue that by fi ghting 
hard against the ethno-nationalist group du jour, and therefore acquiring 
“hard” reputations, governments can deter future would-be nationalists 
from even trying to secede.  29  This theory expects ethnically heterogeneous 
states to fi ght harder than relatively homogenous—especially binational—
states because the former’s relative diversity implies a greater number of 
potential secessionists that need to be deterred. 
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 While logical and a substantial fi rst step in the systematic study of seces-
sionist confl ict, the reputation argument has three main fl aws. First, the evi-
dence in its favor is mixed; some large-n statistical results are more 
supportive of this argument than others.  30  Second, the reputation argument 
underpredicts violence in binational states. While the absence of “other” 
groups for the state to deter would lead theorists to expect exceedingly 
peaceful measures by the state, as seen in Canada’s or Czechoslovakia’s 
confrontations with secessionist minorities,  31  Sri Lanka and Israel are bina-
tional too. Third and most important, it struggles to explain internal 
variation in state response to secessionism because its independent 
variable—states’ demographic profi le—does not change but the outcome—
peace versus violence—does. This is problematic because the vast majority 
(136/163, or 83 percent) of secessionist movements took place in a state 
experiencing multiple movements. Furthermore, of those 33 “multiple 
movement” states, 19 (58 percent) sometimes used violence and sometimes 
did not, leaving aside even fi ner distinctions within the category of “vio-
lence.” Internal variation is a big slice of the separatist violence pie.  32  
 More recent research has argued that the internal structure of states 
affects how they respond to self-determination movements. One view is 
that the number of “veto factions” within a state—those factions that can 
veto policy change—constrains which states can offer concessions to move-
ments and which cannot. Because states are “consensus-building,” conces-
sions can occur only when all relevant factions agree on their advisability. 
Large numbers of veto players are likely to result in internal deadlock, leav-
ing the state unable to offer concessions. But, interestingly, even low num-
bers of veto factions make states less likely to offer concessions. The 
argument forwarded is that a state with few veto factions is a less credible 
bargainer in the eyes of self-determination movements, and as a result, it 
foresees that such groups will not place any trust in concessions it offers. 
Therefore, it does not make any concessions in the fi rst place.  33  Thus there is 
a proverbial sweet spot of veto factions—about fi ve—where concessions 
from states are most likely.  34  In other situations, either the state cannot offer 
concessions, or believing that ethnic groups will not accept them as credible 
chooses not to do so.  35  
 Though the focus on the internal politics and factionalization of states 
and movements is valuable and a signifi cant advance in confl ict studies, 
this analysis too ignores the role of geopolitics. More important, while the 
internal structures of self-determination groups assuredly are important 
determinants of the state opting for concessions or war,  36  the relationship 
between states’ internal structures and their strategies seems murkier, both 
empirically and theoretically. Empirically, even scholars favoring this argu-
ment admit to the more limited effects of the internal structures of states 
relative to that of groups and concede that their qualitative evidence says 
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little about the role of veto factions in contributing to state strategies.  37  This 
lack of evidence on the causal mechanisms connecting veto factions to out-
comes is made more troubling by the logical problems in the theory con-
necting the two. While one can easily accept why large numbers of veto 
factions, and the attendant potential for internal deadlock, may make con-
cessions more diffi cult,  38  it is diffi cult to see why a low number of veto fac-
tions is similarly damaging to the prospect of concessions.  39  Why would a 
unitary or centralized state hesitate to make an offer of concessions simply 
because a group might deem such an offer untrustworthy, a suspicion 
based on nothing more than the number of veto factions within the state?  40  
What would be the cost of having such an offer rejected? Is it even reason-
able to expect state leaders to make such fi ne-tuned calculations, whereby 
they choose to forego offers of concessions they would have otherwise 
made because they believe the movement, itself deciding between whether 
the state has three or fi ve or eight veto factions, would deem such an offer 
incredible if the number falls below a certain threshold? As such, the claim 
that there exists a curvilinear relationship between the number of veto fac-
tions within a state and the likelihood that it offers concessions requires 
further substantiation.  41  
 Finally, some scholars marry an emphasis on internal institutions to 
the reputation logic, tracing how the nature of a state’s administrative 
boundaries determines its response to separatists. The claim is that states 
are liable to allow peaceful secession to regions that represent a “unique” 
administrative type. By contrast, territories that share administrative 
status with others could instigate a domino effect were they granted con-
cessions; such secessionist regions thus see resistance from states.  42  
While an important contribution to the debate on separatist violence, 
this argument’s treatment of the breakup of colonial empires and mod-
ern nation-states as one and the same is problematic. Colonial powers 
may have split their empires into various units, such that France admin-
istered Algeria differently than West Africa, but countries in the modern 
era are more uniform in how they divide territory, with just one major 
administrative line creating either provinces, regions, states, or cantons. 
Since states do not generally create differentiated administrative bound-
aries as empires did, this argument is less applicable to modern separat-
ist confl ict than the independence struggles of native nationalists against 
colonial rule.  43  
 While this literature makes valuable and telling contributions, then, it 
leaves out a huge factor: the external security ramifi cations of secession, 
and how they condition a state’s behavior. More generally, recent civil war 
research has tended to ignore geopolitics, focusing instead on explaining 
the dynamics of violence in specifi c local contexts.  44  Such inattention is a 
mistake. Because security is the most important international goal of 
INTRODUCTION
8
states,  45  we miss a great deal by ignoring the bigger picture. Secession dra-
matically alters the international balance of power facing the rump state in 
very negative ways, which cannot help but color state responses to separat-
ists. Establishing a new border would imbue a possibly threatening ethnic 
group with the considerable material, social, and institutional power that 
accompanies statehood.  46  As evinced by the Ethiopia-Eritrea and Russia-
Georgia wars in the last two decades, along with grave tension between 
neighbors such as Kosovo and Serbia or Sudan and South Sudan or Russia 
and Ukraine, war between a rump and a seceded state remains a distinct 
possibility. Additionally, losing substantial territory and population at a 
stroke considerably weakens a state relative to existing state rivals, who can 
act opportunistically against the weakened state. Rather than face these 
(threats of) war against strengthened rivals, the state is better off using 
coercion. Even the calibration of how much coercion to employ depends on 
an external factor, third-party support, since such backing makes rebels 
stronger on the battlefi eld and decision-makers and security forces more 
emotional. This typology of coercion—from policing to militarization to 
collective repression—brings nuance to the view held by most scholars that 
states merely choose between peaceful concessions and violent denials 
when dealing with separatists. 
 Incorporating the external environment in theoretical accounts of state 
strategy to secessionism also seems reasonable given the ample attention 
it has received in related inquiries, especially in recent research on nation-
alism, ethnic confl ict, and the creation and destruction of state boundar-
ies.  47  For instance, scholars have found that external conditions are crucial 
in explaining decisions to assimilate, accommodate, or exclude particular 
nations or ethnic groups from the political-social fabric of the state.  48  
Additionally, research has shown that ethnic cleansing is especially likely 
when rival states, in an effort to bring about changes to the territorial sta-
tus quo, form an alliance with an ethnic group on the territory they seek to 
win.  49  More generally, the international environment often determines 
how long and bloody a civil war will be.  50  This is especially true when it 
comes to the involvement of third parties, who upon deciding to intervene 
in a secessionist confl ict,  51  irrevocably change the dynamics of such wars. 
Under such circumstances, the civil war becomes “nested” under an 
unstable regional or systemic confl ict, making it more intractable.  52  Civil 
wars that feature third parties are longer, more intense, and less prone to 
negotiated settlements.  53  In part, this is because third-party support for 
rebels can affect the calculations of the ethno-nationalist groups and their 
leaders. Insurgents will become emboldened and radicalized if they per-
ceive that, due to the interventions of outside powers, the balance of 
power between them and the central governments will shift. Scholars 
have shown that even the mere prospect of support can lead such groups 
to adopt more extreme demands.  54  Finally, the external environment also 
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plays a signifi cant role in the (re)drawing of borders on the map,  55  the pre-
cise outcome secessionists hope to accomplish. Secessionists’ ultimate suc-
cess in forming states often depends on international relations,  56  and such 
states do not become fully sovereign unless they are recognized by the 
international community as such—recognition which is contingent on 
great power politics.  57  
 The importance of international factors allows us to gain greater insights 
on separatist confl icts both past and present. Consider the Israel-Palestine 
dispute (chapter 5), a diplomatic and security problem festering for decades. 
My argument sheds light on how a “liberal” democracy such as Israel can 
go to the lengths it does to deny statehood to the Palestinians. The hostility 
of its Arab state neighbors historically, combined with an essentializing of 
Palestinians that subsumes them under a larger “Arab” identity, means that 
Israel’s decision makers forestall Palestinian statehood, using as much coer-
cion as necessary to do so. Similarly underlining the signifi cance of geopo-
litical forces, Sudan and Ethiopia supported violent separatism on each 
other’s territory for decades, while the long-running Nagorno-Karabakh 
dispute is essentially an internal confl ict in Azerbaijan wrapped within its 
interstate rivalry with Armenia. 
 In addition to clarifying such disputes, this book makes several empirical 
contributions. First, unlike domestic-variable arguments, the theory I pre-
sent here is adept at explaining internal variation in states’ treatment of eth-
nic nationalists. Why might a state such as Pakistan treat Bengalis differently 
from Baloch in their respective quests for independence, merely two years 
apart? Why would India employ more brutal, indiscriminate tactics in 
Kashmir than Assam despite facing secessionist movements in both states 
at the same time? My theory can also account for variation over time: why 
the Ottoman Empire would treat Armenian nationalists differently in 1915 
than in 1908, or why Sikh separatism in Punjab provoked more violence 
after 1987 than in 1985. Such internal variation is of enormous consequence 
because most secessionist movements (83 percent) take place in states 
experiencing more than one such movement, and in turn, most of these 
“multiple movement” states treat certain groups differently from others. 
Arguments that center on, say, ethnic heterogeneity struggle to explain why 
a state with an unchanging demographic profi le may behave differently at 
different times against different groups. 
 Second, the ability to explain cases of extremely violent separatist con-
fl icts is a strength of my theory. Most of the thirty-three cases of “intense” 
separatist warfare involve some external component.  58  In Africa, both the 
Nigeria-Biafra and Ethiopia-Eritrea confl icts featured high levels of sup-
port from regional and global powers.  59  The Sudan–South Sudan war had 
strong external reverberations not just because of Ethiopia’s intervention, 
but also because the seceded state and its former host are on the verge of 
outright war. The bloodiest separatist confl icts in South Asia—Indian 
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Kashmir, northern Sri Lanka, and East Pakistan—had signifi cant geopoliti-
cal implications, as we shall see later in this book. Long, deadly fi ghts 
between the Kurds and various states in the Middle East, but especially 
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, have been marked by fears of external wrangling. 
My argument attempts to make sense of why separatist confl icts that have 
an external angle to them are prone to extremely high levels of violence. 
 Third, the role of geopolitics in civil confl ict is not especially well cap-
tured by existing research, much of it characterized by large-n statistical 
studies based on a few popular datasets. For instance, the widely used 
PRIO Armed Confl ict dataset considers civil wars “internationalized” only 
when a state fashions its troops in support of domestic rebels; it is impossi-
ble given these data to examine the effects of more limited support, such as 
fi nancial or military aid. I bring a fi ner-grained and more nuanced under-
standing of how external support can affect states’ decision-making. 
 Focusing on external security does not just benefi t academic research of 
separatist war but can also serve as a useful guiding principle for policy-
makers interested in curtailing the death and destruction that such con-
fl icts usually leave in their wake. Understanding the factors that cause 
some governments to address secessionist demands on the battlefi eld, as 
opposed to the negotiating table, is crucial to peace building. Such an 
understanding would allow interested parties to pursue strategies designed 
to keep the peace between ethnic groups in a state, and promote stability 
more generally. Although the international community is often reluctant to 
interfere in civil confl icts because of concerns about political and legal sov-
ereignty,  60  my research suggests that the roots of fi ghting within borders 
often lie outside those borders. This implies that the international commu-
nity can play a signifi cant role in these confl icts by allaying the fears of 
states facing separatist movements and providing them with reassurance 
of their security. 
 For instance, the international community can make the shift in the bal-
ance of power attendant on secessionism more palatable to the rump state 
by providing defensive guarantees and pledging protection from its mili-
tary rivals in the future. The international community could tie the promise 
of security guarantees to good behavior in its dealings with the minority, as 
part of an explicit quid pro quo. For instance, if the United States had prom-
ised Pakistan military aid and a security partnership in 1971, in return for a 
more measured and less violent policy against the Bengalis, we might never 
have witnessed the genocide. A contemporary example of such a policy 
would be American military support of Israel being made contingent on 
more concessions to the Palestinian independence movement, while pro-
viding explicit security guarantees to Israel against state threats, including 
those from Palestine. A further implication of my study is that as a seces-
sionist confl ict brews in a particular country, the international community 
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must restrain the state’s geopolitical rivals. These rivals must make explicit 
and credible guarantees that they will not join forces with the secessionists 
in any meaningful way, either today or in the near future. This will aid in 
placating the state and make it less fearful of “encirclement,” which often 
drives the most vicious of responses. A present-day example of such an ide-
alistic policy would be to pressure both India and Pakistan to cease mate-
rial support for Baloch and Kashmiri separatists respectively. 
 The research presented here, then, is highly relevant to policymakers 
who wish to curtail civil violence. In a nutshell, I suggest that the interna-
tional community must place front and center the motivations of central 
governments repressing secessionists. It also implies that, as with most con-
fl icts, the time to contain the confl ict is before it actually erupts: by guaran-
teeing the security of the state in the future, the international community 
can protect the victims of the state in the present. The overarching lesson is: 
third-party involvement would be most useful in separatist confl icts if it is 
(a) early, before hostilities have taken place; (b) made contingent, such that 
exhortations for better treatment of ethnic minorities go hand in hand with 
security (and possibly other) cooperation with the host state, and (c) aimed 
at dissuading support for the movement by global or regional rivals of the 
host state. 
 Research Design 
 In this book, I deal with secessionist movements in the twentieth century. 
I consider any movement as falling within the scope of my argument if it 
sought to escape the control of a larger state by establishing a state of its 
own or an autonomous region. There were 163 such movements after 1946, 
a start date chosen because most datasets on political violence have little 
reliability before that date. I ignore decolonization movements, which 
I believe should not be confl ated with secessionist movements in modern 
nation-states. Any anticolonial movement that was geographically cut off 
from its target by a substantial body of water,  61  as was the case for African 
and Asian movements against British, French, Portuguese, and Dutch rule, 
was not considered. With geographic contiguity in mind, I include in the 
dataset the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which some scholars consider 
an “empire,”  62  and conduct a detailed examination of the Ottoman Empire’s 
treatment of its Armenian minority (chapter 5). 
 methodology 
 As social scientists have discussed, case-study research has many virtues, 
including greater confi dence in the theory’s internal validity, a greater 
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attentiveness to causal mechanisms, a deeper and more detailed accounting 
of empirical variation, and appropriateness for questions for which data 
and information are incommensurable across a population of cases  63  —
assuredly a characteristic of separatist confl icts, some of which are signifi -
cantly more opaque than others. It is for these reasons that my primary 
method of empirical research is historical. Much of the literature on civil 
war and secessionist violence employs quantitative methods and large-n 
datasets. Such research is not especially adept at showing causal mecha-
nisms at work. As mine is a theory of decision-making, it is imperative to 
get the causal mechanism right, and this can be done only with close his-
torical examination of cases of secessionism. 
 I employ the “most-similar” method, by which a researcher studies a pair 
(or more) of cases which are similar in all respects except the variables of 
interest.  64  In general, this method results in greater confi dence in the theory 
if, within the pairwise comparison, there is wide variation in the indepen-
dent and dependent variables and all other dimensions are highly similar.  65  
At times, scholars can divide a single longitudinal case into two subcases, a 
technique known as “before-after research design,” as long as care is taken 
to ensure only one signifi cant variable changes at the moment that divides 
the two periods.  66  Combining this most similar method with process-
tracing allows us greater confi dence in the theory.  67  Process tracing is a 
method by which the researcher zooms in on the causal mechanisms link-
ing a hypothesized independent variable to an outcome. Causal mecha-
nisms are the “meat” of any theoretical argument; they are the processes 
and intervening variables through which an explanatory variable exerts its 
infl uence over the outcome in question.  68  Though there are valid varieties 
of process-tracing, the one I employ in this book is that of “analytic expla-
nation,” whereby historical narratives are couched in explicit theoretical 
terms.  69  Throughout these narratives, I emphasize both where my argu-
ment is consistent with the evidence as well as where it is contradicted by 
it, pointing to the importance of elements outside my theoretical frame-
work in a number of cases. After all, no one social scientifi c theory can 
explain all relevant aspects of major phenomena or events, and it is incum-
bent on careful researchers to be attentive to the importance of other vari-
ables and contingencies. 
 case selection 
 I choose to focus primarily on states experiencing more than one seces-
sionist movement, for two main reasons. The fi rst is methodological: choos-
ing multiple cases falling within one state, especially in narrowly 
circumscribed periods, gives us the best chance of fulfi lling the conditions 
of “most-similar” research design outlined above, since structural fac-
tors such as state wealth, institutional structure, and geography are likely 
INS AND OUTS OF SEPARATIST WAR
13
to be common across both movements. The second is substantive: a vast 
majority of secessionist movements take place in “multiple movement” 
states. An argument that can explain variation in response to secessionism 
in one state would be considered, all else equal, more powerful than those 
that suffer at the hands of the internal variation problem. 
Choosing individual cases to study from my larger universe of 163 move-
ments after 1946, as well notable pre–World War II movements, requires 
careful consideration. How is a particular case situated in the more general 
population? Is this case being used to infer a theory or test one? Is it estab-
lishing a theory’s range or its antecedent conditions?  70  
 To test my theory, I focus on South Asia. Specifi cally, I examine Pakistan’s 
reactions to Bengali and Baloch demands for independence in the 1970s in 
chapter 3, and India’s responses in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam in the 1980s 
and 1990s in chapter 4. Theories of secessionist violence have mostly 
been built on the experience of the Balkans and the Caucasus.  71  South Asia, 
generally speaking, has escaped the attention of scholars dealing with 
secessionism. This is a strange omission given each major state in South 
Asia—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—has experienced seces-
sionism, and in India and Pakistan’s cases, multiple movements across both 
space and time. One should endeavor to choose “typical” or “representa-
tive” cases,  72  and given that both South Asian neighbors are ethnically 
heterogeneous developing countries that have experienced multiple move-
ments, they fi t the bill. Furthermore, methodologists encourage cases with 
within-case diversity, encompassing the full range of values of the indepen-
dent and dependent variables.  73  South Asia displays this variation in my 
independent variable amply; certain separatist confl icts have an extremely 
relevant geopolitical component (Kashmir, East Pakistan), others less so 
(Balochistan, Punjab), and still others even less (Assam). As far as the 
dependent variable of state strategy is concerned, South Asia sees a wide 
range of state behavior,  74  sometimes within the same confl ict. Finally, by 
circumscribing my investigation in one region in one era—each of the con-
fl icts studied occurred between 1971 and 1991—I hold structural conditions 
such as levels of wealth, state development and capacity, institutional struc-
ture, and demography broadly constant, leading to a more rigorous identi-
fi cation of why states choose the policies they do against separatists. 
 Later in the book, I expand the case selection to include vastly different 
time periods, geographic locations, and types of state. This empirical sec-
tion is devoted to establishing the argument’s explanatory range. The wider 
the theory’s applicability across space, time, and context, the more confi -
dent we can be in its mechanisms. 
 I begin in chapter 5 with variation across time in the Ottoman treatment 
of its Armenian population between 1908 and 1915, when the Young Turk 
regime went from accommodating the Armenians in 1908 to seeking their 
wholesale forcible removal from Ottoman territory during World War I, 
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leading to genocide. As scholars have pointed out, “extreme” cases, or 
those where either or both of the independent and dependent variable are 
present in large quantities, have signifi cant methodological value. It is pre-
cisely because these observations lie far from the median that they prove so 
instructive.  75  The Ottoman case displays the largest variation in the depen-
dent variable in this book, with state strategy veering from the most peace-
ful, “negotiations and concessions,” to the most violent, “collective 
repression.” Second, because the Ottoman case was not one of a modern 
nation-state, as are most of the cases I consider in this book, but an empire 
in the midst of dissolution, its inclusion increases the breadth of the sample 
being tested. 
 Chapter 6 continues the theme of gauging the theory’s explanatory 
power in vastly different situations so that we can be confi dent that the 
argument “travels.” I begin with the interaction between Israel and Pales-
tinian nationalists, focusing especially on the fi rst intifada, for two main 
reasons. First, this dispute allows a direct comparison of my argument with 
its primary competitors, centering on reputation and institutions. As a 
binational state, one that is a wealthy, liberal democracy no less, Israel has 
no “other” ethnic communities than the Palestinians, and thus should be 
expected to not have any concerns about establishing a “tough” reputation 
to deter future independence movements. At the time of the Madrid and 
Oslo talks in the aftermath of the fi rst intifada ,  Israel was led by a center-left 
government with the support of Arab parties in the Knesset.  Consequently 
it should have had little need to resort to violence against Palestinians. My 
argument would predict the opposite, given Israel’s security concerns with 
the prospect of an independent Palestine. That is, Israel is a “most-likely” 
case my competitors—a case which is predicted to result in a certain out-
come, but does not  76  —made more signifi cant by the fact that my theory 
makes the opposite, and correct, prediction in this case. 
 I then investigate the Velvet Divorce separating Czechs and Slovaks at 
the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Norway-Sweden union 
in 1905. Generally, social scientists are “concerned not only with cases 
where something ‘happened,’ but also with cases where something did 
not.”  77  It is important that any theory of separatist confl ict address one or 
both of these cases, since they, as two of a handful of completely peaceful 
secessions of the twentieth century, occupy the extreme ends of the spec-
trum, just as the Armenian and Bengali genocides do. Choosing extreme 
cases only because they are extreme may strike some as violating the social 
science tenet to “not choose on the dependent variable.” However, quali-
tative scholars encourage choosing such extreme cases, as long as they 
are accompanied by cases that are more representative, because it allows 
for maximizing “variance on the dimension of interest.”  78  Without an 
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understanding of what factors led to relatively rare outcomes in these 
cases, it would be diffi cult to identify the necessary and suffi cient condi-
tions for peaceful separatism more generally.  79  
 Finally, I investigate the U.S. Civil War, even though it technically lies 
outside the data universe of my argument: it neither took place in the twen-
tieth century, nor was it, strictly speaking, a case of an ethnic group seeking 
independence. Nevertheless, the very fact that it does not fi t the profi le of 
the type of secessionist struggle I study makes it a useful litmus test: if my 
argument can account for elements of a dispute that lies outside its original 
scope conditions, we can gain even greater confi dence in its explanatory 
power. 
 The overall sample, then, consists of three states that experienced sepa-
ratism before World War II (the United States, Ottoman Empire, and Swe-
den) and four after (Pakistan, India, Czechoslovakia, and Israel). The cases 
feature each of authoritarian, democratic, monarchic, and imperial gover-
nance. Some are highly centralized states, others highly federalized. The 
geographic scope is similarly varied: I cover North America, Northern 
Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Most crucially, 
the sample contains each of the four major strategies I discuss, ranging 
from negotiations to limited war to genocide, leaving me with a great deal 
of material to test my argument. 
Table 1 Explaining case selection
Goal Case Methodological value
Testing the theory
Pakistan Variation in IV and DV across space 
(Bengal vs. Balochistan)
India Variation in IV and DV across space 
(Kashmir vs. Assam vs. Punjab) and across 
time (Punjab 1985 vs. post-1987)
Establishing explanatory 
range of the theory
Ottoman Empire Large variation in IV and DV across time 




Israel-Palestine “Most-likely” case for reputation 
argument




 The empirical material for this book is drawn from various sources, 
including more than 110 semistructured interviews I conducted in person 
with current and former political, diplomatic, and security offi cials; jour-
nalists and analysts; insurgents; and scholars and academics (or, for those 
interviewees in Europe, the Middle East, or South Asia, over the telephone 
or Skype). Additionally, I draw on tens of thousands of pages of diplomatic 
archives, primarily from American and British sources.  80  Daily newspaper 
archives, especially but not only of the  Assam Tribune ,  Chandigarh Tribune , 
Dawn ,  Kashmir Times , and Times of India , also proved invaluable.  81  In addi-
tion to these sources, I used other primary and secondary material, such as 
memoirs, interviews to the press, internal government memoranda con-
cerning secessionist confl icts, and detailed case studies in other disciplines 
such as history and sociology, and biographies. 
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 chapter 1 
 An External Security Theory of 
Secessionist Confl ict 
 When confronted by secessionists, a state can adopt a wide array of poli-
cies, from granting independence or major concessions, to resisting the 
nationalists’ demands with varying levels of violence. For states, the deci-
sion of how to respond to separatists is based on external security consider-
ations. At particular secessionist moments, central governments weigh the 
extent to which the group is an external threat, and that calculation of vul-
nerability determines the strategy the state adopts: the more threatened a 
state feels, the more violent it is.  1  
 At bottom, what drives a state’s decision-making is the large and imme-
diate shift in the balance of power that would accompany a change in its 
borders. If a secessionist group were to succeed in creating a new state, it 
would signifi cantly weaken the host state with respect to not one, but two 
potential external rivals. The fi rst actor to greatly benefi t vis-à-vis the 
former host state would be the secessionists. Formerly an ethnic group 
without a large polity, now one in control of a state, this actor would have 
greater capabilities to hurt the former host state, should it choose to do so. 
Second, successful secession would weaken the host state relative to its 
geopolitical rivals, since it would have lost signifi cant territory and popula-
tion, two crucial components of power. 
 When such large, rapid shifts in the balance of power are in the offi ng, 
states must be careful about accommodating secessionists. States should be 
especially wary of offering concessions to such groups if they foresee war 
with either the newly independent state or a geopolitical rival. Why allow 
the balance to shift unfavorably if one anticipates security threats in the 
future? The creation of a potentially hostile state, or war against an already-
existing state rival emboldened by the host state’s loss of territory and popu-
lation, are eventualities the host state is unwilling to countenance. To prevent 
such challenges to its external security, the state will fi ght the secessionists. 
 The factors that infl uence whether a state decrees future war likely, either 
against the ethnic group seeking independence, or regional state rival(s), 
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are crucial. There are two particularly noteworthy issues that affect this 
judgment. First, is the ethnic group’s identity opposed to the state’s national 
core? Second, how war prone is the state’s regional neighborhood? A state 
is sanguine about the security implications of secessionism only when it 
lives in a peaceful neighborhood and its national identity is not opposed to 
the separatists’. Such an optimistic, “postsecurity” environment is a neces-
sary condition for a state to consider a “negotiations and concessions” 
strategy. This strategy is aimed at satisfying, or satisifi cing, the ethno-
nationalists’ demands. If it succeeds, this strategy maintains the territorial 
integrity of the state at the cost of decentralization of certain powers and 
privileges to the regional nationalists. Even the worst-case scenario under 
this strategy—the separatists’ using piecemeal concessions to pave the way 
to independence—does not spell doom for the state, for it has little reason 
to fear the security consequences of a new neighbor. Either way, recourse to 
violence is deemed not necessary. 
 However, states are rarely confi dent enough about their future security 
for such generosity. More likely, in situations in which the state is either 
located in a relatively militarized part of the world, or it suffers a signifi cant 
identity division with the separatists, it would consider the possibility of 
border changes in more urgent, sometimes-apocalyptic, terms and attempt 
to forestall it with violence. In other words, the prospect of future war is a 
suffi cient condition for the state to use coercion. 
 Once a state turns to coercion, it calibrates just how much violence to 
employ based on how much support the separatists enjoy from its geopolit-
ical rivals. For both materialist and emotional reasons, more external support 
results in more repressive strategies. First, the higher the threat of military 
defeat, the more brutal states generally get.  2  Third-party support, by transfer-
ring “technologies of rebellion,” makes the movement a stronger fi ghting 
force, increasing the level of violence required to defeat it.  3  Second, external 
backing of the separatists by rivals of the state fuels emotional, pathological 
actions by both leaders and security forces, directed by a collective sense of 
betrayal. Third-party support pushes the state to climb the escalatory ladder, 
from what I term “policing” to “militarization” to “collective repression.” 
 The bottom line is that as perceived external threats to the state increase, 
so does the weight of the state’s response: more serious threats are dealt 
with more violently. The extent of the external threat, in turn, depends on 
the state’s evaluation of future war, either against the seceded state or an 
existing rival, and the degree of third-party support for the secessionists. 
 Setting up the Theory 
 My argument examines state strategy at secessionist moments. Though 
interesting, I do not consider the causes of, and route to, the secessionist 
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moment in the fi rst place.  4  Rather, I focus on states’ decision-making at the 
point at which an ethno-nationalist movement has made a demand or dec-
laration of independence or signifi cant autonomy. Such secessionist 
moments can take the form, among others, of an ethnic party winning an 
election; a massive rally, riot, or demonstration that compels fence-sitters to 
choose sides in favor of those demanding independence; or an assassina-
tion, murder, or kidnapping that unites the opposition. There may be some 
strategic bluffi ng at play regarding the movement’s true aims  5  —groups 
that would be satisfi ed with mere autonomy sometimes demand secession 
to set a high initial price; groups that ultimately desire secession sometimes 
demand autonomy to hide their goals—but either way, the central state is 
forced to sit up and take notice of its dissatisfi ed ethnic minority. My theory 
is aimed at deconstructing the state’s calculus at that precise moment. 
 To build the theory, I rely on three assumptions. First, I assume that actors 
are strategic and forward looking. This is a fairly common assumption 
made by social scientists, though it is not without its critics. At bottom, this 
assumption holds that all relevant actors possess a reservoir of information 
and beliefs from which they weigh costs and benefi ts in a crude but identi-
fi able way to help decide on which course of action is most suitable. Actors 
are not necessarily reasonable, intelligent, or accurate in their understand-
ings of the world, nor is it unlikely that “nonrationalist” feelings, such as 
racism and prejudice, interfere with their decision-making. Indeed, as we 
shall soon see, leaders often behave in response to visceral, emotional cues. 
I assert only that decision makers are strategic in their interactions with 
other individuals and groups, and seek to maximize net gains on behalf of 
whichever organization or state they represent. 
 Second, I assume that states are more powerful than substate actors. 
Because states can draw on the organizational, military, and economic 
capabilities that inhere in statehood, they can be characterized as being 
more powerful than minorities within their borders. “Small” can still beat 
“big”  6  —tactics, terrain, the balance of resolve, and the public support all 
matter a great deal in any armed confl ict—but, prima facie, the state would 
have to be favored in such a fi ght. Indeed, it is precisely the greater capa-
bilities that states possess that motivate minority groups to pay, at times, 
high costs to attain those capabilities. 
 Third, I treat states as “unitary” actors, a long-standing assumption in 
international relations (IR).  7  This assumption implies that when dealing 
with external threats, even when such threats happen to emanate from 
within their borders, states will act “as if” they are unifi ed entities. This is 
not to suggest the level of internal discord on policies is precisely zero. At 
times, governments are intensely divided into camps advocating different 
proposals to the problem of a separatist movement. However, at highly 
politicized moments—the start of wars, after a major attack, a deadly riot, a 
landslide electoral victory by an ethnic party—most decision makers will 
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“fall in line” and afford considerable leeway to top leaders. Even in democ-
racies such as India, Israel, the United States, and Czechoslovakia, domestic 
opponents fall lockstep behind executives at such times, to say nothing of 
authoritarian states like Pakistan or the Ottoman Empire, where crucial 
decisions are highly localized to one or a few actors. Because violence, or its 
threat, is inherently polarizing,  8  secessionist moments force domestic 
groups and factions to choose between the state and the secessionists, with 
the result that these groups invariably opt for the former. Notwithstanding 
tactical disagreements and opportunistic criticism, major and genuine dis-
agreements among government leaders during secessionist crises are 
rare—at least if evidence from South Asia to the Middle East to Europe is 
anything to go by. 
 More important, the unitary-actor assumption affords us analytical trac-
tion on the external environment. Allowing for all relevant factors to vary, 
as they assuredly do in the real world, makes for unwieldy theories. If one 
wants to examine how the external implications of separatism affect state 
strategy, it is advisable to simplify the domestic politics angle. For useful 
theory building, abstraction has to occur somewhere in the process—either 
domestic politics are assumed away and external relations analyzed (as 
I do), or vice versa (as others do).  9  
 Secessionism as an External Threat 
 War between a state and the one it was carved out of is a distinct possibility 
after secession. Consider the case of Ethiopia. In April 1993, Eritreans voted 
overwhelmingly for independence in a referendum. Rather than standing 
in their way, the Ethiopian government, tired from decades of confl ict, 
“welcomed” the prospect.  10  This bonhomie led to optimistic prognostica-
tions about the two countries’ ability and desire to live in peace in the 
future.  11  Such optimism was misplaced. In 1998, Eritrea attacked its former 
host state over a border dispute, a “stab in the back” to its erstwhile allies.  12  
The war was immensely costly, leading to the deaths of between 70,000 and 
200,000 people in two years, making it one of the deadliest interstate wars 
in recent history.  13  In Ethiopia, it exacerbated economic, power, and food 
crises.  14  Analysts have concerns about a similar trajectory with respect to 
the world’s newest state. After South Sudan was created via a referendum 
in which 99 percent of its residents voted for independence, tensions con-
cerning territory and oil wealth have led to fears of full-blown war between 
the two neighbors.  15  Other regions exhibit similar traits: Kosovo and Serbia 
have an icy relationship; Russia fought a war against Georgia less than two 
decades after the latter’s independence,  16  and recently invaded Ukraine. 
 Aside from confl icts against new neighbors, states also face the prospect 
of war against its geopolitical rivals, especially those in the region. If it 
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experiences secession, the state would lose territory and population. Such 
losses may embolden existing rivals to take advantage of the weakened 
state. For instance, thanks to substantial losses of land and people after its 
defeat in the Balkan wars in 1912, the Ottoman Empire was less able to 
withstand the exigencies of international security competition, evinced by 
its capitulation to Russian demands for Armenian reform, summed up in 
its Mandelstam Plan (chapter 4). 
 The threat of such wars, either against the seceded state or existing rivals, 
casts a foreboding shadow under which states must respond to separatist 
movements. Against this backdrop, states have to make relatively quick 
decisions about strategy at secessionist moments. They know that in the 
rough-and-tumble system of international politics, where actors have offen-
sive military capabilities and unknown intentions, and where states gener-
ally have nowhere to turn to when faced with crisis or peril, the price for not 
being adequately fearful of potential security threats can be prohibitive.  17  
 Consequently, states tread very carefully when dealing with separatism, 
with their overarching goal to ensure that their future security is not com-
promised. Most of all, states wish to avoid policies that could sow their 
own demise. If a state considers secessionists’ success problematic for its 
future security, it would do whatever necessary to forestall an adverse 
shift in the balance of power. Why grant concessions and allow potential 
threats, whether existing states or new neighbors, to become stronger? At 
bottom, this means that a state fearful of future security threats is better 
off using coercion, not accommodation, against secessionist movements. 
As a result, optimistic states will systematically treat secessionists better 
than fearful ones. 
 I elaborate on each leg of the theoretical argument below, beginning with 
the fi rst step: why secession represents a signifi cant shift in the balance of 
power. 
 secession and the balance of power 
 In IR, power is generally understood as being based on material capabili-
ties. These include a state’s military forces, its wealth, the size and talent—
measured by education standards, perhaps—of its population, and its 
position of technological advancement. One prominent study of IR theory 
states simply that power is “based on tangible assets.”  18  Setting basic defi -
nitional issues aside, what is important for our purposes is that in the inter-
national system, states uniquely possess these material capabilities on an 
aggregate level. 
 Secession changes the balance of power between the ethno-nationalists 
and their former host state, making the latter more vulnerable to attack. 
The balance of power shifts because attaining a state magnifi es the capabili-
ties of any social group controlling it, mainly for three reasons. 
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 First, control of a state generally leads to control of the organized means 
of violence within it. Charles Tilly has famously written on the relationship 
between state building and war making, a connection vital to under-
standing the processes at work here.  19  What he terms the “state’s tendency 
to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion,” is a key element of the 
shift in the balance of power.  20  After all, if winning a state translates into the 
presence of an organized military, and an organized military is an impor-
tant marker of capabilities, then the creation of a new state has enormous 
implications for the power of a group controlling it. Often, one of the key 
proximate causes of an ethnic group seeking its own state is that it is sys-
tematically excluded from military recruitment more generally, and offi cer 
positions in particular, in the multinational state. This leaves the group vul-
nerable to intimidation and control by forces often hostile to it. Conversely, 
there are tremendous advantages, both with respect to internal and external 
rivals, to gaining greater representation in the armed forces of a state. If an 
ethnic group can essentially come to dominate a state’s military, it can 
better direct coercion against opponents. 
 This switch—from being systematically excluded from a state’s military 
to essentially running one’s own—is crucial to understanding the shift in 
the balance of power between the host state and the ethno-nationalist group 
potentially forming its own state. Suddenly, the ethnic group can stand up 
to its former host state in ways that were simply impossible when it was 
marginalized as a stateless group. Even if the new state’s military is weaker 
than that of the rump state, the difference in strength between the two 
actors is now one of degree, not one of kind. 
 The second component of the shift in the balance of power is economic. 
Within this category, there are two central elements: domestic economic 
policy and foreign economic policy. With respect to domestic policy, the 
ethno-nationalist group in control of a new state now faces incentives such 
that what’s good for the group is good for the state, and vice versa. Previ-
ously, in the unifi ed state, coalitional politics, racism, and intergroup rivalry 
could have resulted in the sidelining of a particular ethnic group from eco-
nomic growth or, in a logically equivalent way, economic losses could have 
been more than proportionately suffered by the group in question. With 
their own state, such concerns are no longer valid. The ethnic group can 
freely use its state to extract resources from its population in the form of 
taxes as well as fashion certain economic policies such as industrialization, 
the construction of dams and irrigation canals, and targeted investment in 
certain sectors of the economy.  21  
 This is not to suggest that intergroup rivalry vanishes with the creation of 
a new state—political scientists have shown that the salience of particular 
ethnic and political cleavages changes with the redrawing of institutional 
and geographical boundaries  22  —but the particular ethnic group as a whole 
is no longer in danger of being unfairly targeted with respect to economic 
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gains and losses. Economic nationalism can now take over, in every sense 
of the term, increasing the group’s economic power as a whole. Indeed, it is 
widely acknowledged that one of the central motivations for organizing the 
modern nation state is to maintain economic competitiveness in an era of 
industrialization.  23  
 Related to this issue is foreign economic policy, particularly trade and 
membership in certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). As a 
canonical study on trade and power noted, “Among the economic determi-
nants of power, foreign trade plays an important part.”  24  Foreign trade, by 
directing resources to more effi cient avenues of production and consump-
tion, increases the military and economic capacities of states.  25  It is taken as 
a truism that states’ goals with respect to trade policy in particular, and 
foreign economic policy in general, include most prominently the aim of 
increasing their aggregate power.  26  Trade can also be used strategically to 
manage relations with other states, giving birth to and cementing alliances.  27  
Finally, membership in international organizations aids states in managing 
external relations and achieving their policy goals.  28  Such institutional 
membership is a legalistic symptom of a more general point, which is that 
membership in the comity of states is a “social” enterprise—similar to col-
lege fraternities, one can join only when those already on the inside acqui-
esce.  29  Once a group is recognized as a state, and welcomed into “the society 
of states,”  30  its social and institutional power increases. 
 Once again, the contrast between being a subnational ethnic group and 
an ethnic group controlling the state is readily apparent. When a group is 
relatively powerless within a state, it cannot strategically manage foreign 
economic relations for its benefi t; such a luxury is left to the group that con-
trols the state. The distributional consequences of foreign trade are often 
quite severe for marginalized groups, as agents of the state ensure that rival 
groups bear the brunt of the costs of trade, while their supporters garner 
the benefi ts.  31  And minority groups certainly cannot win membership into 
international organizations, most of which are open only to states or their 
recognized representatives. When an ethno-nationalist group wins its own 
state, however, it can then partake in these benefi ts in ways that were 
unlikely or impossible in the status quo  ex-ante . 
 The third power-magnifying benefi t of state formation relates to demo-
graphics. All else being equal, the larger the population of a state, the 
greater its power.  32  The most widely cited source of material capabilities, 
the National Material Capabilities Dataset, part of the Correlates of War 
project, includes in its composite score six elements of state power; two of 
the six are demographic variables (total population and urban population). 
A larger population base means that states can build bigger militaries, that 
they can put more people to work in both peacetime and during war, that 
they can have a wider tax base, and that their consumer markets are more 
attractive for investment and capital building. 
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 When it comes to ethnic minorities, winning a state can be a signifi cant 
game-changer in this regard. Assuming the presence of a coethnic diaspora 
in other parts of the region and the world at large, a state exclusively 
devoted to a particular ethnic group means that, all of a sudden, there is a 
home to go to. In other words, the new state will not be populated just by 
the group that fought for it, but by their ethnic brethren from various far-
fl ung corners of the globe. An illustration of this principle is Israel’s Law of 
Return, passed in the immediate aftermath of independence, which allows 
Jews worldwide, along with their progeny and spouses, to become citizens 
of Israel, regardless of national origin. Decision makers, we can be assured, 
are aware of the possibility of an immigration explosion in the new state, as 
evinced by Ottoman leader Enver Pasha’s thoughts on the creation of an 
Armenian state in the early twentieth century: 
 In my opinion this is a very big mistake. If today in the Caucasus a small 
Armenia possessing a population of fi ve to six hundred thousand and suffi cient ter-
ritory is formed, in the future this government, together with the Armenians that 
will come mainly from America and from elsewhere, will have a population of mil-
lions. And in the east we will have another Bulgaria and it will be a worse 
enemy than Russia because all the Armenians’ interests and ambitions are 
in our country. Consequently, in order to remove this danger, the formation 
of even the smallest Armenian government must be prevented.  33  
 By changing the balance of population, so to speak, between an ethnic 
group and its former host state, the creation of a new state irrevocably 
changes the balance of power between the parties too. Cold, hard numbers 
matter a great deal.  34  
 Secession, then, would lead to the ethno-nationalist group posing more of 
a threat to the rump state than it would as a minority group within a unifi ed 
one, mainly because statehood would endow the group with military, eco-
nomic, institutional, and demographic benefi ts. Admittedly, self-government 
entails both benefi ts and costs: managing territory and population can 
present a unique and new set of challenges to the separatists. After all, 
mobilizing a population and governing it require different political skill 
sets. For instance, when the Asom Gana Parishad, a party of Assamese 
ethno-nationalists, gained power in state elections in December 1985 after 
months of agitation and negotiations with central state, its record was poor; 
it included corruption, nepotism, and a lack of development (chapter 3).  35  
Similarly, rather than usher a promised era of liberty and progress, 
Bangladesh’s hard-won freedom from Pakistan (chapter 2) resulted in 
signifi cant political instability—including a coup and the assassination of 
Awami League leader Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, his entire family with the 
exception of two daughters then in West Germany, and his personal staff—
less than four years after it achieved statehood. Today, only half a decade 
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after they won independence, South Sudan’s leaders fi nd themselves in 
the midst of a brutal civil war that threatens mass famine. 
 Even accounting for such costs, however, the creation of a new state 
leaves the host state more vulnerable to the ethnic group, generally 
speaking. First, the costs of managing territory and population, important 
as they are, are circumscribed to group elites, unlike the benefi ts—such as 
the gains from trade, membership in international organizations and inter-
national society, and nondiscrimination in military and civil service—which 
are distributed to the population at large. Thus it is reasonable to suggest 
that groups overall benefi t from secession. Certainly, ethnic groups around 
the world believe the benefi ts of statehood far outweigh the costs; if they 
did not, they would not demand independence at the rates they do (163 
movements between 1945 and 2000). 
 Second, even if we concede the real-world existence of situations where 
independence can hurt the ethnic group’s power, the host state cannot 
make decisions based on such best-case scenarios. States operate in the 
dog-eat-dog world of international politics, where the costs of being wrong 
about prospective security threats can be prohibitive.  36  It is thus reasonable 
for the state to be concerned with the ethnic group gaining the massive 
military, institutional, and demographic resources that accrue to all states in 
the system. 
 Third, and most important, border changes shift the balance of power not 
just between the host state and the seceding ethnic group, but also between 
the host state and its existing state rivals. That is, in addition to losing out 
relatively to the ethnic minority, the state will also fi nd itself weaker vis-à-
vis other states in the region and around the globe. After all, if power “rep-
resents nothing more than specifi c assets or material resources available to 
a state,”  37  it stands to reason that losing signifi cant amounts of territory and 
population in one fell swoop disadvantages states with respect to their 
rivals (and even friends). 
 Widely used datasets and major scholarly works in IR highlight the role 
of population as an important component of power.  38  Because territory and 
population are important components of states’ reservoir of material capa-
bilities, losing them wholesale results in signifi cant shifts in the balance of 
power between the state and its adversaries. Consider the extent to which 
India pressed its advantage after East and West Pakistan split in 1971. 
Between 1970 and 1972, the ratio of India’s material capabilities to Paki-
stan’s increased by almost 50 percent, from 4.6:1 to 6.7:1,  39  a major part of 
this shift resulting from Pakistan losing half its population. Losing territory 
is also a major setback. No state likes to relinquish its hold on land easily, 
and indeed, the bulk of confl icts in modern international history have been 
fought over territory.  40  States have attachment to territory for a variety of 




 The problem with losing signifi cant territory and population is that such 
a process makes states much weaker, leaving them more vulnerable to 
opportunist regional rivals. Scholars of territorial disputes have found that 
states are more likely to challenge rivals—or “engage in higher levels of 
diplomatic and military pressure”—the more advantageous their relative 
power position.  42  Even if this empirical pattern was not a fact of interna-
tional politics, decision makers tend to behave as if it is. Generally speaking, 
states are quite suspicious of others’ intentions and are loathe to acquiesce 
to any decrease in their relative power, given the exigencies of interstate 
security competition.  43  
 Even in the highly unlikely situation where independence hurts rather 
than helps the ethnic group’s power, then, the host state will still fi nd itself 
more vulnerable to existing states. The sum consequence of the prospective 
changes supported by the secessionists, therefore, is a large and rapid shift 
in the balance of power between the state and two sets of rivals: the ethnic 
nationalists and geopolitical adversaries. In turn, the potential of large and 
rapid shifts in the balance of power activate the commitment problem. 
 the commitment problem as a cause for 
conflict escalation 
 IR scholars have long grappled with a seemingly simple yet intractable 
problem: why do states fi ght wars? After all, two actors with confl icting 
interests need not go to war over them.  44  Doing so might even be consid-
ered irrational on the surface, because the divisions of gains and losses that 
is reached after the war could, in theory, have been reached in peaceful 
bargaining before any fi ghting took place, thus saving both actors the high 
costs of confl ict. To put it in concrete terms, instead of fi ghting a war over 
Alsace-Lorraine, Germany and France—as rational, forward-looking 
actors—could conceivably see how such a war would unfold and divide 
the territory based on their estimates, without doing any of the fi ghting. 
Under such a scenario, both would be better off than in the case where they 
fought a war to fi nd the same division of spoils. 
 One of the problems with this view, however, is that there is no credi-
bility of commitment. Even when both sides have gained in the sense of not 
fi ghting a war, one side will gain more than the other with respect to the 
actual division of what is being contested—some territory, policy, or what-
ever. In turn, this means that one side is more equipped to attack the other 
in the future based on those very gains, as well as other gains in capability 
that accrue over time, such as arms buildups or a rising population. The 
actor whose power trajectory shows a steeper upward slope has no credible 
way of committing to  not attacking the other side in the future. More impor-
tant, the more vulnerable actor knows all of this, and as a result, initiates 
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confl ict. Why risk (the threat of) war against a strengthened rival, the logic 
goes, when we have a better chance of success today? 
 This framework helps explain why a state would adopt coercion to deal 
with separatism. At the heart of the commitment problem, an inability to 
trust that a bargain will be adhered to, are potential large and rapid power 
shifts, exactly the situation that characterizes secessionism. A state fearful 
of border changes cannot afford concessions, for such a policy makes its 
worst-case scenarios more likely. If the state offers negotiated deals that fall 
short of full statehood, the ethno-nationalists may use the greater organiza-
tional resources attendant on decentralization and regional autonomy to 
press their case further in the future. As Grigoryan writes, “Concessions 
will only embolden [the minority] to make more demands or to attempt 
secession from a position improved by those very concessions.”  45  This is 
because autonomy only reinforces and reaffi rms the distinctiveness of 
ethno-nationalist identity, in part by encouraging the growth of regionalist 
parties who play an important role in mobilizing the population for confl ict 
and secessionism.  46  Large-n studies corroborate this argument and show 
that federalism facilitates the formation of substate identities.  47  Agent-
based computer models based on constructivist identity theory also dem-
onstrate that power-sharing encourages larger identitarian movements.  48  
Accommodation allows groups to aggregate proto-statelike resources, 
administratively, politically, economically, and socially, spoils that make 
states leery of negotiated concessions. 
 Of course, coercion against separatists is not a riskless strategy either. 
Harsh repression can increase ethnic groups’ later determination to secede. 
India, for instance, has found itself unable to stamp out Kashmiris’ desire for 
self-determination, in part precisely because of the brutal methods it has 
employed over the last three decades in that state (chapter 3). However, as 
I detail below, states need not escalate to high levels of repression absent sig-
nifi cant third-party support. Lower levels of coercion, such as policing, gen-
erally do not have high material or reputational costs associated with them. 
 More important, the risk of domestic, regional, or global reputational loss 
is less worrisome for states than the risk of creating bigger security problems 
for itself. Because accommodationist policies only kick the secessionist can 
down the road, setting the stage for more powerful and organized claims in 
the future, only states unafraid of border changes can afford to try them. 
That is, a benign security prognosis is a necessary condition for a state to 
consider concessions such as signifi cant autonomy or full independence. If, 
on the other hand, the state foresees the creation of the new state as geopo-
litically problematic in its future, it would behoove it to use force in the 
present, and nip the threat in the bud.  49  The fear of future war, in this view, 
is a suffi cient condition for state coercion against separatists. The question 
then becomes: how does a state determine whether future war is likely? 
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 independent variable i :  probability 
of future war 
 As the examples of Eritrea and Ethiopia, Georgia and Russia, Kosovo and 
Serbia, and Sudan and South Sudan show, there exists a possibility of con-
fl ict between a state and an ethnic group that achieved independence. 
Decision-makers must consider not just such possibilities, but also the like-
lihood of future war against existing states, who may be emboldened by 
the host state’s loss of territory and population. For instance, the Ottoman 
Empire, having lost about half its land and people in the Balkan wars of 
1912 (chapter 4), faced a resurgent Russia in World War I, and India and 
Pakistan fought in the snowy heights of Kargil in 1999, a quarter-century 
after the former helped dismember the latter (chapter 2). 
 In my theory, the fear of future war is a suffi cient condition for the state 
to coerce separatists. Its fear of future war against the seceded state turns 
on whether the ethnic group’s identity is opposed to the state’s national 
identity. Its fear of future war against existing states depends on the relative 
war proneness of the region the state inhabits. The possibility of war against 
either foe functions as a proverbial trip wire for the state’s adoption of coer-
cion: if either or both are “set off,” the state will attempt to forestall inde-
pendence with violence. 
 Future War and Depth of Identity Divisions.  Nation-states seek to build 
national myths that strengthen social ties among its citizens and between the 
citizens and the state. 50  This is especially true in the postcolonial regions of 
Asia and Africa, whose states became independent in an age in which ethnic 
and national identities were largely accepted as the dominant mode of state 
organization. Importantly, not all ethnic or national groups are equally likely 
to be in control of such myth-making ventures. To the contrary, certain groups 
are more likely to be in control of the state, and certain “national” ideologies 
are more likely to be adopted. 51  In turn, certain ethnic or national groups 
find themselves in more direct opposition to the state’s chosen nationalistic 
narrative, even in states that practice so-called civic nationalism. 52 
 Where does the secessionist ethnic group’s identity fall on this spectrum 
with respect to the core? A national identity can be inclusive of, indifferent 
to, or opposed to an ethnic group. If, for instance, a state defi nes its identity 
as that of a white Christian nation, then for the purposes of both Northern 
European Protestants and Western European Catholics, its nationalism is 
inclusive. If a national identity is inclusive of an ethnic group, it is unlikely 
that the group would consider seceding, and thus while a possible value for 
this variable, it drops out of the analysis. The variable then becomes dichot-
omous: identity relations can be indifferent or opposed. For our purposes, 
secessionists with mobilizing identities opposed to the state’s national nar-
rative are deemed dangerous in the future. 
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 An indifferent identity relation occurs when the key national character 
dimension—language, religion, race, ethnicity, creed, and sect—is orthog-
onal to the one on whose basis the ethnic group is mobilizing. For instance, 
if a state defi nes its nationality along linguistic lines and an ethnic group 
secedes on the basis of a difference in religion, then that ethnic difference 
will be categorized as indifferent. On the other hand, if a state’s national 
identity is organized along racial lines, and an ethnic group attempts seces-
sion based on its racial character, then that constitutes opposed identity 
relations. Of course, in the real world, issues concerning identity are not as 
clear cut as dispassionate scholars and analysts often imply, and peoples 
and states often subscribe to, and mobilize around, multiple, overlapping 
identities. That said, the job of the theoretician is to simplify. In this case, it 
seems reasonable to assert that one identity marker, above others, exerts a 
greater political force on individuals and groups, particularly at highly 
politicized times such as secessionist moments. 
 This is not to suggest that the nation-state’s or the ethnic group’s identity 
are fi xed and unchanging. To the contrary, scholars of ethnic politics fi nd 
that the precise identity cleavage around which groups mobilize is context 
and institution specifi c.  53  Voters in Zambia, for instance, might organize 
along tribal lines under single-party rule, but along linguistic lines in multi-
party rule. Fighters in civil wars may be motivated by regionalist identity in 
one year and an ethnic one the next.  54  Even the state’s national identity is 
contested and ever in fl ux: the ruling Young Turk regime in the early 1900s 
changed the composition of its national identity from “Ottoman” to “Turk” 
in less than half a decade (chapter 4). This had profound consequences for 
how Armenians were seen in the empire. What this means in concrete terms 
is that the identity-distance variable can vary across both space and time, 
even if we are considering just one ethnic group and one state. 
 What I attempt to capture with this concept of identity division is the 
ethnic group’s likelihood to have so-called greedy motives in the future. IR 
scholars generally distinguish between “security-seeking” and “greedy” 
states. Both types can be expansionist, but aggression by “security-
seekers,” as the term suggests, is geared toward increasing the state’s secu-
rity by, say, increasing resources or advancing borders to a more defensible 
frontier. On the other hand, “greedy” states are expansionist for nonsecu-
rity reasons, such as wealth, prestige, or ideological fervor.  55  In essence, 
greedy states are more diffi cult to placate than security seekers; they do 
not take yes for an answer. As I conceive of it, the identity division between 
the center and the ethno-nationalists is a measure of the latter’s future 
desire to strike back at the state for purely nationalistic or “greedy” rea-
sons. Because one of the central political roles of ethnic identity is to reduce 
uncertainty,  56  the precise content of relational ethnic identities can infl u-
ence actors’ assessments of the likelihood of war or peace resulting from 
secessionism.  57  
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 If the identity division between the ethnic group mainly in charge of the 
state and the independence-seeking minority group is  especially frayed, 
then the state is likely to be wary of the minority group. While it is true 
almost by defi nition that the relationship between an ethnic group seeking 
independence from a state and the state itself is not warm, some rivalries 
are especially intense. Some are decades and even centuries old, others 
more recent. Some have featured violence at high levels relatively regularly, 
others sporadically or not at all. For example, despite Bohemia and Moravia 
being occupied by a Nazi Germany that enjoyed an alliance with an “inde-
pendent” Slovakia for most of World War II, Czechs and Slovaks did not 
subject each other to extreme levels of violence the way, say, Croats and 
Serbs did.  58  Fifty years later, the divorce between Czechs and Slovaks was 
many orders of magnitude more peaceful than the one that took place in 
Yugoslavia. The more damaged a relationship is perceived to be at the 
secessionist moment, the more likely the state is to ascribe malicious inten-
tions to the group. 
 At times, the ethno-nationalists may use costly signals to reassure the 
state, attempting to lower the state’s estimation of the likelihood of future 
war and increasing its inclination to offer concessions. After all, what truly 
drives the central government’s perceptions of future confl ict are the ethnic 
group’s intentions, which can, technically, become more known.  59  How-
ever, given that talk is cheap and that secession necessarily implies such a 
large and rapid power shift, seceding groups have to take extraordinary 
measures to signal benign intentions. Such measures can include the 
destruction of military capabilities by the seceding minority, as Norway did 
in 1905, when it destroyed its border forts to make it easier for Sweden to 
acquiesce to its independence (chapter 5). Even better in this regard would 
be direct transfers of military or security-related assets from the ethnic 
group to the seceding state: what could be a more reliable signal of a group’s 
benign intentions than it helping its former host state potentially destroy it? 
For instance, during the time of the Velvet Divorce, the vast majority of the 
formerly united Czechoslovakia’s military capabilities were diverted to the 
Czech half, which made Slovak secessionism more acceptable (chapter 5). 
But even such assurances do not guarantee kind treatment from the state. 
The Palestinian national movement gave in to Israeli insistence, as far back 
as the Oslo agreements of the mid-1990s, that an independent Palestine 
should be demilitarized (chapter 5). Yet this concession has brought the Pal-
estinians no closer to statehood; the reservoirs of distrust and suspicion 
between Israel and its neighbors run too deep for such a promise to assuage 
Israel of its future security. Generally, the prospect of a new state on one’s 
borders spells trouble for one’s security, and cases such as Czechoslovakia 
or Sweden-Norway tend to be exceptional. As Secretary of State William 
Seward asserted in the run-up to the American Civil War, “The new Con-
federacy . . . must, like any other new state, seek to expand itself northward, 
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westward, and southward. What part of this continent or of the adjacent 
islands would be expected to remain in peace?”  60  
 Future War and Existing States: Regional War Proneness .  In addition to 
concerns about future war against the seceded state, a state must also con-
sider the potential for war against an existing state, emboldened by the 
host state’s loss of territory and population. Will border changes imperil its 
prospects in war too gravely? The state’s assessment of the probability of 
future war against rivals turns on its prior experience with interstate war 
in its neighborhood, since this has implications for the constraints  against 
war in its region. 
 Although war is a systemic phenomenon, certain subsystems appear 
better at avoiding it than others. For instance, South Asian states are twice 
as likely to threaten or use violence against one another relative to South 
American states, and Western Europe is half as war prone as the Middle 
East.  61  Just as it is for human beings, so it is for states: certain neighbor-
hoods are worse to live in than others. And the type of neighborhood a state 
lives in conditions its view of the world—particularly the threats it faces. 
 States that live in “bad” neighborhoods, in which rivals regularly target 
one another militarily, would deem future war with existing rivals likely. 
Such states live under more permissive norms insofar as the use of force is 
concerned, and as such, they are likely to be on guard about the prospect of 
border changes and the attendant loss in relative power. A comparable state 
in a peaceful neighborhood, conversely, is likely to be unruffl ed by such an 
eventuality. For instance, both Israel and Canada are wealthy, liberal 
democracies dealing with a sole nationalist challenge—Palestinians in the 
former, Quebecois in the latter—but they differ in one crucial respect: the 
peacefulness of their neighborhoods. As Israeli insiders put it, “Six wars, 
numerous major confrontations, and ongoing violence, from low-level ter-
rorism to massive rocket attacks, have been basic features of Israel’s external 
environment. A sense of nearly unremitting Arab enmity prevails, of a con-
fl ict of unlimited hostility and objectives . . . national security issues in 
Israel are commonly addressed in existential terms.”  62  As such, all else 
equal, we would expect Israel to be more afraid of the security implications 
of a new Arab state in the Middle East, even if such a state would be drasti-
cally weaker than it, than Canada would be with the creation of a French-
speaking one in North America. Consequently, we would expect Israel to 
put up a stiffer fi ght against Palestinian independence than Canada against 
Quebecois separatism. 
 The bottom line is that states consider future war to be unlikely only 
under a relatively narrow set of conditions, and the rarity of these condi-
tions explains why most separatist movements result in coercive state 
responses. After all, a necessary condition for the state to consider a peaceful 
strategy is that it must not fear future war. For this condition to obtain, the 
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secessionists must mobilize around an identity that does not threaten the 
host state’s dominant conception of itself, since this would assure it that 
the seceded state’s independent guns will not be turned toward it, and the 
state must live in a peaceful neighborhood, since this would assure it that it 
will not be exploited by opportunist state rivals. These relatively rare con-
ditions translate to an optimistic, postsecurity environment for the state, 
where border changes are not seen in urgent or apocalyptic terms, enabling 
the possibility of peaceful concessions in its dealings with separatists. Con-
sistent with this expectation, it bears noting that during the latter half of the 
twentieth century, separatism failed to incite even low-level confl ict mainly 
in those regions where interstate war is not a serious possibility—such as 
Western Europe and the Pacifi c.  63  Much more commonly, however, the 
power shift that inheres in secession leaves the state too afraid to try 
peaceful negotiations. The fear of future war, against either the separatists 
or an existing rival, is a suffi cient condition for the state to decide on coer-
cion. Such coercive strategies result in a stronger correlation between seces-
sionism and the outbreak of war in regions such as the Middle East, South 
Asia,  64  Southeast Asia, the Balkans and Caucasus,  65  and sub-Saharan 
Africa.  66  As much as a state may balk at paying the material and reputa-
tional costs associated with such a strategy, such costs pale in comparison 
to those associated with facing interstate war against relatively strength-
ened rivals. 




Peaceful Future war unlikely Future war likely
War prone Future war likely Future war likely
independent variable ii :  third-party support
 Once a state has made an assessment that it must use coercion against 
secessionists because they represent an external threat, it faces the decision 
of how much force to employ. “Coercion,” after all, can mean any number 
of things, from beatings to widespread torture, from localized violence to 
genocide. How far states will up the repressive ante depends on the pre-
cise level of external threat the separatists represent, which depends on 
whether, and the degree to which, they enjoy third-party support. 
 Third-party support shortens a state’s time horizons. A geopolitical rival 
helping the ethnic group secede is not just an external security problem for 
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the future, but one very much for the present. States do not generally take 
kindly to their rivals’ attempts to destroy their territorial integrity, from 
within or without. The level of third-party support infl uences the strength 
of the secessionists by transferring the “technologies of rebellion”;  67  higher 
levels of support mean the threat is to be taken more seriously, which in 
turn translates to a heavier hand by the state.  68  Third-party support also 
adds an emotional dimension to separatist confl ict and can fuel patholog-
ical levels of violence if delivered at signifi cant levels. 
 Secessionists as a Fifth Column .  Classical statements on external support 
for separatist minorities focused on irredentism,  69  or the desire to incorpo-
rate a neighbor’s secessionist region into one’s own state. Such goals, how-
ever, constitute the extreme end of the spectrum when it comes to the 
strategic aims of third parties.  70  More commonly, they are motivated by less 
grandiose aims, such as the destabilization or “mere” dismemberment of 
the host state to favorably shift the balance of power. Support to the seces-
sionist minority can also be spurred by an ethnic affi nity with the move-
ment or domestic calculations,  71  or a combination of these. Supporting a 
secessionist group from afar is often the best of both worlds for geopolitical 
rivals: their costs of engagement are signifi cantly lower, they can retain 
plausible deniability, they are not seen as the aggressor by the court of 
global public opinion—which could invite verbal rebukes, or worse—and 
they trap the host state in a diffi cult confl ict being conducted on its own 
soil. This was precisely the situation India found itself in during Pakistan’s 
civil war in 1971, when its Border Security Forces trained and equipped the 
Mukti Bahini across the border, bleeding Pakistan at reasonably low cost 
before its eventual dismemberment (chapter 2). 
 States worry a great deal about so-called fi fth-columns,  72  especially 
during times of war. There are two main factors about third-party support 
to separatists that makes states escalate: it enables stronger movements, 
and it encourages emotional decisions and behavior by leaders and secu-
rity forces. 
 The fi rst effect of third-party support is that outside help represents 
material support, which means a change in capabilities by the secessionists: 
the more help the nationalists have, the stronger they are, and the more 
violence is needed to defeat them. Civil war researchers have demonstrated 
how external backing results in the transfer of the “technologies of rebel-
lion” that allow challengers to fi ght the state.  73  Within IR, it is a truism that 
states get increasingly violent the more desperate they get.  74  Outside sup-
port increases the capabilities of the challenging group and narrows the 
possibility of the state winning. A state is thus likely to respond to external 
sponsorship with high levels of violence to curtail the threat. Additionally, 
the more material support an outside power provides, the higher is its 
resolve, at least as perceived by the central government. Given increasing 
CHAPTER 1
34
levels of outside support, the central government is forced to conclude that 
the outside power is in for the long haul, and that high levels of violence 
will be required to deal with the threat. Lower levels of support, by con-
trast, smack of context-specifi c opportunism, and while no state is likely be 
pleased that one of its ethnic groups is receiving support, it is less likely to 
deem low levels of third-party cooperation threatening to the state’s 
survival. 
 The second factor about outside support that affects the state’s strategy is 
decidedly nonmaterialist. Researchers exhort us against sidelining emo-
tions when studying confl ict, noting that “although the bloodless conven-
tions of social science make it simpler for academics to sweep such messy 
emotions aside when building their theories, those who visit the [affected] 
region fi nd it impossible to explain what they fi nd without reference to 
emotions.”  75  Ethnic separatists soliciting and receiving external support, 
especially from the host state’s rivals, represents an emotional betrayal to 
the central state. It is one thing to divorce, another thing entirely to divorce 
as a result of an affair with a spouse’s sworn enemy. Though states are not 
people, they often behave as such.  76  Indeed, emotions produced and con-
sumed by groups, such as governments, are often more powerful than 
those of the individual level.  77  Emotions trigger action, because “emotional 
judgments are quicker and stronger than cognitive judgments” and because 
they “heighten the saliency of a particular concern.”  78  During times of 
ethnic tensions, three emotions in particular—resentment, fear, and 
hatred—are said to catalyze violence.  79  
 There is no doubting the importance of these emotions, but the process of 
secessionism leads to a distinct emotion, as-yet unconsidered by ethnic vio-
lence research: betrayal. According to scholars, the notion of betrayal con-
notes “a voluntary violation of mutually known pivotal expectations of the 
trustor by the trusted party, which has the potential to threaten the well-
being of the trustor.”  80  In essence, Ego is badly let down by Alter, contra-
vening its expectations about the latter. Politically, the structural conditions 
that give rise to this emotion involve an antecedent institutional arrange-
ment being threatened by either an active or passive contributor of that 
arrangement. For instance, many nation-states in Asia and Africa gained 
independence from their erstwhile colonial rulers through nationalist 
movements, which saw alliances between varied ethnic, linguistic, or reli-
gious groups. The nation-state, in this case, is the institutional arrangement. 
When this state’s borders and existence are threatened by one of the very 
groups that fought for it, the core governing group feels betrayed. For 
example, when the Bengali Muslim population of undivided India went 
from fi ghting for an independent Pakistan in the 1940s to campaigning for 
an independent Bangladesh a quarter century later, it greatly angered Paki-
stani nationalists (chapter 2). Crucially, this baseline level of betrayal is sig-
nifi cantly exacerbated by an alliance between the ethnic group and an 
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external patron. From the perspective of the core group, it is bad enough that 
an in-group wishes to become an out-group, it is another thing entirely for 
this group to elicit the support of a rival. Irrespective of whether such an 
alliance is prompted solely by realpolitik, identity-based concerns, or some 
mix of the two, if an ethnic group partners with outside rivals, it fuels a 
betrayal that can result in almost pathological or genocidal violence (chap-
ters 2 and 4). When groups become perceived as collectively traitorous, 
both leaders and security forces become thirstier for gruesome punishment. 
Put simply, hell hath no fury like a state betrayed by its own. 
 The relevance of these two aspects of third-party support—the separat-
ists’ material capabilities increasing and the state feeling betrayed—
depends on the state’s perceptions of how much help the ethnic group 
enjoys. At most times, these perceptions will be fairly consonant with the 
objective level of support provided. After all, states generally devote an 
enormous amount of resources to matters of security and intelligence, and 
should be able to accurately gauge both the source and extent of support 
reasonably clearly. More important, while third-party support operations 
are meant to be covert, designed to conceal the identity of the sponsor, they 
are rarely clandestine—those operations whose execution itself is meant to 
be secret. By its very nature, external sponsorship of rebels is hard to keep 
under wraps, and as such, states on the receiving end of it tend to well-
informed of its nature and intensity. Nevertheless, in some cases, states do 
get it wrong. Such miscalculations of third-party support can be the joint 
product of bureaucratic friction and racism or essentialism.  81  A state may 
believe that at ethnic group is “in bed with the enemy” based on nothing 
more than ascriptive characteristics of that group and the enemy in ques-
tion, with its internal politics precluding self-correction. For example, the 
Pakistani military leadership wrongly believed the Bengali movement for 
independence was operating hand-in-glove with the Indian state in March 
1971, despite a number of local offi cials, even those hailing from West Paki-
stan, informing them otherwise (chapter 2). In such situations of misper-
ception, the state will behave “as if” third-party support existed even when 
it did not. 
 Aside from these genuine misperceptions, states may make accusations 
of external sponsorship against rebellious groups that they know to be 
false, either to discredit the group or build support for the government. 
Indira Gandhi’s government, to cite one of many examples, claimed that 
Khalistani separatists were backed by Pakistan years before they actually 
were (chapter 3). Sometimes governments go further still and seek to 
“frame” groups for receiving external backing, as when Zulfi qar Bhutto 
concocted an “interception” of arms ostensibly traveling from Iraq to 
Baloch rebels (chapter 2). Such episodes, however, do not present insur-
mountable problems for the researcher interested in uncovering the “true” 
perceptions of governments at secessionist moments. This is because “fake” 
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accusations of third-party support are quite transparently contrived, espe-
cially in hindsight. The insights and opinions of neutral observers, espe-
cially, contained in diplomatic archives or contemporary news reports, can 
help disentangle those situations in which the state genuinely perceives 
third-party support from those in which it is engaged in propaganda. As 
we shall see in the empirical chapters, when a state  actually believes a group 
is enjoying third-party support it behaves very differently to when it merely 
alleges such support for domestic gain. 
Levels of  Third-Party Support .  A state’s level of coercion is calibrated to its 
perception of third-party support, which can be broken down into three 
types, each representing an escalation in the level of threat, and betrayal, 
that the state faces. The most elementary level of support is “limited”: this 
includes situations in which third parties provide verbal, fi nancial, or sanc-
tuary support to the secessionists. A state can provide verbal or diplomatic 
support to secessionists and be considered offering limited support for the 
purposes of my theory mainly because in international politics, as in many 
other walks of life, talk is cheap. Mere verbal support does not aid seces-
sionists. Though there are rare occasions on which governments take even 
verbal support from outsiders to secessionists quite seriously because of 
what it supposedly portends—Abraham Lincoln and other American 
leaders, for example, were extremely sensitive to British rhetoric that sig-
naled their backing of the Confederacy (chapter 5)—generally speaking, 
diplomatic and political support does not weigh heavily on states’ calcula-
tions to use force. 
 Financial aid, meanwhile, assuredly makes it more diffi cult to defeat the 
rebels, and signals the third party’s preferences about the outcome of bar-
gaining between the ethnic group and its government. It must be noted, 
however, that delivering fi nancial aid to rebels can be a challenging task, 
for reasons ranging from a lack of social and institutional connections to 
rebels and fi eld commanders, to legalistic countermeasures taken by the 
host state, such as freezing accounts and wire transfers. Consequently, 
fi nancial aid is often delivered only in limited doses. More generally, 
principal-agent problems abound—those on the ground have different 
incentives and preferences than foreign fi nanciers, and often the latter 
group will not enjoy reasonable levels of oversight over the usage of the aid 
once it is delivered. Additionally, fi nancial aid does not change the compo-
sition of the resource-palette that rebels enjoy, it only enlarges it. Thus it is 
not a “game-changer” in terms of the types of support a third party can 
give, unlike, say, direct military aid of equipment that rebels currently do 
not possess. 
 The strongest form of “limited” support is a physical sanctuary across an 
international border. Sanctuaries are more important than fi nancial aid 
because states are much more qualifi ed and capable of regulating activity 
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and governing people within their borders than without. Scholars have 
noted that “state boundaries are perhaps the most fundamental interna-
tional institutions in the modern state system” and “ the primary function of 
international boundaries is to demarcate legal or de facto lines of military control 
and political jurisdiction . The military and police forces of one state have no 
authority in another state, and crossing borders with such forces is seen as 
an act of aggression.”  82  States are less able to target and monitor the activi-
ties of rebels if they take place across sovereign boundaries owing to the 
diffi culties of pursuit and international norms for territorial integrity.  83  
However, sanctuaries are purely a defensive “weapon.” A group’s hold on 
a sanctuary would enable it to escape state action under most circum-
stances, but it would almost never, by itself, lead to more destructive capa-
bilities against the state or its coercive apparatus. Rather, it is only when 
cross-border bases are combined with recruiting, training, or the provision 
of supplies that they assume real potency.  84  For these reasons, I consider a 
sanctuary an important type of third-party support, to be sure, but not 
capable of tipping the balance in any meaningful way—unless comple-
mented with more serious forms of third-party support. 
 I call the second level “moderate” third-party support, which includes 
military aid, in the form in the form of equipment, supplies, and/or 
training. Military aid accomplishes signifi cantly more than fi nancial aid 
when it comes to aiding the political prospects of the secessionists’ 
demands. It can considerably improve the battlefi eld capabilities of rebels, 
since states have access to arms in much greater numbers, and in much 
greater variety, than substate groups. Often foreign benefactors will 
supply rebels with crucial technology aimed at upturning the balance of 
power.  85  The famous—and perhaps overstated—case of the Afghan muja-
hideen employing U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles to defeat the Soviets 
serves as an exemplar of this phenomenon. Additionally, rebel or militant 
organizations fi ghting on behalf of secessionists are often poorly trained 
or organized hastily as situations on the ground can change rapidly, 
causing them to be ill-prepared for armed confl ict with a state’s regi-
mented forces. Military aid and training from outsiders can close that gap 
appreciably and fairly quickly. It took approximately ten weeks, for 
instance, for Indian Border Security Forces to train and equip Mukti Bahini 
fi ghters in their quest to win independence from the Pakistani state in 
1971 (chapter 2). 
 Finally, the highest form of support a third-party state can give is to fi ght 
alongside secessionists in a confl ict with the host state. Once this level of 
support is reached, then the two parties’ behavior, as opposed to simply 
their interests, becomes consonant. States fi ghting secessionists joined by 
third-party states are often unable to distinguish between the two as a 
practical matter. If states offer “high” levels of support to secessionists, 
then for all intents and purposes the state is fi ghting an interstate war on 
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its soil against an alliance composed of both internal and external rivals. 
This type of support was seen in Russia’s support of Armenian national-
ists in World War I. In such situations, we can expect the state to escalate 
viciously, using pathological levels of violence to refl ect both the hard task 
of winning an interstate war as well as the perceived betrayal of the state 
by the ethnic group. 
 External Security and State Strategy against Separatists 
 To sum up the basic framework, states have two related concerns about 
the external security implications of any secessionist movement. First, is 
future war likely, either against the newly independent state or an existing 
regional rival? This assessment depends on whether the ethnic group’s 
identity is directly opposed to the state’s core, as well as the war proneness 
of the regional neighborhood. If the state foresees a geopolitical problem 
with the creation of a new state, it behooves it to use coercion in the 
present, so that the threat may be nipped in the bud. The fear of future 
war, in other words, is a suffi cient condition for the state’s adoption of 
coercion against separatists. Under these circumstances, the state must 
make a second calculation: how much third-party support do the seces-
sionists currently enjoy? The existence and level of outside support will 
shorten the state’s time horizons, bring external security concerns forward 
from the future to the present, and compel it to use escalating violence to 
deal with the threat. 
 A state can face, broadly speaking, four possibilities when confronted 
with a secessionist movement. The movement can be externally unthreat-
ening, or if it is an external threat, it can be tied to either limited, mod-
erate, or high third-party support. These possibilities correspond to four 
basic strategies a state can employ regarding separatists: negotiations and 
concessions, policing, militarization, and collective repression. 
 If the movement does not represent an external security threat because its 
identity division with the core is relatively muted and the state is sanguine 
about its regional environment, then the state is open to being peaceful in 
its response. Not being threatened with future war is a necessary condition 
for the state to use a “negotiations and concessions” strategy. This strategy 
entails the state meeting representatives from the ethno-nationalists, 
whether they are drawn from political parties or rebel organizations. The 
state may not necessarily offer concessions immediately, but the use of vio-
lence on any meaningful scale is ruled out. The state could offer a bargain 
short of complete independence to satisfy, or satisfi ce, the minority—
primarily because no state likes losing territory—but if such a bargain is not 
acceptable to the minority, the state will not attempt to use force or violence 
to convince the ethnic group otherwise. The state essentially adopts an 
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attitude that connotes: we would like you to stay, but if you still choose to 
leave, we will not stop you. 
 To that end, the state may offer concessions to convince the minority it is 
better off staying in the unifi ed state than going its own way. Such conces-
sions can include greater political autonomy; more economic aid from the 
center (if the ethnic group is disadvantaged) or allowing a higher propor-
tion of tax revenue to stay in the region (if the ethnic group is advantaged); 
more control over its culture; and so on. Some concessions concern just one 
issue, such as policy concerning the language of instruction in schools; 
others are more multifaceted, such as decentralist changes in the state’s 
administrative structure; some concessions transfer real governing power 
to the group or region, others not.  86  The bottom line is that bargaining takes 
place in smoke-fi lled rooms, not on the smoky ruins of the battlefi eld. These 
situations, seen only in states in comfortable, optimistic, postsecurity envi-
ronments, result in either autonomy where the minority fi nds the conces-
sions at least momentarily acceptable (as in Quebec and Scotland), or 
full-blown independence where it does not (as in Slovakia). 
 When the state perceives a likelihood of future war, by contrast, it is 
impelled to use coercion. If there is limited third-party support for the 
secessionists, then it will adopt the moderately violent strategy of policing. 
This strategy includes the use of the state’s armed apparatus, but not to any 
great extent. The state may imprison or even physically beat separatist 
leaders, harass political parties at their headquarters, forbid large meetings 
and protest rallies, or shut down radio, television, or other media access the 
secessionists may enjoy. It is a coercive strategy but one with a relatively 
light footprint; one should not expect substantial casualties under policing. 
The state may also use concessions to isolate the moderate elements of the 
movement from the more radical  87  —the absence of signifi cant third-party 
support renders the threat muted enough for the state to offer concessions 
as a tactical, if not strategic, measure. However, outright secession or any-
thing even close, such as signifi cant transfers of power, will be completely 
off the table. As a strategy, policing ensures that the movement does not 
gather momentum toward independence, already ruled out by the state 
fearful of the future, while keeping levels of violence at relatively accept-
able levels. The major difference between policing and negotiations is that 
the state is not prepared to give up on territory without a semblance of a 
fi ght. However, unlike in situations where there is major outside support, 
the threat is relatively manageable. Because states prefer to keep violence at 
relatively moderate levels to avoid the potential of sowing deep resent-
ment, they do not escalate to high levels of repression. Examples of policing 
include India’s strategy in Assam between 1987 and 1990 (chapter 3) or the 
Israeli response to the fi rst intifada (chapter 5). 
 Once a group starts receiving moderate support from outside powers, 
especially if it is in the form of military aid, the equation changes. Now the 
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level of threat the state faces increases appreciably, mainly because the pal-
ette of resources the nationalists enjoy becomes more dangerous. This 
causes the state to up the repressive ante, both to deal with the threat as an 
aggregation of material capabilities but also to send a message that fi fth 
columns are not tolerated. In such a situation, the state would practice mili-
tarization, using state forces and violence against training camps and popu-
lation centers. The escalation to militarization is a safe indicator that the 
state is fi ghting a civil war. Militarization entails the use of the state’s mili-
tary and paramilitary forces, but largely against violent or militant organi-
zations or those suspected of directly aiding rebels. This is not to suggest 
that states practicing militarization always use perfectly legal or ethical 
policy instruments; torture and enforced disappearances would be consis-
tent with militarization. For this to be the case, however, such policies must 
be practiced on a relatively limited scale, and not be pursued as a matter of 
offi cial or quasi-offi cial state policy. Militarization is often seen in so-called 
simmering confl icts,  88  where the state strikes sporadically against purely 
military targets and then retreats, at least in a military sense. Typical cases 
of militarization include Pakistani policy in Balochistan in the mid-1970s 
























Figure 1. State decision-making when confronted by separatists
SECESSIONISM AND EXTERNAL SECURITY
41
 Finally, if the ethnic group enjoys high levels of external support, then 
the state would respond with collective repression. This is the harshest 
strategy a state can adopt. This policy includes the use of indiscriminate 
violence, including massacres against civilians; heavy-handed punishment, 
such as the burning of entire villages, forced migrations, and ethnic 
cleansing, as seen in the Bengali (chapter 2) or Armenian (chapter 4) geno-
cides; and draconian legal instruments, such as emergency laws that grant 
the state the authority to imprison enemies of the state for long periods of 
time with no due process, as witnessed in India’s conduct in Kashmir 
(chapter 3). Though genocide is not a necessary outcome of such a policy, 
huge numbers of deaths—in the tens or hundreds of thousands—can be 
common if the state chooses collective repression. This strategy demon-
strates the state’s lethality and sheer capability for infl icting widespread 
violence and pain. When states adopt collective repression, they are usually 
cited for vast human rights abuses and leave devastation and destruction in 
their wake. The severity of the external threat is what compels states to 
escalate to this strategy. First, for materialist reasons, the ethnic group 
becomes essentially as powerful as the external patron, given it is literally 
fi ghting alongside it. In such a situation, a state cannot hold anything back. 
Second, this situation sees the starkest consequences of a logic of betrayal, 
with the central government intent on revenge and sending a message. 
Angry leaders usually pave the way for angry militaries and paramilitaries, 
with the result that the violence on the ground is often pathological and 
indiscriminate. Figure 1 graphically represents the theoretical argument 
I proffer here. 
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 chapter 2 
 Pakistan’s Genocide in Bengal and Limited 
War in Balochistan, 1971–1977 
 States behave differently against different secessionists, I suggest, because 
state strategy against separatist movements is determined by the degree to 
which they are an external security threat. Can my theory account for the 
variation in response by the Pakistani state to two movements for inde-
pendence in the 1970s? While Pakistan was assuredly coercive against both 
movements examined here, East Pakistan saw “collective repression” and 
Balochistan “militarization.” 
 Acquiescing to a loss of territory was simply out of the question for a 
state like Pakistan in the 1970s, whether in Bengal or Balochistan. Paki-
stan was born an exceptionally weak state,  1  especially relative to its larger 
and more powerful neighbor. The country covered a quarter of undivided 
India’s landmass but had only one-tenth its industrial base and one-sixth of 
its fi nancial assets.  2  Confl ict over Kashmir immediately after independence, 
the unequal division of British-India’s assets and water at partition,  3  and a 
massive refugee crisis in the fi rst months of statehood exacerbated its sense 
of “inferiority and insecurity” over its “precarious geopolitical situation.”  4  
In turn, this unfavorable security environment facilitated the outsized role 
of defense and foreign policy issues within the country. Most important, the 
Pakistani army and establishment was convinced that India would always 
threaten its security, and even existence as a state, with successive leader-
ships believing, in Liaquat Ali Khan’s words, that India had never “whole-
heartedly accepted” partition.  5  
 It should not surprise us, then, that successive Pakistani leaders couched 
their reluctance for provincial autonomy in terms of the strength and pros-
pects for survival of the state. In the ruling establishment’s collective mind, 
Pakistan’s security environment required a strong center,  6  and indeed, the 
emergence of the national security state was encouraged by the establish-
ment’s perception of the lack of loyalty to the state among various eth-
nic groups.  7  In his warning that some wanted to destroy Pakistan, Ayub 
Khan argued that “I have always told you that Pakistan’s salvation lay in 
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a strong center.”  8  Zulfi qar Ali Bhutto commented that the idea of auton-
omy was “a ridiculous one for a country that wants to count for some-
thing in the world.”  9  Zia-ul-Haq confessed that he found the concept of 
autonomy unfathomable: “I simply cannot understand this type of think-
ing. We want to build a strong country, a unifi ed country.” Scholars argue 
that “whatever their background, Pakistani leaders have consistently seen 
expressions of provincial feeling as a threat to the Pakistani state,” espe-
cially when such movements are married to foreign enemies.  10  Between 
1947 and the 1970s, when the two major secessionist confl icts under study 
took place, Pakistan lost (or at least, failed to win) two wars against India. 
Its neighborhood was dangerous—by one measure, the most militarized in 
the world.  11  Given that most of its strategic decision-making was under-
taken against the backdrop of the Indian threat, the idea of acquiescing 
to border changes was anathema. Pakistan’s environment was nothing 
close to the optimistic, postsecurity context within which concessions are 
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feasible. Instead, Pakistan would, as my argument predicts, choose coer-
cion when confronted with separatist movements. 
 The more interesting question, however, is not why Pakistan coerced 
both the Bengali and the Baloch national movements, but why it coerced 
one signifi cantly more than the other. In 1971, Pakistan plunged into civil 
war between its eastern and western wings; at least hundreds of thousands 
of East Pakistani lives were lost at the hands of the Pakistani army, in what 
can plainly be called genocide. Between 1973 and 1977, the rump Pakistani 
state—East Pakistan had seceded after the civil war and had become the 
independent country of Bangladesh—fought another ethno-nationalist 
rebellion, this time in Balochistan, where the level of repression was much 
lower than had been experienced in East Pakistan. 
 This variation in violence, I argue, was driven by differences in perceived 
third-party support for the two movements, which meant that the Benga-
lis were considered a greater external threat to the Pakistan state than the 
Baloch were. The latter movement was one composed primarily of tribal 
leaders and left-leaning nationalists but was unable to secure the back-
ing of the Soviet Union in any meaningful way, and aside from “moder-
ate” support from Afghanistan, a weaker power, fought alone. In addition, 
global or regional powers supported the state rather than the rebels, with 
Iran, in particular, strongly supportive of Pakistani action in Balochistan. 
These factors in confl uence meant that the threat represented by the Baloch 
rebels was deemed manageable. In turn, the relatively muted threat allowed 
Pakistani leadership to deal with the Baloch issue without using maximum 
repression. 
 By contrast, the Bengalis of East Pakistan were perceived by the cen-
tral government as well as soldiers to be supported politically, militarily, 
fi nancially, and diplomatically by India, a historical and signifi cantly more 
powerful rival of Pakistan. This perception of “high” third-party support, 
especially at the outset of the crisis, was a product of cultural and reli-
gious essentialism. Pakistan’s founding nationalism, encapsulated in the 
so-called two-nation theory, encouraged a suspicion of Bengalis of being 
more Indian than Pakistani. This purported relationship between India and 
East Pakistan was the emotional trigger behind the heavy, gruesome, and 
disproportionate use of force in quelling Bengali discontent. Additionally, 
actual—as opposed to merely alleged or perceived—Indian military sup-
port to the Mukti Bahini from May 1971 onward ensured a tougher fi ght 
for the Pakistani army in the postmonsoon phase of the confl ict, and con-
sequently more violence. That is, both effects of high third-party support, 
emotional and materialist, were operative in East Pakistan. 
 Figure 2 summarizes my theory’s application to Pakistan in the 1970s. 
 As I detail later in the chapter, rival explanations do not explain the 
observed variation as well as my argument does. In the case of explana-
tions grounded in mid-range IR theories—such as the reputation argument 


























 Figure 2 . Variation in Pakistan’s responses to secessionism in the 1970s 
for fi ghting secessionists, or the veto-player argument for concessions—
the case is either at odds with their predictions, or the causal mechanisms 
they identify were not operative. Meanwhile, explanations peculiar to the 
Pakistan case—such as the argument that blames pathological racism for 
the genocide in East Pakistan—do not adequately address the variation 
observed; they can explain why one war was very violent, but not why one 
war was signifi cantly more violent than the other. 
 Juxtaposing the Bengal and Baloch secessionist confl icts has several ben-
efi ts. First, there is signifi cant variation in the independent and dependent 
variables in the two cases, which is useful for theory testing.  12  Second, by 
choosing a pair of confl icts in one country so close to one another tempo-
rally, I hold structural conditions broadly constant, allowing me to isolate 
the effects of variation in external security implications.  13  Third, no other 
study that I know of has compared these confl icts, even though they took 
place for similar reasons in one country in one relatively circumscribed time 
period; there is thus a pure empirical payoff. Fourth, scholars are encour-
aged to tackle puzzles that are of “intrinsic importance,” episodes that 
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drastically altered both history and a people’s fate.  14  It is safe to say that the 
genocide that marked the birth of Bangladesh meets this criterion. 
 Pakistan Divided Between West and East 
 Pakistan’s civil war, fought between the country’s military and their cona-
tionals in East Pakistan was a quarter century in the making, with the 
antecedents of the war found in the period immediately following the over-
throw of British rule in 1947. At independence, the country was divided into 
West and East Pakistan, separated by a thousand miles of enemy territory. 
It soon became obvious, however, that the vast Indian landscape was not 
the only division between the two wings. Questions concerning the official 
or national language of the country, as well as the legal and political rights 
of Bengalis, became contentious issues, and the consistency with which the 
West Pakistani establishment ignored Bengali aspirations led to a collective 
view that they had replaced the British colonial administration with a West 
Pakistani one.  15  
 Tensions initially erupted over language. The East Pakistani public and 
its politicians wanted Bangla to enjoy coequal status with Urdu as the 
national language. Liaquat Ali Khan rejected the idea, saying, “It is nec-
essary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be 
Urdu and no other language.”  16  East Pakistanis, 56 percent of Pakistan’s 
population, were asked to learn another language less than a year after pur-
portedly ridding themselves of colonial masters.  17  The following month, 
the founder of the nation and its fi rst governor general, Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah, decided to visit Dhaka, in response to language protests,  18  where he 
summarily dismissed Bengalis’ language and their demands.  19  And while 
the center fi nally relented in 1954, the language issue remained only one of 
many concerns Bengalis had, including political, bureaucratic, military, and 
economic disenfranchisement. 
 Politically, there were two salient questions. First, what was to be the rela-
tionship between the provinces and the center? Bengalis would have liked 
Pakistan to be a loose federation, while the West Pakistani establishment 
preferred a more tightly bound centralist state. Second, what was the con-
stitutional relationship amongst the provinces themselves? As things stood 
shortly after independence, East Pakistan demographically outmatched 
the provinces of West Pakistan—Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan. To 
counter East Pakistan’s strength in numbers, the West Pakistani elite estab-
lished the One Unit scheme in 1955, which claimed that the eastern and 
western parts of Pakistan each constituted a “unit,” in effect, combining 
the demographic and political strength of the four western provinces. Even 
aside from One Unit, representation in parliament did not fairly refl ect the 
demographics of the provinces.  20  
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 It was a similar story within the civil services and military. Bengalis were 
poorly represented in the bureaucracy, which tended to be dominated by 
Punjabis and Urdu-speaking Mohajirs from Sindh, and made up just 1 per-
cent of the three armed forces. By the late 1960s, the situation was only mar-
ginally better, as Bengalis made up 5 percent of the offi cers and 7 percent 
of the other ranks in the military. Military doctrine and defense planning 
too was unfair toward the Bengalis. Because of the Pakistan military’s belief 
that the “defense of the East lay in the West,” the majority of the armed 
forces were to be stationed in the West. If India chose to attack East Paki-
stan, the military would respond by attacking India’s western borders. 
Essentially, East Pakistan was left defenseless.  21  Sure enough, in the 1965 
war that began in Kashmir, India invaded East Pakistan. The bare defenses 
stationed in East Pakistan—one relatively weak division, fi fteen Sabre jets, 
and no communication with the Western wing  22  —were a stark notice of the 
prioritization afforded to Bengali security by the military establishment. 
 Finally, issues of economic inequality abounded. The economic disparity 
between the two wings, already appreciable at independence, became more 
acute through the 1950s and 1960s, to the point where per capita income in 
the west was 61 percent higher than that in the east. There were also sig-
nifi cant transfers of wealth, as the state exploited the export earnings from 
jute, which was one of East Pakistan’s primary revenue streams. Moreover, 
much of East Pakistan’s industrial strength was actually in the hands of 
West Pakistani elites and businessmen; by the beginning of the 1970s, six 
non-Bengalis controlled more than 40 percent of East Pakistan’s industrial 
assets.  23  
 the december elections and their aftermath 
 This was the setting, then, of the 1970 elections. The elections were sup-
posed to represent a peaceful transfer of power from Yahya Khan’s military 
regime to civilian authorities. Instead, the polls marked the beginning of 
the end and set rolling a process that ultimately led to the creation of Ban-
gladesh and the dismemberment of Pakistan. 
 There were three actors that drove events during and after the elec-
tions. The fi rst was the Pakistani military, in control of the country since 
1958 through two dictators, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan (no relation), and 
generally suspicious of politicians, their ability to govern, and their compe-
tence. The second was the Pakistan People’s Party, or the PPP, headed by 
Zulfi qar Ali Bhutto, a fast-rising party that shocked many observers with 
their excellent showing in the elections. The third was the Awami League, 
centered in East Pakistan and led by Mujib-ur-Rahman, a collection of dis-
parate actors bound by an unwavering belief in greater autonomy for East 
Pakistan—captured by Mujib’s famous Six-Points platform  24  —and a gen-
eral anti–West Pakistan view, born out of two decades of exploitation.  25  The 
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elections saw 162 National Assembly seats contested from East Pakistan 
and 138 from the west, for a total of 300. The Awami League swept the 
polls in the East, winning 160 out of its 162 seats and an overall majority in 
the National Assembly. In West Pakistan, the PPP dominated, winning 84 
seats.  26  But the results were never allowed to speak for themselves by the 
military and Bhutto, who denied Mujib and the Awami League their right-
ful place as leaders of Pakistan.  27  
 Throughout early 1971, the three principals—Yahya, Bhutto, and Mujib—
met in various permutations to fi nd a mutually acceptable agreement on 
questions concerning the National Assembly and constitution, to little avail. 
Notably, the fi rst meeting was between the two men from the west, with 
Bhutto paying a visit to Yahya in late December, terming the meeting “very 
useful and constructive.”  28  Yahya and Mujib then met in Dhaka on January 
11 and 12, after which Mujib claimed he was “satisfi ed,” and Yahya publicly 
said that “Sheikh Mujibur Rehman is going to be the future Prime Minister of 
the country.”  29  On January 16, Yahya visited Bhutto in Larkana. It was after 
this meeting that Yahya fi rst explicitly drew a public equivalence between 
Bhutto’s and Mujib’s positions, noting that “both are the major national 
leaders and they must cooperate.”  30  Bhutto and Mujib then met with their 
aides on January 26, 27, and 28 “apparently without any agreement on the 
principles on which the country’s future constitution should be framed.”  31  
 Mujib legitimately reasoned that since his party had won the elections 
fair and square, the National Assembly should be convened and allowed to 
formulate a constitution on the basis of his Six Points, for which the Awami 
League won an overwhelming mandate.  32  The problem was mainly Bhutto, 
who was bent on power, and treated himself and the PPP as Mujib’s and the 
Awami League’s equal. For Bhutto, his party represented the West while 
the Awami League represented the East,  33  even though the election results 
clearly placed the Awami League in a more advantageous position.  34  Bhutto 
believed that legally the majority party could form a constitution, but omi-
nously warned that doing so without “the necessary consensus” would 
spell trouble for the country and its people.  35  Bhutto sought to portray the 
Awami League as ill-fi tting as a representative of the entire country, argu-
ing that it was exclusively an East Pakistani entity, his thinking perfectly 
encapsulated by his phrase that “a majority alone doesn’t count in national 
politics.”  36  He also claimed in a speech to PPP supporters that “we respect 
the majority . . . [but] . . . both Punjab and Sindh are centers of power. We 
may or may not form a government at the Center but the keys of the Punjab 
Assembly chambers are in my pocket [in addition to] the keys of the Sindh 
Assembly.” He warned both Mujib and Yahya that “if the People’s Party 
does not support it, no government will be able to work, nor will the con-
stitution be framed.”  37  Bhutto used his contacts within the upper echelons 
of the military, such as General Pirzada, a friend to both Bhutto and Yahya, 
to ensure that Bhutto had the president’s ear before others.  38  His stance 
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severely complicated what should have been a relatively simple transfer of 
power to civilian authorities.  39  
 Matters soon came to a head. The most pressing area of disagreement 
became the date at which the National Assembly was to convene. Mujib 
wanted it to meet by mid-February; Bhutto, playing for time, wanted it 
to meet at the end of March. Yahya chose March 3 as a compromise.  40  
While it was Mujib that should have been more aggrieved by Yahya’s 
delay, it was Bhutto that fi red the more loaded and damaging rhetori-
cal salvo. In a speech on February 28, he helped create conditions under 
which it would be impossible to transfer power to the Awami League, 
threatening to “break the legs” of anyone from his party who dared to go 
to Dhaka for the fi rst meeting of the National Assembly. Those that did 
choose to go, Bhutto warned, should proceed on a “one-way ticket,” as 
they would be welcome back neither to the PPP nor to West Pakistan.  41  
Yahya then decided to indefi nitely postpone convening the assemblies 
without informing Mujib.  42  
Events soon began to spiral out of control. Dozens of people were killed in 
riots in East Pakistan.  43  In response to the assembly delay, Mujib announced 
a six-day strike to begin on March 3, promised that “you will see history 
made if the conspirators fail to come to their senses,” and was particularly 
critical of Bhutto for “always acting in the most irresponsible manner.”  44  
 final negotiations,  their failure, 
and operation searchlight 
 There were three key developments in March 1971 relevant to our story. 
The first was Yahya’s too-little, too-late announcement of a date for the 
convention of the National Assembly. In a speech on March 6, amidst 
social and political unrest in East Pakistan, and surprised by the reac-
tion to his earlier decision to indefinitely postpone the convention of the 
National Assembly, Yahya announced that it would meet on March 25. 
After years of promises unfulfilled, however, Yahya’s latest claim simply 
lacked credibility.  45  As a response to Yahya, Mujib’s speech on March 7 
broadcast on Radio Dhaka was contradictory at times; he escalated his 
rhetoric from autonomy to something greater—“The struggle this time is 
the struggle for freedom; the struggle this time is the struggle for Indepen-
dence”—but also left open the possibility for a negotiated settlement to be 
found with the words “before we go to the Assembly, our demands have to 
be conceded.”  46  At the very least we can confidently state that Mujib and 
the Awami League were showing increasing signs of willingness to not be 
held in check by the politicking of the West Pakistani establishment and 
had grown more assertive. 
 The second important point was the fi nal, futile efforts of the three prin-
cipals to reach a negotiated solution in Dhaka. Yahya was determined to 
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fi nd a solution that had the “full endorsement of all major political lead-
ers.”  47  In Bhutto’s words, “President Yahya Khan told me that he had made 
it clear to Mujibur Rahman that his concurrence to the proposal would be 
subject primarily to my agreement.”  48  Perversely, by handing Bhutto veto-
power, Yahya further incentivized him to act as a spoiler. Mujib was insis-
tent that four conditions be met: the lifting of Martial Law, the withdrawal 
of military personnel in East Pakistan back to the barracks, an inquiry into 
the dozens of deaths that had occurred in antiriot policing in East Paki-
stan in early March, and the transfer of power to the provinces.  49  As late 
as March 23, it appeared that steady if strained progress was being made, 
before Yahya called off the talks. The failure of the talks hammered the fi nal 
nail in the coffi n of a political solution to the crisis. 
 The third noteworthy event was the violent crackdown by the military 
in East Pakistan, marking the beginning of the civil war that eventually 
ruptured Pakistan and halved its population. Given the loss of the gov-
ernment’s central authority that he was witness to in Dhaka, along with 
misguided elements within his coterie of advisers counseling toughness, 
Yahya decided to order military action.  50  In his announcement banning the 
Awami League, outlawing all political activity, and censorship of the press, 
Yahya said that 
 I should have taken action against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his collabo-
rators weeks ago but I had to try my utmost to handle the situation in such 
a manner as not to jeapordise my plan of peaceful transfer of power . . . 
we have left no stone unturned. But he has failed to respond in any con-
structive manner; on the other hand he and his followers kept on flouting 
the authority of the Government even during my presence in Dacca . . . his 
obstinacy, obduracy and absolute refusal to talk sense can lead to but one 
conclusion—the man and his party are enemies of Pakistan and they want 
East Pakistan to break away completely from the country. He has attacked 
the solidarity and integrity of this country. This crime will not go unpun-
ished. We will not allow some power-hungry and unpatriotic people to 
destroy this country and play with the destiny of 120 million people.  51  
 Yahya closed by noting that he had ordered the army “to do their duty and 
fully restore the authority of the Government.” The result was Operation 
Searchlight. The object of the operation was to restore central control over 
East Pakistan, to arrest Mujib and other top Awami League leaders, disarm 
Bengali military units—such as the East Pakistan Rifles—and police, and 
neutralize radical and student organizations.  52  
 Operation Searchlight entailed extremely high levels of repression. The 
orders were to treat the Awami League, its supporters, and sympathizers 
as rebels. Any resistance was to be met with death.  53  The general offi cer 
commanding the operation, Major General Khadim Hussain Raja said that 
“I will muster all I can—tanks, artillery, and machine guns—to kill all the 
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traitors and, if necessary, raze Dacca to the ground. There will be no one 
to rule; there will be nothing to rule.”  54  The Pakistani military lived up 
to those words. On the fi rst night of the confl ict, troops entered Dhaka 
University and student hostels, killing hundreds, and fi lling mass graves. 
There was widespread violence in the form of rapes, murders, and mas-
sacres of entire villages—including women and children.  55  Intellectuals 
and journalists were targeted, as were Bengali Hindus. A Pakistani general 
later noted that some elements of the army went “berserk” as they sprayed 
bullets at random and destroyed whole villages at a time.  56  General Tikka 
Khan, a commanding general in the theater, was later nicknamed the 
“Butcher of Bengal.” A senior offi cer in the military noted that any Bengali 
thought to be a rebel or member of the Awami League was to be “sent to 
Bangladesh”—a euphemistic phrase referring to execution without trial.  57  
The total number of casualties that the Pakistan military infl icted on its 
citizens in the East is still debated; Mujib said it was more than 3 million 
while Tikka Khan placed it at 34,000. We can reasonably deduce that it was 
at least an order of magnitude above Tikka Khan’s estimate, and probably 
at least 1 million, a genocidal fi gure when one considers the war lasted 
less than nine months. Simply put, the Pakistani military and its leaders 
chose to practice what I call “collective repression” in East Pakistan, the 
highest level of violence possible. Why, we must ask, was such extreme 
violence used? 
 the external threat and its role in violence 
 India and its relationship with Pakistan was a central factor in the geno-
cidal response the Pakistani state fashioned in East Pakistan. The Bengali 
nationalist movement was perceived to enjoy high levels of support from 
India because of West Pakistani leaders’ and soldiers’ racist views of Ben-
gali identity, rooted in the country’s foundational “two-nation theory.” The 
two-nation theory’s reification and ossification of the supposed civiliza-
tional differences between “Hindu India” and “Muslim Pakistan” would 
have vicious consequences on the ground in East Pakistan, especially for 
Bengali Hindus. Additionally, Indian covert support to the Mukti Bahini in 
the summer of 1971 made Pakistani counterinsurgency more challenging, 
and consequently more violent. That is, high third-party support had both 
emotional and materialist consequences on Pakistani strategy. 
 Conflating Bengali Nationalists, Hindus, and the Indian State .  From the 
beginning of the crisis, the West Pakistani establishment dismissed Ben-
gali aspirations as an Indian ruse to destroy Pakistan.  58  Importantly, such 
sentiments were not the product of post-hoc rationalization of the army’s 
brutality; rather, the belief of Bengali-Indian collusion was widely accepted 
at the time. Indeed, the idea of a plot by India and Bengalis generally, and 
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Mujib and the Awami League specifically, to damage Pakistan’s interests 
was an idea popular in the West for decades.  59  In 1971, this general unease 
with Mujib and the Awami League’s intentions and faith in the Pakistani 
nation manifested in thinking that the Bengali uprising was the joint pro-
duction of “a few [East Pakistani] miscreants” and Indian subversion, the 
entire episode characterized as “India’s Trojan horse.”  60  
 It was certainly true that Mujib and the Awami League evinced a friend-
lier outlook toward India than the West Pakistani establishment. In a tri-
umphant rally in Dhaka shortly after the elections, he stressed his desire 
to see disputes with India resolved peacefully.  61  One British diplomat 
stationed in New Delhi noted in February 1971 that “for the fi rst time at 
least since 1965 a political leader has emerged in Pakistan who holds out 
the promise” of warming relations with India, mainly because “he is not 
committed to the recovery of Kashmir” and “he is not committed to the 
West Pakistan thesis of massive expenditure on the forces and continued 
hostility towards India.”  62  American diplomats agreed, predicting that “if 
he achieves a position of power, Sheikh Mujib . . . would take all possible 
steps to restore full trade and commercial relations with India. He spe-
cifi cally mentioned the necessity of getting cheaper Indian coal for East 
Pakistan,” as well as emphasizing the need for India’s cooperation for 
fl ood control in East Pakistan.  63  Reporting on a meeting with Mujib after 
the elections, the U.S. consul in Dhaka wrote that “better relations with 
India will probably in fact be his most pressing concern since he sees at 
least partial solution to East Pak problems in expanded trade with neigh-
boring India. Mujib, like many Bengalis, is not (except for record) particu-
larly hard on Kashmir.”  64  
 Greater economic and disaster-management cooperation with India 
hardly spelled geopolitical collusion to destroy Pakistan, but that is how 
Mujib, the Awami League, and Bengali nationalists were perceived at large. 
Bhutto, the military, and the bureaucracy “feared that Mujib’s constitu-
tional scheme [Six Points] giving more political and economic freedom for 
the eastern region would allow East Pakistan to go close to India which 
would ultimately weaken Pakistan and kill the Kashmir issue for good.”  65  
As one journalist put it, Mujib’s “theory of ‘Bengali nation’ was against the 
political conception of Pakistan. His advocacy for establishing trade and 
economic relations with India without the solution of the Kashmir dispute 
and the Farakka Barrage issue . . . was against the national interests of 
Pakistan.”  66  
 Behind this belief in collusion between Bengali nationalists and the Indian 
state was Pakistan’s founding ideology, the “two-nation theory.” This 
“theory” of religious nationalism claimed that the Muslims of South Asia 
formed a distinct community from its Hindus and thus needed a distinct 
political unit; in the words of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Hindus and Muslims 
“belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. 
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They neither intermarry not interdine together, and indeed, they belong 
to two different civilizations which are based mainly on confl icting ideas 
and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different.”  67  Partly as 
a result, and partly in spite,  68  of Jinnah’s machinations based on this “two-
nation” theory, Pakistan joined the comity of nations on August 14, 1947. As 
Devji writes of this development, “No other country has made of religion 
the sole basis of Muslim nationality.”  69  
 This foundational religious nationalism was, upon independence, the 
ideological glue for the new state. Scholars refer to concepts such as state-
building nationalism, whereby the state promotes a common national iden-
tity to displace more parochial attachments.  70  This process is carried out by 
using public schools and the military, as well the creation and manipula-
tion of symbols such as fl ags, anthems, and monuments,  71  to build a uni-
fi ed identity that coalesces around the state. For Pakistan, built on Muslim 
nationalism, it was but natural to adopt Islam as a unifying ideology in 
the face of religious and ethnic diversity.  72  While early rulers found these 
concerns pressing, it was Ayub Khan’s regime (1958–69) that “began the 
process of offi cial myth-creation in earnest,” primarily through its control 
of textbooks, electronic media, and print media.  73  
 The centrality of Islam to the identity of the state was contrasted with 
“Hindu” India, notwithstanding the latter’s claims to being a secular state,  74  
and cemented a stark division in Pakistan’s conception of the national-
isms of itself and its neighbor, defi ned in civilizational, religious terms. 
Basic demographic facts, however, complicated this story: Bengali Hindus 
were a sizable minority in East Pakistan. As such, extensive “Hindu” or 
“Indian” infl uence in East Pakistan was a constant concern of paranoid 
West Pakistanis and manifested itself in their racist views of Bengalis well 
before 1971. For instance, during the 1960s, Bengal governor Monem Khan 
banned the songs of Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore from being 
played on Radio Pakistan because he felt that Bangla was a “non-Muslim” 
language and was an agent of cultural domination of Indian Bengal.  75  One 
of Yahya’s own ministers admitted that the regime thought of the so-called 
nonmartial Bengalis as “Muslims converted from lower caste Hindus.”  76  
According to Ayub Khan’s autobiography, Bengalis, who “probably belong 
to the very original Indian races” had not known “real freedom or sover-
eignty” until the creation of Pakistan, before which “they have been in turn 
ruled either by the caste Hindus, Moghuls, Pathans or the British.” Most 
important, “they have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural 
and linguistic infl uence.”  77  Even the December 1970 electoral success of the 
Awami League was thought to be a result of the large Hindu minority in 
East Pakistan,  78  even though it enjoyed strong support from Bengali Mus-
lims too. 
 This confl ation of “Hindu,” “India,” and “Bengali” translated into Paki-
stani perceptions that the Bengali nationalist movement enjoyed high levels 
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of third-party support in 1971. In this simplistic view, “Hindu” stood for 
“India,” and the “Hindu infl uence” on East Pakistan—symbolized by its 
substantial Hindu population, and cultural, geographic, political, and lin-
guistic links to Northeast India—meant that the Bengalis were thought to 
owe their allegiance to the other “nation” that constituted the basis of the 
two-nation theory. The prism of religious bifurcation between “Muslim Pak-
istan” and “Hindu India” that the West Pakistani establishment saw events 
through, when combined with anti-Indian sentiment in the upper echelons 
of the same, meant that any Bengali uprising was perceived to be operating 
hand-in-glove with the Indian state. One Western historian, extremely sym-
pathetic to the West Pakistani military and wider establishment in general, 
and Yahya Khan in particular, captured this sentiment when arguing that 
“East Pakistan, because of the predominance of the Bengali elements in its 
population, because of its very considerable Hindu minority of some 
15 percent, and because of its physical separation from West Pakistan by 
hundreds of miles of Indian territory has for long afforded favorable condi-
tions for the exercise of Indian infl uence.”  79  
 As a result of perceptions of full-blown Indian support for the Bengali 
nationalist movement, the Pakistani state responded with extreme bru-
tality. The emotional implications of third-party support—pathological 
violence fueled by feelings of betrayal—revealed itself especially clearly 
in the collective repression carried out by security forces during the fi rst 
stage of the war, from March to May. Commanding generals gave specifi c 
instructions to seek out Bengali Hindu villages to wipe out, and Pakistani 
soldiers—already indoctrinated with strong anti-Hindu and anti-Indian 
sentiment—effi ciently followed orders.  80  During the early stages of the 
war, the U.S. consul general in Dhaka, Archer Blood, cabled Washington 
to report the “mass killing of unarmed civilians, the systematic elimina-
tion of the intelligentsia, and the annihilation of the Hindu population.”  81  
Indeed, U.S. offi cials in Dhaka were among the fi rst to sound the alarm 
on the developing genocide, and the particular targeting of Hindus. “One 
of Blood’s senior staffers privately noted ‘evidence of selecting singling 
out of Hindu professors for elimination, burning of Hindu settlements 
including 24 square block areas on edges of Old Dacca and village built 
around temple.’”  82  Another was witness to the army lining up people 
outside their houses and shooting down in lines, “killing close to six 
hundred” in one go.  83  One diplomat in Dhaka plainly noted in April that 
“Hindus seem bear brunt of general regin [ sic ] of terror designed con-
vince populace not cooperate with Awami League or anti-military forces 
in future.”  84  
 The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission report, a judiciary-led inquiry 
into the war in its aftermath, reported that “there were verbal instructions 
to eliminate Hindus.” Testimony such as that given by Lieutenant Colonel 
Aziz Ahmad Khan to the commission—“Gen. Niazi visited my unit at 
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Thakargaon and Bogra. He asked as to how many Hindus we had killed. 
In May, there was an order in writing to kill Hindus. This order was from 
Brigadier Abdullah Malik of 23 Brigade”—was commonplace.  85  Writing a 
series on the 1971 war for BBC Urdu, Colonel Nadir Ali recounted a con-
versation with his superior offi cer in the fi rst month of the war. “The brief-
ing offi cer said: ‘Listen Nadir, we have got the root cause of this problem, 
and that is the Hindu. The decision was taken to kill Hindus. If Hindus 
are fi nished then this problem will be solved forever.’”  86  On the very fi rst 
night of the confl ict, the military made it a priority—alongside major mili-
tary objectives, such as the disarming of East Pakistani Rifl es and police 
and arresting Mujib—to target the Nawabpur area, where Hindu houses 
were alleged to have been converted into armories.  87  Even the decisions 
about which dormitories and halls at Dhaka University were to be tar-
geted on March 25 were partly infl uenced by the “Hindu” factor, since 
Jagannath Hall, traditionally home to Hindu students, was one of the three 
main buildings attacked.  88  
 The Pakistani military would attempt to ascertain whether locals were 
Hindu or Muslim before unleashing violence—as in Dhaka on April 16, 
where troops killed seven people after querying residents “are you Hindu 
or Muslim?” or as on a train from Mymensingh on May 18 where passen-
gers were forced to recite the  kalma to prove that they were Muslim.  89  The 
headmaster of a Catholic school in Nawabganj received a letter instruct-
ing him that “Hindus are trouble makers and you are not to give them 
any help.”  90  There was a “common pattern” to the military’s operations, 
“whereby troops move into a village, ask where Hindus live, and then kill 
male Hindus.”  91  Even food relief for the largely peasant population stricken 
by civil war was denied to Hindus.  92  
 Security forces on the ground in East Pakistan deployed paramilitary 
and irregular units in their aims, and the constitution of these irregular 
units offers a further clue to how the confl ict was seen. Most conspicuous 
was the use of the Islami Jamiat-e-Taliba (IJT), the violent student wing of 
the Jamaat-e-Islami, a rightwing Islamist political party that gave its com-
plete support to the army in its actions against “enemies of Islam.”  93  The 
cooperation between the Jamaat and the army saw the formation of two 
paramilitary units drawn from the IJT called al-Badr and al-Shams—note 
the Arab/Islamic nomenclature—which aided and abetted the military’s 
hunting of guerrillas and nationalists.  94  A Western observer noted during 
the crisis that West Pakistan’s confl ict with Bengalis “had overtones of a 
religious crusade or jihad . . . Western Muslims say the Hindus have cor-
rupted Bengali Muslims” and that “one cannot be a Bengali and a Muslim” 
simultaneously.  95  
 Contemporary diplomats’ explanations for Pakistani aggression, 
especially against Hindus, corroborate the importance of perceptions of 
Indian support for Bengali nationalists. Speaking of the genocidal “naked, 
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calculated and widespread selection of Hindus for special treatment,” 
Blood wrote that “evidence suggests Pak military unable make distinctions 
between Indians and Pakistani Hindus, treating both as enemies. West 
Paks resident here in conversations with us often equate ‘wicked Hindus’ 
and ‘wicked Indians,’ using both terms interchangeably . . . it conceivable 
that soldiers from West Pakistan, where virtually no Hindus reside, incul-
cated with line that Hindus are responsible for secessionist currents in East 
Pakistan.”  96  Similarly, summarizing their conversations with Pakistanis 
in Islamabad over the fi rst two months of the confl ict, the U.S. embassy 
cabled that “India is emotionally criticized as the principal culprit in the 
East Pakistan situation,” which was deemed a conspiracy hatched by 
“only a ‘small’ hard-core of ‘Bengali nationalists and Indian agents’ . . . 
[who] should be dealt with summarily.” Indeed, “the major criticism of 
the MLA [Martial Law Administration] is that Yahya showed too much 
patience and waited too long before striking down the Awami League.”  97  
A few months later, describing the “general mood in Karachi,” American 
diplomats cabled that “to one and all, India is chief cause of trouble in East 
wing, major threat to peace in area, and warmonger determined to break 
up Pakistan. Intensity of anti-Indian feeling is hard to overestimate.”  98  
A U.S. cable relayed a conversation between a senior East Pakistan govern-
ment offi cial and two USAID offi cers, in which the offi cial claimed that “the 
Hindu community in East Pakistan has always conspired against Pakistan 
and spoken and acted in such a way as to heighten distrust and hatred of 
West Pakistan by Bengalis.”  99  Providing its explanation of the cleansing 
of Bengali Hindus one month into the war, the U.S. diplomatic mission 
in Islamabad noted that “there exists large body of West Pak opinion that 
Hindus leading element behind secessionist movement.”  100  In mid-May, 
the same offi ce wrote that “thinking of West Paks, especially Punjab is col-
ored by an emotional anti-Hindu bias. This has been buttressed in recent 
weeks by thrust of GOP propaganda line about East Pak situation which 
has stressed alleged role of Hindus (and Indians) in creating crisis.”  101  
American consul Blood wrote at the same time that “we must allow for 
strength of army, and West Pakistan belief that Hindus in East Pakistan 
are subversive element, working with Indian movement and ‘unpatriotic’ 
Bengali Muslims to destroy integrity of Pakistan. Pak troops clearly look 
upon local Hindus as ‘the enemy.’”  102  
 These views were supported by contemporary American intelligence 
assessments. An intelligence memorandum written six months into the 
war explained that the Pakistani military’s “wrath” turned toward Hin-
dus was “apparently . . . because they were associated with India, which 
was thought to be responsible for the Bengali ‘uprising,’” later noting that 
“Hindu residents were adjudged a permanent threat to security and appar-
ently until that threat was reduced, i.e., until a suffi cient number of Hindus 
had left the country, the government’s repressive policy was to continue.”  103  
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Another memo suggested that “troops mostly from the West Pakistani Pun-
jab (an area now almost 100 percent Muslim and strongly communal in out-
look) appear have made Hindus, darkly suspected anyway of being Indian 
spies and secessionists, their special targets. In this virulent atmosphere, 
many Pakistani junior offi cers, enlisted men, and resident collaborators 
have become accustomed to mistreating the Hindu religious minority.”  104  
In May, the CIA reported that “Pakistani soldiers have almost certainly 
been encouraged in their extreme actions by the steady stream of anti-
Indian, anti-Hindu propaganda put out by the Pakistani authorities, who 
claim that the trouble is India’s fault and that they are only fi ghting foreign 
inspired subversive and secessionist plots.”  105  
 In an explosive article in the  Sunday Times in June that detailed the extent 
of the army’s atrocities in considerable depth, Anthony Mascarenhas spoke 
to soldiers and offi cers about the brutality. His article is worth quoting in 
some detail, for it captures soldiers’ thinking at the time: 
 “The Hindus had completely undermined the Muslim masses with their 
money,” Col. Naim of 9th Division headquarters told me in the officers [ sic ] 
mess at Comilla. “They bled the province white. Money, food, and produce 
flowed across the borders to India. In some cases they made up more than 
half the teaching staff in the colleges and schools, and sent their own chil-
dren to be educated in Calcutta. It had reached the point where Bengali cul-
ture was in fact Hindu culture, and East Pakistan was virtually under the 
control of the Marwari businessmen in Calcutta. We have to sort them out to 
restore the land to the people, and the people to their Faith.” 
 Or take Major Bashir. He came up from the ranks. He is SSO of the 
9th Division at Comilla and he boasts of a personal bodycount of 28. He had 
his own reasons for what has happened. “This is a war between the pure 
and the impure,” he informed me over a cup of green tea. “The people here 
may have Muslim names and call themselves Muslims. But they are Hindus 
at heart. You won’t believe that the  maulvi of the Cantonment mosque here 
issued a  fathwa during Friday prayers that the people would attain  janat 
if they killed West Pakistanis. We sorted the bastard out and we are now 
sorting out the others. Those who are left will be real Muslims. We will even 
teach them Urdu.”  106  
 As a serving officer in the 1971 war summarized, “Everyone thought that 
this secessionist activity was an Indian conspiracy.”  107  
 Accusations of Indian Support: Misperception or Propaganda?  While it is quite 
clear that the soldiers and officers directly involved in the mass killings were 
convinced of the Indian-Hindu-Bengali triangle of subversion, the more 
difficult question is whether those in the higher leadership believed their 
own myth making.  108  Did the Pakistani leadership deploy propaganda—
to the effect that the crisis was India’s doing, acting primarily through the 
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Bengali Hindu community—that it entirely disbelieved? Was this a case 
of “genuine” misperception or deliberate dissembling? On the one hand, 
it is certainly true that leaders often use the “bogey man” of a foreign 
backer to distract the attention of their citizens and outside observers when 
clamping down on their own population; in a British telegram in early 
April, it was deemed “no surprise that the central government should use 
India as a scapegoat for any lack of progress in reimposing control in East 
Pakistan.”  109  Perhaps the best evidence for this purely cynical view of the 
exaggeration of the “Indian threat” can be found in the tone and content 
of West Pakistani reports once censorship went into effect in late March, 
resulting in an almost comical level of concern with “infiltration” of “armed 
Indians” as well as movements of Indian troops and paramilitary forces on 
the border,  110  well before Indian forces were actually involved. 
 However, at the same time, it is likely that the military leadership 
believed at least some, and probably most, of what it was desperately try-
ing to convince its population, and the rest of the world, of: that the Ben-
gali movement was operating hand-in-glove with the Indian state. After 
all, they did not exist separately from the society in which such opin-
ions were received wisdom. General K. M. Arif, a serving offi cer in the 
1971 war, wrote about the ill-feelings Bengalis had toward West Pakistan 
by alleging that “initially, India played a subtle role in instigating such 
hatred. So did the Hindu minority in East Pakistan.”  111  General A. A. K. 
Niazi, the commanding offi cer in the theater from April 1971, wrote that 
“India had been continuously assisting Mujib” and that “the vast major-
ity of teachers in [East Pakistan] schools and colleges were Hindus.”  112  
“The teachers played an important role in moulding [ sic ] the ideas of the 
youth in their formative years. The West Pakistanis were painted as impe-
rialists, exploiters, and tyrants. The seeds of discontent were sown.”  113  
He added that “thousands of Indians” entered East Pakistan during the 
unrest in early March, amidst the negotiations between Yahya, Mujib and 
Bhutto and that these thousands of Indians were actually military person-
nel who had crossed the border in civilian clothing to keep their identity 
secret.  114  While these recollections could be read as post-hoc justifi cations 
for their behavior during the war, such perceptions were confi rmed by 
neutral observers. As U.S. ambassador Farland wrote in a secret telegram 
to Washington two weeks after Operation Searchlight kicked off, “Pak 
build-up of ‘Indian threat’ is probably a mixture of genuine concern and 
an effort to divert internal and external attention from Pak army actions 
in East Pakistan. I know the Paks [ sic ] are worried about India’s inten-
tions, and from info available through intelligence channels they have 
cause for worry.”  115  
 Pakistan’s extreme brutality, especially in the fi rst stage of the war, was 
typical of the emotional or pathological levels of violence that can result 
from perceptions of high levels of third-party support. Its “collective 
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repression” strategy had its roots in how Bengali nationalists were seen: 
as acting on behalf, and with the full support, of the Indian state. Both the 
general slaughter, and the specifi c targeting of Hindus, can be attributed to 
the essentialism of leaders and soldiers. In turn, this racism was based on a 
civilizational conception of the difference between Hindu India and Mus-
lim Pakistan, as captured by the two-nation theory. Niazi’s description of 
the conduct of General Tikka Khan’s forces the fi rst two nights of Operation 
Searchlight is revealing in its choice of words: “Tikka let loose everything at 
his disposal as if  raiding an enemy , not dealing with his own misguided and 
misled people.”  116  
 Indian Support for the Mukti Bahini and Pakistani Counterinsurgency .  In 
addition to its emotional implications, the materialist effects of third-party 
support, which result in harsher state violence because it faces a tougher 
military fight, were also operative in 1971. Though Pakistan exaggerated, 
and believed some of its own exaggerations, concerning Indian involve-
ment at the outset of the crisis, that does not take away from the fact that, 
within weeks of war breaking out, India verifiably began to provide sup-
port to the movement. 
 The Indian position in early April was, according to a British diplomat, 
“not to intervene militarily in either West or East Pakistan; to give assis-
tance in the form of asylum and to allow supplies, short of war material, 
to the East Bengalis . . . the Indians are in no position to go further because 
they lack information of the development of the resistance movement in 
East Pakistan and of the progress made by the West Pakistan Army to 
secure control over the whole of East Pakistan.”  117  Instead it would pay to 
wait, as another British cable in early April noted: “Time is needed for Ben-
gali resistance to take organized form however and to work out strategy 
for longer term. Time is also needed to build up innatl support . . . nature 
of assistance India may provide when situation clarifi ed will depend on 
circumstances.”  118  Though there had been high-level political and military 
discussions of more direct intervention as early as March 26, initial support 
from the Indian side of the border in the early weeks was almost entirely 
unoffi cial or unconfi rmed.  119  
 However, India’s involvement quickly stepped up.  120  In mid-April, 
American diplomats conveyed to their British colleagues that “the Indi-
ans are providing small arms and communications equipment to the 
East Bengalis” through the Border Security Force. Still, at that time “the 
Americans [did] not believe that the quantities are very large.”  121  A week 
later, British diplomats reported that “reliable journalists” who had vis-
ited the border informed them that, in addition to supplying arms and 
communications equipment, the BSF “had crossed the border to blow up 
bridges when requested to do so by the resistance movement . . . [BSF] 
personnel spoke freely about their intention of setting up camps on Indian 
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territory to give military training to East Bengalis. It was considered that 
the East Bengalis if properly trained could become effective guerrilla 
fi ghters.”  122  
 By the fi rst week of May, British diplomats were reporting the “fi rst rea-
sonably authenticated case we have come across of supply of substantial 
quantity of arms from Indian side.”  123  Indian arms factories were at this 
point manufacturing unmarked bullets for the Mukti Bahini.  124  A few days 
later, training camps were set up on the border by the recently “reorganized 
and expanded” BSF—previously under one inspector general, now under 
three IGs in each of West Bengal, Tripura, and Assam—leading diplomats 
to conclude that “present pattern of support seems to suggest direction by 
central government.”  125  Indeed, the fi rst evidence that training camps were 
being set up had arrived in late April.  126  
 By the summer, the picture had changed appreciably from the beginning 
of the crisis, and Indian behavior had caught up to Pakistani perceptions 
and allegations.  127  By then, millions of Bengalis had poured into India, seek-
ing refuge from the brutality of the Pakistani army. Among those crossing 
the border were thousands of defecting soldiers, police, and students, cor-
ralled into a guerrilla army, called the Mukti Bahini, by the Indian Border 
Security Force, which provided sanctuary, safe passage to its camps, food, 
money, small arms, ammunition, explosives, training, and intelligence to 
the insurgents.  128  The military commander of the Mukti Bahini was Colonel 
Osmani. Journalists who spent time with the Mukti Bahini were convinced 
“that most of their operations masterminded by the Indian intelligence and 
the Indian Army, who frequently gave fi re cover to Mukti Bahini activi-
ties across the border.”  129  Notably, men from the BSF or army themselves 
did not cross into Pakistan, notwithstanding offi cial Pakistani accusations 
to that effect, though a State Department intelligence note did claim that it 
was “distinctly possible” that the Indian military had provided “advisors” 
on East Pakistani soil.  130  
 India’s direct support to the Mukti Bahini played an important role in the 
form and function of Pakistani counterinsurgency, especially in the post-
monsoon phase of the confl ict. First, India’s strengthening of Mukti Bahini 
capabilities of insurgency and sabotage led to more guerrilla activity from 
the summer onward, resulting in vicious reprisal attacks from the army. 
Second, with its presence along, and shelling from, border positions, India 
ensured that Pakistan’s army would necessarily be spread thinly, increas-
ing its reliance on large-scale violence to control the population. 
 Indian support kicked in at a crucial time in the confl ict: the West Paki-
stani military had largely asserted control of major towns, but had little 
presence in the countryside.  131  Additionally, while Bengali rebels did not 
lack resolve, they certainly lacked the material and technical capabilities 
to fi ght a guerrilla war. Finally, the monsoon was imminent.  132  These fac-
tors meant that Indian support ensured a signifi cantly tougher fi ght for 
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Pakistani security forces than would otherwise have been the case; Mukti 
Bahini activity picked up considerably from the summer months.  133  Suc-
cessful rebel attacks on security forces or infrastructure, such as bridges—
possible partly because of India’s “major role in training and supplying 
insurgents”—would invariably lead to vicious reprisals from the mili-
tary, operating on the principle of collective punishment.  134  Commenting 
on how Indian support for the Mukti Bahini complicated their efforts in 
“counseling Paks against collective reprisals,” the U.S. ambassador noted 
that “most of reprisals recently reported were in response to Mukti Bahini 
actions. Pak Army is caught up in vicious cycle of violence which cannot be 
halted solely by GOP restraint . . . this comment is not offered in any way 
as justifi cation for harsh and stupid collective reprisals, however, and we 
shall continue to press for more rational army response.”  135  When discuss-
ing the “primitive element in some of the army’s actions,” British offi cials 
gently impressed on Indian diplomats that “severe action was still likely in 
the border areas, particularly if there were any incursions or if the means of 
resistance were supplied from the Indian side.”  136  
 Moreover, the high levels of infi ltration and coordination with forces 
from across the border necessitated the military guarding the long border 
with India, leaving it thin in the countryside towns and villages where 
the insurgency was centered.  137  Even before the summer, Pakistani lead-
ers and military offi cials seemed concerned about Indian strategy and its 
encirclement in East Pakistan.  138  British diplomats reported a message 
from Yahya to the prime minister in which “the President had expressed 
apprehension about the Indian military forces in the states adjoining East 
Pakistan.”  139  Similarly, Yahya complained to President Nixon in a let-
ter on March 31 of “the deployment of nearly six divisions of the Indian 
Army not too far from the borders of East Pakistan” and expressed hope 
that Nixon would impress “upon Indian leaders the paramount need for 
refraining from any action that might aggravate the situation and lead to 
irretrievable consequences.”  140  The Yahya regime constantly asked dip-
lomatic representatives for information about Indian intentions vis-à-vis 
direct military intervention.  141  By the summer of 1971, Pakistan’s worst 
fears began to be realized. As one American diplomat in Dacca summa-
rized in July, “demands on Pak Army to defend border against India and 
protect its vital lines of communication may be out-running its capabil-
ity. This gives insurgents who are willing to operate deep in East Paki-
stan territory opportunity that will be hard to pass up.”  142  Blood summed 
up the trade-off facing the Pakistan military: “Concentration of searchs 
[ sic ] and purges in Dacca and contingency redeployment against Indian 
action would have effect of limiting army’s freedom to control country-
side, assuming it desired to achieve such control.”  143  Shortly before India 
overtly intervened in the confl ict, the “two-front” problem facing the Pak-
istan military became even more acute: Indian shelling and “probing” of 
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the border “pins regular Pak army to the borders and gives them plenty 
to think about.”  144  
 Scholars expect militaries operating in counterinsurgency environments 
where their forces are stretched to adopt indiscriminate violence to spread 
fear, hoping they can suffi ciently terrorize the local population in the hopes 
of subduing them.  145  As British diplomats noted in July, the problem the 
army faced was that “it must use its strength to compensate for its lack of 
numbers. It continues apparently to try to protect essential services against 
sabotage by instilling fear in the local populace that if the bridge or pylon 
near their village is damaged their village is going to suffer.”  146  Reporting 
on a British journalist’s visit to Tripura, a diplomat in Calcutta cabled that 
“his talks with refugees had convinced him of continued selective killing 
by Pakistan army of Bengalis and Hindus to terrorise population and also 
to establish wide deserted corridors along main communications routes 
and along Tripura frontier.”  147  
 Amidst the slaughter, India intervened overtly in the confl ict, notwith-
standing contemporary diplomats’ concerns with such a step.  148  India’s 
entry into the war can be laid almost entirely at the feet of West Pakistani 
decision makers, who believed so strongly in Bengali-Indian collusion that 
they helped bring it about, in a tragic self-fulfi lling prophecy. The Indian 
state’s casus belli  to intervene was directly related to West Pakistani 
repression, especially at the beginning of the confl ict. The heavy hand of 
security forces created a massive humanitarian and refugee crisis,  149  with 
millions of Bengalis fl eeing across the border, mainly to the Indian states of 
West Bengal, Tripura, and Assam. The severe demographic and economic 
strain those states found themselves under, and the resulting domestic 
pressure imposed on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to take action, led to 
India’s overt entry into the war. It is an open question how much lower 
refugee fl ows would have been had the Pakistani military, correctly per-
ceiving the “limited” third-party support Bengalis actually enjoyed, used 
a lighter hand at the outset of the crisis. It is beyond debate, however, 
that the extent of Pakistani repression eliminated both the prospect of 
any prominent Bengali politicians or leaders supporting the state, and 
induced India to directly intervene. Contrary to West Pakistani beliefs, 
India’s actions were less a result of long-term planning and cooperation 
with Pakistani Bengalis and more an ad-hoc response to a growing cri-
sis;  150  it saw an opportunity to weaken its primarily rival in the region and 
gleefully took it.  151  On December 16, 1971, lieutenant generals Niazi and 
Jagjit Singh Aurora signed the instrument of surrender of Pakistani forces, 
formally splitting the country into the independent states of Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. 
 An inescapable irony is that since its traumatic split in 1971, Pakistan 
has been more adept at defending itself. This increased territorial secu-
rity is at least partly a product of military modernization, including the 
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acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan is also better able to 
defend itself because it is a more coherent state, at least territorially speak-
ing, than it was before Bangladesh’s secession. Indeed, one of the central 
predicaments facing Pakistani military decision makers between 1947 and 
1971 was how to adequately guard both borders against India simulta-
neously; their solution to this problem—leaving the East almost entirely 
undefended, as in the 1965 war—was an important contributor to Ben-
gali grievances.  152  In a sense, then, Pakistani leaders were, tragically and 
with great cost, wrong about the security effects of losing East Pakistan: 
secession decreased, rather than increased, the long-run chances of Indian 
invasion of Pakistan’s territory. At the time they were making their deci-
sions about whether and how much to repress Bengalis, however, Paki-
stani leaders could not have known, and did not believe, that losing East 
Pakistan would be benefi cial for their security. They conceived of territo-
rial loss in much more simplistic terms: losing land and people that were 
nominally tied to the Pakistani state was an unwelcome prospect to be 
resisted at all costs—and resist they did. 
 A few years later, the now diminished state of Pakistan would face 
another secessionist movement. This time, however, the military acted with 
more restraint, despite evincing a similar intransigence on territorial loss. 
 Defeating the Baloch Insurrection in the 1970s 
 Between 1973 and 1977, the Pakistan Army was ordered into Balochistan by 
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto was unhappy with the fact that 
his party, the PPP, had little influence in the province, and he had uneasy 
relations with the parties in power in the provincial assemblies. He dis-
missed the assemblies, leading to Balochistan’s secessionist moment, with 
the province rising in revolt, sparking an insurgency. The conflict con-
tinued for almost four years, and while there certainly was an element of 
repression carried out by the state, it was not at the level that it was during 
the 1971 civil war; in all, the four-year conflict between the state and the 
Baloch militias agitating for greater autonomy cost about nine thousand 
lives on both sides.  153  
 The level of violence used at the time of the secessionist moment approxi-
mated “militarization.” The reason for this response was that the dispute 
was seen primarily in domestic terms, and the movement was not consid-
ered a signifi cant external threat. Third-party support for the Baloch rebels 
was “moderate”: they enjoyed sanctuary and low levels of fi nancial and 
military support from Afghanistan, a much weaker power than Pakistan, 
after Sardar Daoud Khan launched a coup, but little material support from 
major powers, including the Soviet Union. Other states, most notably Iran, 
backed Pakistan in the confl ict. As such, the threat posed by the movement 
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was deemed manageable without recourse to the levels of repression seen 
earlier in the decade. 
 early troubles 
 Balochistan’s relationship with the center had always been rocky, and 
in fact could be traced to the British colonial era. British rule of the prov-
ince was mostly indirect, exercised through the patronage of various tribal 
chiefs. Such policies empowered the tribes at the expense of local admin-
istration, and consequently Baloch tribal chiefs and leaders had a much 
stronger streak of independence than local actors elsewhere in British 
India.  154  The geography of the province has also facilitated the empow-
ering of tribes: the large expanse—it is easily the largest by area in all of 
Pakistan—combined with the relatively low population, arid climate, and 
little fertile land resulted in a “nomadic pastoral” society. The long dis-
tances between settlements and desert environment made the execution 
of centralized authority difficult, thus fragmenting the society along tribal 
lines.  155  
 Baloch tribal chiefs chafed under attempts to bring Balochistan into 
a wider body politic, whether under British or Pakistani administration. 
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, an important tribal elder of the Bizenjo tribe and the 
“principal spokesman for the independence forces,” pointedly summarized 
Baloch nationalist sentiment in 1947 when he said that “we have a distinct 
culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslims 
requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran should 
also be amalgamated with Pakistan.”  156  This streak of independent tribal-
ism manifested itself in the Kalat State issue in 1947. Kalat was one of four 
princely states in Balochistan.  157  Upon the departure of the British, leaders 
of princely states were allowed a “third way”—an option other than acced-
ing to either India or Pakistan, which is what the majority of states in Brit-
ish India faced. This third option was of independence, and unsurprisingly, 
many princely states opted for it, short-lived though it may have been.  158  
The Khan of Kalat declared independence in 1947, with the support of the 
other princely states of Balochistan.  159  He was also supported by the Kalat 
State National Party, which was the majority party in the then Kalat House 
of Commons.  160  
 Less than a year later, under considerable duress, Kalat acceded to the 
state of Pakistan. The accession was undertaken after the use of force by 
the Pakistan Army in putting down Baloch guerrilla forces. The coerced 
incorporation of Balochistan into Pakistan proper angered Baloch national-
ists, resulting in rallies and protests in some parts of the province.  161  An alli-
ance featuring various nationalist tribes and parties—including the Kalat 
State National Party, the Baloch League, and the Baloch National Worker 
Party—unsuccessfully attempted to lead a national liberation movement, 
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and various “states” within Balochistan continued to assert their indepen-
dence. It was not until 1954 that Balochistan was integrated both internally 
and externally as an offi cial province of Pakistan.  162  
 However, the troubled relationship between Balochistan and the center 
continued in the 1960s. Many of the underlying issues remained the same: 
Baloch leaders demanded autonomy or outright independence, owing to a 
sense of displacement due to the in-migration of Punjabis and Pashtuns in 
Balochistan, along with more longstanding grievances, such as underrep-
resentation of the Baloch in the military and bureaucracy and the exploita-
tion by the center of Balochistan’s plentiful natural resources.  163  The state, 
meanwhile, continued to bring Balochistan under even greater control. 
For instance, in 1955 the One Unit scheme was executed. One Unit real-
ized the idea that the four provinces in West Pakistan—Balochistan, NWFP, 
Punjab, and Sindh—were a single administrative entity, while East Paki-
stan was distinct. It was aimed at neutering East Pakistan’s numerical and 
demographic superiority, but for the purposes of Baloch nationalists, it was 
another instance of the center integrating Balochistan with the rest of the 
country despite their preferences to the contrary. 
 One Unit resulted in the second in a series of Baloch revolts. Guerrilla 
forces numbering about a thousand, primarily drawn from the Zehri tribe, 
fi rst fought Pakistan military units in 1958 until the uprising was quelled.  164  
But the cessation of hostilities proved sporadic. Skirmishes between the 
center and various tribes—including the Zarakzai, the Bugti, the Marri, 
the Mengal, and the Bizenjo tribes—continued intermittently throughout 
the 1960s, with major confrontations taking place in 1964 and 1965.  165  Dur-
ing this period, the Baloch movement was rocked by the Nauroz Khan inci-
dent, an episode which confi rmed for future nationalists that the Pakistani 
state was untrustworthy and deceitful. In 1960, Nauroz Khan agreed to lay 
down his arms only on the condition that One Unit would be done away 
with, and that he and his men would be granted amnesty and safe passage. 
Having agreed to these terms, the military reneged on its promise, arrested 
Nauroz and his right-hand men, and hung fi ve of his men for treason. Nau-
roz himself died in prison in 1964, and his imprisonment and death became 
an important symbol for the Baloch nationalist movement.  166  
 the secessionist moment and 
pakistan’s militarization strategy 
 For domestic political reasons, Bhutto had been unhappy with the pro-
vincial leadership of the main party in power in Balochistan, the National 
Awami Party (NAP). The NAP was a left-leaning nationalist party which 
also enjoyed power in NWFP.  167  The two provincial governments had 
troubled relations with the center throughout their tenure, with the NAP 
alleging that the federal government was intent on destabilizing the 
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provinces in order to wrest control of them. The NAP leadership also 
raised concerns about the newly written constitution, which the PPP 
government had introduced with much fanfare.  168  In general, they “mis-
trusted Bhutto.”  169  For its part, the PPP had little representation in NWFP 
and none in Balochistan; the main stakeholders in Baloch politics owed 
their allegiance to local tribal chiefs, such as the Bizenjos and Mengals, 
and not Bhutto’s party.  170  Bhutto’s leadership style was authoritarian, 
and he squabbled repeatedly with the NAP in his efforts to make them 
more subservient. 
 Even at the height of their “cooperation”—the spring of 1972—close 
observers predicted trouble between Bhutto and the NAP.  171  Sure enough, 
on February 12, 1973, he dismissed the provincial government, and that 
summer he would ban the NAP outright and arrest its leaders.  172  Bhutto 
fi red the governor of the province, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo—“little 
purpose would be served” in explaining why, he wrote in his letter to 
Bizenjo—and replaced him with his confi dante and ally Nawab Akbar 
Bugti, considered by many to be a traitor to the Baloch nationalist cause 
ever since.  173  He also dismissed Sardar Ataullah Mengal as chief minister, 
and in so doing ensured that two vital reservoirs of power in the province, 
the Mengals and the Bizenjos, strongly opposed his government.  174  
 Bhutto used two episodes as justifi cation for the move, and while conclu-
sive proof is hard to come by, it is widely believed that his government was 
responsible for both. The fi rst was trouble in Lasbela, which began in early 
1973. According to the offi cial PPP version, the localized violence was due 
to a dispute between the Marri and Mengal tribes, and it required central 
intervention in the form of army troops to restore order.  175  On the other 
hand, Baloch nationalists alleged that the government itself was “foment-
ing trouble” and “creating anarchical conditions in the provinces,” and that 
“vested interests,”  176  such as federal home minister, Khan Abdul Qayyum 
Khan, “had a hand” in the “armed rebellion” in Lasbela, designed to 
“overthrow the elected and constitutional Government of Baluchistan.”  177  
As  Dawn ’s editorial on the Lasbela situation said, “It is almost impossible 
for any disinterested observer to form a coherent idea of the course of 
developments out of this welter of one-sided narratives and opinions.”  178  
Regardless, the center sent in its fi rst batch of troops—their numbers to be 
increased manifold in the coming months—so that they could “restore law 
and order” in Lasbela.  179  Knowing Bhutto and his single-minded pursuit 
of power as the analyst armed with hindsight does, and knowing that the 
government had on its side the  jam (tribal chief) of Lasbela, a staunch oppo-
nent of the NAP, it is more than reasonable to surmise that the incident was 
instigated by the central government itself. Certainly that is the view of 
those involved in the confl ict, one supported by contemporary diplomatic 
correspondence.  180  A telegram from the British embassy in Islamabad, writ-
ten during the Lasbela crisis, noted that “those people who theorised that 
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Mr. Bhutto had been encouraging Akbar Bugti and the other opponents of 
the Baluchistan Government to create trouble to provide an opportunity for 
the imposition of President’s rule, may take this latest development as an 
indication that their theories are proving correct.”  181  
 The second and arguably more important justifi cation for Bhutto’s move 
was his revelation that Pakistan intelligence had recovered “a cache of 350 
Soviet submachine guns and 100,000 rounds of ammunition in the house 
of the Iraqi political attaché in Islamabad.”  182  Bhutto claimed that the arms 
were destined for Pakistani or Iranian Balochistan, but the Iraqi Embassy 
episode is, to this day, shrouded in mystery. After all, if the arms were 
destined for Southwest Pakistan or Southeast Iran, then using Islamabad, 
the capital city located in the northeast of the country, as a transit point 
made little sense, a point noted by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR) in Washington and the U.S. embassy in Islamabad.  183  Interviews also 
pointed to the great likelihood that Bhutto’s government was behind the 
whole episode.  184  All that can be said with assuredness is that the event was 
extremely convenient for Bhutto—an “uncanny coincidence” and “political 
windfall” according to the INR—which he used as a pretext to overturn the 
Balochistan and NWFP provincial governments.  185  
 What was beyond contestation, however, was the fact that Bhutto’s 
actions greatly angered Baloch nationalists, who rose in revolt, representing 
the movement’s secessionist moment. Bhutto’s actions were a catalyst—
“he had created the Balochistan tragedy by his own overwhelming 
egomania”—but the underlying reasons for the revolt were more 
structural.  186  Balochistan remained a perilously underdeveloped region. Per 
capita income was easily the lowest of Pakistan’s provinces, development 
projects instituted in the region often favored outsiders and settlers more 
than locals, royalties from valuable resources such as natural gas were 
extremely limited, literacy levels were the lowest in the country, and Baloch 
representation in the national and provincial governments was poor.  187  
 An insurgency against the state got underway, featuring roughly 
between fi ve and ten thousand armed insurgents.  188  It was by far the most 
serious challenge emanating from Balochistan in Pakistan’s history. In 
response, Bhutto’s government gave the Pakistan Army control over mili-
tary operations; the military sent in eighty thousand troops to suppress 
the movement. The rebels were nominally united under the Balochistan 
People’s Liberation Front and drew support from a number of tribes, but 
mainly the Marri tribe, in conjunction with the Mengal and Bizenjo tribes. 
They established bases of operation in Balochistan as well as in some parts 
of Afghanistan.  189  They were fi ghting what they deemed an army of occu-
pation from Punjab and promised to keep fi ghting as long as their  sardars , 
or leaders, remained imprisoned by Bhutto and as long as General Tikka 
Khan’s troops remained in the province.  190  The Baloch tribesmen favored 
tactics such as cutting off the main transportation routes in the province, 
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attacks on Western oil exploration teams, surprise attacks followed by 
quick retreats into the hills of Balochistan and even Afghanistan, and hit-
ting military supply lines.  191  By July 1974, the rebels had succeeded in cut-
ting off the majority of roads leading into the province and halting coal 
transportation from Balochistan to Punjab by repeatedly attacking the cru-
cial Sibi-Harnai rail link. The guerrillas also attacked “colonial” oil explo-
ration in the province, by targeting drilling and survey operations. More 
generally, as with most guerrilla groups, the Baloch nationalists focused 
on avoiding direct confrontation with the Pakistan Army, instead opting 
for ambush attacks.  192  
 The Pakistan military, meanwhile, began its operations in the Marri 
and Mengal tribal areas.  193  It attempted to hold tribal leaders accountable 
for tribes’ actions and imposed levies on tribes. It also used population 
transfers—an anti-insurgent technique imported from British tactics—in a 
bid to weaken the guerrillas from within. The most important element of 
the military’s strategy, however, was air power. Air power was crucial in 
the largest and most important single battle of the confl ict that took place 
in September 1974, when rebels fought a pitched battle against the army 
at Chamalang. The rebels set themselves up in a defensive formation to 
protect families and livestock. Benefi tting from the maneuverability and 
fi repower they provided, helicopter gunships, as well as F-86 and Mirage 
fi ghter jets, pummeled the rebel positions and, combined with ground 
forces, defeated the rebels soundly. Most of the guerrillas either escaped or 
were captured, and their livestock, including 50,000 sheep and 550 camels, 
crucial to their sustenance, were taken and sold to non-Baloch in Punjab. 
The Battle at Chamalang was a turning point in the confl ict. After its con-
clusion, the war simmered at low levels since the tribesmen were unable to 
“regain the military initiative in the three ensuing years of . . . increasingly 
uncoordinated fi ghting.”  194  
 The confl ict ended in 1977 when General Zia-ul-Haq withdrew forces 
after declaring victory. In total, the war cost about nine thousand lives on 
both sides.  195  The confl ict was a small-scale war of attrition, fairly typical 
of civil confl icts in that the rebels were advantaged by the terrain, lack of 
communication links deep in the province, sound local knowledge, and 
a friendly population, while the state enjoyed greater military exper-
tise, mobility, and fi repower.  196  Though there were some echoes of Gen-
eral Yahya Khan’s disastrous decision to use force in East Pakistan, the 
repression in Balochistan never approached the carnage on display in East 
Pakistan. Notwithstanding many Baloch partisans’ attempts to draw the 
obvious analogy, the levels of force used in the two theaters simply were 
not comparable: one confl ict resulted in hundreds of thousands dead (at 
least) in less than a year, the other, several thousand over four years. Bhutto 
sent eighty thousand troops into the province, but the violence was, by and 
large, contained to targeted action against militant camps and positions.  197  
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“The major  sardars [tribal chiefs] and other NAP leaders . . . were taken 
into custody by the government, charged with treason and subsequently 
brought to trial in Hyderabad”  198  —which may well represent repression 
but most assuredly a less extreme version than what Awami League leaders 
experienced, who were to be hunted down and killed on sight. Rather than 
the “collective repression” witnessed in the cities and countryside of East 
Pakistan, Balochistan witnessed Pakistani “militarization.” 
 external support for rebels and the state 
 The most important consideration for the relatively low levels of violence 
and repression in Balochistan was that the movement did not represent a 
serious external threat. Baloch secessionists enjoyed only moderate support 
from Afghanistan, which was a weaker power than Pakistan. To the extent 
that that there was an external dimension to the conflict, it favored the state; 
the only major regional power to get involved was Iran, which, owing to its 
own “Balochistan problem,” backed Pakistan against the nationalists. Given 
the source and type of external backing, the materialist effects of third-
party support were not especially threatening, and the emotional implica-
tions were muted. As such, the Baloch movement was deemed manageable 
enough without recourse to such brutality as witnessed in East Pakistan. 
Doubtless, part of this tractability of the Baloch threat stemmed from basic 
material factors of the dispute, such as the low population base in the prov-
ince. But insurgencies in even isolated, rural environs can attract vicious 
and disproportionate responses from state security forces, as occurred in 
Guatemala in the mid-1960s.  199  Moreover, rebellions in sparsely populated 
areas, such as Afghanistan, can pack quite a punch if they are wholeheart-
edly supported from abroad; at the extreme, such movements can defeat 
even the most powerful of states, as occurred in that country in the 1980s. 
That is, geographic and demographic factors, in and of themselves, do not 
determine the manageability of threat. 
 That the Baloch tribal insurrection was seen primarily as a domestic 
issue with no major external implications by the Pakistani state is an inter-
pretation backed by various primary sources. First, contemporary media 
reports attest to Balochistan in the 1970s being a domestic dispute, waged 
by Zulfi qar Bhutto on the one side and recalcitrant NAP nationalists on 
the other, mainly over Bhutto’s constitution and his authoritarianism. 
A few weeks prior to the deployment of troops, when the Federal Constitu-
tion was fi rst presented to the National Assembly, Wali Khan, the leader of 
the NAP, demanded a debate on the question, with the main issue being 
how much power the prime minister enjoyed.  200  Bhutto, for his part, criti-
cized the opposition for allegedly backing out of the constitutional accord 
the parties had reached the previous year, even though he had changed 
the terms of the agreement in favor of more power to the center.  201  The 
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public wrangling over the constitution continued for weeks,  202  marked 
by talks at the end of January that ultimately failed to close the distance 
between the parties.  203  
 Upon troops being deployed, the substance of the dispute did not 
change.  204  The day that headlines informed readers of troops being sent 
into Balochistan, Bhutto railed that Pakistan “must get a democratic con-
stitution at any cost.”  205  Bhutto’s visit to the province in late February, and 
its aftermath, were dominated by concerns about the constitution.  206  Fol-
lowing the “discovery” of arms at the Iraqi embassy, Bhutto removed the 
NAP government in Balochistan and NWFP, only two days before parlia-
ment took up discussions on the constitutional bill.  207  By the summer of 
1973, Bhutto was deliberating reaching a deal with the NAP—his constitu-
tion having passed, and Akbar Bugti being a less than useful puppet in the 
province—but he was unable to fi nd one, instead arresting the NAP leaders 
(the charges, in the British ambassador’s phrase, smelled “of the lamp”),  208  
and it was at this point that the insurgency kicked off in earnest. 
 Second, contemporary diplomatic correspondence and intelligence 
reports point to the confl ict’s primarily domestic nature. As early as May 
1972, foreign observers had noted the NAP’s problems with the PPP’s pro-
spective constitution.  209  In August that year, American diplomats summa-
rized that “the heart of the National Awami Party’s dispute with the Bhutto 
regime involves (a) the degree of provincial autonomy to be provided by 
the new constitution, (b) the regime’s alleged intention to set up an authori-
tarian one-party state, and (c) the regime’s effort to undermine NAP’s 
political position.”  210  In March 1973, after Bhutto dismissed the provincial 
government, U.S. embassy cables from Islamabad reported that the “major 
domestic issue for Bhutto remains constitution”  211  and that “Bhutto meet-
ing shortly with National Awami Party leaders from Baluchistan, which has 
become major obstacle to Bhutto both in securing all province consensus on 
constitution and in obtaining compatible provincial government.”  212  In a 
handwritten edit to a confi dential telegram in December 1972, the British 
ambassador noted that “the discussions now going on in Islamabad about 
the new draft constitution, in which the degree of authority to be enjoyed 
by provincial governments is a major item.”  213  A research report prepared 
by the INR claimed that Bhutto’s PPP “had only very limited strength in the 
Assemblies of NWFP and Baluchistan. Thus, much of the political confl ict 
in Pakistan has revolved around President Bhutto’s attempt to assert his 
control in these two provinces where he is politically weakest.”  214  Similarly, 
a telegram from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad in April 1973 clearly located 
the cause of the dispute between Bhutto and NAP leaders as internal 
matters—the constitution and domestic reforms.  215  
 Third, proceedings of the Hyderabad Tribunal from the middle of the 
decade—in which the entire leadership of the NAP, both Baloch and 
Pashtun nationalists, was on trial before the Supreme Court—speak to 
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the confl ict’s domestic roots in Bhutto’s bid for unbridled power and an 
unyielding NAP. While it is reasonable to question the reliability of tes-
timony by major political players to the state’s highest judicial body, the 
general tone and substance of the proceedings provide valuable clues as 
to how the confl ict was seen at the time by its participants. On the one 
side, we get a clear picture of the government’s—really, Bhutto’s—version 
of events. The attorney general’s background to the crisis is that “the new 
President [Bhutto] sought the help and co-operation of all political parties 
for the preparation of an Interim Constitution for the country with a view 
to restoring democracy and re-establishing democratic institutions.” To 
secure this cooperation, Bhutto reached an accord with the NAP in 1972. 
“In spite of these agreements however, the Provincial Governments set 
up in these Provinces not only adopted an attitude of non-cooperation 
towards the Federal Government, but openly started violating their 
legal and constitutional obligations.” Partly because the NAP did not 
subscribe to the ideology of Pakistan, and partly because it “resorted to 
methods designed to systematically destroy the infra-structure of the 
law enforcing agencies in the Province,” Bhutto was impelled to send in 
the armed forces. 
 In response to these charges, the joint statement of NAP leaders claims 
that the government “falsely, frivolously and maliciously fabricated the alle-
gations” against it in a bid to establish “naked one man’s rule.” Rather than 
the NAP being responsible for the “confrontation” between the provinces 
and the center, “it is, in fact, the Federal Government which had violated its 
constitutional obligations while Provincial Governments, on their part, had 
tried their utmost to cooperate with the Federal Government.” Wali Khan’s 
statement noted that Bhutto’s conduct was “the design to achieve its politi-
cal aim of setting up ‘a one-man State.’” Marri made similar claims, arguing 
that Bhutto’s government “started a campaign of vilifi cation and vitupera-
tion against the N. A. P. so as to provide material for banning it, as it was the 
only effective political force in the country which could stand in the way of 
People’s Party leadership and the latter considered it as its main political 
opponent and a serious hurdle in their way for establishing dictatorial one 
man’s fascist rule in their ‘New Pakistan.’”  216  
 Fourth, interviews with those party to the confl ict, either as insurgents or 
on behalf of the state, and other contemporary observers, painted a similar 
picture. Ahmed Rashid—then a member of the so-called London Group 
of leftists that fought in Balochistan—told me that the cause of the con-
fl ict was Bhutto trying to “demolish” the NAP’s power.  217  Similarly, Rashed 
Rahman claimed the confl ict got underway when Bhutto dismissed the 
provincial government in Balochistan, which he did because he was “an 
extreme centralist” who “wanted to reverse his concessions” on constitu-
tional matters concerning provincial autonomy. Baloch nationalist Moham-
mad Ali Talpur agreed, saying that Bhutto resented the Baloch forming 
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a government of their own, and that the main issue between Bhutto and 
the NAP was domestic power.  218  Shehryar Mazari, the son of prominent 
Baloch intellectual and political fi gure Sherbaz Mazari, said that Bhutto did 
not like the fact that his PPP was not in control in Balochistan, and that 
“he wanted to be in complete power, wanted to be Napoleon or Hitler.”  219  
Another member of the Mazari family stated simply: “Mr. Bhutto did not 
want to share power.”  220  
 Fifth, we can partly appreciate Bhutto’s then-mindset by examining the 
memoirs of those PPP advisers closest to him, such as Kausar Niazi, Rao 
Rasheed, and Rafi  Raza.  221  Our greatest clue about the relative manageabil-
ity of the Balochistan dispute here is simply the absence of clues in the fi rst 
place: they did not devote many pages to the confl ict. For instance, Niazi’s 
recollection of Bhutto’s tenure mentions Balochistan only tangentially, with 
the dominant political issues being restricted to Punjab and Sindh, and 
Bhutto’s hold on power more generally. When discussing the “four fronts” 
that Bhutto faced during Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear weapon, a period 
coinciding with the Balochistan crisis, Niazi does not even mention Balo-
chistan.  222  Rasheed gives more thought to Balochistan, but mostly in gen-
eral terms, diagnosing the causes of discontent in the province, favorably 
comparing British administration of the province—who ostensibly tried to 
solve the issues of the people—to the Pakistani state’s more negligent poli-
cies, and describing the tribal nature of Baloch society. Like Niazi, Rasheed 
does not mention Balochistan when discussing Bhutto’s main challenges, 
instead focusing on his downfall at the hands of “industrialists, big land-
lords, traders, and religious people.”  223  
 Of the three party insiders, it is Rafi  Raza that provides the most details 
about Bhutto and the Balochistan crisis, and his recollections only burnish 
the argument that the confl ict was almost entirely domestically oriented. 
Raza discusses the background conditions for the crisis, noting that with 
the ascension of Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Ataullah Mengal to the posi-
tions of governor and chief minister, respectively, center-province relations 
were marked by confrontation, partly due to the Baloch tribal leaders’ inex-
perience in formal government but mostly because of Bhutto’s “failure to 
accept” the NAP-dominated government in Balochistan. Crucially, Raza 
describes how, during talks in the spring of 1973 between the dismissed 
NAP leaders and Bhutto, he (Raza) played intermediary and tried to 
impress on Bhutto the fact that his preferred client in Balochistan, the jam of 
Lasbela, did not have the political capital to maintain power and that con-
tinued military intervention in the province would be disastrous. Bhutto, 
however, remained apprehensive, and feared the consequences of retreat. 
In an attempt to placate him, Raza assured Bhutto that the constitution had 
suffi cient safeguards in case the NAP-led government posed diffi culties in 
the future.  224  That Raza felt the chief concern in Bhutto’s mind vis-à-vis the 
NAP leaders was the constitution speaks volumes. 
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 A related indicator of the confl ict’s domestic character is its failure to res-
onate strongly with the Pakistani establishment, manifested by a lack of lit-
erature and fi rst-person accounts of the confl ict, even by military personnel 
directly involved. Pervez Musharraf, who served as a major in the war, and 
is normally unafraid of media attention and speaking his mind, has exceed-
ingly little to say about his experiences in Balochistan during the 1970s.  225  
Bhutto, who wrote more than half a dozen books in his lifetime on politics, 
world affairs, his daughter Benazir, his jail sentence and anticipated judicial 
assassination, the 1971 war, and Islam, also has next to nothing to say about 
the Balochistan war. This is despite the fact that the war lasted longer than 
the East Pakistan confl ict, and that Bhutto himself, more than any one indi-
vidual, was responsible for the outbreak of war. 
 Viewed from the perspective of Bhutto’s party confi dantes, along with 
contemporary media, intelligence, and diplomatic reports, as well as court 
proceedings at the Hyderabad Tribunal and interviews with participants 
in the confl ict, it is clear then that Balochistan in the 1970s was not a major 
crisis, threatening the existence of the state. Rather, it was a domestic politi-
cal dispute over which parties enjoyed control of particular provinces, and 
how the NAP may or may not have threatened Bhutto’s constitution and 
hold on complete power. 
 Baloch rebels were not deemed a challenge to Pakistan’s external secu-
rity not just because of the proximate causes of the dispute being entirely 
domestic in nature—the constitution and questions of autonomy—but also 
because of its geopolitical context. The most important regional or global 
power to get involved in the confl ict, Iran, did so on the side of the state, not 
the secessionists. Owing to its own “Balochistan problem,” the shah of Iran 
wholeheartedly supported Pakistan’s attempts to defeat the movement,  226  
calling for the movement in Balochistan to be “crushed.” The shah’s stance 
earned the ire of nationalists such as Mengal, Bizenjo,  227  and Wali Khan, 
who criticized him for interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs, pointedly 
noting that “the Shah had no right to decide which party should or should 
not rule in one or more provinces . . . if Iran can do this, why not China or 
the United States which have given more help to Pakistan than Iran?”  228  
Indeed, the shah’s concerns with events in Pakistani Balochistan may even 
predate Bhutto’s—as early as the spring of 1972, when the NAP and PPP 
were still nominally allies, the British ambassador to Iran was delivered 
a message by the shah, who “was a bit concerned about the new ‘federal’ 
constitution in Pakistan. He hoped this would not eventually lead to what 
he had long feared, namely, encouragement of provincial dissidence and 
exploitation by the Russians of Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan separatist 
movements, working through Afghanistan in ways inimicable to Iran’s 
interests.”  229  The shah’s concerns about Baluchistan were so extreme as 
to lead to Bhutto’s privately expressed “mild irritation” on account of the 
shah’s “hint of paternalism.”  230  
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 With the benefi t of hindsight, we can safely hypothesize that Balochistan 
generally and Bhutto’s strategy for quelling trouble in the province specifi -
cally was a topic of discussion when the shah made his second visit to Paki-
stan in the middle of January—the fi rst of several meetings with Bhutto in 
1973—when the two leaders went on a duck hunt in interior Sindh.  231  The 
shah and Bhutto had met thrice the previous year, once in Pakistan and 
twice in Tehran.  232  A confi dential British appraisal in late February claimed 
that the shah “offered military assistance in Baluchistan if requested to do 
so by Bhutto.”  233  At the conclusion of the trip to the “brotherly country” of 
Pakistan, the shah captured the spirit of bonhomie between the two leaders 
in his farewell statement, in which he was “convinced that valuable dis-
cussions and the exchange of views we had together on matters of mutual 
interest will contribute to consolidate still further the close ties of amity and 
co-operation linking Iran and Pakistan.”  234  The highly suspicious “capture” 
of arms at the Iraqi embassy in February 1973, which allowed Bhutto to 
scapegoat and paint as treacherous Baloch nationalists, took place less than 
a month after this “private” visit by the shah.  235  The timing of events lends 
credence to the belief that the two leaders were eager to strike at a common 
domestic foe. 
 Before Bhutto’s return visit to Iran in the spring, the U.S. embassy in Teh-
ran characterized the upcoming trip as “further indication of increasingly 
close relationship between Shah and Bhutto. In recent months and espe-
cially since Iraqi arms caper, security organizations of both countries have 
been working closely together with Iranians helping Pakistanis to penetrate 
and deal with what are perceived to be Iraqi/Indian/Soviet efforts at sub-
version in Baluchistan. Meeting will give Shah and Bhutto opportunity 
to compare notes on this problem which is high on Shah’s agenda.”  236  As 
predicted, the Iran trip was an outstanding one for Bhutto: he was given 
a warm welcome, and it yielded several diplomatic coups, such as Iran 
agreeing not to recognize the newly birthed state of Bangladesh until Paki-
stan did so,  237  “highly successful” summit-level talks that promised “tan-
gible results,”  238  praise from the shah that bordered on fawning,  239  and 
most importantly for our purposes, strong promises of mutual defense and 
security cooperation, in which the two leaders “resolved that their coun-
tries would resolutely stand by each other in all matters bearing on their 
national independence and territorial integrity.”  240  The shah also promised 
a return visit to Pakistan at a “convenient and early date,”  241  four months 
after his last trip. Commenting on Bhutto’s Iran visit, the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran wrote that “we are struck with the unusually warm reception the 
Shah has given President Bhutto . . . in our opinion the Shah has made a 
very special effort to show in no uncertain terms that Pakistan’s integrity 
and friendship constitute a principal facet in Iran’s own security and well-
being . . . visit has produced number rumors that Iran and Pakistan are 
developing closer military, even treaty, relationship.”  242  
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 By August 1973, there were reports about Iranian military support to 
Pakistan.  243  Iran gave help mainly in the form of equipment. Specifi cally, 
Iranians supplied gunship helicopters and fi ghter aircraft to the Pakistan 
Army, which did not have such equipment at the time. By November 1973, 
the shah admitted to U.S. diplomats that he had in the previous month 
sent “two or three helicopters to add to the six or seven that were already 
there.”  244  This help was crucial because it covered one of the most glar-
ing weaknesses of the military: mobility. Just as the insurgency was get-
ting underway, offi cials in the British embassy in Islamabad noted that “the 
Army also realizes it has insuffi cient tactical mobility to move its limited 
number of troops quickly between potential trouble areas.”  245  Additionally, 
some Iranian pilots also fl ew helicopters used in Operation Chamalang in 
1974, the most crucial of the entire campaign. Finally, Iran also supplied 
economic aid, specially directed to development in Balochistan.  246  
 Interviews with military sources confi rmed just how important this 
support was in the confl ict. “Iran supported [Pakistan] openly,” retired 
brigadier Asad Munir told me. “Chinook helicopter, troops carrier, logis-
tics support, rations—all out support.”  247  Another former security offi cial 
told me that the shah’s support was “very useful,” especially because the 
helicopters allowed the state to more easily target Balochistan’s large land-
mass, in which the little infrastructure that exists tends to be remote.  248  
Hamid Hussain, a highly respected student of the Pakistan military, also 
spoke of the “signifi cant effect” the shah’s support had. Iran’s state-of-the-
art helicopter capabilities, he told me, allowed the army to negotiate Balo-
chistan’s harsh terrain. According to Hussain, while the state would have 
eventually fought the insurgents to a stalemate regardless of Iran’s support, 
backing from its western neighbor helped Pakistan “speed up” the war; the 
Baloch would have infl icted more casualties and the confl ict would have 
extended for a number of years without Iranian helicopters and pilots.  249  
Absent Iranian air support, the Pakistan Army would have had to fi ght not 
just longer but differently too—more ground operations, with the attendant 
higher potential for ambush, a favorite insurgent tactic, and in turn a higher 
likelihood of vicious reprisals. The importance of Iran’s support is under-
lined not just by military sources, but also by former insurgents; Ahmed 
Rashid, for instance, termed the shah’s help as a “major boost for the army,” 
stressing that the Pakistani military did not enjoy mobile artillery until the 
Iranians gave it to them. 
 While the state enjoyed considerable external backing, the rebels did not 
enjoy any signifi cant diplomatic or military support.  250  India could not sup-
port the Baloch due to simple geography. As one former Indian intelligence 
offi cial wrote, Balochistan “did not have a contiguous border with India. 
Any Indian support could have been only by sea. This was not feasible.”  251  
The potentially most viable and consequential patron was the Soviet Union, 
the superpower from whom the Baloch groups never got the support 
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they were looking for.  252  This was not from a lack of effort: Baloch groups 
made several overtures for the support of the Soviets but were rebuffed.  253  
Though the Soviet Union was keen to support separatist movements with 
leftward tendencies, which the Baloch movement undoubtedly was, its 
material and functional support was simply not forthcoming. The Soviets 
maintained a greater interest in goings-on in Afghanistan at the time, “a 
much bigger piece of the chessboard” for the communist superpower.  254  
The Soviets simply “weren’t interested in the Balochistan issue,” according 
to Baloch nationalists, because it was too peripheral a confl ict to occupy 
their strategic vision. As one former security offi cial who served in Balo-
chistan in the 1970s summed up, there is “no evidence that [the] Russians 
supported these people.”  255  Contemporary American intelligence reports 
confi rm the lack of Soviet involvement, noting that “although both Tehran 
and Islamabad have alleged that Moscow is supporting separatist move-
ments in Iran and Pakistan, there is no evidence to support these charges; 
on the contrary, the Soviet Union has on occasion attempted to restrain 
Iraq’s activities against Iran.”  256  
 While material support was not forthcoming from the Asiatic super-
power, its client state in the region, Afghanistan, did provide sanctuaries 
and some aid for Baloch rebels.  257  Camps in and around Kabul and Kanda-
har allowed rebels to regroup “after bouts of fi ghting. As well as allowing 
the camps to exist, the Afghans provided the rebels with modest amounts 
of fi nancial support.  258  Supplementing this sanctuary and fi nancial sup-
port, Daoud Khan, who had recently come to power in a coup, “supported 
the Baloch tribal leaders with propaganda and small arms.”  259  This level 
of “moderate” support made the Baloch movement stronger than it would 
have been otherwise but was not cause for signifi cant alarm. As a member 
of the Mazari family told me, “If anyone would be supporting the Baloch, 
it would be the Afghans, a tiny government.”  260  Afghanistan’s weakness 
relative to the two main states involved in the fi ghting in Balochistan—
Pakistan and Iran—was a theme emphasized also by military sources.  261  
Asad Munir noted that “Afghanistan was not in a position to help them, 
they didn’t have [a] strong army, they could not support, the only country 
that could have supported them, Iran, was on our side.”  262  Other sources 
have emphasized that Afghanistan’s own relative poverty, and closer iden-
tity relations to Pakistan’s Pashtun community, meant whatever material 
support it extended to Baloch rebels was limited. As Mohammad Taqi told 
me, “The fact is, Afghanistan never did arm or train rebels to the extent 
that India did with Mukti Bahini . . . if Afghanistan would arm anyone, it 
would be the Pashtun nationalists,” rather than the Baloch. In Balochistan, 
by contrast, Kabul’s backing was mostly restricted to “moral and political 
support.”  263  
 This lack of external support played a crucial role in keeping the 
threat from the Baloch nationalists limited and translating into a fairly 
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manageable job for the state. As a Mazari family member told me, “A tribe 
can’t take on the Pakistan army.”  264  Multiple interviews emphasized the 
lack of training and modern equipment the Baloch rebels enjoyed, weak-
nesses that external states would and could have covered up had their 
sponsorship been more forthcoming. While the majority of Baloch tribes-
men were armed in their villages, their weaponry was not sophisticated 
enough—for instance, they did not have automatic weapons.  265  Crucially, 
there was never a threat of invasion from abroad in the Balochistan case,  266  
a stark departure from what the military had experienced in East Pakistan, 
which meant that military did not have to spread itself thinly. The confl u-
ence of signifi cant support for the state, and the near-complete lack thereof 
for the rebels, meant that its counterinsurgency efforts did not need to be 
extended particularly far.  267  
 Despite rhetoric that cast the Baloch separatists as aided by external ene-
mies, Bhutto and the leadership in Pakistan knew that this particular insur-
rection was mostly domestically based, especially at its inception. That is, 
the state’s allegations of foreign support, made well before Daoud even 
came to power, were not perception but propaganda. These allegations 
began apace in early 1973, led primarily by Akbar Bugti, to the considerable 
consternation of Baloch nationalists. However, as the British high commis-
sioner in Islamabad delicately noted, 
 It is difficult to know how much to believe of his stories of foreign arms: 
anything that Bugti says at the moment must be highly coloured by his 
desire to topple Bizenjo and the NAP Government and take their place him-
self . . . . We have no reliable information to indicate that they [the reports] 
are true . . . . There are those who believe Bugti and Bhutto are working 
hand in hand on this . . . to stir things up, and for the Central Government 
to intervene later as a Deus ex Machina.  268  
 American diplomats described unsophisticated propaganda tying the 
NAP to Soviet-backed Iraqi groups, in the form of pamphlets and maps of 
“Greater Balochistan” that were several years old, as “merely another infor-
mation minicstry [ sic ] attempt to keep up propaganda pressure on NAP,” 
while at other times noted “clumsy” and “apparently contrived” attempts 
to tie domestic opposition to foreign conspiracies with “concrete evidence” 
of foreign complicity “notably absent.”  269  United States embassy cables 
from March 1973 also give strong indication that the allegations of external 
support were tendentious, designed as political theater, and that the bone 
of contention remained the constitution.  270  Bhutto was doubtless concerned 
about the Baloch conflict  becoming  an international war and attracting the 
support of Baghdad, Kabul, Delhi, or Moscow, but did not believe that it 
actually was one at the time. In June 1973, Bhutto sent a letter to his gov-
ernor in the province, Akbar Bugti, and wrote that “perhaps Khair Bakhsh 
Marri is trying to play a miniature Bangladesh. Perhaps he wants to get 
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some Marris across the border . . . to internationalise the problem. We must 
therefore bottle up the migration even if it is a handful of Marris.”  271  What 
this statement clearly shows is that at the time, Bhutto did not consider the 
Baloch insurrection an “internationalized” dispute in the first place. Unlike 
the East Pakistan case, public allegations of third-party support for rebels 
in Balochistan were almost entirely political theater, rather than reflective 
of genuine belief. 
 Certainly, the relatively low military threat from the Baloch was also a 
function of pure demographics: estimates suggest their organized fi ghting 
forces numbered between fi ve and ten thousand, due in part to the revolt 
being mainly carried out by the Marri and Mengal tribes rather than a cross-
section of society in Balochistan.  272  Moreover, the insurgency’s geographic 
spread was restricted to eastern Balochistan, in the mineral-rich districts of 
Kohlu, Khuzdar, and Dera Bugti; by contrast, the Pashtun-speaking towns 
of the province, such as Sibi, Zhob, Loralai, and Pishin districts, did not 
participate in the rebellion.  273  There is little doubt these factors helped miti-
gate the threat the state faced from Baloch nationalists. 
 On the other hand, geographically restricted insurgencies in rural areas 
with low levels of popular support are not always treated kindly by states. 
Consider Guatemala. Two decades before its gruesome civil war claimed a 
hundred thousand lives, the country witnessed a smaller-scale insurgency, 
extinguished with “shockingly brutal”  274  methods. The number of active 
guerrilla fi ghters in the mid-1960s did not exceed fi ve hundred—a tenth 
of the fi ghting force in Balochistan—and yet the Guatemalan government 
employed a “massive counterinsurgency program” in Zacapa and Izabal, 
which included modernized weaponry, a vast intelligence network, mobile 
military police, and “sophisticated” torture techniques.  275  Most notably, the 
government used right-wing death squads, the most active of which was 
the Mano Blanco, which tortured and murdered large numbers of peasants 
and possible sympathizers.  276  This “pacifi cation program” led to the deaths 
of around ten thousand peasants in a short period (1965–67): “Entire vil-
lages were razed to the ground. Mutilated bodies were left in public places 
as a warning to others.”  277  
 Of course, the context and conditions of insurgency in Guatemala were 
different than those in Balochistan, but the case bears noting if only to 
demonstrate that revolts in rural, sparsely populated regions do not nec-
essarily see relatively sedate responses from states. Moreover, a rebel 
force of between fi ve and ten thousand fi ghters is hardly an insignifi -
cant fi gure when compared to other insurgencies worldwide; the Bengali 
insurgency took until May or June of 1971 to have that many men under 
arms. As the secretary of fi nance in Balochistan told one British offi cial, 
the security situation in the province “was really potentially very serious. 
He could not say what sort of casualties the army was taking, but a friend 
of his had seen the bodies of 20 soldiers in the Hospital only last week and 
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numbers of this sort were by no means unusual. He did not think that the 
Baluch, who were experts in guerrilla tactics, were taking anything like 
these casualties.”  278  
 Indeed, it is unlikely that a fi ghting force of between fi ve and ten thou-
sand rebels with experience fi ghting the Pakistan Army and with strong 
external state backing would have presented such a manageable chal-
lenge for the Pakistan military. A thought experiment can help build the 
case: assume that, instead of being concerned about a Greater Balochistan, 
Iran was wholeheartedly behind its development. Under such circum-
stances, it is easy to imagine a signifi cantly tougher rebel movement in 
Balochistan, and an attendant increase in the Pakistani state’s brutality.  279  
When I put this hypothetical to a former security offi cial, he claimed that 
the threat posed by the rebels would have been signifi cantly stronger with 
such support.  280  For obvious reasons, few interviewees would explicitly 
concede that the state would have employed more indiscriminate violence 
as a consequence. But as one student of the Pakistan military noted, “If 
the insurgency is stronger, then [the] state’s response would be more seri-
ous.”  281  Commenting on the manageability of the Baloch threat in the 1970s, 
a retired three-star general noted that, “unlike today,” the relationship 
between India, Afghanistan, and Balochistan then did not involve “weap-
ons, training, systems, money.”  282  
 The extent to which the Baloch movement enjoyed outside support, then, 
was intimately tied to how grave a threat it posed to the state, which in 
turn guided how repressive the state was in its dealing with the movement. 
Prima facie, a movement resting on a longtime historical dissatisfaction with 
the state, featuring between fi ve and ten thousand rebels in rugged terrain, 
would pose a signifi cant issue for any state. However, because the roots of 
the confl ict were entirely domestic in nature, and because the movement 
enjoyed only moderate support from a weaker power—in stark contrast 
to the state, which enjoyed the fruits of its partnership with its powerful 
western neighbor, Iran—the degree to which the movement was deemed a 
threat was reduced considerably. As such, the confl ict never represented an 
existential danger to the central Pakistani state and consequently required 
less violence to quell it than the Bengali insurgency of 1971. 
 Alternative Explanations 
 No single study that I am aware of has tackled the Bengali and Baloch 
secessionist conflicts side by side, but we can adduce a number of general 
and context-specific arguments for why Pakistan might have responded to 
this pair of movements differently, insofar as levels of violence and repres-




 It is unclear how much the reputation argument from the literature on 
secessionist confl icts can account for Pakistan’s strategies in East Pakistan 
and Balochistan, simply because its different strands point to different pre-
dictions. On the one hand, this argument expects states to be more violent 
against movements appearing earlier, because the state has more of a rep-
utation to create then. This, indeed, is what took place in Pakistan, with 
the Bengalis in 1971 subject to genocide, while Balochistan in the middle 
of the decade saw less harsh measures. On the other hand, scholars mak-
ing this argument also point to changes in leadership as crucial: reputation 
concerns aggregate at the level of individuals in power.  283  If this is the case, 
then, the military in 1971 and Bhutto in 1973 would have faced similar incen-
tives to establish “tough” reputations, and thus we would expect similar 
levels of violence. Even if one is generous to this argument, and discounts 
the mixed predictions it generates, the causal story it proffers was simply 
not relevant to these confl icts: there was little indication that the leadership 
in  either confl ict was concerned with sending messages to other domes-
tic ethnic groups. This is precisely why process tracing is valuable—
it allows for researchers to check for spurious correlations, unlike in 
large-n work.  284  
 Insofar as the argument for domestic veto players is concerned, the insti-
tutional setup of the Pakistani state did not experience the kind of meta-
morphosis between 1971 and 1973 that would have changed the responses 
to nationalist movements so drastically.  285  While it is true that Pakistan 
experienced a nominal transition from military to democratic rule, it is 
important not to overstate the effects, or even substance, of this transi-
tion. A more accurate reading would be that Pakistan went from military 
to civilian authoritarianism; the number of impediments to centralized 
decision-making did not change between 1971 and 1973. Furthermore, the 
veto-player argument is valid only in those situations when decision mak-
ers wish to make concessions but cannot do so for institutional reasons, 
but in these confl icts, the state was not much interested in concessions in 
the fi rst place. 
 Moving away from general explanations for secessionist violence, there 
are a number of context-specifi c arguments that could possibly account 
for the observed variation. The most obvious of these would be that Balo-
chistan was simply an easier fi ght than East Pakistan: the population to be 
subdued was smaller and the terrain and weather more forgiving. There 
is assuredly something to this argument, especially in accounting for the 
military’s violence in Bengal after the summer monsoon of 1971, when it 
tried and failed to pacify the Bengali countryside. Militarily, however, the 
Baloch were arguably a stronger force than the Bengalis at the outset of the 
respective crises, which was when the decision to use force was made, and 
indeed, one of the reasons for the military’s overwhelming force in East 
Pakistan was its persistent belief in Bengali pusillanimity and decided lack 
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of martial strength. The Baloch had about ten thousand men under arms 
when their province was occupied by the Pakistan military. In addition, 
Baloch tribes had experience of fi ghting pitched battles against the Pakistan 
Army in the 1950s and 1960s. By contrast, the Bengalis were in disarray 
in March and April of 1971; their strength in numbers was similar to the 
Baloch insurgents, drawn from the deweaponized East Pakistan Rifl es, the 
East Bengal Regiment, and policemen, but they faced important handicaps 
to the extent that they lacked fi repower, adequate transportation and com-
munication, and commanding offi cers to lead the insurgency,  286  and had 
to wait until well into the civil war before training, arms, and logistical 
support from the Indian state bestowed them with the capabilities to be a 
viable military force. 
 Another alternative argument is that the Pakistani military acted with 
overwhelming force in East Pakistan out of a pathological hatred for Hin-
dus and non-Muslims. There is no doubt that emotion was an impor-
tant factor in the response in East Pakistan. When commanding offi cers 
refer to the actions of their men as going “berserk,”  287  we can reasonably 
deduce that strategic concerns were not responsible for all that happened 
in 1971. Nevertheless, we must ask why racism and emotion mattered so 
much more in Bengal than Balochistan. After all, the Pakistani military has 
historically been dominated by the “martial races” of Pashtuns and Pun-
jabis, and both Bengalis and Baloch were deemed unworthy of fi ghting by 
both the colonial British as well as the postcolonial Pakistani state.  288  Why 
was the Pakistani state more racist against Bengalis than the Baloch? The 
distinction in the two cases lies in that the “other” race in East Pakistan 
was perceived to be close to India, Pakistan’s biggest and most signifi cant 
rival—culturally, linguistically, and geopolitically. The Baloch were not con-
ceived of in these terms.  289  That is, even if pathological racism was at work 
in East Pakistan, that racism was operating through the lens of geopolitics. 
A simple thought experiment will bear this point out. Consider a situation 
where Balochistan borders India and its population shares strong political, 
ethnic and linguistic ties to citizens across the border. Conversely, imag-
ine “East” Pakistan bordering Afghanistan and Iran, two states that either 
do not have the ability or willingness to threaten Pakistan’s security from 
without, and that have never fought a war against Pakistan. Is it reason-
able to surmise that Pakistani racism and hatred would be directed against 
Balochistan more strongly than in “East” Pakistan in this hypothetical? 
 A third context-specifi c argument would be that the West Pakistani 
leadership was chastened as a result of civil war and the dismemberment 
of the country in 1971, causing it to tread more carefully in Balochistan 
later that decade. Such an inference would be incorrect. First, Baloch 
insurrections—even those before the 1971 civil war, such as those in the 
1950s and 1960s—had  always been treated with more direct and focused 
military action, rather than the widespread and indiscriminate repression 
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on hand in East Pakistan. Second and more important, there is sparse evi-
dence that the memories of 1971 played any signifi cant role in Bhutto’s or 
the military’s decision-making.  290  Individual offi cers who had fought in 
East Pakistan were either eased off into retirement or were prisoners of war 
when the fi ghting broke out in Balochistan. Meanwhile, at the institutional 
level, there was no strategic review or internal analysis of the military’s 
mistakes following the loss of East Pakistan.  291  The one verifi able area in 
which the memory of 1971 did reverberate was in Bhutto’s decision to have 
ethnically mixed regiments in Balochistan, as opposed to the purely Bengali 
regiments found in the former East Pakistan,  292  but the effect of this was 
minimal on the actual decision-making pertaining to the confl ict itself. The 
basic elements of the logic behind the decision to use force to put down a 
rebellion rather than grant concessions were the same—the only difference 
was in the intensity of the response. If the leadership was truly chastened, 
it would have been reluctant to use force in the fi rst place, not calibrate it to 
a lower level. 
 Finally, a materialist explanation would expect Pakistan to fi ght harder 
in more resource-rich regions, but this explanation predicts the opposite of 
what actually occurred. Balochistan was and remains the most resource-
rich province of Pakistan and is an important source of natural gas, miner-
als, copper, uranium, gold, coal, silver, platinum, and potential oil reserves 
for the Pakistan state;  293  by contrast, East Pakistan did not hold much 
potential for material wealth. 
 This chapter has asked the question of why the Pakistani state was so 
much more indiscriminate and extreme in its use of violence against Ben-
gali secessionists in 1971 than Baloch secessionists three years later. It 
showed that the primary reason for the variation in state strategy was the 
perceived differential in third-party support: the Bengali movement was 
deemed to be operating hand-in-glove with the Indian state, receiving full-
blown political and military support, while by contrast, the Baloch only 
received sanctuary from Afghanistan. This distinction between moderate 
and high levels of third-party support meant that the Bengali movement 
was deemed a much more significant threat to Pakistan’s external security 
than the Baloch movement was. Consequently, decision makers and sol-
diers on the ground were more aggressive and violent in East Pakistan than 
they were in Balochistan. 
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 chapter 3 
 India’s Strategies against Separatism in 
Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir, 1984–1994 
 India is hardly a stranger to separatist confl ict—no state has experienced as 
many secessionist movements.  1  I explore three movements that took place 
within half a decade of each other—Assam (1985–92), Punjab (1984–93), 
and Jammu and Kashmir (henceforth Kashmir, 1989–94). These movements 
represent the three “hotbed” regions of ethno-national separatism in India. 
Muslim and Sikh nationalism in Kashmir and Punjab dominated regional, 
national, and even international headlines for years. The Northeast, mean-
while, has proved problematic for India to placate for decades, featuring 
both ideological (primarily leftist or Marxist) and ethnic-based confl icts, 
and Assam is the central state in the region. I focus on these cases because 
of the two basic clusters of secessionist movements in India—immediately 
after independence, and in the late 1970s through the 1980s—we have 
better data and simply know more about the latter period. Moreover, by 
maintaining consistency from the previous chapter in both the region and 
period covered, South Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, I can control for larger, 
structural changes in international politics, such as regional dynamics or 
the Cold War. Finally, because the cases display variation on both the inde-
pendent and dependent variables, and in Punjab’s case, variation over 
time, there is a theoretical, as well as empirical payoff to juxtaposing these 
confl icts. 
 Separatist confl ict in India, broadly speaking, is a function of the coun-
try’s extreme size and ethnic diversity, on the one hand, and the state’s 
long-running stand that it would not acquiesce to the loss of territory based 
on ethno-national claims on the other (see map in chapter 2). This strict 
insistence against secessionism is often thought of as the product of the 
precedent-setting logic, whereby India fi ghts separatists because it fears 
that concessions would only encourage other groups to stake similar claims. 
The thinking goes that, in a state as heterogeneous as India, such a policy 
would lead to a domino-effect, and the internal destruction of the state. 
There is certainly something to this idea, and Indian leaders often invoke 
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the danger to the state’s secular constitution that territorial concessions to 
ethnic or religious groups would entail. However, the emphasis on the 
precedent-setting effect of fi ghting separatists has probably been over-
stated. India has other reasons to foreclose the possibility of secession when 
faced with such movements. Its urgency to keep territory within the Indian 
Union is also a function of external factors: the interplay of its rough neigh-
borhood, its ambitious regional and global agenda, and its collective view 
of the causes of its colonial subjugation. 
 India perceives itself as a major global power, competing for hege-
mony in the region with China. The major narrative sustaining Indian for-
eign and security policy in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
according to Garver, was that “India is a great nation whose radiant infl u-
ence molded a wide swath of the world beyond its boundaries,” and that 
it deserves a “place of eminence in the world.”  2  Jawaharlal Nehru’s deep 
belief in India’s destiny to be a major player in world politics shaped his 
rhetoric and actions as India’s long-running fi rst prime minister and for-
eign minister.  3  Even before independence, Nehru argued for a Security 
Council seat for India on the basis that “it is absurd for India to be treated 
like any small power in this connection . . . India is the center of security in 
Asia.”  4  Notwithstanding its lack of a formal strategic doctrine and its 
claims that it is not hegemonic, scholars argue that India’s behavior is in 
keeping with its own version of the United States’ famous Monroe doc-
trine, whereby it seeks to bar foreign powers from exercising infl uence 
and sees itself as the guarantor of stability in the region.  5  
 The Indian state has been sensitive to the issue of territory since birth, 
when it consolidated itself by bringing under its ambit, in a matter of weeks, 
more than fi ve hundred “princely states” crisscrossing it, bequeathed by a 
clumsy British retreat from the subcontinent.  6  Nehru and the Indian leader-
ship were more than aware that India was only a potential major power, 
not an actual one, and that the realization of its promise depended on its 
size, both geographically and demographically.  7  In 1949, Nehru told the 
Constituent Assembly that there was an “inevitability of India playing an 
important part by virtue of her tremendous potential, by virtue of the fact 
that she is the biggest political unit in terms of population today and is 
likely to be in terms of resources also. She is going to play that part.” Nehru 
believed that alongside the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, “the 
obvious fourth country in the world is India.” This belief that its size and 
population are central to its claims and potential for great power status are 
generally widespread among Indian leaders.  8  
 The main threat to these ambitions to become a major power and exercise 
infl uence in the region and beyond were internal and external subversion 
from its neighbors.  9  India’s grand view of its place in the world is compli-
cated by its strategic environment, where it is the third node in the 
Sino-Indo-Pak triangle.  10  It has had numerous confrontations and wars 
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with both China and Pakistan, including a devastating defeat in a border 
war in 1962 against China that shook not just the security and foreign policy 
establishments, but the entire body politic.  11  China and Pakistan enjoy deep 
strategic ties, and each actor in the Sino-Indo-Pak triangle has been a 
nuclear power since at least the 1980s.  12  Historically, China and Pakistan 
have forced Indian planners to confront the possibility of a two-front war,  13  
though the introduction of substantial nuclear arsenals in the region com-
plicates such plans. Pakistan has launched confl ict over Kashmir several 
times, and continues its revisionism over the territory today. 
 That internal and external security are an “overriding consideration” for 
India’s political elites stems from the widely shared view of its colonial his-
tory, where its two-hundred-year servitude to the British crown was attrib-
uted to its longstanding lack of internal cohesion.  14  For Nehru and the 
newly independent Indian state, therefore, the greatest threats to its secu-
rity came from within, not without.  15  This view has survived decades. Ana-
lysts argue that strategic thought in India sees a “close relationship between 
internal security and outside aggression,” most obviously encapsulated in 
the issue of Kashmir and Punjab,  16  as I discuss below, but also historically in 
places such as Nagaland and Mizoram. India confl ates internal and external 
security with good reason: its internal vulnerabilities mark an opportunity 
to upturn the balance of power against it, one that each of its main rivals has 
taken repeatedly in its Northeast and Northwest over decades. India’s 
neighbors would gain considerably by cartographically cutting it down to 
size, forcing the loss of territory and population, and its geopolitical ambi-
tions demand that it must be consistently on guard against such behavior. 
For India, secessionism is therefore as much an external threat as internal, 
and it consequently denies the possibility of its various ethnic or nation-
alist groups becoming independent. As Indira Gandhi pointedly noted, “If 
there is friendship, well, all the borders can be soft, not just Kashmir!”  17  The 
absence of “friendship” with both China and Pakistan has meant that India 
cannot afford compromise against separatists and must ensure their defeat, 
lest its security and ambitions be threatened. 
 While a combination of concerns about the balance of power and prece-
dent setting may explain why India refuses to acquiesce to secessionism in 
general, we are still left with the puzzle of why the extent of coercion India 
used against separatists in the 1980s varied widely. In Assam, the Indian 
government practiced a mix of policing and militarization: it delegated 
strategy to the state government led by the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), 
itself a product of a concessionary accord with the center, for dealing with 
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), an avowedly secessionist organi-
zation. Its delay, short duration, and limited intensity of military operations 
against ULFA were backed up by repeated offers of talks with “moderates.” 
In Punjab, the government’s initial strategy was policing, encapsulated by 
an accord with “moderate” Sikhs in the Akali Dal (L) Party in 1985, before it 
CHAPTER 3
86
escalated to militarization in 1987, when the Punjab police assumed center 
stage in the confl ict. In Kashmir, in contrast to both cases, the state used col-
lective repression at the outset of the crisis, in the winter of 1989–90. 
 This variation can be explained by these movements representing 
external threats to varying degrees, since there were dissimilar levels of 
third-party support. Kashmir was the main prize in a territorial dispute 
between India and Pakistan—two wars had been fought over it previously—
and religious, political, and military ties between the Pakistani state and 
the Kashmiri secessionists meant that perceived third-party support was 
“high.” Conversely, Indian strategy in Assam was less repressive because 
the movement, owing to third-party support that was “limited” from a sig-
nifi cantly weaker power, Myanmar, did not represent a signifi cant external 
threat, freeing various central governments to alternatively ignore the 
problem, or treat it with low levels of coercion. Indian strategy in Punjab, 
meanwhile, followed shifts in Pakistani support. In 1985, when there 
was “limited” support for Sikh nationalists, and the government saw the 


























Figure 3. Variation in India’s responses to secessionism in the 1980s
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coercion and concessions to moderates. However, the passage of time saw 
Pakistani involvement in support of Punjabi secessionists rise to “mod-
erate” levels, and in 1987, India responded with militarization. Figure 3 
graphically represents the argument proffered in this chapter. 
 The main alternative theories outlined earlier in this book cannot explain 
the variation in India’s strategies against separatists in the 1980s. Internal 
deterrence arguments that privilege the reputation-building effects of using 
violence would predict that the earlier movements—those in Assam and 
Punjab—would see more repression than Kashmir. Arguments for political 
institutions, meanwhile, cannot explain the observed variation simply 
because India’s status as a constitutional democracy and the number of 
“veto factions” within the polity did not change in the period examined, 
but state policy assuredly did. Additionally, arguments specifi c to the 
Indian context, such as those based on natural resources or the extremism 
of the movement’s demands, also offer unsatisfactory answers. A focus on 
external security allows us signifi cantly greater analytical traction on seces-
sionist confl icts in India than we had previously. 
 Assam, 1985–92 
 We fi rst turn our attention to the Northeast of India, encompassing the states 
of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Arunachal 
Pradesh, and Sikkim, home to decades of insurgency and instability. In total, 
there are about one hundred rebel groups active in the region. Much of the 
violence in the Northeast is autonomist or secessionist in nature, but there is 
also violence among the states themselves, among different tribes within 
states, between tribal and nontribal groups, and between native sons of the 
soil and “outsiders.”  18  Indeed, the confl ict-ridden nature of politics in the 
region is refl ected in the title of a book on it:  Durable Disorder .  19  
 Given the wide-ranging panoply of groups and ethnicities in the region,  20  
I focus my attention on Assam, one of the states in question. Why Assam? For 
one, it is the most populous state in the region.  21  For another, the fact that it 
borders every other Northeast sate renders it, at least geographically, the 
region’s core.  22  Finally, of the seven major urban centers of the region, Assam 
is home to four—Guwahati, Jorhat, Dibrugarh, and Silchar.  23  It is thus fair to 
characterize Assam as the “heart of this region”  24  and consider it an apposite 
window to understand secessionist confl ict in the restive Northeast. 
 The Indian state was fairly restrained in its use of force in Assam relative 
to ethno-national movements in other parts of the country. In the period 
under study, the center faced two different types of actors: a student-led 
sons-of-soil agitation in the mid-1980s and a full-blown separatist insur-
gency at the turn of the decade. Neither saw sustained aggressive Indian 
military action. Instead, the former was treated with a negotiations and 
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concessions strategy by the Rajiv Gandhi government, which signed an 
accord with the All Assam Students Union (AASU) in 1985. However, 
because AASU fell well short of a true autonomist or secessionist organiza-
tion, the center’s conduct toward it is not a true test of my argument. On 
the other hand, ULFA was a more typical secessionist organization, and 
while it was assuredly the target of military campaigns unlike AASU, coer-
cion in Assam, compared to Kashmir or Punjab, was delayed in implemen-
tation, restrained in intensity, short in duration, and targeted in scope. For 
years, the center delegated its dealing with ULFA to the AGP-led state gov-
ernment that enjoyed close ties with the organization. When force fi nally 
came in the early 1990s, talks with moderate elements of the movement 
were continually emphasized, and in one case, elected state governments 
were in charge when the campaign was ordered, in contrast to Punjab and 
Kashmir. As such, I consider Indian behavior in Assam between 1987 and 
1992 as falling between policing and militarization. 
 This “soft” coercion had its roots in the fact that unlike in Punjab and 
Kashmir, ethno-national movements in Assam did not pose a signifi cant 
external threat to the Indian state. Third-party support for both the students 
of AASU as well as the separatists of ULFA was negligible from the usual 
suspects, Pakistan and China. Bangladesh provided sanctuary and support 
to ULFA, but this support began in the 1990s, after, not before, the Indian 
military campaigns to fl ush militants out of Upper Assam that I focus on. 
ULFA’s third-party support in the time period in question was restricted to 
a handful of bases in Myanmar, a signifi cantly weaker power than India, 
and as such can be categorized as “limited.” The lack of support from 
threats to Indian security meant that, fi rst, the center’s attention was dis-
tracted from the ULFA problem to more urgent matters elsewhere in the 
country, where external involvement was higher. Second, when the center 
did decide on coercion, such as in operations Bajrang and Rhino in 1990–92, 
it calibrated it to the relatively low levels needed to neutralize an organiza-
tion lacking signifi cant third-party backing. 
 relative deprivation and disaffection 
against outsiders and migrants 
 The major structural cause of Assamese dissatisfaction with the Indian 
state revolved around socioeconomic concerns.  25  Literacy and per capita 
income were lower in Assam than national averages, and roads, communi-
cations, access to piped water, and industrial development lagged well 
behind the rest of the country.  26  From the perspective of native Assamese, 
what was especially galling about the state’s relative poverty was that the 
state possessed plentiful natural resources, without substantially benefi t-
ting the local population. Instead, royalties from oil, plywood, and tea 
were siphoned off to the center.  27  Exacerbating this sense of exploitation 
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was that central and state administrations were dominated by outsiders—
those that were not “sons of the soil.” 
 More immediately, what led to Assamese agitation in the late 1970s and 
1980s was the pace and extent of migration into the state by nonlocals, 
upturning the demographic balance and allegedly “turning the indigenous 
people of Assam into a minority.”  28  The roots of migration into Assam go 
back 150 years. The British colonial administration encouraged migration 
from places such as Sylhet and Mymensingh in present-day Bangladesh, as 
well as Bihar, Orissa (present-day Odisha), the Central Provinces (present-
day Madhya Pradesh), the United Provinces (present-day Uttar Pradesh), 
and Tamil Nadu because it needed a cheap and effective labor force for its 
interests in tea, oil, communications, and economic modernization. In turn, 
these demographic changes led to a desire for more direct administration in 
Assam, leading to greater demand for educated labor to occupy clerical 
and administrative positions in government. The English-speaking popula-
tion of Bengal fi t the bill, resulting in even greater immigration of non-
Assamese to the state.  29  Around this time, formal opposition to immigration 
began to develop, such as with the formation of the Assam Protection Asso-
ciation in 1926.  30  Partition brought another mass infl ux of nonlocals, to the 
chagrin of Congress’s chief minister in Assam, Gopinath Bordoloi, whose 
opposition to the settlement of Bengalis in the state relented only when 
Prime Minister Nehru threatened withholding federal development 
funds.  31  A similar story played out when a civil war in Pakistan between its 
east and west wings spilled over into India, leading to signifi cant migration 
from Bengal to Assam and the rest of Northeast India (chapter 2). This epi-
sode of migration into Assam set the stage for the crisis of the late 1970s. 
 Reliable fi gures on the exact rate of migration into Assam are diffi cult to 
fi nd precisely because immigration was such a politicized issue, and illegal 
immigrants are hardly likely to leave a paper trail on offi cial forms and the 
census. However, some broad inferences have been made, given that popu-
lation growth in Assam consistently outpaced growth in India overall. 
Between 1971 and 1981, Assam’s population grew by 36 percent while 
India’s grew by 25 percent. In the previous decade, the respective fi gures 
were 35 percent and 25 percent. Between 1951 and 1961, Assam experi-
enced population growth of 35 percent and India of 22 percent. In the 
decade before that, it was 20 percent and 13 percent respectively. One esti-
mate notes that had Assam’s population grown at the same rate as India’s 
throughout the twentieth century, Assam’s population in 1971 would have 
been half of its 15 million.  32  While hardly conclusive, this disparity sug-
gests that Assam attracted migrants at a much higher rate than the rest of 
India. Organizations directly involved in the anti-immigrant movement 
claimed that there were between 4.5 and 5 million illegal aliens in Assam, 
about a third of the total population, in the 1970s. This was probably an 
exaggeration. A lower-end estimate put the number of illegal foreign 
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nationals in Assam at about 1.6 million, or 11 percent of the state’s popula-
tion.  33  Regardless of its precise extent, native Assamese found immigration 
troubling for both cultural and socioeconomic reasons: Bengali Hindus and 
even Muslims tended to dominate the public sector as well as professional 
jobs, and there was a fear amongst Assamese property owners that the 
generally impoverished peasants could radicalize their native counter-
parts.  34  Most important was the electoral impact of migration, which dis-
proportionately benefi tted the Congress Party and its “vote bank” among 
Bengalis. 
 the aasu agitation and rajiv gandhi’s  accord 
 In April 1979 Hiralal Patowari, a parliamentarian from the Mangaldai 
constituency, one with a signifi cant Bengali Muslim population, died.  35  
The voter rolls for the resulting by-election included large numbers of 
foreigners; a court found forty-fi ve thousand voters to be illegal aliens, or 
about one-sixth of the overall list.  36  The Mangaldai election put into 
sharp relief an issue that had been simmering for years and had even 
gained national prominence, and led to organized opposition to illegal 
aliens led by the All Assam Students Union (AASU), which kicked off a 
statewide strike to protest the infi ltration issue in June 1979.  37  Two 
months later, it joined the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), 
an umbrella organization counting in its midst several regional parties 
and organizations. Their leaders had one specifi c demand: use the 1951 
National Register of Citizens as the baseline to ascertain which Assam 
residents were legally living there and which were not, and deport all 
identifi ed noncitizens.  38  
 The center and student leaders held a series of negotiations in the early 
1980s on this question of detection, disenfranchisement, and deportation of 
foreigners, but the devil was in the details: who, exactly, was to be consid-
ered a foreigner? In discussions with the prime minister and the Home 
Ministry, the AASU-AAGSP pressed that all immigrants who entered the 
country after 1961 be classifi ed as illegal. The center countered with 1971 as 
the cutoff date, mainly because of a cooperative agreement signed between 
Indira Gandhi and Mujib-ur-Rahman which impelled India to settle all ref-
ugees who entered the country before 1971.  39  From the center’s point of 
view, readily giving in to the nationalists would exact a signifi cant political 
cost: it would imperil its Bengali immigrant vote bank,  40  and treating Hindu 
immigrants from what had been East Pakistan as illegal aliens would have 
courted disaster in mainstream Hindu circles in the rest of the country. The 
“obvious” solution to this problem—of making an exemption for Bengali 
Hindus while declaring Bengali Muslim immigrants illegal—would open a 
unique can of worms, drawing into question the secular nature of the 
Indian republic as well as alienating Muslims at large, an important 
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constituency for Congress. Finally, expelling Bengali immigrants would 
spell trouble for India’s relations with Bangladesh.  41  
 Consequently, neither side conceded much for years, as Assam became 
home to strikes, disturbances, and instability. State governments, devoid of 
legitimacy due to election boycotts and contested electoral rolls, repeatedly 
collapsed after a few months in charge.  42  Even Chief Minister Hiteshwar 
Saikia, an ethnic Assamese and a “most dynamic and astute” politician 
who knew local Assamese politics well, could not stem the agitation after 
coming to power in the 1983 State Assembly elections. The polls were marred 
by an AASU boycott—adhered to in Assamese areas and ignored in Bengali 
constituencies—and signifi cant communal violence, especially in Nellie, 
where some fourteen hundred Bengali men, women, and children were 
killed by a mob of about twelve thousand people.  43  A year after the Nellie 
massacre, a young tribesman told the  New York Times that “our people are 
itching for another confrontation. They tell us that peaceful methods 
haven’t worked for these four years.”  44  
 This juncture fell short of a true secessionist moment, given AASU’s 
demands did not involve greater autonomy or statehood, but the escala-
tory rhetoric and disturbances forced the center to confront this ethnic 
movement. The strategy of Rajiv Gandhi’s government was negotiations 
and concessions, promising a “new initiative” and talks with agitation 
leaders in January 1985 that began the next month.  45  By June, the two 
sides had agreed on all but one issue.  46  By August, optimism was perva-
sive and Rajiv appeared jubilant.  47  Despite a last-minute hitch, an accord 
was signed, and its fortuitous timing allowed the prime minister to 
announce it in his Independence Day speech at the Red Fort in Delhi on 
August 15, 1985.  48  
 On the big question of voter rolls, the center conceded and decreed that 
January 1, 1966, would serve as the base year for ascertaining residents’ citi-
zenship status. Anyone who entered the state after January 1, 1966, but 
before March 25, 1971, would be removed from electoral rolls for a period 
of ten years. Anyone who entered Assam after March 25, 1971, would be 
deported. The government also pledged to ramp up border security. 
Acknowledging the long-running sociocultural undercurrents in the Assa-
mese movement, the government promised that “constitutional, legislative 
and administrative safeguards, as may be appropriate, shall be provided to 
protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social, linguistic identity and 
heritage of the Assamese people.” Finally, the government agreed to 
“review with sympathy and withdraw cases of disciplinary action” against 
those who had transgressed in the agitation and to pay compensation 
money to survivors of those who had been killed. In return, the AASU and 
the AAGSP agreed to halt its agitation.  49  The accord was signed by 
R. D. Pradhan, the home secretary, and AASU president Prafulla Mahanta 
and general secretary Bhrigu K. Phukan. 
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 As was the case in Punjab (see below), Rajiv Gandhi’s “decisiveness” 
garnered a great deal of credit. Unlike his mother, who “disliked making 
decisions,” Rajiv “hears his people and decides quickly—often immedi-
ately in the cabinet meeting.”  50  The “fundamental difference” between the 
two was that while Indira was more interested in protecting Congress’ 
majority, Rajiv cared less about the party’s interests and wanted to be seen 
as a problem-solver.  51  Western headlines and editorials cooed in admira-
tion for Rajiv’s “willingness to rethink seemingly intractable problems, 
open dialogue, and after hard bargaining, reach agreements that give 
promise of providing solutions,” which was a “fresh approach that leaders 
in other troubled areas of the world would do well to emulate.”  52  Rajiv 
himself struck a triumphant tone: “Ten months ago, the world was 
watching whether India would disintegrate into pieces. Today, that ques-
tion does not arise.”  53  Notwithstanding opposition from Assamese Mus-
lims who felt “betrayed,” and politicians in West Bengal, who played up 
the fear of a mass migration of Bengali Hindus into their province, overall 
sentiment toward the accord and Rajiv was almost entirely positive, with 
some going as far as calling it “a magna carta for peace.”  54  For their part, 
the leaders of the agitation were also recognized, marking their return 
from New Delhi at a euphoric rally at Judge’s Field.  55  They formed a new 
party, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), bringing into their fold two 
regional parties, the Assam Jatiata Badi Dal and Purbanchalia Loka Pari-
shad, and delivered a dominant performance in the elections of December 
1985, winning 64 out of 126 seats.  56  Mahanta became the youngest chief 
minister in Indian history and promised that illegal immigrants would be 
“deported immediately after their detection.”  57  “The accord will defi nitely 
be implemented,” he warned Bengali immigrants. “If that antagonizes 
them, we cannot help it. There will defi nitely be no compromise on that 
aspect.”  58  
 From the center’s point of view, the accord defanged the student agita-
tion, bringing it into mainstream politics. However, the center’s accommo-
dationist stance, and the resulting tenure of the AGP government, created 
the space for the development of a signifi cantly stiffer test for the Indian 
state in Assam. Interestingly for our purposes, even the United Liberation 
Front of Assam (ULFA), an avowedly secessionist organization, was treated 
with relative restraint. 
 the rise of ulfa 
 The AGP record in power was, to put it mildly, disappointing.  59  Less than 
two years into the AGP’s tenure, the  Times of India commented that “the 
ruling Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) seems to have lost much of its initial 
enthusiasm for change . . . the AGP is slipping into the familiar role of a 
traditional political party in power which is affected by internal rivalry and 
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faced by disillusionment among its earlier support base.”  60  The AGP failed 
for many reasons. First, their leaders were inexperienced, unprepared, 
internally divided, and corrupt.  61  Second, despite claiming that they would 
“reach out to other Indian citizens who have doubts about our intentions” 
their strict insistence on antiforeigner drives and assertion of Assamese 
identity created the conditions for rebellions by tribals, such as the Bodos, 
led primarily by the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU).  62  Third, the task of 
detecting and deporting illegal immigrants proved challenging, both due 
to the diffi culty of separating illegal immigrants from their ethnic brethren 
who were present legally, and because the Congress government in the 
center could not be accused of expending all its energies in aiding the AGP 
in fulfi lling the conditions of the accord, leading to considerable rancor 
from Mahanta.  63  
 The upshot of these developments was that by 1988, observers were 
referring to the accord as a “crumbling document,” propelling support 
toward ULFA.  64  ULFA was a secessionist organization that fought on 
behalf of “the people of Assam,” unlike AASU, which fought on behalf of 
the “Assamese people.”  65  This distinction was born of an idea to expand 
ULFA’s potential support base and to include not just those drawn from 
the Ahom ethnic stock, but all ethnicities and religions contained on 
Assam’s land; “they realized you can’t take on the Indian state without 
30–35% of the population.”  66  In the words of an organizational spokes-
person, “The ULFA is not a chauvinist organization and [we] treat all sec-
tions of people staying in Assam as equal.”  67  ULFA drew cadres and 
support both from nationalist groups such as the AASU and AAGSP as 
well as leftist groups such as the Assam Jatiyotabadi Yuba Chatro Parishad 
(AJYCP). Largely dormant during the agitation from 1979 to 1985, its activ-
ities restricted to bank robberies and isolated assassination attempts, ULFA 
stepped up its violence in response to the failures of the AGP government. 
Though it is diffi cult to pinpoint one secessionist “moment” for this move-
ment, contemporary reports record it having a signifi cant presence in 
Upper Assam, where it originated, and throughout the Brahmaputra 
Valley by 1987.  68  
 In the fi ve years of AGP rule, ULFA killed about a hundred high-value 
targets, such as Assamese businessman Surrendra Paul, politicians 
belonging to Congress or UMF such as UMF leader Kalipada Sen, and 
police offi cials such as Dibrugarh superintendent Daulat Sing Negi.  69  Its 
activities, including violence, extortion—especially of tea producers, who 
closed factories and tea gardens and evacuated scores of executives—and 
bank robberies were considered serious enough to postpone general elec-
tions in the state in November 1989.  70  By December 1989, it was said to “run 
a fl ourishing parallel government in many rural areas of Assam,” focused 
especially on the districts of Nalbari, Barpeta, Lakshmipur, and Dhemaji.  71  
In November 1990, the  Times of India argued that “the depredations of this 
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secessionist and terrorist outfi t have reached such a stage that the ruling 
Asom Gana Parishad has ceased to govern in all but name.”  72  
 the center’s strategy against ulfa 
 For years, in part compelled by greater external threats elsewhere cov-
ered later in this chapter, the center adopted a hands-off policy and out-
sourced the task of dealing with ULFA to the AGP state government. When 
it did escalate to militarization, it chose a relatively mild form. Crucially for 
our purposes, the Indian state made splitting the separatists into moderate 
and extremist camps a central part of its strategy, a hallmark of policing. As 
such, it would be fair to characterize India’s strategy against ULFA from 
1987 to 1992 as a mixed one, between the poles of policing and militariza-
tion, but tending to the former. 
 Despite demands from toughness from the Hindu right, the center explic-
itly left matters up to the AGP state government on dealing with ULFA 
between 1987 and 1990.  73  This was a curious strategy given that the close 
relations between the AGP and ULFA were widely acknowledged.  74  At the 
same time as Prime Minister V. P. Singh was unleashing Governor Jag-
mohan and Indian security forces in Kashmir, he adopted conciliatory rhet-
oric and offered the carrot of oil refi neries and fi nancial munifi cence to 
placate Assamese dissatisfaction—and was applauded by observers both in 
Delhi and in Assam for doing so.  75  Meanwhile, the AGP “strategy” to deal 
with the situation was comically undercooked: police were “asked to take 
prompt and effective steps” to improve law and order, alongside a 
“publicity blitz” to counter ULFA propaganda.  76  
 It was a change of government, to Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, com-
bined with the threat to international tea producers and sellers, that brought 
about closer center attention to ULFA and Assam, starting around August 
1990.  77  Another possible factor, unconfi rmed, was an alleged video shown 
to the prime minister in which a senior AGP minister was caught having 
discussions with an ULFA leader, the last straw for the government.  78  
Increased central attention to the problem resulted in two military opera-
tions in close succession: Bajrang in late 1990, and Rhino in late 1991, which 
killed or captured a great proportion of ULFA’s senior leadership.  79  Bajrang 
began in November 1990, when Shekhar instituted president’s rule and 
outlawed ULFA.  80  He said that “any country cannot afford that secessionist 
elements go on scot free.”  81  A senior government offi cial was blunter, 
warning that “these fellows are really going to get it in the neck. They’ve 
been getting away all these months with murder, extortion, and worse.”  82  
 Though there was some alarmist rhetoric upon the announcement, fear 
and uncertainty amongst the general public, and reports of human rights 
abuses,  83  the Indian security footprint in Assam was relatively light, espe-
cially when contrasted to events in Punjab and Kashmir. Security forces 
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mostly focused on capturing ULFA cadres alive and dismantling camps.  84  
One indicator of the moderate nature of Indian coercion in Assam was the 
short duration of military operations. Bajrang was phased out after less 
than three months, mainly because of ULFA’s ceasefi re declaration.  85  For-
eign tea companies such as Unilever, often a litmus test of stability and 
order in the state, had returned even earlier, by February.  86  Bajrang brought 
substantial numbers of ULFA cadres to the negotiating table after the orga-
nization had previously claimed it would not settle for anything less than 
full independence.  87  Five months after Bajrang had begun, the center con-
sidered Assam’s situation “normal” enough to announce that it would hold 
general elections in the state.  88  By April, the army had completely sus-
pended Bajrang; by June, elections had been held, with Congress and its 
chief minister designate, Saikia, emerging as the big winners.  89  
 The Indian state was compelled to act once again when, a few months 
later, ULFA kidnapped several important personalities, including state gov-
ernment employees and a Soviet mining expert.  90  Eventually it decided on 
more military action in the form of Operation Rhino in September 1991, 
again focusing on Upper Assam.  91  One important distinction from Bajrang, 
as well as many other Indian military operations including those in Kashmir 
and Punjab, was that Rhino was conducted with an elected state govern-
ment in power, symbolizing delegation from the center. Indeed, Chief Min-
ister Saikia was an important player, mediating between various levels of 
government and the secessionists throughout the crisis.  92  As with Bajrang, 
it did not take long for ULFA to cry uncle. By December 1991, its “backbone 
was broken,” a “virtually decimated” organization.  93  It announced a unilat-
eral and indefi nite ceasefi re in anticipation of talks with the Narasimha Rao 
government in Delhi, and released six major hostages in its custody.  94  In 
turn, this quick retreat by ULFA allowed the center to halt military opera-
tions in January 1992 and pursue a soft strategy of talking, which began in 
February. 
 A crucial part of the government’s strategy was to induce fi ssures in 
ULFA, and it took less than two weeks of Rhino for these splits to occur.  95  In 
fact, there were so many reports of factionalization within the organization 
that its leaders felt compelled to clarify that no such thing was happening.  96  
By March 1992, a formal split was all but complete, with one side favoring 
talks and the other fi ghting.  97  The breakaway moderate faction, called 
S-ULFA (S for surrendered), began negotiations while the more extremist 
camp, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa and Paresh Barua, continuing to face mil-
itary action.  98  This factor, of both national and state leaders continually 
emphasizing that talks with extremist organizations were acceptable, is 
another that distinguishes the center’s strategy from other parts of the 
country, such as Kashmir in the early 1990s or Punjab in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  99  Meanwhile, India’s softer side was shown in the center’s 
promises for establishing an Indian Institute of Technology in North 
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Guwahati, infrastructural development, support for a fourth oil refi nery at 
Numaligarh, and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh’s assurances that 
“that the center would do everything possible to put the state’s economy on 
a sound footing.”  100  
 A policing strategy entails selective coercion against hard-line elements 
alongside tactical concessions to moderates, while a militarization strategy 
includes targeted counterinsurgent operations. India’s strategy against 
ULFA from 1987 to 1992 included elements from both. Its delegation to the 
AGP government between 1987 and 1990, its delay of military operations, 
and its consistent emphasis on talks with moderates all fell under a policing 
strategy.  101  Meanwhile, the very fact that it had to launch counterinsurgent 
campaigns, albeit limited in scope, duration, and intensity, means that it 
escalated to militarization, at least temporarily. 
 the limited role of external security in assam 
 The Indian state faced two types of nationalist movements in Assam, and 
neither saw signifi cantly harsh repression. The state’s response to the fi rst 
movement, against the student agitators, was a negotiations and conces-
sions strategy involving an accord between Rajiv Gandhi and AASU in 
1985. There were few external implications attached to the student move-
ment; the Indian state’s concerns in the run-up to the Assam accord were 
almost entirely domestic in nature. Congress leadership in the mid-1980s 
believed that “a negotiated peace in Assam was important for gaining 
better political control over the Northeastern cluster of states as a whole.” 
The “national leadership was confi dent that the post-accord election would 
strengthen Congress rule in Assam. Even if Congress were to lose the elec-
tion, its replacement could be expected to lend support to the national 
system.”  102  Indeed, this is precisely what occurred. The Assam crisis was 
also an opportunity for Rajiv Gandhi to reaffi rm his “problem-solving” 
reputation, which at least temporarily was a boon to Congress.  103  
 However, the state’s response to the AASU movement is not a true test of 
my theory, given that, while based on a conceptualization of ethnic differ-
ence, it was not aimed at a separate homeland, or anything close. AASU’s 
demands are consistently described as existing within the confi nes of the 
Indian constitution.  104  As one analyst put it, “The student leaders of the 
Assamese movement were fi ghting not so much to assert their separate 
identity as to return to the bosom of Mother India.”  105  Indeed, AASU 
explicitly needed the Indian state to accept its point of view on Bangla-
deshi migrants for it to succeed in its political goals.  106  As such, it is not 
surprising that the Indian state did not use even low-level force against the 
movement. 
 More relevant for my argument is the state’s treatment of ULFA. India 
faced a far tougher challenge against this avowedly secessionist organization, 
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but partly because of a lack of external support, even this was treated with 
relatively soft hands. Contemporary reports declared that, “unlike in Punjab 
and some other states, there is, according to military and civilian intelli-
gence sources, no evidence of state-level foreign involvement in Assam.”  107  
Local journalists confi rmed in interviews that ULFA did not get direct sup-
port from outside India.  108  Instead, ULFA received training from other 
insurgent groups in the Northeast, mainly the Nationalist Socialist Council 
of Nagaland (NSCN), and relied on illicit private Chinese networks to pro-
cure arms.  109  While China had earlier supported assorted rebel groups in 
the Northeast, especially in Nagaland, it had ceased to do so by the early 
1980s. Indeed, “repeated efforts by the ULFA and the NSCN in the late 
1980s to secure Chinese help did not lead to any direct assistant from Bei-
jing,” mainly because by then China, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, 
was seeking to mend relations with India, and saw the “export of revolu-
tion” as undesired “baggage of a Maoist past.” Pakistan too had supported 
groups such as the Naga National Council and the Mizo National Front in 
the 1960s but overtly leftist groups were not generally supported by the 
Pakistani state.  110  Most important, Pakistan’s ability to offer support to 
secessionists in India’s Northeast was severely hampered when it lost 
East Pakistan in 1971, denying it a border connection to the region.  111  Simple 
geographic proximity meant that Pakistan could support movements in 
Kashmir and Punjab much more robustly than those in the Northeast; the 
distance made it challenging for insurgents to go to Pakistan.  112  
 While ULFA would go on to receive signifi cant external support, it would 
be after operations Bajrang and Rhino, not before. Those cadres who did 
not see fi t to surrender escaped to Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, 
where they enjoyed sanctuary and eventually fi nancial and military aid.  113  
The connections with Bangladesh were especially important after the for-
mation of the Khaleda Zia government, one more friendly to Pakistan and 
the ISI than Awami League regimes led by Sheikh Hasina, which were 
closer to India.  114  Indeed, Khaleda Zia’s tenure saw a two-pronged effort, 
both by Bangladesh’s DGFI as well as Pakistan’s ISI, to support ULFA.  115  
But until the early 1990s, the period covered in this chapter, the external 
implications of nationalist movements in Assam were muted, with the only 
possible concern rumors of ULFA’s sanctuaries in Myanmar, a much weaker 
power than India. Even the extent of these bases is disputed, and inter-
viewees noted that ULFA’s sanctuary presence in Myanmar was minimal 
relative to what it achieved in Bangladesh after the early Rhino. As such, 
I code third-party support for the movement in Assam as “limited.” 
 A lack of signifi cant external support had several implications for soft-
ening India’s strategy against ULFA. First, it ensured that Indian action in 
Assam was delayed, because of more pressing external concerns elsewhere 
in the country.  116  In the words of a national editorial, “the total collapse of 
law and order in Kashmir and the continuing violence in Punjab” meant 
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that the “grave situation in Assam is largely going unnoticed.”  117  According 
to a local journalist, “national symbolism” and the “Pakistan obsession” 
had a great deal to do with India’s lack of attention to the Northeast: 
“Kashmir is a high issue, while Northeast India is a low issue.” Because 
there are important electoral constituencies in the Hindi belt, including 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, there is an element of playing to the galleries 
insofar as insurgencies on the western border were concerned. As he told 
me, “These [Kashmir and Punjab] were the important insurgencies, but 
Northeast is a fringe insurgency.”  118  
 Second, the lack of external support for ULFA meant that when military 
action did come, it was relatively brief. ULFA’s material base suffered from 
a lack of foreign sponsorship, dampening the level of force required to 
defeat it.  119  It was “not very advanced” when it came to military capabili-
ties, and “no match” for the Indian army.  120  And unlike Kashmir or Punjab, 
Assam is surrounded by other Indian states, providing a buffer from China, 
thus making it easier to deal with.  121  
 Third, the lack of “emotional” connections to India’s main security rivals 
mitigated the possibility of pathological violence by security forces. As one 
journalist remarked, “In Kashmir, it’s perceived as a war against Pakistan. 
In Punjab also, it was supported from across the border. If ULFA was let’s 
say a Muslim group, my impression is it [Indian use of force] would have 
got more amplifi cation.”  122  While the Kashmiri Muslim is looked at as a 
“closet Pakistani,” Assam’s heavily Hindu population makes it less likely 
that security forces would see locals as being in bed with an enemy state. 
 In Assam, then, India faced movements which enjoyed no support from 
major threats such as China and Pakistan, and even minor powers, such as 
Myanmar, only provided sanctuary. As such, the threat the movements 
posed was relatively muted, which meant that the Indian state adopted 
relatively soft methods to deal with them. It adopted negotiations and con-
cessions against AASU, encapsulated by an accord in 1985. Against ULFA, 
the center adopted a mix of policing and militarization, as seen in its dele-
gation of strategy to the ULFA-friendly AGP state government; its delay of 
military operations because of distraction with other more pressing threats; 
the short duration and limited intensity of its military operations when 
they fi nally did kick off; and its emphasis on talks with moderate elements 
of the movement. 
 Punjab, 1984–93 
 The interaction between the Indian state and Sikh nationalists in the 1980s 
is perhaps the most complex of the cases in this chapter, simply because it 
saw the largest degree of internal variation in strategy. While Assam saw a 
mostly hands-off center and only sporadic military action, and Kashmir 
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witnessed consistent brutality, Punjab was the target of different policies by 
the Indian state. When opposition to the state among Sikhs became wide-
spread after the attack on the Golden Temple in June 1984, marking the 
secessionist moment, Rajiv Gandhi treated the problem with a policing 
strategy, stressing the difference between “moderates” and “extremists.” 
This strategy resulted in a generous, negotiated accord with the Akali Dal (L) 
in the summer of 1985. However, violence continued to fester in the state, 
and in the spring of 1987, India escalated to militarization, when it 
imposed president’s rule and loosened the leash to the Punjab police led 
by K. P. S. Gill. 
 Overall, this case, more than others, highlights the limits of monocausal 
explanations and the need for analytical humility. My theory can shed light 
on important aspects of the variation in state strategy in Punjab. Rajiv’s 
concessions to Sikh nationalists in 1985 were based largely on a domestic 
political logic, staged within a context in which Pakistani support for the 
movement was muted (“limited”). By 1987, when Pakistani support was 
more robust (“moderate”), the Indian state instituted a harsher strategy. 
While at least some of this covariation is causal, in that Pakistani support 
made for a tougher militant movement and consequently a more coercive 
policy, external security considerations were only part of the story. There 
were at least two equally important contributors to the tough fi ght the 
Indian state faced: the long-term institutionalization of British and Indian 
essentialist beliefs in Punjabi Sikhs’ martial capabilities, which imbued 
them with the very same, and the splintering and factionalization of the 
militant movement in the late 1980s. These factors, along with Pakistani 
arming, training, and sanctuary of Sikh militants in the late 1980s, com-
bined to produce an insurgency whose lethality required signifi cant coer-
cion in response. 
 the origins of sikh nationalism 
 A number of factors, structural and more immediate, were responsible 
for the outbreak of Sikh mobilization in the 1980s. First, Punjab had a rela-
tively even demographic split between its Sikh and Hindu populations,  123  
concentrated in the countryside and cities respectively. The rural Sikh com-
munity was itself divided between more prosperous, landowning Jats on 
the one hand, and the traders, former refugees from Pakistan, scheduled 
castes, and landless laborers on the other. The Akali Dal Party, an ethno-
religious party purporting to represent Sikh interests, generally attracted 
the vote of the landowning Jat Sikhs, while Congress’s main supporters 
were Hindus and poorer, urban Sikhs. Congress, as a result, had a larger 
vote-bank than the Akalis; the latter would benefi t if it were able to unite 
the Sikh population, both rural and urban, poor and rich, to form one 
voting bloc.  124  
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 Then there was the matter of provincial boundaries. Since independence, 
Akali leaders had demanded a Punjabi province. But because India’s gov-
erning ideology was marked by a Nehruvian distaste for “communalism” 
or any hint of religious demands, Congress at both the national and state 
level succeeded in delegitimizing Akali demands by casting them as based 
on a Sikh, rather than Punjabi, identity. In their dismissal of Punjabi-centric 
demands as a Sikh Trojan horse, the center was calculatedly aided by Pun-
jabi Hindus, who in the 1951 and 1961 censuses, declared their personal 
language to be Hindi, rather than Punjabi. However, with the deaths of 
Nehru and his successor Lal Bahadar Shastri, along with Sikh sacrifi ces in 
India’s wars against Pakistan and China in the 1960s, the mood within 
Congress—led by Indira Gandhi—shifted. On November 1, 1966, the prov-
ince was carved out, featuring 41 percent of the land and 55 percent of the 
population of the old one, but the absence of many Punjabi-speaking areas, 
such as Abohar-Fazilka, and the fact that Chandigarh, the state capital, was 
administratively a Union territory, to be shared with Haryana, rankled.  125  
 Agriculture was a third structural factor. The Green Revolution dispro-
portionately benefi ted richer Jat farmers at the expense of lower castes and 
landless laborers, polarizing society on socioeconomic lines.  126  More nar-
rowly, the center allocated 75 percent of Punjab’s water for nonriparian 
states despite Punjab providing, in 1980, 73 percent of the central govern-
ment’s food grain reserves and contributing handsomely to the country’s 
rice, cotton, and sugarcane production. Canal irrigation did little to soften 
the blow,  127  and as a consequence, Sikhs demanded greater allocation of 
water from the Ravi-Beas, at the expense of states like Haryana and 
Rajasthan.  128  
 Finally, as Delhi became the scene of “fawners and fl atterers,” Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi centralized power to ward off threats from within 
and outside her party and declared Emergency, suspending constitutional 
provisions and rights. As a result of these actions by Indira, the Akalis, as 
one of the only groups to directly take on her authoritarianism, saw their 
leaders imprisoned.  129  These factors contributed to large-scale mobilization 
in the state, but it took some myopic and foolish decisions from Congress 
leaders for Punjab to reach its secessionist moment. 
 operation bluestar and the sikh 
secessionist moment 
 Upon winning control of the central government in 1980, Indira Gandhi 
dismissed a number of state governments controlled by the opposition, 
including Punjab, and sought fresh elections in each of them.  130  The Akalis, 
turned out of government, won a paltry 27 percent of the vote, which in 
turn allowed Indira to paint them as unpopular. Armed with the Anandpur 
Sahib resolution, which explicitly laid out their grievances on water, 
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Chandigarh, and territory, the Akalis turned to more agitational politics. 
They were, in essence, forced to do so. On the one side, they had to make 
their presence and demands felt to the center. On the other, they were being 
squeezed by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. 
 Bhindranwale was a relatively unknown fi gure until the late 1970s; his 
main claim to fame came from being elected the head of the Damdami 
Taksal, a religious educational institution, in 1977. His role was essentially 
that of a traveling evangelist, encouraging a more ascetic tradition among 
Sikh youth, proscribing clipping beards, smoking, alcohol, or drugs, and 
baptizing hundreds of men and women.  131  His rise to prominence—“from 
a village preacher to national fi gure”—was a result of violence between 
orthodox Sikhs and a breakaway sect known as Nirankaris in the late 
1970s.  132  Bhindranwale recruited gangsters, criminals, and unemployed 
young men execute hits on regular Nirankaris at fi rst, and then expanded 
their target list to include Nirankari sympathizers, dissident Akalis, Con-
gress members, police offi cers, and Hindu journalists.  133  
 Bhindranwale created an extreme fl ank of Sikh agitational politics, even 
if he did not enjoy widespread popularity or legitimacy.  134  Bhindranwale’s 
behavior generated “a game of one-upmanship,” compelling moderates to 
adopt extremist rhetoric, if not methods.  135  Interestingly, Bhindranwale’s 
role as an extremist that would pressure the Akali Dal was envisioned and 
cynically deployed by Congress itself, mainly for electoral reasons. To 
attract Jat Sikh peasant voters and discredit the Akali Dal Party, Congress 
leaders—including those at the very top, such as Giani Zail Singh and 
Sanjay Gandhi—encouraged Bhindranwale’s violence.  136  Such behavior is 
typical of mainstream Indian political parties, which often seek the “pro-
duction” of communal violence in advance of elections, usually in the form 
of riots, so that voters may be polarized into secure voting blocs on reli-
gious lines.  137  
 In the midst of Hindu-Sikh communal violence pushed by the likes of 
Bhindranwale, there was a series of negotiations between Indira and Akali 
leaders such as Sant Harchand Singh Longowal over the status of Chandi-
garh, water rights, territory, and a recognition of Sikh grievances more 
generally.  138  At times, a deal appeared imminent, but Indira would back 
off, generally acting on the political advice of her close confi dantes who 
wanted her to appear tough minded. Meanwhile, communal and terrorist 
violence increased at a slow rate. Between 1981 and 1983, 101 civilians 
were killed, with 75 of those deaths occurring in 1983.  139  Particularly con-
cerning was that Bhindranwale and his men started smuggling arms and 
hiding out in the Golden Temple, one of Sikhism’s holiest sites. From there, 
they acted with de facto impunity.  140  Bhindranwale, in characteristic 
bluster, warned that “if the authorities enter this temple, we will teach 
them such a lesson that the throne of Indira will crumble. We will slice 
them into small pieces . . .  lohe ke chane chabayenge  (they’ll be forced to chew 
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iron lentils, i.e. bullets).”  141  Indira and Congress faced pressure to do some-
thing about the worsening law-and-order. 
 The result was Operation Bluestar. On June 2, 1984, the Indian govern-
ment offi cially ordered the army to “check and control extremists and com-
munal violence in the state of Punjab and the Union Territory of Chandigarh, 
provide security to the people and restore normalcy.”  142  Punjab was sealed 
off from the rest of the country, and troops using tanks and heavy artillery 
surrounded the Golden Temple complex.  143  It took about four days for the 
entire area to be neutralized. At least hundreds of people, including Bhin-
dranwale, died. The operation was deemed a bad idea across the political 
spectrum, with the typical comment referring to it as a “major mistake.”  144  
K. P. S. Gill, the man given credit for eventually eradicating violence in the 
state as director general of police in Punjab, and who generally espouses a 
fairly no-compromise attitude with regard to terrorists in his writings on 
the confl ict, termed the operation “ill-planned, hasty, and knee-jerk . . . the 
damage Bluestar did was incalculable.”  145  Lieutenant General J. S. Aurora, 
a decorated veteran of the military, said in an interview that “the govern-
ment showed no sense, no sensibility in handling the crisis.”  146  
 Bluestar was the point at which Sikh dissatisfaction with the center 
became congealed, becoming widespread from a relatively tiny group of 
militants and extremists to a more general feeling in Sikh society.  147  That is, 
Bluestar’s aftermath represented Sikh nationalism’s secessionist moment. 
For Julio Ribeiro, a former senior police offi cial, Bluestar was “the trigger 
for the Khalistan movement, it affected all ordinary Sikhs.”  148  According to 
a journalist, “Bluestar was a watershed in the history of Sikhs, Punjab, and 
possibly India” because of the role it played in uniting Sikhs who were oth-
erwise more divided into pro-Congress, pro-Akali, and pro-militant camps; 
“almost every Sikh felt alienated and hurt.”  149  Khushwant Singh pointedly 
noted that “only a miniscule proportion of Sikhs subscribed to Khalistan 
before the temple was stormed.” The  New York Times reported that “before 
the raid on the Golden Temple, neither the Government nor anyone else 
appeared to put much credence in the Khalistan movement.”  150  A measure 
of Sikh dissatisfaction was the desertion of four thousand soldiers in the 
aftermath of the twin operations.  151  Sharper still was the assassination of 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984 by two of her Sikh body-
guards. Anti-Sikh riots kicked off in all areas of the country but were espe-
cially acute in Delhi, where the Sikh community became the target of mob 
violence. In an echo of its pre-Bluestar activities, Congress offi cials con-
nived with local authorities to fuel the riots.  152  More than two thousand 
Sikhs were killed and ten thousand left homeless in Delhi alone.  153  
 Facing Punjab’s secessionist moment was Rajiv Gandhi, who took over 
the prime minister’s offi ce the day his mother was assassinated before 
riding the backlash and ethnic mobilization conjured up by that event to 
win a sweeping election victory in the winter of 1984–85. His initial strategy 
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of policing failed to quell the violence, partly due to Pakistan’s increased 
meddling, which caused the Indian state to escalate to militarization in 1987. 
 policing in punjab:  accord with the akali dal (l) 
 Punjab was atop incoming Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s to-do list. 
Though he veered into a hawkish stance early in his tenure, saying in 
December that the Anandpur Sahib resolution was unacceptable and that 
separatists would be “crushed,” Rajiv essentially adopted a conciliatory 
stance.  154  “My government will give top priority to the problem of Punjab,” 
he said. “The Sikhs are as much a part of India as any other community.”  155  
He stressed that “we must go beyond the prevention and suppression of 
violence. We must cure the minds where hatred and prejudice arise.”  156  
 Rajiv adopted what Wallace calls “a process of political accommodation” 
by opening dialogue with Akali representatives and making “signifi cant 
concessions in all major areas of concern.”  157  In fact, Rajiv not only con-
ceded essentially everything his mother had rejected between 1982 and 
1984, but went further still.  158  The central government agreed to turn the 
city of Chandigarh over to Punjab. It appointed a commission to determine 
which Hindi-speaking areas would be transferred to Haryana, further 
cementing the status of Punjab as a Punjabi province. The dispute over the 
river waters was referred to a judicial tribunal. The Anandpur Sahib resolu-
tion, for so long the bane of the center, was referred to the Sarkaria Com-
mission on Center-State Relations.  159  That was not all. Earlier in 1985, 
starting around March, the Rajiv government released senior Akali leaders 
from prison. An inquiry into the killings of Sikhs in Delhi was ordered and 
a ban on the AISSF was lifted. Economic assistance to the state was also 
promised.  160  Finally, the Rajiv government also planned to hold state elec-
tions in Punjab which, presumably, the Akalis would win, and thus would 
constitute a transfer of power.  161  
 The accord was signed with hopeful language, with the signatories—
Rajiv Gandhi and Longowal—declaring that “this settlement brings to an 
end a period of confrontation and ushers in an era of amity, goodwill and 
co-operation, which will promote and strengthen the unity of India.”  162  
Both Rajiv and Longowal earned considerable goodwill within and out-
side Punjab, and optimism was pervasive. The  Times of India ’s report on 
the accord began, “The Punjab problem has been solved.”  163  The  Chandi-
garh Tribune glowingly commented that “statesmanship, courage, a judi-
cious blend of diplomatic fi nesse and administrative fi rmness and 
purposeful mediation” all contributed to Rajiv’s agreement with Lon-
gowal, one that “represents the collective triumph of sanity and good 
sense over sectarian sentiments and mutual hatred.”  164  A week after the 
accord the governor, Arjun Singh, claimed that “normalcy was returning 
to Punjab at a fast pace.”  165  
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 With respect to my argument, India adopted a policing strategy, where 
state violence is restrained, and instead tactical concessions—especially to 
those nationalists deemed “moderate”—are employed to deal with the 
movement. Indeed, the distinction between the “moderate” Akali Dal (L) 
faction and those actors deemed more extreme, both in the AD (L) and 
broader Sikh movement more generally (e.g. AD [United], AISSF), was one 
Rajiv consistently played up. In public appearances, he credited Longowal 
for isolating terrorists, expressed gratitude for his reciprocation of his good 
faith, and emphasized that “the other group was the extremists and we will 
deal with them as such.”  166  
 As my theory would predict, these concessions could be made only 
within a context of depressed external vulnerability. Most explanations for 
Rajiv’s accommodationist stance explicitly credit a domestic-political logic. 
For example, scholars such as Kohli and Brass cite the heavy electoral vic-
tory Rajiv and Congress won in 1984–85 as the primary cause of the conces-
sions to the Akalis, since Rajiv could concede from a position of strength 
and be unconcerned with a backlash in the Hindi belt, having swept into 
power on the back of a massive and convincing electoral victory.  167  A biog-
raphy of Rajiv Gandhi’s also notes that the accord brought the prime min-
ister a “great deal of kudos and the respect of friend and foe alike,” 
reaffi rming his early reputation as a problem-solver.  168  
 It is true that allegations of Pakistani support to Sikh militants were 
common in 1984–85, but contemporary media reports suggest that rather 
than refl ecting “true” perception, such accusations were propagandistic, 
deployed for political gain and discrediting adversaries. Indira Gandhi’s 
warnings about “foreign forces” at work in Punjab after Bluestar were 
politely dismissed as carrying “the odour of election propaganda in 
them.”  169  Similarly, a  New York Times  report soon after Bluestar summed up 
the prevailing wisdom on the authenticity of accusations of external 
involvement, which pointed to not just Pakistan but also the CIA. It wrote 
that “the Government has yet to provide proof of foreign complicity to 
overcome doubters among Indians and Western diplomats,” noted that “in 
the past, attacks on Pakistan have been politically popular among the 
Hindi-speaking tier of northern India, which has become a crucial arena for 
elections expected to be called around December,” and quoted both opposi-
tion politicians, such as the BJP’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and anonymous dip-
lomats, as dismissing the Pakistani connection.  170  The  Washington Post 
reported that “the only indirect evidence of a Pakistani link that has sur-
faced so far has been the confi scation of weapons smuggled across the 
border into Amritsar with markings indicating they came from the arms 
pipeline that normally services Afghan guerillas operating on Pakistan’s 
western border,”  171  while another Western paper informed its readers that 
“specialists say there is little evidence thus far that Pakistan is supplying 
armaments to extremist Sikhs in the Punjab.”  172  Indian security offi cials 
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claimed to the media, based on the testimony of one arrested truck driver, 
that Pakistan was training “15,000 Sikh youths” in “subversive activi-
ties,”  173  an outlandish fi gure. One item of proof ostensibly demonstrating 
Pakistani complicity was the discovery of two circumcised men at the 
Golden Temple.  174  A media report quoted an army offi cer admiring the 
cleverness of Pakistani support to Sikh militants, noting that they “have 
covered their tracks so well that it is diffi cult to pinpoint them,”  175  eliding 
the possibility that their tracks were nonexistent because they had not yet 
walked the soil. Indeed, the weapons that were coming from across the 
border into Punjab around the time of Bluestar were the product of smug-
gling networks rather than full-throated offi cial support.  176  Given that the 
Pakistani angle appears to have been publicized more as a product of cyn-
ical electoral and political objectives rather than apparent wholehearted 
belief, it seems reasonable to code Indian perceptions of Pakistani support 
in 1985 as “limited.” 
 For the Indian government, then, the combination of Rajiv’s domestic 
incentives and muted external support allowed for a relatively restrained 
policy, where the center made signifi cant concessions to “moderate” ele-
ments of the nationalist movement. Elections held soon after the accord fea-
tured a high turnout and were dominated by the Longowal wing of the 
Akalis, suggesting that mainstream Sikhs were satisfi ed with the accord.  177  
 Unfortunately, the extremist fringe of the Sikh movement did not accept 
the deal. An ominous sign was a police subinspector’s killing in Amritsar 
the day after the accord.  178  The “United” Akali Dal assailed the pact as a 
“sellout” and claimed that the leaders of the Akali Dal (Longowal) did 
not represent Sikhs.  179  Less than a week after the accord, there were gun-
fi ghts between Akali Dal factions at the Golden Temple, where AISSF 
cadres were distributing pamphlets describing Longowal and other Akali 
Dal (L) leaders as traitors to the Panth.  180  AISSF cadres disrupted Akali 
Dal meetings with anti-Longowal and anti-accord slogans.  181  Meanwhile, 
Longowal pleaded with less moderate party allies to not air their differ-
ences with him and the accord in public.  182  Eventually, those party allies 
would come around, but tragically only on the day Longowal was shot 
dead.  183  Longowal’s assassination took place less than a month after the 
accord; it was “hard to imagine a more lethal blow to the cause of peace 
and harmony in Punjab.”  184  A drumbeat of murder and violence ensued. 
The accord became controversial, with Hindu hard-liners, such as the 
BJP’s L. K. Advani, criticizing it for hurting the interests of Haryana and 
Rajasthan, and its implementation, or lack thereof, becoming a cause of 
recrimination between the state government and the center.  185  
 Following its election victory in September, the AD (L)-led state govern-
ment proved unable or unwilling to arrest the violence.  186  The Akali Dal’s 
administrative control of the state was always tenuous, caught as they were 
between religious militants accusing them of being stooges and a center 
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impatient with their ineffi cacy in quelling violence.  187  There were several 
illustrations of this predicament, one not dissimilar from what the AGP 
faced in Assam. In February 1986 for instance, Chief Minister S. S. Barnala 
claimed that it was up to the executive committees of the Akali Dal and the 
SGPC (a religious institution) to decide on how best to clear the Golden 
Temple of militants, rather than the elected state government which he 
headed.  188  Twice in the next year, Barnala was hauled up by the Akal Takht 
(Sikh religious authority) on account of his religious misconduct,  189  blur-
ring the lines of authority in the state. Militants were widely perceived to 
have considerable sympathy and outright support of many within the 
police and the Akali Dal (L) Party itself, compromising Barnala’s ability 
to mobilize political support to take Sikh terrorism head on.  190  As such, the 
center’s next major step was to institute president’s rule in May 1987. 
 escalation to militarization 
 President’s rule had been on the cards months earlier. In December 1986, 
the  Times of India  editorialized that, given the law and order situation, “the 
case for President’s rule in Punjab has become pretty strong.”  191  The Hindu 
right was regular in its demands that it be imposed, warning of “unprece-
dented bloodshed” absent “drastic steps.”  192  By May, disappointed in the 
state government’s efforts in bringing order, the center was ready to pull 
the trigger. It dismissed Barnala and the Akali government, marking the 
coda to the Punjab accord’s political arrangement.  193  Alongside president’s 
rule, the center instituted the draconian Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act.  194  Rajiv promised that under the new regime there would 
be “no compromise with terrorism” and “no leniency” would be shown 
until “this terrorism ends and this issue is solved.”  195  His fi rmness was sup-
ported by brokers in Delhi.  196  Almost immediately after the imposition of 
president’s rule, security forces launched a major offensive against militant 
hideouts in Tarn Taran.  197  In response, the militants too stepped up their 
attacks, marked by an especially horrifi c attack on dozens of Hindu com-
muters riding a bus in July.  198  
 These measures represented an escalation from policing to militarization, 
the Indian state’s admission that it was fi ghting a war. As Julio Ribeiro said 
at the time, “We are in the thick of a battle.”  199  For him, the Indian state had 
to react to the militants’ increasing violence.  200  Similarly, K. P. S. Gill wrote 
that by 1987, “the confl ict had certainly escalated to the level of warfare.”  201  
Under his much-discussed leadership, the Punjab police instituted a 
harsher, tougher strategy, a “ruthless but effective police campaign,” 
marked by operations such as Black Thunder in May 1988 (aimed at clearing 
the Golden Temple), massive search and cordon operations, and Operation 
Rakshak in November 1991, which called for a “catch and kill” policy for 
alleged militants.  202  The so-called Gill doctrine, “grounded in hard-headed 
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Clausewitzian principles,” emphasized “kinetic counter-terrorist mea-
sures,” or in plain English, aggressive force.  203  As one analysis states, Gill 
“did not waste time trying to engage them in theological debates. Instead 
he appealed directly to their natural instinct for survival. Gill offered the 
terrorists a stark choice: they could either die for their idea of God, or live 
for themselves. There was no third option.”  204  The early 1990s, especially, 
saw Gill and the Punjab police given “ carte blanche power to confront mili-
tancy without interference from legislators or state administration” fol-
lowing the election of Prime Minister Rao.  205  Predictably, human rights 
violations piled up: Indian security forces, “and the Punjab police in par-
ticular, summarily executed civilians and suspected militants in custody, 
engaged in widespread disappearances and brutally tortured detainees” 
during the confl ict’s worst years. Gill dismissed concerns about such 
methods, noting that “if an offi cer has done something wrong, it is between 
him and his maker.”  206  
 There were two main trends that were responsible for rising militancy in 
the state, and in turn Indian escalation to militarization: increasing Paki-
stani support, and the Sikh insurgents’ lack of unity. When Sikh militants 
fi rst crossed into Pakistan after Blue Star, they were disappointed at their 
cool reception: “The Pakistani state initially denied them military aid and 
imprisoned them so as to control their movements better. It was not until 
the Sikh insurgency truly began to organize in 1986 that the Pakistani secret 
services considered supporting the insurrection in earnest.”  207  Pakistan’s 
initial hesitation sprung from the militants’ lack of discipline and the fact 
that Punjab “was not Kashmir” and simply not as important. As such, hun-
dreds of Sikh militants were held in a Faisalabad jail, while some potential 
leaders were given villas in Lahore. Indeed, not only did Pakistan not sup-
port these militants initially, but it did not even allow them to go back to 
India, leading to a failed prison-escape in Faisalabad. “It was not until the 
fi rst Sikh political-military structures were formed in 1986 that ISI really 
began to back these insurgents’ war effort,” achieving real momentum only 
after 1988.  208  
 Similarly, a journalist with close ties to the Indian security establishment 
argues that Pakistani “support seems to have been generally low-grade 
prior to 1984,” and it took until the early 1990s for Pakistan to “become a 
signifi cant player.”  209  Elsewhere he notes that while “we do not know pre-
cisely when and how Pakistan arrived at the decision to back terrorists” in 
Punjab, it is only in 1987 when the Kalashnikov rifl e and “hundreds of ter-
rorists” crossed the Indo-Pak border.  210  One former security offi cial cor-
roborated that Pakistan’s supply of the dreaded Kalashnikov rifl e did not 
reach appreciable levels until 1988.  211  It was in response to the 1989 
Brassstacks crisis that Pakistan further opened the “terror tap” when “small 
arms fl ows, in particular, increased dramatically.”  212  This support included 
the supply of assault rifl es, including the AK-47 and AK-56, RPG-7 rockets, 
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Chinese-origin machine guns, night vision equipment, communications 
equipment, training, and leadership of Khalistani groups by Pakistani 
intelligence personnel, thus qualifying Pakistani support in 1987 as “mod-
erate” by my framework.  213  
 The importance of Pakistani support in the late 1980s for Indian counter-
insurgency can be gleaned from a variety of sources. K. P. S. Gill told me that 
“the impact of [Pakistan-supplied] AK-47s was very grave,” that absent 
Pakistani backing, the insurgency would have ended “much earlier” and 
been “treated on par with aggravated dacoities, on par with criminal 
issues” rather than the war that it was fought as.  214  As he wrote, the mili-
tants’ collective ability to kill was “directly connected with the gun-power 
available” to them through Pakistan.  215  Another former security offi cial 
told me that Pakistani support, including “fi nances, weapons, training, 
explosives” gave the Sikh militant movement greater “lethality and 
punch,” and was like “oxygen” for the Sikh militants. “We tried to choke 
that supply of oxygen.”  216  Specifi cally, he discussed a two-pronged strategy, 
whereby K. P. S. Gill went “hammer and tong” in the heartland, while on 
the border the erection of a fence beginning in 1988 drastically cut “hard-
core terrorist numbers.” Pakistani external support meant that even rela-
tively low numbers of militants—Julio Ribeiro claimed there were between 
three hundred and fi ve hundred terrorists operating in 1986—could para-
lyze India’s most prosperous state because the large number of arms and 
ammunition that fl ooded Punjab were far superior to what the Indian 
police then possessed.  217  
 Alongside this increasing Pakistani support, the splintering of the Sikh 
movement—“there was no common leadership, no common manifesto”—
meant that there were innumerable militant groups, whose violence took 
on as much a criminal as ideological color.  218  Each area would see a dif-
ferent, local organization come up, with no central command coordinating 
between the many leaders and groups.  219  One estimate was that there were 
162 militant groups active at some point during the insurgency.  220  Recent 
scholarship on civil confl ict has emphasized how fractionalization of 
national movements generates higher levels of violence; fragmentation 
results in actors using violence to outfl ank rivals within the movement, and 
it precludes attempts by movement leaders to end hostilities when peace 
agreements are signed.  221  Both processes, outbidding as well as spoiling, 
were in evidence in Punjab after the accord. 
 These two trends—splits from within, and support from without—took 
on greater potency in the wider context of Sikh martial capabilities. Both 
the colonial British state, as well as the Indian Republic (less explicitly), 
subscribed to a belief in a theory of “martial races,” whereby some ethnici-
ties are considered better fi ghters than others. Punjabis—and especially 
Punjabi Sikhs—have long been overrepresented in the Indian armed forces 
(at partition, Punjabis were 6.5 percent of the population and 54 percent of 
INDIA’S STRATEGIES AGAINST SEPARATISM 
109
the army).  222  This belief has become a self-fulfi lling prophecy because it 
helped endow Sikhs with greater-than-average levels of military training 
and combat experience. These longstanding policies caught up to, and 
deeply compromised, the Indian state in the 1980s, since it afforded mili-
tant organizations a steady stream of possible recruits who could provide 
organizational, tactical, and weapons skills. Indeed, the heaviest violence in 
Punjab took place in precisely those districts where the army is most heavily 
recruited (Amritsar, Gurdaspur, and Tarn Taran).  223  As one journalist told 
me, militants in Punjab were “very tough” and “would not bend in inter-
rogation,” and that gun battles were “very long” between security forces 
and militants.  224  The fi ghting in Punjab often took place “between Jat 
Sikh and Jat Sikh” often drawn from the same village, one fi ghting for the 
police and one for the militants.  225  
 India’s escalation from policing in 1985 to militarization in 1987 can be 
clearly seen in the annual death tolls from the confl ict. In the years pre-
ceding the accord, “terrorist” fatalities were relatively low: 14 in 1981, fol-
lowed by 7, 13, 77 (a gross underestimate), and 2 in 1985. These low numbers 
were consistent with a strategy of policing. In 1986, there was a rise to 78, 
before a massive increase to 328 in 1987, then 373, 703, 1,320, 2,177, 2,113, 
and 798 in 1993.  226  Put differently, when Pakistani support for the militants 
was essentially nonexistent, between 1981 and 1985, the average number of 
annual deaths (including civilians, militants, and law enforcement) in the 
confl ict was 138. The corresponding fi gure for the period between 1986 and 
1992, when Pakistan support was more robust, was 2,841.  227  Though corre-
lation does not imply causation, the difference in casualty rates in the two 
eras is massive, and testimony from analysts, journalists, and former secu-
rity offi cials all point to the centrality of Pakistani support in generating a 
stiff insurgency. 
 Generally, the Punjab case observes the theoretical predictions of this 
book. When the Punjabi movement was viewed through a domestic lens—
that is, when external support for the separatists was relatively low—the 
state’s response was policing. Despite the best intentions of the Rajiv-
Longowal accord, the extensive raw material for, and splits within, Sikh 
militancy, alongside Pakistan’s increasingly active role in the late 1980s in 
Punjab, led Indian strategy to become more heavy handed over time. 
 Kashmir, 1989–94 
 The third crisis under study in this chapter is the one that took place in 
Kashmir, beginning in the winter of 1989–90. This crisis was set off by a 
fraudulent election in 1987, which pushed Kashmiri nationalists to launch a 
secessionist struggle. Unlike the Assam and Punjab cases, however, the 
center employed collective repression at the outset of the crisis. The 
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principal driver of the overwhelmingly violent response by the state was 
that Kashmir was center stage for the Indo-Pak rivalry. In particular, Paki-
stan had twice before tried to take over Kashmir in the decades prior to the 
secessionist struggle and was widely perceived to be behind the rebellion 
in the early 1990s, especially by Indian security forces on the ground. For 
the Indian state, Kashmir’s separatist movement posed a greater external 
threat, and as a consequence, it acted as the theory proffered in this book 
would predict—with heavy-handed repression, with both emotional and 
materialist effects of “high” third-party support operative. 
 a buffer state since birth 
 Contestation over Kashmir and its future began during the drive for, and 
in the immediate aftermath of, independence from the British. Under the 
terms of the British withdrawal, Muslim-majority provinces such as those 
in Northwest India and the northeastern province of Bengal were to become 
part of Pakistan; the rest would become the independent nation state of 
India. The grey area in between was occupied by the so-called princely 
states, which were governed by monarchs nominally independent of the 
British crown but who still paid allegiance to it. The leaders of these princely 
states were given three choices: join India, join Pakistan, or become inde-
pendent. 
 The unique factor about Kashmir was that it was a Muslim-majority prov-
ince with a Hindu leader, Maharaja Hari Singh. From a strictly demographic 
perspective, it probably should have acceded to Pakistan, but Hari Singh 
opted for independence, not wishing to subject himself to larger powers. As 
a result, a tribal rebellion broke out in Kashmir in July 1947. Sensing an 
opportunity, Pakistan sent bands of its own forces to support the rebellion 
later that year,  228  leading to Hari Singh asking for Indian help to quell the 
disturbances. India promised aid only on the condition that he formally 
accede, a condition he agreed to. India’s forces faced off against Pakistan’s, 
in what became the fi rst war over Kashmir. The war ended in an essential 
stalemate, and the ceasefi re line drawn by international mediators in the fall 
of 1948 left Pakistan with about one-third of Kashmir and India the rest.  229  
 Over the next few decades, the Indian center’s interventionist practices 
caused Kashmiri disaffection.  230  For instance, state elections in the rest of 
India began in 1952, but Kashmir had to wait until 1962 for legislative 
assembly elections and 1967 for national assembly elections to be held. 
Moreover, the elections that were held were typifi ed by irregularities, rig-
ging, and fraud, aimed at ensuring that the center’s chosen affi liates main-
tained power.  231  It took until 1963 for the formal offi ces of the governor 
and the chief minister to be introduced, and for the Indian Election Com-
mission and Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction in Kashmir.  232  Addi-
tionally, India failed to hold a plebiscite Prime Minister Nehru had promised 
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Kashmir in November, 1947.  233  By the mid-1970s, Shaikh Abdullah, the 
most popular leader in the province, had ceased his demand for a plebi-
scite, having been in jail for close to two decades, and signed an accord with 
Indira Gandhi.  234  Ominously, these developments were not taken in stride 
by Kashmiris, who began to question whether personalities such as Shaikh 
Abdullah truly spoke for them. Shaikh Abdullah’s administration was 
highly corrupt and authoritarian, all the while doing little for the socioeco-
nomic development of the state, which was marked by increasing unem-
ployment among educated youth.  235  
 The 1983 elections represented a crucial turning point. Shaikh Abdullah 
had passed away, replaced as party head by his son, Farooq Abdullah, who 
was not blessed with his father’s charisma and political acumen.  236  Though 
there were some irregularities and violence during the election, most 
broadly accepted the National Conference’s comfortable victory—resting 
mainly on Muslim support in the valley—with one important exception: 
Indira Gandhi.  237  When in May 1983, Farooq Abdullah joined a national alli-
ance of anti-Congress parties, the die was cast. Up to this point, Kashmiri 
politicians, even relatively nationalist ones, concerned themselves mainly 
with developments within the state. The approach onto the national stage 
was uncharted territory, and it was one that was not appreciated by the 
prime minister.  238  She dismissed the Abdullah government, with incoming 
governor Jagmohan informing Abdullah that he had “lost confi dence” of 
the state assembly. In his place, Congress installed a puppet regime led by 
Abdullah’s personal rival, and brother-in-law, G. M. Shah.  239  However, G. 
M. Shah himself soon outgrew his usefulness and was dismissed. Farooq 
Abdullah, desperate to return to power, reached an agreement with the 
center to contest the forthcoming elections in an alliance with Congress.  240  
 Predictably, Kashmiris did not react amiably to this alliance, which they 
perceived as a sellout to the center, similar to Farooq’s father’s act in the 
mid-1970s. A conglomerate of parties under the banner of the Muslim 
United Front (MUF), led by the Jamaat-e-Islami, called a strike after the alli-
ance was announced, and on March 23, 1987, hundreds of activists were 
arrested.  241  The MUF would be the primary opposition party contesting the 
now-infamous 1987 elections, widely deemed to be rigged and fraudu-
lent.  242  More generally, Kashmiris began to shed their previously docile 
acquiescence to the maneuvering by the center and the National Confer-
ence Party, their mobilization driven by a more literate citizenry and greater 
access to media. Kashmiris could no longer be bought off with the ease 
with which they once were.  243  
 1987 elections 
 The Congress–National Conference alliance swept to an overwhelming vic-
tory in 1987, in an election widely acknowledged to be rigged. An anonymous 
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source in the Indian Intelligence Bureau told one scholar that thirteen seats 
were stolen. Two weeks before the election, six hundred opposition party 
workers were arrested in stronghold areas. Despite the pervasive allega-
tions of fraud, watchdog institutions such as the Election Commission and 
the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir were silent.  244  The importance of 
the 1987 election rigging can be inferred from the fact that the leaders of the 
Kashmir insurgency, when it fi nally came in early 1990, were all polling 
agents for the MUF in the 1987 elections. These included Shabir Shah, Yasin 
Malik, and Javed Mir.  245  Abdul Ghani Lone summed the 1987 rigging this 
way: “It was this that motivated the young generation to say ‘to hell with 
the democratic process and all that this is about’ and they said ‘let’s go for 
the armed struggle.’ It was the fl ash point.”  246  
 Under pressure from the opposition and with increasing agitation in the 
state by 1989, Farooq Abdullah began to lose control. The unrest was fueled 
by global developments, such as those in Eastern Europe, where the Soviet 
empire was collapsing and giving rise to free and independent states.  247  
Becoming increasingly assertive, the main insurgent organization in the 
state—the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)—kidnapped the 
daughter of the Indian home minister in December 1989 and successfully 
used her as a bargaining chip for the release of fi ve members of their 
group.  248  The following month, Farooq Abdullah’s government was dis-
missed and Kashmir was brought under direct rule by New Delhi. 
 This was Kashmir’s secessionist moment. Kashmiris were expectant of a 
new era; “they thought it was the beginning of what they’ve been asking 
for.”  249  The Indian state would follow with a highly repressive response, 
beginning with the installation of the hard-line Jagmohan as governor and 
the banning of foreign journalists from the valley.  250  
 collective repression in kashmir 
 The extent of the repressive response to separatism in Kashmir can, at a 
fi rst glance, be discerned from the language deployed to describe Indian 
behavior from 1990 to 1994. Scholars and journalists have variously 
described Indian actions as “stringent repressive measures,” “undirected 
repression,” “nonsurgical,” “unleash[ing] its iron fi st,” “ferocious,” “tena-
cious,” “often unruly,” and “bare-knuckled.”  251  State offi cials directly 
involved in the violence have also guardedly betrayed the high levels of 
state violence in the early 1990s: secessionists “required a credible display of 
the might of the State to put things in proper perspective,” and it was crucial 
to “give sharp teeth to the machinery against terrorists.”  252  
 What, precisely, are these descriptions of? First, there was a high level of 
military and paramilitary participation in the state. By January 1990, just as 
the Kashmir issue was becoming a national concern, there were already over 
80,000 troops in the state, and the Kashmir “valley had been virtually handed 
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over to paramilitary forces.”  253  By the middle of 1993, these fi gures had 
increased to an estimated 175,000 soldiers and 30,000 paramilitary personnel 
in the province.  254  By the mid-1990s, the number had increased further still, 
to 400,000, a number which represents more troops than all but sixteen coun-
tries’ entire active-duty personnel in 1995.  255  These forces were overwhelm-
ingly non-Kashmiri and non-Muslim,  256  meaning that not only did the 
Indian government blanket the state with security forces from an early junc-
ture, but also that these soldiers were generally deemed to be outsiders. 
 Second, Indian forces were afforded a great deal of latitude, and absolved 
of any accountability, when it came to the security operations.  257  “The 
Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Ordinance, introduced in July 
1990, provided the security forces with extraordinary powers to shoot and 
kill, and search and arrest without a warrant, all under immunity from 
prosecution ‘in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exer-
cise of power conferred by this Act.’ ”  258  It also introduced the Disturbed 
Areas Act to supplement existing emergency laws in the state, as well as the 
Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. However, as Bose 
notes, “most Indian counterinsurgency operations in the Valley made no 
reference to  any framework of law.”  259  
 Alongside the liberal use of curfews, often accompanied by shoot-on-
sight orders, crackdowns were the main ingredient in the stew of Indian 
counterinsurgency.  260  Crackdowns involved large groups of heavily armed 
security forces arriving in jeeps and trucks and cordoning off a village or 
neighborhood. All men would then be asked to step outside their homes 
and congregate in an open space, where local informers—often tortured 
into fl ipping to the government’s side—would identify militants and those 
who helped and harbored them. Meanwhile, soldiers would carry out 
house-to-house searches for weapons and explosives; allegations of theft, 
vandalism, and sexual assault of women and girls were commonplace 
during these searches. These crackdowns “would last a whole day or 
longer, even in harsh winter conditions.”  261  Those that were identifi ed as 
militants or supporters of militants would be driven to “interrogation cen-
ters” which grew rapidly in Srinagar and the Valley in general. “Torture, 
often in gruesome forms, became routine and widespread . . . numerous 
people returned from interrogation either physically crippled or mentally 
disturbed, or both; others never returned at all.” Journalists and rights 
organizations estimate that a few thousand persons disappeared after being 
taken into custody throughout the duration of the confl ict.  262  
 More serious was the series of massacres of unarmed civilians in Kashmir, 
especially during the early months of the crisis. In January 1990, a large 
group of unarmed civilians gathered at Gawakdal Bridge to protest searches 
conducted at Chota Bazar and Guru Bazar that morning. The protestors 
were shot at with live ammunition from either side of the bridge, and more 
than a hundred died in what is considered one of the worst massacres in 
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Kashmiri history.  263  In fact, in just three days in late January, Indian security 
forces killed more than three hundred unarmed protestors.  264  In March 
1990, similar demonstrations were shot at by police forces, and more than 
forty people died.  265  When Maulvi Mirwaiz Farooq, chief preacher at Jama 
Masjid in Srinagar, was assassinated in May 1990, his funeral procession 
passed through Islamia College, where the Sixty-Ninth Battalion of the 
CPRF was stationed. The security forces fi red at the crowd and killed 
between sixty and one hundred people. Mirwaiz’s coffi n was also struck 
with bullets. As a close aide of Governor Jagmohan said, “They just went 
berserk and emptied all the bullets they had.”  266  
 Neutral observers assiduously recorded Indian repression, including 
summary executions, reprisal killings, torture, rape, the destruction and 
looting of civilian property, arson of residential neighborhoods, and lethal 
force against protestors.  267  They described Indian behavior in places such 
as Handwara, where the BSF burned down three dozen houses and two 
hundred shops and fi red into a crowded market in October 1990; or in 
Phazipora in August 1990, when Indian army soldiers killed twenty-fi ve 
civilians in a village in retaliation for a militant attack two kilometers away; 
or in Pattan, also in August, where soldiers fi red from their convoy into a 
crowded market, despite no provocation.  268  International media also high-
lighted the importance of collective punishment for Indian counterinsur-
gency, noting its reliance after July 1990 on arson—witnesses described 
seeing “men in khaki sprinkle gunpowder, light it, then keep fi refi ghters 
away at gunpoint”—and gang rape as a response to militant attacks.  269  
 It is important to reiterate that these policies were carried out at the 
beginning of the crisis, representing the state’s primary response to Kash-
miri nationalists. Furthermore, notwithstanding Governor Jagmohan’s 
hard-line reputation, this response was “supported by virtually the entire 
spectrum of Indian political opinion.”  270  According to a news report, 
“ ‘Action fi rst, political initiative later.’ This is the line of thinking that is 
emerging among various political groups in the State,” while another 
relayed Rajya Sabha parliamentarians’ demands for a “ruthless crackdown 
on the militants.”  271  Even when Jagmohan resigned in the spring of 1990, 
there was no letup, with Saxena, his replacement, clarifying that “there is 
no change of policy” and that he would be “very fi rm” in Kashmir.  272  The 
Indian response of collective repression, which targeted both insurgent 
groups as well as civilians, took a heavy toll, with estimates of tens of thou-
sands dead in the fi rst few years of the confl ict. 
 indian strategy in kashmir:  the 
pakistan connection 
 As soon as the crisis hit the Valley, the Indian state blamed Pakistan for 
its “direct incitement to subversion, violence and terrorism” in Kashmir.  273  
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Indeed, it would be diffi cult to make sense of the Indian response in 
Kashmir without accounting for how the region fi gured into the interstate 
tension between India and Pakistan. 
 Kashmir was valued highly by both India and Pakistan at independence, 
with neither state prepared to relinquish its claim.  274  For India, the state 
mattered a great deal for its self-perception as a secular republic, as opposed 
to its bitter rival, Pakistan, which is often thought of as the product of com-
munal and religious agitation. As the only Muslim-majority state in India, 
Kashmir is often regarded as the emblem of India’s secularism. In a 1951 
address, Nehru summed up this feeling when he said that “Kashmir has 
become the living symbol of that non-communal and secular state which 
will have no truck with the two-nation theory on which Pakistan has based 
itself.” On another occasion, he commented that “Kashmir is symbolic as it 
illustrates that we are a secular state; Kashmir with a . . . large majority of 
Muslims nevertheless of its own free will wished to be associated with 
India.”  Pakistan too felt the acquisition and control of Kashmir was a sine 
qua non of its existence as a state because the idea of Pakistan as a home for 
South Asian Muslims simply did not make sense without holding all 
Muslim-majority states in the Indian subcontinent. As M. A. Gurmani, Pak-
istani minister for Kashmir affairs noted in 1951, “We are fi ghting for 
Kashmir on the same principle as that on which we fought for Pakistan.”275 
 Pakistan’s fi rst salvo for Kashmir took place in the winter of 1947–48, 
when it supported a tribal rebellion in an effort to win control of the state. 
Less than two decades later, it tried, and failed, again, launching Operation 
Gibraltar, which called for Pakistani troops bearing the sharp teeth of a 
domestic uprising and seizing the entirety of Kashmir.  276  These wars ren-
dered Jammu and Kashmir the most sensitive border state in India and 
made Congress and other mainstream parties in India regard any opposi-
tion emanating from Kashmir as inherently suspicious.  277  This suspicion 
was exacerbated by citizens of Indian Kashmir playing up Pakistan rela-
tions; for instance, it was common to see the Pakistan fl ag hoisted on 
14 August (Pakistan Independence Day) and a black fl ag on 15 August 
(Indian Independence Day), and locals tended to back Pakistan in hockey 
or cricket matches against India.  278  
 Pakistan did not cause Kashmir’s secessionist moment, but certainly took 
advantage of it, as it became “deeply involved in the uprising and provided 
training, arms, and sanctuary,” along with fi ghters themselves. As one ana-
lyst put it, the “situation in Srinagar appeared like a dream come true” for 
India’s neighbor.  279  Initially surprised by the scale of Kashmiri unrest and 
dissatisfaction, Pakistan moved quickly. What was different about its inter-
vention in 1990 from what came earlier was that this time, Pakistan waited 
for Kashmiris to act fi rst. As one local journalist put it, “the insurgency 
in Kashmir was imported, not exported.”  280  What aided Pakistan was a 
decade of practice in the anti-Soviet confl ict in Afghanistan—the so-called 
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Afghan model—which entailed training, arming, and funneling money to 
antistate guerrillas from across the border. The Pakistan Army and its Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) set up training camps and used much of the same 
personnel it had used in Afghanistan, who, conveniently, were available for 
action given the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.  281  
Joshi provides details on Pakistani training: 
 When insurgency began, training tended to be elementary, spanning just 
about a week to ten days and involved learning the use of AK-47 rifl es, pis-
tols, throwing grenades and laying explosives. Trainees were shown how to 
take apart a rifl e or a pistol, clean it and put it together again. Later, the 
course was increased to two and a half weeks and the syllabus was upgraded 
to include the use of RPG-7, light machine-guns as well as techniques of 
concealment, camoufl age, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.  282  
 Pakistan did not uniformly back every insurgent group operating in 
Kashmir. While at the outset, Pakistan supported groups demanding inde-
pendence, such as JKLF, as well as those demanding accession to Pakistan, 
such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), it quickly grew to favor the latter. Even-
tually, by cutting off fi nancial and logistical support for JKLF and over-
whelmingly siding with its insurgent rivals, Pakistan ironically aided India 
in decimating the most viable organization for winning independence.  283  
This unevenness in support emanated from the ISI and Pakistan military’s 
natural partiality to those groups that shared their goals—unity with Paki-
stan, rather than independence, which would conceivably cut into Pakistani-
controlled Gilgit-Baltistan. Moreover, the JKLF was more of a secular, 
nationalist organization, while HM and its allies were more Islamist in 
nature, fi tting better with the ISI worldview and ideology.  284  
 Relative to Punjab and other secessionist “hot-spots,” the Kashmiri 
nationalist movement saw more Pakistani support. One Kashmiri journalist 
told me that “Kashmir is an altogether different ballgame,” compared to 
other separatist confl ict in India, and another stated simply: “No country 
backed Punjab like Pakistan backed Kashmir.”  285  One defense analyst 
informed me that there was a “huge difference” in scale between the Kha-
listan and Kashmiri insurgencies, marked especially by the large numbers 
of young men going across the Line of Control in January 1990 and the 
equally large number of weapons coming back. Additionally, the Kashmiri 
insurgency was almost entirely funded by the ISI while the Punjab insur-
gency was largely fi nanced autochthonously.  286  A newspaper analysis in 
May 1990 commented that the Kashmir insurgency was “totally different” 
from others India had faced because there had never before “been such a 
massive involvement of a neighboring country.”  287  
 All this is to say that Pakistan exercised a great deal of control over the 
direction and strength of the insurgency in Kashmir. However, even before 
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reliable intelligence had been collected, Indian offi cials were convinced that 
Pakistan was behind the insurgency. The fi rst indication that India inter-
preted Kashmir as an external confl ict was that it moved thousands of 
troops from its border with China to Kashmir and the Pakistani border.  288  
Less than two months after Rubaya Sayeed’s kidnapping, intelligence 
sources claimed that there were fi ve hundred Pakistan-trained militants in 
the valley, supplied with “sophisticated arms and explosives.”  289  Jagmohan 
repeatedly mentions the importance of Pakistan in his memoirs. He writes 
that when he assumed his role, he faced “an intensifi ed onslaught of the 
terrorist campaign which Pakistan intended to fan vigorously,” that “pow-
erful forces, both internal and external, were operating, at various levels, to 
frustrate whatever I was doing, or intended to do,” and that of the forty-
four distinct militant organizations operating in Kashmir, “almost all” of 
them came from across the Line of Control; “it came to be known that there 
were at least 39 training centers in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Paki-
stan.”  290  According to him, “Pakistan provided not only moral, political 
and propaganda support to the subversionists in the Valley, as it itself 
admitted, but also actively helped them in training in guerilla warfare and 
techniques of contemporary terrorism . . . sophisticated weapons and 
fi nances were made available.”  291  
 Other state offi cials were on a similar page. Sudhir Bloeria, who served 
in various roles in the Kashmir bureaucracy, wrote that when he arrived in 
the area in April 1990, he had to “launch an immediate and vigorous exer-
cise to . . . assess the impact of the sustained and strenuous efforts of the 
Pakistani ISI and its cohorts.”  292  He discovered that “an unspecifi ed number 
of sympathizers and motivators had been activated by the ISI operators 
along the border and in the interiors.”  293  The “fi re and smoke” in Kashmir, 
he claimed, was caused by the “machinations of Pakistan and its notorious 
ISI,” and there “were unmistakable signs as well as confi rmed intelligence 
reports that ISI was making strenuous efforts to foment trouble” in 
Kashmir.  294  
 In October 1990, Governor Girish Chandra Saxena summarized the status 
quo by noting that “the number of militants is very large. Weapons avail-
able to them are also sizable. And the situation on the ground is not frozen. 
Pakistan is trying to push more and more people.”  295  A similar snapshot of 
the Indian security establishment’s bleak view during the fi rst months of 
the insurgency is captured by A. S. Dulat, a former senior intelligence offi -
cial, in his recent memoirs: 
 Things were going badly in the Valley: Kashmiris began to sniff azaadi, for 
they were taken in by the ISI’s bluff that if they started something big 
enough, the Pakistan army would come and liberate them from India, much 
in the way India had helped Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan. Insur-
gency in Kashmir was masterminded by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and his henchmen 
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as revenge for Bangladesh. Kashmiris were crossing the border in droves . . . 
we were in a mess. The Pakistanis were enjoying watching Kashmir burn.  296  
 The Indian state, then, believed Pakistan was behind developments in 
Kashmir;  297  third-party support was perceived as “high.” As my theory 
would predict, there were two aspects of this support that led to a more 
vicious Indian reaction. First, violence from security forces on the ground 
was more indiscriminate because of their seeing the entire local population 
as disloyal and traitorous, in bed with an enemy state. Second, Pakistani 
support led to a more challenging fi ght, since it meant a stronger Kashmiri 
nationalist movement alongside the potential for a Pakistani invasion. This 
tougher fi ght generated a more vicious counterinsurgency. 
 According to Bose, “In the eyes of the several hundred thousand sol-
diers and paramilitary troops fl ooding the Valley, the whole population 
was suspect—not just disloyal to India, but, much worse, in league with 
the enemy state across the LOC [Line of Control] . . . for the average Indian 
soldier fi ghting insurrection in the Valley, ‘the face of the Kashmiri has dis-
solved into a blurred, featureless mask. He has become a secessionist-
terrorist-fundamentalist traitor.’ ”  298  Representatives of the Indian state 
themselves make the case for violence being intensifi ed due to suspicions 
of divided loyalties amongst the local population. As Bloeria wrote, 
“Those who had been swayed by the propaganda and sustained efforts of 
the ISI and had embarked on the path of militancy, anti-national activities 
and challenging the integrity of the country, required a credible display of 
the might of the State to put things in proper perspective . . . the aim was 
to send a clear message to the militants and their supporters that they 
would not be in a position to carry out their nefarious activities unchal-
lenged and the retribution would be swift and severe.”  299  Saxena, who 
succeeded Governor Jagmohan as the lead administrator in Kashmir, 
noted that “because of a proxy war being conducted from across the 
border and sponsoring of terrorist violence on a large scale, it was at times 
diffi cult to ensure targeted responses by the security forces. There were 
occasions when there was overreaction or even wrongdoing.”  300  The dis-
tinction between ordinary Kashmiris and Pakistanis had all but vanished 
for those in charge.  301  BSF personnel argued that, given the presence of 
Pakistani agents in Kashmir, “judicious suspicion” was an “essential” part 
of their duty.  302  
 Yasin Malik, one of the top commanders of JKLF, alleged that when held 
in captivity, “They called me a Pakistani bastard. I told them I want my 
rights, even my vote was stolen.”  303  This treatment was not restricted 
merely to those who took up arms. A moderate Kashmiri politician said 
that “we are branded Pakistanis. We have always been objects of suspicion. 
Even if we pick up the Indian fl ag, and start shouting  Jai Bharat ma , the sus-
picion will remain. They do not trust us. Our elders fought against the 
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Pakistanis in 1947, we fought against them in 1965 and 1971, but I do not 
know why we are still not trusted.”  304  When a labor leader was tortured 
and attempted to tell soldiers about his Indian friends, they replied that 
“Humme sab kuch pata hai. Tum sab Pakistani ho” (We know everything. 
You are all Pakistanis).  305  A four-member fact-fi nding team visited the state 
in March 1990 and concluded that security offi cials “suffer from the para-
noiac feeling that the entire population of the valley are pro-Pakistani ‘ter-
rorists.’ Dictated by such suspicions, operations to maintain law and order 
have invariably led” to Indian counterinsurgency “wreaking vengeance on 
the innocent masses of the valley.”  306  
 Veteran Kashmiri journalists pointed out how due to their perceived pro-
Pakistani leanings, Kashmiris were seen as an “enemy” by security forces; 
“for India, every Kashmiri is a Pakistani agent, or at least anti-India. Their 
loyalty is in doubt.”  307  Younger Kashmiri journalists, explaining the inten-
sity of Indian counterinsurgency in Kashmir, agreed that it was an emo-
tional reaction, rooted in “the baggage of partition” and the fact that 
Kashmir is an overwhelmingly Muslim state.  308  Journalists and analysts 
based in Delhi backed these assessments, arguing that there was “no ques-
tion” that Pakistani support led to a tougher, more emotional, and more 
vicious Indian response, as it hardened Indian resolve.  309  Another sug-
gested that the Indian state had a “panicked” reaction to the insurgency 
because Kashmir was an issue “attached to Pakistan,” with its Muslim-
majority population.  310  
 One aspect of the Kashmiri-Pakistani threat confl ation that bears men-
tioning, commented on by several interviewees, was the rise of right-wing 
Hindu nationalism in India during this period. One former security offi cial 
who served in Kashmir emphasized this angle at length. According to him, 
what explained the Indian reaction in Kashmir was the national context 
within which it took place, including the rise of Hindu fundamentalism 
and religious polarization in mainstream politics, with the rise of the BJP, 
the Ayodha mosque incident, and communal riots in Bombay.  311  As a result, 
violence in Kashmir from both insurgents and the state became colored 
with a religious tinge, especially since a substantial proportion of Kash-
miris were demanding or fi ghting for accession to Muslim Pakistan. 
Notably, during the midst of the crisis, the Hindu right, led by the BJP, 
insisted on tough measures against the Kashmiri movement—in part as a 
signal to Pakistan. The BJP claimed that only the “strongest possible mea-
sures” including a “bullet for bullet approach” could salvage India’s unity 
and integrity, arguing against any “political moves” given that the “the fi rst 
priority should be to check and curb Pakistan’s interference in the affairs of 
Jammu and Kashmir.”  312  
 Other sources shed light on the second important implication of Paki-
stani support: that it resulted in a more challenging fi ght for the Indian 
state. Similar to Indian support for Bengali separatists, Pakistani support 
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for the Kashmiri national movement set up a two-front problem for the 
Indian state, whereby it had to practice counterinsurgency internally while 
guarding an international (de facto) border from which it regularly received 
fi re.  313  This meant that the security forces were as concerned with infi ltra-
tion of insurgents into Kashmir as it was with their activities once crossed.  314  
 At the outset of the crisis, it was deemed that the Indian state’s solidarity 
was under threat from a “Pakistan-backed insurgency [that] has assumed 
alarming proportions.”  315  As far as Indian decision makers and soldiers 
were concerned, they needed to fi ght very hard to keep Kashmir within the 
union. A former Congress Party offi cial told me that the period between 
1989 and 1992 saw “extreme brutality” because Kashmir was “a bone of 
contention between India and Pakistan, India will defend it no matter the 
cost. Suspicion of Pakistan support from the beginning gave legitimization 
for extreme violence.”  316  Another former offi cial said that the Indian state’s 
response to the Kashmir rebellion “was that a portion of Indian territory is 
under attack and needs to be defended.”  317  A Kashmiri Pandit who fl ed the 
valley claimed that matters escalated faster in Kashmir than in Punjab or 
Assam because unlike those territories, in Kashmir the combination of a 
history of border war with Pakistan, and the fact that it was “a Muslim 
country providing [help to] Muslim citizens” of India, meant that the state 
was on high alert.  318  As one contemporary analysis argued, “most Indians, 
for security reasons, would tolerate a level of repression in Kashmir that 
they would protest if it occurred elsewhere in the country.”  319  
 The seriousness of the external threat in Kashmir necessitated strong 
resolve. Referring to Pakistan, Prime Minister V. P. Singh noted in April 
1990 that “they want to achieve their territorial goals without paying the 
price of war. You can’t get away with that. You will have to pay a heavy 
cost. We have the capability to infl ict that cost.”  320  He made clear that there 
would be no compromise with “anti-national elements” who were “getting 
assistance from external forces,” and that “no force, either external or 
internal, will ever be permitted to alter” Kashmir’s status in the Indian 
union.  321  Dispelling the impression that security forces’ actions in Kashmir 
were excessive, the prime minister pled for a proper understanding of the 
threat that necessitated such a response: “Let us not underestimate the very 
deep conspiracy across the border.”  322  Similarly, his successor, Chandra 
Shekhar, argued for “strong measures” in Punjab and Kashmir to ensure 
that the militants not receive Pakistani help.  323  A diplomat summarized the 
Indian position succinctly: “We have pulled no punches in our messages to 
the Pakistani leadership . . . we have told them clearly to stop interfering in 
Kashmir and that we will not allow the secession of any part of India.”  324  
 Jagmohan himself justifi ed his repression as a response to the territorial 
threat India faced, noting that “now I am saving the union. How many 
people did Abraham Lincoln kill? If I have to use force, there’s a moral 
legitimacy to it.”  325  Home Minister Mutfi  Mohammad Sayeed, one of the 
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principal architects of India’s Kashmir policy, similarly argued that “no 
slackness” would be shown to the “terrorists” of Kashmir.  326  He warned 
Pakistan that “any attempt to destabilize the nation will be fought back 
with full determination and fortitude,” that “we have the capacity and 
determination to fi ght out this undeclared war,” so that it may “defend 
every inch of Kashmir.”  327  Even ousted chief minister Farooq Abdullah 
claimed that an “iron hand” was needed in Kashmir to adequately deal 
with the “evil designs of our neighbor.”  328  
 Former security offi cials also focused on the material implications of Pak-
istani support. Some emphasized that insurgent organizations need mili-
tary leadership for purposes of planning and analysis of military operations, 
and pointed to the importance of training across the LOC in the early years 
of the insurgency, which gave insurgents the ability to take on, and in cer-
tain cases, be militarily superior to, state security forces. Put together, the 
cocktail of training, command and control support, and sanctuary meant 
that security forces’ “hands were full.”  329  Others argued that a movement 
as large-scale as the Kashmiri insurgency could not be sustained without 
the level of support the Pakistani state proffered.  330  The sophistication of 
the arms Pakistan was supplying, for instance, necessitated an upgrade in 
Indian security forces equipment in both Kashmir and Punjab.  331  
 This position was shared by the press. An editorial in a national news-
paper urged the Indian nation “to gear itself for the very long haul in 
Kashmir” given that Pakistan was now imparting “control and direction of 
the movement in the Valley.”  332  It cheered “the tough line being taken by 
the home ministry against militants and secessionists,” which dealt signifi -
cant blows to “the ideologues of the Pakistan-sponsored movement.”  333  
Pro-union Kashmiri newspapers urged their readers to consider this “a 
time when every patriotic Indian should have supported the efforts of Gov-
ernor Jagmohan in dealing with the terrorist menace [and] restoring peace 
and tranquility in the valley.”  334  Security forces’ “excesses” may be trou-
bling, “but in a kind of situation that we face in the valley today and in 
view of the increase in the militants’ attacks on the security forces, it will be 
diffi cult to altogether avoid” them; the deaths of innocents’ was “inevi-
table” when security forces came under attack from “groups of militants 
numbering 50 to 100.”  335  The  Kashmir Times argued several times that Paki-
stani support for the insurgency necessitated toughness from the Indian 
state, and latitude for Jagmohan’s repression. In February 1990, it solemnly 
noted that “in view of [the] serious threat of militants in the valley and 
threatening posture of Pakistan the country is facing a serious situation in 
the border state . . . any letup in the efforts being made to combat terrorism 
and face the challenge to the country’s integrity is unthinkable.”  336  Simi-
larly, in March, it argued that “what we face today is a war-like situation 
with the neighboring country planning infi ltrations, arming the militants 
and providing them every kind of assistance including fi nances and 
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sophisticated arms in addition to crude propaganda to boost the morale of 
the subversives . . . in such a situation the security forces in the State cannot 
take things lying down . . . what is important at this juncture is a clear-cut 
Kashmir policy by New Delhi and free hand to the Governor to fi ght the 
terrorist menace in Kashmir.”  337  President’s rule in the summer of 1990 was 
“inevitable because of the continued attempts by Pakistan to push more 
and more militants and arms into the valley.”  338  
 High levels of perceived support from Pakistan to the Kashmiri nation-
alist movement, then, helped generate collective repression by the Indian 
state in response. Pakistani aid to, and affi nity with, the local population 
meant that they were seen as a disloyal fi fth column, leading to more indis-
criminate violence on the ground. Pakistani support also meant that Indian 
security forces faced a tougher fi ght than they would have otherwise, both 
within the valley and across the LOC, which resulted in more violence. 
 Alternative Explanations 
 The two main theoretical alternatives to the view given in this chapter do 
not fare well in the Indian case. The argument for institutional veto points 
fails to explain the observed variation because India’s governing structure 
did not change in the period in question while its strategy assuredly did. To 
the extent that political arrangements with varying degrees of centraliza-
tion were imposed, such as president’s rule, these were consequences, not 
causes, of India’s decision-making. The precedent-setting argument, mean-
while, has been often employed by Indian leaders when justifying their 
stance against secessionism. Typically, leaders will refer to the noncom-
munal and secular nature of the Indian state when denying the possibility 
of independence to ethnic or religious groups, arguing essentially that if the 
Muslims go, what will stop the Christians or Sikhs? An argument for cas-
cading secessionism being the state’s overriding concern would expect the 
most violence and repression in the crisis which chronologically appeared 
before the others. However, the Indian state employed concessions and 
policing to deal with the fi rst two crises in Assam and Punjab, which took 
place in the early and mid-1980s, and employed the more brutal response 
in the confl ict that arose last. 
 More context-specifi c arguments also offer unsatisfactory answers. For 
instance, one could argue for a natural resource–based explanation, where 
a state fi ghts harder for richer lands, but this would also fail to explain the 
variation examined here, since it was Assam that was the most resource-
rich province of the three, not Kashmir. Assam contains large oil reserves 
and is also a massive producer of tea. One could make the case that even 
Punjab is more resource-rich than Kashmir, given the reliance of the Indian 
state on Punjab for agricultural production. 
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 It could also be reasoned that the movement in Kashmir had the most 
extreme goals (full independence, rather than autonomy) and thus saw 
more violence. This view ignores that the ULFA, treated with relative 
restraint, was an explicitly secessionist organization. More generally, this 
argument ignores “strategic bluffi ng” by separatist movements, an exceed-
ingly common tactic:  339  movements demanding independence sometimes 
do so only to set a high initial price, while movements demanding autonomy 
could do so as the fi rst of a series of “salami slice” claims. Prima facie, it is 
diffi cult for states to distinguish between the two types. Past a certain base-
line of organizational and political strength, which all three movements dis-
played in spades, the state must treat the movement’s demands with 
seriousness. In turn, the seriousness with which the state takes each indi-
vidual movement is dependent on how much it can threaten the state, 
which rests on how much third-party support it enjoys. 
 One could also point to varied levels of democratic political institutions 
in each of the states examined here, with Kashmir featuring a much higher 
degree of centralization of power, as a more powerful explanation for varia-
tion in violence. There is no doubt that a decaying institutional framework 
gave fuel to dissatisfaction on the ground to rebels and their supporters, 
especially in Kashmir. However, from the perspective of the state’s decision-
making—the object of inquiry here—differences in institutionalization was 
as much a consequence as a cause of its calculus. It was precisely  because 
Kashmir was viewed through an external lens that the center could ill 
afford to take chances with allowing greater democratic representation to 
its citizens. In Assam, by contrast, rebel parties such as the AGP could be 
brought into the political fold because of the lower level of threat the move-
ment posed, and state governments in both Assam (1987–90) and Punjab 
(1985–87) could be trusted to tackle militancy when the external threat was 
relatively low. 
 A fi nal counterargument to mine could reason that I overstate the varia-
tion in Indian strategy across space and time. One specifi c version of this 
claim would point to Operation Bluestar, and question why the death of 
hundreds at the hands of state security forces would not be considered 
harsh coercion. I consider Bluestar the very event that led to the Sikh seces-
sionist moment, and as such, do not include it as part of the Indian state’s 
strategy against separatists. To the contrary, until 1985, Sikh agitation was 
restricted mainly to Bhindranwale and a relatively tiny group of militants, 
in part encouraged by the Congress government itself. As such, the Indian 
government’s actions at the Golden Temple in 1984 should be seen as an 
overcompensatory corrective to its cynical deployment of religious crimi-
nals for electoral gain, rather than as part of a strategy against a full-blown 
separatist movement. A more general version of this counterargument, 
meanwhile, would make the claim that “India has always been very brutal” 
in its counterinsurgency, pointing to, for instance, Indian strategy in the 
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Northeast in the 1960s, and dispute whether there is a signifi cant difference 
between its conduct in places such as Assam and Kashmir and Punjab.  340  
A more general assessment of Indian counterinsurgency lies outside the 
scope of this book. However, it bears noting that during the much-
discussed period of Indian brutality in the Northeast, the 1960s, insurgents 
enjoyed signifi cantly more Pakistani and Chinese support than in the 
period examined here. For example, groups in Nagaland began receiving 
weapons and training from East Pakistan in 1958.  341  This support was 
intensifi ed after China’s victory against India in the 1962 war, after which it 
began its wholehearted support of Naga insurgents, making Indian counter-
insurgency considerably more challenging from the mid-1960s onward.  342  
It was Pakistan’s loss of its eastern wing in 1971 that severely compromised 
its ability, and China’s, to support groups in the Northeast,  343  explaining 
why, during the 1980s, the scale and intensity of Indian counterinsurgency 
in the Northeast did not approach its behavior on the western border. 
 The comparison of Kashmir with Punjab and Assam is instructive. In 
Assam, the Indian government was willing to escalate to only mild coer-
cion, while signing accords with both political and militant representatives 
of the ethnic group. In Punjab, similar to Assam, the government was 
willing to be accommodationist when it viewed the confl ict through pri-
marily a domestic lens; it was only when Pakistani support for the Sikh 
separatists increased that the Indian state went to a more aggressive 
strategy. In the Kashmir case, however, at the fi rst signs of trouble, the 
center imposed president’s rule, sent in the hard-line Jagmohan, and when 
he proved to be a disastrous choice, replaced him with the equally hard-line 
Saxena. High levels of violence were evident from the very beginning of the 
crisis. The Indian state simply could not afford to do anything other than 
smash the insurgency, given that it believed Pakistan was behind it, and 
that a serious and signifi cant threat to the territorial status quo between the 
two states had developed.  344  
 As my theory would expect, the movement that represented the greatest 
external security threat, Kashmir, received the most repressive strategy—
collective repression. Conversely Punjab was a more mixed case: a strategy 
centering on policing at the initial secessionist moment, and then an escala-
tion to militarization when Pakistani support increased to moderate levels. 
The movement deemed the least threatening externally due to limited 
levels of third-party support, Assam, was dealt with the softest hands, with 
a mixture of policing and militarization. 
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 chapter 4 
 The Ottoman Empire’s Escalation from 
Reforms to the Armenian Genocide, 
1908–1915 
 In the fi rst decade and a half of the twentieth century, Ottoman treatment of 
its Armenian community changed in step with changing threats to the 
polity. The Armenian nation had no pivotal secessionist “moments” as such 
during this period. Rather, the state of Armenian demands and nationalism 
was a near constant phenomenon: signifi cantly greater autonomy, up to 
and including statehood. As we shall see, the Ottoman response to these 
Armenian demands ebbed and fl owed. Upon deposing the sultan and 
assuming power in 1908, the Young Turk movement dealt with the Arme-
nians peacefully, with the promise of administrative reforms. However, 
once World War I broke out, and Turkey joined the Central Powers, the 
Armenians faced genocide. Seven years apart, the same regime, facing the 
same ethnic group, used strategies as vastly different as “negotiations and 
concessions” and “collective repression.” Why? 
 The increased external vulnerability brought about by Turkey’s involve-
ment in the war was crucial in the escalation the Armenians faced, partic-
ularly given relations between Russia, the Ottoman state, and the 
Armenian community. When the Young Turks fi rst rose to power, they 
had a relatively optimistic outlook on the state’s future in Europe. More 
important, they conceived of Ottoman identity as including the presence 
and participation of Armenians. These beliefs supplied the confi dence 
necessary for a strategy of negotiations and concessions. However, by 
1914–15, their treatment of Armenians changed dramatically, with two 
factors relating to external security especially relevant. First, the changing 
shape and form of the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1914—it lost 
essentially all of its European territory—meant that the state’s identity 
became based more on a narrow Turkism than an accommodating Otto-
manism. Shifts in Ottoman identity ensured that Armenian nationalism 
was no longer considered indifferent to the national core but actively 
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existentially threatening light. Second, the fact that the Ottomans and 
Russians were on opposite sides in the war meant that when the latter’s 
support for Armenians shot up, it did so at a time when the very survival 
of the Ottoman Empire was in peril. Strong support by Russia for the 
Armenians had both material and emotional consequences, whereby the 
Ottoman Empire faced a signifi cantly tougher fi ght in World War I thanks 
to Armenian collaboration and acted angrily in the face of perceived 
betrayal. In conjunction, these factors—the adoption of a more exclusivist 
and paranoid nationalism by the Young Turk regime, which shifted the 
identity distance between the two groups from “indifferent” to “opposed,” 
and “high” Russian support for the Armenians during the Great War—
translated into genocide. 
 I believe this case is worthy of investigation for a number of reasons. 
First, “extreme” cases, or those where either or both of the independent and 
dependent variable lie far from the median, can prove instructive.  1  The 
Ottoman-Armenian case certainly fi ts this description, with state strategy 
spanning from “negotiations and concessions,” wide-ranging and substan-
tive reforms to the Armenians, to “collective repression.” Insofar as the 
independent variable is concerned, it is diffi cult to imagine a more exter-
nally threatening environment than the one the Ottoman Empire faced 
during World War I. 
 Second, because the Ottoman case was not one of a modern nation-state, 
but an empire in the midst of dissolution, its inclusion increases the breadth 
of the sample tested thus far. Unlike most other European empires—the 
British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish—the Ottoman Empire was 
geographically contiguous, with no body of water between the metropole 
and the periphery. This meant that it “looked” like a state more so than the 
Western European empires (see chapter 1). 
 Third, scholars suggest dividing a single case into two subcases, a tech-
nique known as “before-after research design,” in order to gauge the effects 
of changes in one signifi cant variable.  2  Leveraging the variation in Young 
Turk strategy with respect to the Armenians in 1908 and 1915, when little 
about the case changed other than the appreciably different external environ-
ment the state faced, allows for a fruitful examination of the effect of external 
security conditions on state strategy with respect to separatist minorities. 
 Before proceeding, it is important to note that the historical origins of the 
Armenian genocide are strongly contested. As the title of one book sug-
gests, the Armenian genocide is a “disputed genocide.”  3  There are essen-
tially two interpretations on what transpired between the Ottoman state 
and its Armenian nation. First, there is the belief that, absent World War I, 
the Armenian genocide could not and would not have happened. This view 
is generally forwarded by Western historians, who argue that the Ottoman 
position and performance in the war was intimately tied to its decision to 
organize the deportations of hundreds of thousands of people in bad 
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weather and through rough terrain, without protection against marauders 
or disease, resulting in the murder of a million Armenians. The opposi-
tional view, generally forwarded by Armenian historians, is that the geno-
cide was a premeditated act, planned well before World War I.  4  There is a 
third view, proffered primarily by “offi cial” Turkish historians,  5  who argue 
that there was no deliberate mass-targeting of the Armenian community in 
the fi rst place,  6  and to the extent that there was violence committed against 
Armenians, it was part and parcel of the fog of war. Such “scholars” under-
state levels of violence against the Armenians;  7  overstate Armenian respon-
sibility for the violence; claim that rather than ordering massacres, the 
Young Turk regime wanted to provide both food and security to the 
deportees;  8  argue that the Armenians suffered no more or less than other 
communities in the state during the Great War; and practice frankly bizarre 
forms of false equivalence, where small-scale incidents such as murders 
and seizures of banks occupy the same moral space as the deaths of hun-
dreds of thousands of people.  9  This third view has been thoroughly dis-
credited, and as such, I will not engage with it at length here, except to 
merely note its existence. 
 I side primarily with the fi rst camp. Although the leadership in the 
Ottoman state may well have harbored considerable ill-will toward their 
Armenian citizens before the war and was uneager to ensure their safety 
once deported, it was only the security exigencies of the Great War that 
caused the genocide. In particular, the real and perceived partnership 
between Russia and the restive Armenian population made the senior 
Ottoman leadership believe that their prospects of survival in the war were 
nonexistent if they did not fi rst tackle the Armenian “problem.” 
 The main factors to consider in favor of this argument are: the perilous 
situation the Ottomans found themselves in the spring of 1915; the location 
of major Armenian population centers, occupying important territory along 
Ottoman lines of communication and supply as well as possible lines of 
Russian invasion; and the timing and escalation of the major deportation 
orders by Talaat and Enver Pasha. As we shall see, Armenian population 
centers were concentrated in the Ottoman rear, especially with respect to 
two of their three major fronts in World War I—the Caucasus campaign 
against Russia and the Palestine and Mesopotamian campaigns against 
Britain. During the spring and summer of 1915, when the Ottoman Empire 
was considered to be on its last legs, and faced Allied and Russian incur-
sions in three theaters as well as internal insurrections, its leaders ordered 
deportations both  when and  where it faced the greatest security threat. In 
conjunction with corroborating public and private testimony from the main 
Ottoman decision makers, the implication is that the Ottoman state was 
concerned with the prospect of the Armenian fi fth column attacking its vul-
nerable supply and communication lines, or alternatively, joining advancing 
Russian or Western forces, both fears that were realized in a number of 
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cases. On a wider temporal scale, the onset of the war, and considerable ter-
ritorial losses in the years running up to it, at once solidifi ed the existence of 
threats emanating from abroad, and hardened Ottoman resolve to deal 
with them. 
 For the purposes of the general argument forwarded in this book, then, 
external security considerations for the Ottoman state were the crucial 
driving variable for the escalation from its accommodationist policy to 
widespread slaughter. In 1908, the revolutionary Young Turk government 
attempted “negotiations and concessions” to solve the Armenian issue 
because they had an optimistic view of the state, both internally and exter-
nally. By the time the war began, however, and the external threat that the 
Ottoman state faced ramped up due to changes in national identity and the 
wider geopolitical context, its policy of “collective repression” was put in 
place. Figure 4 summarizes the argument I forward in this chapter. 
 The main theoretical alternatives to mine outlined in the introduction 




























 Figure 4 . Variation in the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of Armenians, 1908–15 
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would predict that the earlier movement would face greater violence, but 
the opposite took place. Meanwhile, Young Turk leaders’ concentration of 
power between 1908 and 1915 would have been relevant for the veto points 
argument—as long as they preferred a policy of concessions, only to be sty-
mied by a lack of credibility with the minority. However, in the spring of 
1915, the Young Turk leaders were fl atly uninterested in concessions to the 
Armenians, rendering theories centering on domestic institutions less than 
useful in explaining the Ottoman escalation to genocide. The main alterna-
tive, context-specifi c argument would be that external security consider-
ations were merely correlated, rather than causally related, with Ottoman 
decision-making, and that the leadership had decided on genocide well 
before the Great War. Such a view does not withstand empirical scrutiny, as 
we shall see. 
 Antecedent Conditions of a Tripartite Rivalry 
 In the early 1800s, historic Armenia was scythed up between the Russian 
and Ottoman empires, and the Russians supplemented those gains in the 
coming years by snapping up territory through wars, conquests, and trea-
ties.  10  By the middle of the century, the Ottoman state was left with just 
over 2 million Armenians under its control, more than half of which lived 
in six  vilayets , or provinces: Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Kharput, and 
Sivas, where they outnumbered both ethnic Turks and Kurds. Armenians 
were also concentrated on the Mediterranean coast at Cilicia.  11  The geo-
graphic distribution of Armenians mattered greatly because the Ottoman 
authorities, in trying to dampen calls for reform, would attempt to mini-
mize the number of Armenians in particular areas.  12  
 Armenian demands in the latter half of the nineteenth century had not 
yet escalated to full independence. Rather, they sought guarantees of life 
and property. Armenians often fell victim to marauding Kurds, who would 
attack entire villages and extort local merchants. This practice forced a 
system of double taxation on Armenian communities, who paid high taxes 
to the state on account of being non-Muslim, even before they were sub-
jected to violence and intimidation from Kurds. Moreover, the laws and 
regulations of the Ottoman system imposed additional hardships on the 
Armenian community: Christians were not equal before the law and judi-
cial system, and they were barred from serving in the higher levels of the 
government and military. Worse still was that the perpetrators of attacks 
against them were never punished, which in turn encouraged yet more 
attacks. In fact, the Turkish-Armenian confl ict actually began as a Kurd-
Armenian confl ict; the latter were generally defenseless against Kurdish 
violence and extortion, and it was the refusal of Ottoman authorities to do 
anything about it that greatly angered the Armenians.  13  
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 The Armenian community was generally more economically advanced 
than most ethnic blocs under the Ottomans. In this, they were aided by the 
fact that Muslims in the state were discouraged from merchant or trade-
reliant careers. Moreover, the Armenians’ geographic clustering and reli-
gious identity led to a stronger sense of nationhood and common identity 
than among most other groups. As a consequence, it was easier for them to 
forward demands as a unifi ed community in the face of discrimination. 
Reform on security, administrative matters, taxes, and property were the 
central Armenian demands in the latter half of the nineteenth century, with 
independence or autonomy not a major concern as yet.  14  From the state’s 
point of view, the Armenians were not considered the most pressing 
internal problem either, to the point that they were famously considered the 
“most loyal community” among Ottoman Christian citizens in the nine-
teenth century.  15  
 In 1877, war broke out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The 
Ottomans allied with Britain, which itself was wary about Russian ambi-
tions in and around Asia Minor, Persia, and India. However, Britain’s sup-
port did not extend to lending a military hand to the sultan, and Russia 
won the war relatively easily. In fact, they entered Constantinople and were 
six miles from the Porte before French and British forces compelled the 
Russians to stop their advance. The war resulted in Russia annexing the 
border regions in the Caucasus. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin marked the end of 
the war, and with it ensured independence for Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Romania—that is, the Ottomans lost most of their Christian citizens. In 
addition, Bulgaria won greater autonomy and reforms were promised to 
Macedonia, eastern Roumelia, Salonika, and Kosovo.  16  
 These developments reaffi rmed Ottoman perceptions of Russia seeking 
to weaken it from within by supporting the independence efforts of ethnic 
groups in their midst, particularly if they were Christian.  17  More generally, 
they fueled resentment at Western intervention in the state’s domestic 
affairs.  18  Russia’s actions did not allay these concerns. It put its cards on the 
table when it pledged to withdraw from annexed Ottoman territory only 
when reforms targeting Armenian grievances were put in place.  19  Per-
versely but unsurprisingly, international intervention in Armenian efforts 
toward reform provided mixed results at best—while the recognition of 
their strife led to a greater sense of national consciousness among the Arme-
nians, European interference tended to give the Ottoman leadership more 
reason to clamp down on them.  20  
 Russia’s ambitions for Ottoman Armenians were not very grand or wide 
ranging. Contrary to Ottoman perceptions, Russia did not prefer Turkey’s 
empire to dissolve or be partitioned out of existence; rather, Russia 
preferred a weak but still viable Ottoman state. With regard to Armenian 
aspirations, Russia wished for the sultan to enact relatively moderate 
reforms—concessions too weighty would be problematic for the Russians 
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too, since they had their own politically active Armenian minority.  21  
Although Russia’s geostrategic focus turned partly from the Balkans and 
Near East to Persia and the Far East, it still considered its “historic” tasks in 
the Near East important. These objectives were that no third state should 
control the Straits, which were key for Russian commerce, and a natural 
launching point for control of the Balkans and the Black Sea; statehood for 
Balkan Christian peoples; and a general, non-negotiable sphere of infl uence 
in the Near East.  22  
 Regardless of Russian interference and provocation, when the Young 
Turks rose to power, their fi rst interactions with Armenians were hardly 
marked by antipathy, or anything close to it. To the contrary, their relation-
ship was, at least at the outset, marked by cooperation and mutual 
optimism. 
 Young Turks Ascension to Power and Accommodation of Armenians 
 The Young Turks assumed control of the state in a revolution in 1908 that 
featured “astonishingly little bloodshed.”  23  The revolutionaries were an 
eclectic group: modern thinkers, intelligentsia, liberals, and naval and mili-
tary offi cers, organized under various political groups, most prominent of 
which was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The CUP was 
inspired by the French Revolution and Japan’s Meiji Restoration, which 
imparted to the Young Turks the lesson that constitutionalism was the key 
to state strength. In this simplistic view, constitutionalism was considered a 
panacea, “a recipe for alleviating ethnic strife, ending nationalist separatist 
movements, propelling economic growth, and instituting legal rationality 
in the military and the civil administration.”  24  The organizational ante-
cedent for the Young Turks was the Ottoman Union, a secret group formed 
in 1889 by medical students in Istanbul, which operated underground and 
worked to establish contacts with liberal-minded members of the sultan’s 
regime as well as oppositional fi gures abroad, particularly in Western 
Europe. Ahmed Riza was the main leader in charge of the organization that 
was to develop into the CUP.  25  Riza was based in Paris—many of the Young 
Turk movement’s leaders resided abroad—and led calls for constitution-
alist government. He also decried foreign interference in Turkey’s internal 
affairs.  26  Additionally, dissatisfi ed military offi cers were an important com-
ponent of the Young Turks and the CUP. One scholar has characterized the 
entire transition to constitutionalism as “overwhelmingly military in char-
acter” and the revolution as “the corroboration of the ideas and activities of 
a handful of idealists who leaned upon the military for its prompt and 
smooth execution.”  27  
 The Young Turk movement had been the subject of persecution from the 
sultan’s regime throughout the 1870s and 1880s but its organizational 
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strength and activism grew in the 1890s to the point where it was a latent 
revolutionary threat to the regime.  28  The elements behind the Young Turks 
even attempted a coup in August 1896 but were thwarted at the last 
moment, throwing their entire secret organizational structure into chaos 
and forcing a temporary retreat.  29  The Young Turks fi nally staged their rev-
olution in 1908, with July 24 signifying the end of autocratic rule and the 
beginning of the era of the Second Constitution.  30  Ideologically, what united 
the movement was their common goal of a comprehensive modernization 
program and a fervent belief in Ottoman nationalism and identity, building 
on ideas fi rst carried forward by the Young Ottomans.  31  Their principal aim 
was to restore the constitution and depose the sultan’s government, which 
was too theocratic and regressive for their modernist world view.  32  
 Even before their revolution, the Young Turks had foreshadowed a 
spirit of cooperation that was to mark their relationship with Armenian 
nationalists in 1908. Despite differences of opinion, representatives from 
nationalist parties such as the Hanchaks, including Stepan Sapah-Gulian, 
M. Boyadjian, and Arpiar Arpiarian, met with Young Turk leaders Nazim 
and Behaeddin Shakir. As Kirakossian writes, the two sides found a mutu-
ally benefi cial framework: the Young Turks “agreed with the idea of estab-
lishing autonomous Armenia: she was not to be separated from Turkey but 
could have a European governor. . . . Ahmed Riza and others expressed 
readiness to meet Armenian requirements on the condition that Huntchaks 
assist in resolving general state problems.”  33  Consistent with these expecta-
tions, when they fi nally rose to power, the Young Turks dealt with the 
Armenian community peacefully. Their strategy was rooted in both a rea-
sonably secure regional environment and, more importantly, a belief that 
Armenians were an important component of Ottoman national identity. 
 The Young Turks assumed power with the wholehearted support of the 
two main Armenian revolutionary parties, the Hanchaks and the Dash-
naks.  34  In terms of their goals, the Hanchak Party was more radical than the 
Dashnaks, who unlike the former group, did not advocate for full-blown 
independence, but rather reform within the empire.  35  Though there was 
much to unite the elements that made up the nascent state, there was one 
important division, which was to matter a great deal a few years down the 
road. Specifi cally, how would the state be organized administratively? 
Ahmed Riza called for greater centralization, while the decentralist group, 
which was led by Prince Sabahaddin, the sultan’s nephew, called for polit-
ical and economic liberalization along the Anglo-Saxon model.  36  The Arme-
nian community, naturally, supported the Sabahaddin camp.  37  
 At the time, however, Armenian nationalists and the Young Turks put 
their differences aside. It was not just a common foe that united them—
though it remains trivially true that neither had any love lost for the 
sultan. Rather, the promise of a constitution and a more modern Ottoman 
Empire held appeal for each set of ideologues, the Armenian nationalists 
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as well as the Ottoman state builders. This was why “Armenians took 
great satisfaction in the victory of the army and its CUP commanders. . . . 
The downfall of the sultan and the restoration of the constitution of 1876 
was everything and more that they and their parties such as the Dashnaks 
had hoped for.”  38  
 In the aftermath of the July Revolution, the CUP reached out to all non-
Turkish communities, including the Armenians, Greeks, and Macedonians, 
to institutionalize cooperation on the question of candidates for the 
upcoming elections, bringing them into the CUP fold.  39  From the perspec-
tive of the CUP, it was imperative, right from the beginning, to portray a 
friendly and tolerant image toward the Christian communities within the 
empire and to do away with internal divisions. Their message was clear: 
the aim was a constitutional regime, and all communities organized against 
the sultan’s regime were not just welcome but necessary.  40  To that end, the 
Young Turk regime’s initial months were marked by greater liberalization 
in the entire state, including lifting censorship of the press, disbanding the 
sultan’s internal intelligence network, amnesty for political prisoners, and 
the dismissal of corrupt government and palace offi cials.  41  Citizens of “all 
denominations marched in the streets under banners bearing the slogan 
‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’ in various languages, and welcomed the age of 
freedom and democracy.”  42  
 Aside from this general trend of liberalization, the Young Turks made 
several substantial concessions to the Armenian community. Armenians 
contested seats in parliament, as full Ottoman citizens of the state, rather 
than as part of a separate  millet , or nation. The Armenian national assembly 
was convened after being banned under the sultan. Schools and libraries 
were opened, and newspapers were allowed to circulate. Kurdish raids and 
violence were scaled down. Exiled notables, such as the deposed patriarch 
of Constantinople, Madteos III Izmiriliyan and the writer Grigor Zohrap, 
were welcomed back home. Enver Pasha, Talaat, and other Young Turk 
leaders went to Armenian churches, schools, and graveyards, where they 
paid respects to fallen Armenians who had died in the antisultan struggle, 
and made powerful speeches pointing to cooperation between Turks and 
Armenians. Enver told “children that the old days of Moslem-Christian 
strife had passed forever and that the two peoples were now to live together 
as brothers and sisters.” The changes that took place were slow moving, but 
they were substantive, and recognized as such—even by revolutionary 
Armenian parties.  43  The Hanchaks went so far as to claim that the Ottoman 
parliament was a “genuine spokesman of the yearnings and will of the sub-
jugated element, staunch supporters of its human rights and the champion 
of the fatherland’s freedom.”  44  Sapah-Gulian, one of their leaders, wrote 
that “when the constitution was proclaimed, the majority of Armenians 
and myself among them, became Ittihadists. Our common belief was that 
the party that proclaims the constitution is heart and soul for the progress 
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and development of the entire country and all her people.”  45  Parties such as 
the Dashnaks would participate fully in Ottoman politics, cooperating with 
the CUP, playing an active role in the fi rst parliamentary elections, and 
mobilizing Armenian support in favor of the constitution.  46  As Suny sum-
marizes, “The 1908 revolution proclaimed a new era for the empire, a pro-
gressive step into a European-style modernity based on constitutionalism, 
equality, fraternity, and personal freedom,” and therefore “Ottoman Arme-
nians and other minorities joyfully greeted the restoration of the liberal 
Constitution, hopeful that the new government would provide a political 
mechanism for peaceful development within the framework of a represen-
tative parliamentary system.”  47  
 CUP’s rhetoric and actions spoke to the accommodationist stance they 
held toward the Armenian community in the early days of their regime. To 
use my theoretical framework, the state used “negotiations and conces-
sions” when dealing with Armenian demands for autonomy. This strategy 
was undergirded by confi dence in their future security; Young Turk leaders 
were not preoccupied with foreign relations but sharply focused on internal 
reform. They could maintain such a focus fi rst because they had a base opti-
mism about the future of the Ottoman Empire. Specifi cally, in 1908 “the 
Young Turks believed in the possibility of their empire’s becoming a full 
member of European international society, convinced that it could repre-
sent the harmony of Eastern and Western civilization,” and went about cul-
tivating diplomatic contacts in various European capitals, seeking to 
cement friendships with major powers such as Britain, France, and 
Germany.  48  
 More important than this optimism about their regional environment, 
the Young Turks’ conceptualization of Ottoman identity was consistent 
with, and welcoming of, the presence of Armenians, and called for their 
greater political participation. The Armenian and central leaderships 
shared ideological goals, and Armenian demands for autonomy were not 
seen as unreasonable or problematic. The basic belief upholding their 
reforms was that if the Ottoman Empire could unite its various nationalities 
from within, its relations with Europe and the world would, in essence, 
take care of itself. For the Young Turks, unlike previous Ottoman regimes, 
Armenian identity was not “opposed” to that of the central state, but 
“indifferent.” 
 Ottoman nationalism, particularly in the early period of the Young Turk 
regime, implied the privileging of Ottoman identity over and above com-
munities’ parochial identities. As Kayali notes, “In the euphoria of July 
1908 the Unionists believed that the non-Muslims would be won over to 
the CUP’s Ottomanist platform in the new parliamentary regime. They 
hoped that religious and ethnic differences would be superseded by a 
broader Ottoman identity.”  49  In other words, Ottoman concessions to Chris-
tian communities generally and the Armenians specifi cally grew out of a 
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belief that all Ottoman citizens owed their allegiance to the state, and as 
such, their primary identity should be tied to it. The antecedent arrange-
ment of separate millets, or nations, starkly recognized, and contributed to, 
the ethnic differences between different groups of Ottoman subjects,  50  dis-
tinctions which the Young Turks aimed to extinguish. This shift in world-
view mirrors the so-called soup versus salad debate on immigration in 
contemporary politics, where some advocates argue that all communities 
must subjugate themselves to a larger identity, as ingredients mix in a 
melting pot of soup, while others argue for the maintenance of (respectful) 
boundaries between different ethnic or religious groups, akin to vegetables 
in a salad bowl, such that each maintains their unique character in a larger 
ensemble.  51  
 The Young Turks initially opted for a soup model. As Enver Pasha mem-
orably claimed, “We are all Ottomans.” The general philosophy they 
espoused was one of unity “without distinctions of race” and the “peace 
and safety of the common homeland” alongside the abandonment of “par-
ticular purposes.” The state would be organized along the “secular and 
universalist principle of the equality of all subjects, who all owed equal 
loyalty to the empire.”  52  As the CUP wrote to one Bulgarian politician, 
“This country belongs neither to the Turk, nor to the Bulgarian or Arab. It is 
the asset and domain of every individual carrying the name Ottoman. . . . 
Those who think the opposite of this, namely those who try to sever the 
country into parts and nations, even if they are Turks, are our adversaries, 
our enemies.”  53  
 This fervent belief in Ottomanism is referred to by detractors of the 
regime as “fascist,” but in reality, the Young Turks were simply behaving as 
other European powers, where the creation, imposition, and sustenance of 
national and uniform identities became state projects.  54  Nationalism, as it 
existed in contemporary Europe, swept into the Ottoman state around the 
middle of the nineteenth century, and came hand in hand with a more gen-
eral belief in transporting the dominant ideas about politics at the time, 
from reforms aimed at strengthening the bureaucratic nature of the state, to 
the liberalism of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Smith.  55  It was the very late-
ness of this arrival of nationalism that forced on the Young Turks such deci-
sions about the “offi cial” state identity.  56  
 Terms such as  centralism and  decentralization , therefore, should be treated 
with caution, as they are often taken to mean things that they do not. For 
instance, it would be easy to fall into the analytical trap of confl ating 
“decentralization” with positive reforms toward the Armenian community. 
In fact,  centralist ideas lay behind the concessions: the notion that all citi-
zens were Ottomans fi rst and foremost meant that the CUP was eager to 
ensure equality in treatment. For the Young Turks, Armenian nationalism 
was not opposed to Ottoman identity, it was to be seamlessly subsumed 
under it. 
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 The Young Turks’ view of their national identity, which had a welcome 
place for the Ottoman Armenian community, when combined with the rela-
tively relaxed external environment the state faced in 1908, opened the pos-
sibility of signifi cant concessions. Soon, however, both the Ottoman 
Empire’s regional security, as well as its conception of Armenian nation-
alism, would undergo drastic changes—with severely deleterious conse-
quences for Armenians. 
 Radicalized Identity, Deteriorating Neighborhood 
 The spirit of bonhomie and mutual cooperation between the Young Turks 
and the Armenian community lasted less than a year. The 1909 Adana mas-
sacre, where roughly twenty thousand to thirty thousand Armenians died 
following a temporary countercoup by the sultan, and the general slow 
pace of reform notwithstanding promises to the contrary, put paid to Arme-
nian hopes. For their part, the Young Turks’ view of the Armenian commu-
nity would also change drastically over the next half-decade, with two 
episodes particularly responsible. 
 First, the Ottomans’ defeats in the Balkan wars of 1912 would irrevo-
cably change both the physical and ideological nature of the state. Losing 
its European and Christian territories meant that the Ottoman Empire 
pursued an increasingly Turkifi ed nationalism, as a result of which Arme-
nian identity assumed a much more sinister and threatening shape. These 
developments caused the shift in Ottoman perceptions of Armenian iden-
tity from “indifferent” to “opposed.” Second, the 1914 Mandelstam Plan, 
named after a Russian diplomatic offi cial, which called for Armenians’ 
autonomy being guaranteed by foreign powers, mainly Russia, cemented 
in the leadership’s collective mind that Armenian nationalists were a fi fth 
column not to be trusted. Together, these developments ensured that the 
Ottoman leadership began to see Armenian nationalism as a signifi cant 
security threat, one whose dangers escalated drastically once World War I 
broke out and Russian support for Armenians rose to “high” levels. 
 the balkan wars’  territorial and 
ideological consequences 
 The fi rst major episode that shifted Young Turk perceptions of Ottoman 
Armenians was the Balkan wars. In October 1912, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Greece, and Bulgaria declared war on the Ottoman state. “Out-powered, 
demoralized, unprepared, and poorly equipped, the Ottoman army fought 
fourteen battles and lost all but one of them.”  57  Within a few years, due to 
war losses and successful separatist movements, the Ottomans lost about 
40 percent of its landmass and about 25 percent of its population. The fi rst 
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domino to fall was Bulgaria, which declared its independence, followed by 
Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having fought 
a war against Italy in 1911, due to which the Ottomans lost Libya, the 
Balkan wars in 1912 ensured that Turkey was essentially no longer in 
Europe.  58  
 What proved pivotal was not just the extent of territorial loss, but also its 
nature. Having lost almost all its European and Christian territories, the 
multinational and multiethnic character of the state lay in tatters, moving 
the center of gravity of the Ottoman Empire east, toward Anatolia. The 
Balkan provinces had been the “heart of the Empire, its provinces being by 
far the most advanced and the most productive. They had always provided 
much of the Empire’s wealth and had long been the recruiting ground for 
the army and the bureaucracy.”  59  This was no longer the case. The loss of 
European territories precipitated a crisis for the Ottoman state; one scholar 
claims that “it is no exaggeration to state that the effect of the Balkan wars 
on Ottoman society was nothing short of apocalyptic.”  60  There were a 
number of reasons for this. 
 First, and most important, the territorial losses and European oppor-
tunism narrowed the Young Turks relatively pluralistic Ottomanist ide-
ology to one espousing Turkish identity and nationalism.  61  After all, simple 
demographics meant that with the exit of the Albanians, Greeks, and Slavs, 
the Turks were numerically dominant in a way that they were not before 
1908. Moreover, the very fact of territorial losses “strengthened the hands of 
centralizers and of Turkish nationalists/Islamicists against liberals and 
Christians—a stronger, more loyal state was needed.”  62  As a consequence, 
the state saw a transition, from the “seemingly liberal, egalitarian Young 
Turks into extreme chauvinists, bent on creating a new order.”  63  One exem-
plar of this trend was Ziya Gökalp, one of the key intellectual and ideolog-
ical fi gures behind the new Young Turk movement, who believed that state 
strength comes from homogeneity. A nation, he wrote, “must be a society 
consisting of people who speak the same language, have had the same edu-
cation and are united in their religious and aesthetic ideals—in short those 
who have a common culture and religion.”  64  
 This paradigmatic shift in the regime’s conception of the state’s identity 
would have signifi cantly adverse consequence for the Armenian commu-
nity down the road. Armenians were now perceived as directly opposed to 
the Ottoman national core, after previously being seen as unthreatening to, 
and being subsumed under, it. As Bloxham notes, what eventually drove 
the Armenian genocide was the “the impulse ‘to streamline, make homog-
enous, organize people to be uniform in some sense. . . . CUP nationalism 
was . . . shaped by, and in reaction to, the ethno-nationalist movements in 
the Balkans.”  65  Melson concurs, noting that “by 1912, certainly by 1915, the 
Young Turks were not particularly benign or dedicated to pluralism. They 
had become xenophobic integral nationalists for whom the identity and 
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situation of the Armenians were suffi cient proof of their treachery and 
potential threat to the continuity of the empire.”  66  War losses generated a 
signifi cant shift in the Young Turks’ outlook on questions of identity. 
 Second, the Balkan losses increased the salience of any seditious activity 
in Anatolia, which now constituted the Turkish heartland.  67  As Abdullah 
Jevdet, a CUP leader, said: “Anatolia is the well spring of every fi ber of our 
life. It is our heart, head, and the air we breathe.”  68  The Young Turks consid-
ered disloyalty from its secessionist citizens as the primary cause of mili-
tary defeat. The positive reforms they had instituted had, in a sense, sown 
the seeds of the state being scythed up. 
 More than the failure of the Ottoman army to mobilize and defend the 
empire, many observers saw treason at the heart of this tragic defeat. Local 
Christian civilians and armed bands in Macedonia had aided the onslaught 
of the Balkan States. The eviction of hundreds of thousands of Ottoman 
Muslims from Macedonia and Kosova entailed the forfeiture of countless 
homes and hectares of land to the Christian victors. Ottoman Christian sub-
jects still under Istanbul’s rule were not immune to blame . . . the complicity 
of both Christian and Muslim Albanians in establishing an independent 
Albanian state in November 1912 confi rmed to many in the government the 
duplicity and seditiousness of their former countrymen.  69  
 Finally, the losses in the Balkan wars led to the predominance of external 
security concerns for the CUP, which “weighed heavily on the minds of the 
Young Turks immediately after the fi ghting ended.”  70  No longer was the 
neighborhood deemed safe enough to risk policies that could result in 
border changes. The losses in the Balkan wars created a “new sense of 
crisis” for the state and its Committee of Union and Progress leadership.  71  
As Üngör argues, the issues of external security, a more fervent Turkish 
nationalism, and ethnic separatist mobilization were inextricably bound up 
with one another: 
 Most of all, the Young Turks’ perception that the catastrophe of the Balkans 
should never be allowed to happen to the remaining territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, especially the eastern provinces, would give birth to 
unprecedented forms of population politics and social engineering. One 
major outcome of these processes was a deep fear, or perhaps a complex, of 
loss. The fear of losing territory was a persistent phobia of both late Ottoman 
and Turkish political culture.  72  
 Crucially, this increase in levels of fear the regime faced was directly due to 
the behavior of outside powers. As the U.S. ambassador during the war 
noted in his memoirs, “Of all the new kingdoms which had been carved out 
of the sultan’s dominions, Serbia . . . is the only one that has won her own 
independence. Russia, France, and Great Britain have set free all” the other 
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Christian peoples in the Ottoman Empire.  73  The realization of external vul-
nerability led the triumvirate of Enver, Talaat, and Jamal to make military 
restoration a serious priority on reasserting strong control of the Ottoman 
state in 1913. They wished to modernize the military corps, increase their 
spending on defense, acquire better equipment, and build modern naval 
ships. They also recruited German offi cers, thought to be the best offi cer 
corps in Europe, for army training purposes, as well as the British and 
French for the navy and reorganizing the gendarmerie respectively. The 
Russians, owing to the transparency of their designs on Ottoman territory, 
were not considered.  74  
 Turkey’s territorial losses in the Balkan wars were signifi cant from the 
point of view of the Armenian nationalists too, serving as valuable learning 
experiences. They thought great powers might help resolve their national 
question just as had been the case with other Christian peoples under the 
Ottomans.  75  An article in a Russian newspaper argued that “all the Turkish 
Armenians regardless of their membership of a party . . . see Russia as their 
sole defender and savior and are envious of the peaceful life of the Russian 
Armenians.”  76  
 In sum, the losses in the Balkan wars made the Young Turks more wary 
of external security concerns, more suspicious of any secessionist activity in 
its homeland, and more narrowly nationalistic in its outlook. Territorial 
losses changed how the ruling regime saw the state as well as how it saw 
the Armenian community: identity relations shifted from “indifferent” to 
“opposed.” Moreover, all these changes took place in an environment 
of internal upheaval for the CUP.  77  Within this context of geopolitical 
weakness—a shrinking state facing ethno-nationalism from within and, 
from without, rapacious European powers with whom it suffered an imbal-
ance of economic and military power—the Armenians and Russians pushed 
for a reform plan.  78  The Mandelstam Plan hammered the nail in the coffi n 
of Ottoman-Armenian relations. 
 the mandelstam plan 
 By the time the Balkan wars were over, the Armenians had essentially 
given up on eliciting concessions from the Turks without external interven-
tion, their hopes from the 1908 revolution dashed.  79  The obvious patron 
was Russia, whose reasons for supporting Armenian reforms were stra-
tegic. Unlike the 1890s, when they expressed greater trepidation at the 
prospect of Armenian independence or autonomy owing to a fear of nation-
alistic confl agration, Russia was more fi rmly behind this round.  80  Previ-
ously, Russia was fearful that Armenian uprisings in the Ottoman Empire 
would spread to Armenian territories in Russia, a problem that it could do 
without. By the early 1910s, however, Russia’s strategic calculus had 
reversed. With Western powers, including Germany and Britain, taking an 
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increasing interest in the region’s division of spoils, Russia became more 
assertive in its traditional preference for the strategic benefi ts of the territo-
ries in question. This was especially because Russia’s main rival in Europe, 
Germany, was deepening its footprint in the region, with schemes for rail-
ways in Persia and greater military cooperation with the Ottomans.  81  Russia 
also had domestic political reasons to push for reform. Russia still faced its 
own restive Armenian community despite some minor efforts in placating 
it. Russia feared that Ottoman Armenians would use the example of other 
beleaguered nationalities under the rule of the Ottomans, rise to indepen-
dence, and attempt to include Russian Armenians in an independent state.  82  
To dampen their rebellious spirit, Russia wished to advance the cause of 
their Armenian “brothers” across the border, so as to show that they had 
the community’s best interests at heart. 
 Russia therefore took the lead in designing and proposing a plan, which 
originated in the Armenian National Assembly, for reform aimed at 
Ottoman Armenians. The reform plan, named the Mandelstam Plan after 
the chief dragoman of the Russian embassy, was seen as a way to extend 
Russian infl uence in the region. In a secret notice sent by the Russian vice 
consul at Van to Russian ambassador Giers, in Constantinople, the need to 
take the initiative was made clear: “We must not allow Britain to oversee 
the realization of reforms in Kurdistan and Turkish Armenia which lie in 
the sphere of our political infl uence. A Russian protectorate for Turkish 
Armenians is a must; this gives the possibility for the Russian government 
to have a permanent infl uence in Turkey. This is one way to penetrate by 
peaceful means.”  83  
 The Mandelstam Plan was signed between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire in February 1914 after almost a year of deliberations between the 
two principals as well as Britain, Germany, and France. The negotiations 
were testy because of the stakes involved, with each power keenly aware of 
its interests in the region. Russia wanted to expand its infl uence and placate 
its Armenian minority; Turkey wanted to minimize foreign involvement 
on its territory above all else; Germany sought to gain a foothold in the 
region; and Britain wanted to ensure that neither Russia nor Germany 
gained too much.  84  The plan that was fi nally agreed on entailed the creation 
of two Armenian “zones”—one in the six eastern Armenian  vilayets and 
one consisting of Trebizond on the Black Sea—to be administered by two 
neutral European inspectors at the Porte. The foreign inspectors, nominated 
by European powers in conjunction with the Ottoman state for a term of 
fi ve years, were to ensure the execution of liberalization reforms toward 
the Ottoman Armenian community.  85  The administrators would have 
the right “to appoint and dismiss all offi cials and provisional judges” as 
well as “the command of the gendarmerie and the disposal of the military 
forces for the maintenance of order.” They would govern in consort 
with a “consultative council,” which would include European advisers. 
CHAPTER 4
142
Armed elements of the state such as the police and gendarmerie were to 
be drawn from the local population, half of which were mandated to be 
Christians. Offi cial Kurdish militias were to be disbanded. Both Christian 
and Muslim communities were granted elected assemblies for which they 
could nominate representatives.  86  
 Germany, Britain, and France looked on this plan with considerable 
trepidation, viewing it as the fi rst step toward the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman state and a violation of its sovereignty.  87  During the negotiations, 
German ambassador Wangenheim reported in a cable that “Russia desires 
an autonomous Armenia . . . [but] autonomy is to be thought of as one step 
on the path that ultimately leads to Istanbul.”  88  Wangenheim claimed else-
where that “the Armenian question is the key that will open the Straits for 
Russia,” giving a clear indication of the prevailing wisdom in Germany on 
affairs in Turkey.  89  The plan had also called for a “regional military service” 
that would ensure order and stability in those regions most susceptible to 
uprisings, but this element was shot down by the other European powers, 
who saw it as a step too far.  90  The accord was signed by Turkish and Rus-
sian representatives in February 1914.  91  
 The Ottoman leadership bristled under the external involvement in their 
internal affairs. In their collective mind, the Armenians were to blame for 
internationalizing a domestic issue, and thus causing embarrassment to the 
state.  92  In addition, it greatly angered them that the reform question was 
brought up by the Armenians at a time of great national loss for the Otto-
mans, who had lost considerable swathes of territory in the Balkan wars of 
1912. As one minister said, the defeats in the Balkan wars had “turned the 
heads of Armenian politicians,” who saw the confi rmation of Turkey’s 
external weakness as an opportunity to press for the redress of grievances 
at home.  93  Moreover, the constant interference from abroad was diffi cult to 
accept for a regime that so prized its national, independent, and modern 
identity. 
 That it was the Turks’ historical and traditional enemy, Russia, which was 
behind the chipping away of Ottoman territory and prestige only exacer-
bated matters.  94  Indeed, the CUP government saw the Mandelstam measures 
as Russian preparation for annexation of the six Armenian provinces and 
increased control of the areas bordering Persia. As an editorial in the regime-
affi liated newspaper  Tanin put it, “Europe’s intervention and Europe’s desire 
to control our internal affairs is a warning to us to ponder the fate not only of 
Rumelia [Balkans], but also eastern Turkey, for it will be impossible to spare 
eastern Turkey the fate awaiting Rumelia.”  95  Simple geography played a key 
role; “the fact that the Christian communities who revolted lived in the 
border regions of the Empire and that Empire progressively lost territories 
from the border regions were primary factors determining the policies” of 
the regime.  96  Armenian allegiance with Turkey’s “national enemy” in humili-
ating the Ottomans ensured that the cognitive confl ation between its external 
FROM REFORMS TO GENOCIDE
143
enemy and restive minority was all but complete.  97  This confl ation would 
have devastating consequences once the war began, and Russian support for 
Armenians shot up to “high” levels. Recent research in political science backs 
this assessment: rather than a long-standing ideological conviction on the 
part of Ottoman leaders, it was “Russian, and later French, military and dip-
lomatic support of the Armenians—rather than merely the cultural or reli-
gious difference between Armenians and Turks per se—that transformed the 
perception of this group in the eyes Ottoman ruling elites and set the stage” 
for the genocide.  98  
 Overall, then, the “initial rapprochement between the CUP and Arme-
nian nationalists during the Revolution of 1908 in the name of ‘Brotherhood 
and Unity’” gave way to widespread suspicions that the Armenians were 
poised for a mass uprising, buoyed by the Ottomans’ losses of its European 
provinces as well as increased contact between Russian forces and Arme-
nian dissidents.  99  This fear, often exaggerated but still deeply held, led to 
drastic and genocidal measures when the level of external threat ramped 
up with the Ottoman entry, and disastrous losses, in World War I. 
 The Escalation to Genocide 
 By the end of 1914, the territorial and ideological changes in the Ottoman 
state, alongside the scarcely concealed alliance between Armenian nation-
alists and Russia, increased the baseline level of threat the center perceived 
from the Armenians. Peaceful reforms were now anathema, the prospect of 
an Armenian state or anything approximating it deemed impermissible.  100  
Gone were the days when the Young Turks considered Armenians a valu-
able and integral part of the tapestry of the revolutionary state. Now, Arme-
nian identity was deemed directly opposed to the Ottomans’ concept of 
nationhood. Furthermore, the Young Turks’ optimism about their external 
environment had given way to the cold realization of their empire’s 
vulnerability. 
 With the outbreak of the Great War, which heightened considerably the 
baseline threat the Armenians posed to the Ottoman Empire, the idea of 
making concessions that could lead to an Armenian state was out of the 
question. The security consequences of such an eventuality were simply 
too grim, as Enver Pasha noted: 
 In my opinion this is a very big mistake.  If today in the Caucasus a small 
Armenia possessing a population of fi ve to six hundred thousand and suffi cient ter-
ritory is formed, in the future this government, together with the Armenians that 
will come mainly from America and from elsewhere, will have a population of mil-
lions . And in the east we will have another Bulgaria and it will be a worse 
enemy than Russia because all the Armenians’ interests and ambitions are 
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in our country. Consequently, in order to remove this danger, the formation 
of even the smallest Armenian government must be prevented.  101  
 The Turks were wary of the prospect of an Armenian state not just because 
Armenians themselves could cause them great harm in the future, but also 
because they could partner with others to the same end. For instance, there 
were concerns expressed that the British and others would use Caucasian 
Armenia as a base from which to drive out the Turks from eastern Ana-
tolia.  102  Even their decision-making at the end of the war betrayed Ottoman 
leaders’ central preoccupation with the security implications of an Arme-
nian state, when in a bizarre diplomatic volte-face, they  supported  its cre-
ation, on one condition: that ethnic Georgians and Azeris join them. This 
was because at that point, it was clear an Armenian state would come into 
existence; the only question was its composition. Behind the Ottomans’ 
seemingly curious policy was a transparent aim, to weaken the Russian 
state from within. More to the point, where the Armenian state was essen-
tially a fait accompli, the Ottoman diplomatic corps attempted to limit the 
size of the Armenian army, a signal that it was concerned with the security 
ramifi cations of Armenian independence.  103  
 Before an Armenian state became a cartographic fact, however, the 
Ottoman Empire used a strategy of “collective repression” in 1914–15 to 
forestall its creation. This was because Armenian nationalists were sup-
ported at “high” levels by Russia during World War I. In other words, 
Ottoman leaders perceived that cooperation between Russia and the Arme-
nians extended to them fi ghting side by side. Armenians’ collusion with 
Russia meant that when the war began, they were targeted for extermina-
tion and deportation by the Ottoman authorities. During the spring and 
summer of 1915, both materialist and emotional implications of “high” 
third-party support were operative. The threat of Armenian collaboration 
and rebellion, especially given the community’s location, ensured a tougher 
fi ght for the Ottomans against the Russians. Additionally, “the collective 
stereotypes of Armenians as grasping and mercenary, subversive and dis-
loyal, turned them into an alien and unsympathetic category that then had 
to be eliminated.”  104  Armenians had been the subject of massacres and vio-
lence before, most notably under the regime of the sultan,  105  but the level, 
intensity, and length of time that they were made victims of genocidal 
policy was something unprecedented. At the center of it all was the 
Armenian-Russian partnership, and what it meant for Ottoman security. 
Below, I develop this argument in four steps. 
 First, the circumstances under which the genocide unfolded, particularly 
relating to Russian-Armenian collaboration, need to be closely examined. 
Second, a look at Ottoman leaders’ statements and quotes captures their 
decision-making processes at the time. Third, the timing of deportations is 
indicative of the importance of the external peril facing the Empire. Fourth, 
FROM REFORMS TO GENOCIDE
145
the location of the major Armenian population centers, on the path of 
oncoming Russian or British thrusts, alarmed the Ottomans because it 
exposed their vulnerable supply lines and threatened collaborationist 
attacks. Taken together, these items constitute strong evidence for the argu-
ment that the Armenian genocide was directly related to the Ottomans’ 
external security concerns. 
 Before we proceed, it is important to note two points. First, the question 
of whether the Armenian genocide was “preplanned” is contested in the 
historical literature. There are essentially two views. One claims that the 
genocide was planned and prepared for before the war broke out, and that 
the Ottoman authorities waited until the war only to use it as an excuse to 
carry out a long-held preference for the extermination of the Armenian 
nation, perhaps to create “space” for a Pan-Turkic empire. This is a view 
most often, but not exclusively,  106  expressed by scholars sympathetic to 
Armenia.  107  The other side argues that though the Armenians were subject 
to much violence and coercion before World War I, the policy of  genocide 
 and  deportation arose only as direct responses to conditions of international 
war. I side with the latter group, and in the following pages show that this 
side has greater claims to historical accuracy. 
 The second note to make is to reiterate that an explanation for genocide is 
in no way commensurate with its justifi cation. My purpose in this chapter 
is to understand the factors that led to the Ottoman genocide of Armenians, 
but it is certainly not to suggest that such strategic decisions are moral or 
excusable under any circumstances. There simply can be no justifi cation for 
the slaughter of a million noncombatants. Even if one grants the Ottoman 
state the concession that there existed security exigencies concerning the 
Russian-Armenian alliance, the reaction to those exigencies was wildly dis-
proportionate. As one historian notes, the allegations of disloyalty and 
treason aimed at the Ottoman Armenian community were “wholly true in 
as far as Armenian sentiment went, only partly true in terms of overt acts, 
and totally insuffi cient as a justifi cation for what was done.”  108  Perhaps 
more important, the Ottomans’ perilous security position in 1914–15, both 
externally and internally, was in large part its own doing: it joined the war 
of its own volition to fulfi ll revisionist aims despite its military and eco-
nomic weakness relative to European powers, and through decades of 
vehemently resisting reforms that would improve the lot of its Armenian 
community, drove it into the arms of its longtime enemy, Russia. Cruelly, 
the most vulnerable actor in the Russia-Ottoman-Armenia triad was the 
one that bore the brunt of great power machinations. 
 war,  collaboration, and genocide 
 Initially, the Ottoman Empire was neutral in the war, but the desire to 
oppose Russia was too great, given past hostilities. On October 20, 1914, 
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Enver Pasha, as the minister of the navy, convinced Jamal Pasha to bom-
bard Russian ports and ships with German ships. As a consequence, Russia 
declared war on the Ottoman Empire on November 2, 1914. The British and 
French followed suit on November 5.  109  It would be the tenth time that the 
Ottomans and Russia were at war in two centuries, but this time, the for-
mer’s traditional allies, Britain and France, were on the other side. Czar 
Nicholas II conveyed Russian war aims to the French ambassador: to expel 
the Turks from Europe, to bring Constantinople under a neutral adminis-
tration, and to annex Armenia.  110  
 Meanwhile, the Ottoman’s central concern in the war was to reclaim lost 
territories and, more broadly, to reclaim its status as a great power—to fi ght 
off British and French control of its fi scal policy and European violation of 
its sovereignty. The Armenian reform agreement signed just the previous 
year was particular cause for angst, and overturning it, or ignoring it alto-
gether, was one of the driving decisions to enter the war.  111  Barely a month 
after the Ottomans’ entry into the war, the two European inspectors 
required by the Mandelstam Plan, L. C. Westenenk from the Netherlands 
and Nicolai Hoff from Norway, were sent home, and the plan as a whole 
was torn up, by way of an imperial rescript.  112  
 Once the war began, the Armenian community was dealt with on the 
basis of security: would it help provide it, or prove to hinder it? Armenian 
representatives from all the  vilayets , but particularly in the Caucasus, 
rejected the Young Turks’ suggestions on cooperating during the war.  113  
Their refusal cemented the belief that Armenian nationalism was a proxy 
of European great powers and morphed into a stereotype of Armenians 
as collaborators. Upon the war’s commencement, Ottoman leaders 
received reports from the provinces about Armenian collaboration with 
advancing Russian forces. One telegram from the Interior Ministry to the 
eastern provinces in August 1914 referenced “completely reliable reports 
to the effect that the Russians have, through the assistance of the Arme-
nians in the Caucasus, incited the Armenians among us . . . additionally, 
they have brought weapons and munitions with the intent of depositing 
them at certain places along the border.” Another cable to the eastern 
provinces evinced considerable concern with Armenian-Russian coopera-
tion, requesting offi cials “investigate and report back soon . . . on how 
many Armenian families have as of now left for the Caucasus and whether 
or not there is such a revolutionary movement or sensibility as this is 
present among the Armenians living there or if it is limited.”  114  In 
November 1914, the government “was already requesting lists of those of 
its subjects who had voluntarily gone to Russia, as well as members of 
their families.”  115  
 The feelings of suspicion and the belief that the Armenians were fi fth 
columnists were widely held. One cartoon that appeared in a satirical 
Turkish paper during the war summed up the dominant view in this 
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regard, showing one Turk questioning another about where he gets his 
news. “I do not need war news,” the second Turk replied. “I can follow the 
course of the war by the expression on the faces of the Armenians I meet. 
When they are happy I know that the Allies are winning, when depressed 
I know the Germans had a victory.”  116  Certainly the Ottoman authorities 
had reason to believe that they would face a two-pronged attack, from 
both within and without.  117  Though Armenians had valiantly fought for 
the empire in its various wars in the past, the level of Armenian desertions 
to, and collaboration with, invading Russian forces was rising. Particularly 
in eastern Anatolia, the Ottomans had justifi able fears of an Armenian 
revolt being tied to external threats. Up to thirty thousand Armenians 
formed bands, and were armed and trained across the border in Russia, 
before returning when the war began.  118  To cite an example of the eager-
ness with which the Russians and Armenians embraced each other, the 
czar traveled to the Caucasus to make plans for Russian-Armenian coop-
eration in preparation for the winter confl ict between Russian and Turkish 
forces in the region. The president of the Armenian National Bureau in 
Tifl is said in response: 
 From all countries Armenians are hurrying to enter the ranks of the glorious 
Russian Army, with their blood to serve the victory of Russian arms. . . . Let 
the Russian fl ag wave freely over the Dardanelles and Bosporus. Let, with 
Your will, great Majesty, the peoples remaining under the Turkish yoke 
receive freedom. Let the Armenian people of Turkey who have suffered for 
the faith of Christ receive resurrection for a new free life under the protec-
tion of Russia.  119  
 At the onset of the war, the czar also notably promised the Armenian 
catholicos Kevork V that “a most brilliant future awaits the Armenians” if 
they allied with the Russians against the Turks.  120  In September, the czar 
told Armenians that “the eve of liberation from Turkey was nigh,” and Rus-
sian military plans included the formation of “armed Armenian bands 
under military command in the Caucasus at Olty, Sarikamish, Kagysman, 
and Igdyr, and, in Persia, bands at Choi and Dilman under the authority of 
the Russian military and the Choi consulate.”  121  Within the specter of war, 
however, these promises of support from the Russian side and desertions 
from the Armenian side spelled disaster for the Armenians, since it com-
pleted the cognitive tying together of their cause with the Russians: percep-
tions of third-party support were locked at “high” levels. 
 It is important to note that Turkish accusations of desertions and Arme-
nian soldiers passing over to Russian territory are corroborated by Amer-
ican, German, and Austrian sources, as well as prominent Armenian 
nationalists themselves, like Nubar. The historical record shows, among 
other instances, that the well-known Armenian partisan Andranik helped 
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the Russian forces invading Saray, east of Van province, from Persian Choi, 
and that another group of Armenian volunteers joined the Russian forces in 
occupying Bayazid, in the north.  122  In a cable from early February 1915, 
Ambassador Wangenheim conveyed to offi cials in Germany that “I con-
stantly come up against an opinion among the Turks, which until now has 
not been refuted by the behavior of the Armenians, that if Turkey is defeated, 
the Armenian population would defi nitely join the winner’s side.”  123  
 Young Turk leaders, then, “were convinced that all Armenians were 
potentially disloyal and likely to be pro-Russian.”  124  Such Armenian-
Russian collaboration was deeply concerning to Ottoman leaders—enough 
for Talaat, at the beginning of the war, to demand that Germany offer 
Russia parts of occupied Poland if it would translate into Russia’s with-
drawal from any part of the Ottoman Armenian  vilayets . He also asked 
that the Germans evacuate parts of Flanders as a quid pro quo for the 
British to leave Iraq.  125  At the same time, the Ministry of War created the 
Secret Organization for the purpose of dealing with security threats 
throughout the empire. One of the fi rst tasks that the Secret Organization 
concerned itself with—in addition to the Greek community in western 
Anatolia—was how to disentangle the Armenian community in eastern 
Anatolia from the territory in question, owing to its proximity to Russia.  126  
Prominent members of the Armenian political community and intellec-
tuals were to be closely monitored.  127  In addition, the Ministry of War, 
under Enver’s direction, also created a series of paramilitary youth groups, 
supplying them with arms and ammunition for the “defense of the father-
land.” Enver also ensured that the CUP maintained greater control of the 
military than previously by culling the old regime of offi cers—he fi red 
eleven hundred in January 1914 alone—and promoting hundreds of loyal-
ists to high-ranking positions.  128  
 The killings of Armenians started in the late summer of 1914. In the 
border regions of the Caucasus and Persia, Armenian property was looted 
and plundered, and Armenian men were rounded up and killed, by militias 
and small bands of forces. At that point, the killings had not yet attained the 
massive scale they would later. Rather, the genocide proper began in the 
spring of 1915 as a series of massacres in sensitive border regions most vul-
nerable to external intervention.  129  The killings then spread south and west 
from eastern Anatolia, where the largest share of the Armenian population 
lived. In all, more than 1 million Armenians died in the genocide, more 
than two-thirds of whom met their fate as a direct result of being deported.  130  
Most of the violence was carried out by paramilitary organizations and 
through secret orders.  131  
 Balakian summarizes how the genocide unfolded: 
 Armenians were rounded up, arrested, and either shot outright or put on 
deportation marches. Most often the able-bodied men were arrested in 
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groups and taken out of the town or city and shot en masse. The women, 
children, infi rm, and elderly were given short notice that they could gather 
some possessions and would be deported with the other Armenians of their 
city or town to what they were told was the “interior.” Often they were told 
that they would be able to return when the war was over. . . . 
 A map of the Armenian genocide shows that deportations and massacre 
spanned the length and width of Turkey. In the west the major cities 
included Constantinople, Smyrna, Ankara, and Konia. Moving eastward, 
Yozgat, Kayseri, Sivas, Tokat, and Amasia were among the large cities of 
massacre and deportation. Along the Black Sea, Samsun, Ordu, Trbizond, 
and Rize were killing stations where Armenians were often taken out in 
boats and drowned. In the south, in historic Cilician Armenia, Adana, 
Hadjin, Zeitun, Marash, and Aintab were part of the massacre network. The 
traditional Armenian  vilayets in the east—Sivas, Harput, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, 
Erzurum, Van—with hundreds of villages and dozens of cities, where the 
majority of the Armenian population of the empire lived on their historic 
land, were almost entirely depleted of their Armenian populations.  132  
 The forced marches exacted such a high toll because they were through 
rough terrain in diffi cult weather, with no medical support or protection 
against marauders.  133  First person testimony is sparse for obvious reasons, 
but some survivor’s tales have made it through the test of time. One 
memoir, for instance, describes a typical scene following a deportation 
order: 
 As I now recall that day, there is a trembling in my body. The human mind 
is unable to bear such heaviness. My pen cannot describe the horrors. Con-
fusion! Chaos! Woe! Wailing! Weeping! The father kisses his wife and chil-
dren and departed, sobbing, encrazed. The son kissed his mother, his old 
father, his small sisters and brothers, and departed. Those who went and 
those who remained sobbed. Many left with no preparation, with only the 
clothes on their backs, the shoes on their feet, lacking money, lacking food, 
some without even seeing their loved ones. Already thousands of men had 
gathered in the appointed place, and like madmen, others were joining 
them.  134  
 the mindset of ottoman leaders in 1914–15 
 Why did the Ottoman Empire commit genocide against its Armenians? 
Ottoman leaders were obsessed with the prospect of territorial loss, and the 
potential of Armenians to aid in their state’s dismemberment by collabo-
rating with Russia. The specifi c personalities behind the policies that led to 
genocide offer a clue as to its origins: by most accounts, Enver Pasha, the 
minister of war, and Talaat Pasha, the minister of interior, were behind the 
mass deportations, lending credence to the belief that the deportations 
were a security issue, rather than an ideological one.  135  Unfortunately, it is 
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diffi cult to ascertain the exact processes by which the triumvirate of Enver, 
Talaat, and Jamal made decisions because archival records within the 
Ottoman state were either lost or destroyed in a period of chaos.  136  How-
ever, that these leaders consistently maintained both publicly and privately 
that their drastic measures against the Armenian population were primarily 
due to the wartime situation and the existential threat the state faced given 
Armenian-Russian collusion is instructive. Their particular emphasis on 
the threat posed by Armenians in their rear, as they faced the Russians in 
the Caucasus and the British in Palestine, suggests that the material effects 
of “high” third-party support were especially important. Alongside this 
material effect of Russian backing, Talaat’s and Enver’s statements also 
stress the emotional consequences of collusion that Armenians experienced: 
an angry and betrayed state. 
 Take, for instance, Talaat’s warning to an Armenian representative in a 
moment of candor: “We will do whatever Turkey’s interests demand, it is a 
matter of one’s fatherland. There is no place for personal attachments. Do 
not forget how you jumped at our throats and stirred up the problem of 
Armenian reforms in the days of our weakness.”  137  Elsewhere Talaat stated 
that “it was deemed necessary, in order to avoid the possibility of our army 
being caught between two fi res, to remove the Armenians from all scenes of 
the war and the neighborhood of the railways.”  138  After the Armenian 
uprising at Van, timed to coincide with the Russian invasion, Enver reveal-
ingly told Ambassador Morgenthau in a private meeting that 
 the Armenians had a fair warning of what would happen to them in case 
they joined our enemies. Three months ago I sent for the Armenian Patri-
arch and I told him that if the Armenians attempted to start a revolution or 
to assist the Russians, I would be unable to prevent mischief from hap-
pening to them. My warning produced no effect and the Armenians started 
a revolution and helped the Russians. You know what happened at Van. 
They obtained control of the city, used bombs against government build-
ings, and killed a large number of Moslems. We knew that they were plan-
ning uprisings in other places. You must understand that we are fi ghting for 
our lives . . . and that we are sacrifi cing thousands of men. While we are 
engaged in a struggle such as this, we cannot permit people in our own 
country to attack us in the back. We have got to prevent this no matter what 
means we have to resort to. It is absolutely true that I am not opposed to the 
Armenians as a people. I have the greatest admiration for their intelligence 
and industry, and I should like nothing better than to see them become a 
real part of our nation. But if they ally themselves with our enemies, as they 
did in the Van district, they will have to be destroyed.  139  
 As Enver said, treatment of secessionist minorities in war time obeyed dif-
ferent logics than during peace, when the external threat was not as signifi -
cant: “During peace times we can use Platonic means to quiet Armenians 
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and Greeks, but in time of war we cannot investigate and negotiate. We 
must act promptly and with determination.” On another occasion, he reit-
erated the importance of war and external security on their decision-
making process: “Our situation is desperate, I admit it, and we are fi ghting 
as desperate men fi ght. We are not going to let the Armenians attack us in 
the rear.”  140  In a cable to most of the Ottoman provinces, Talaat echoed this 
logic, writing that “the objective that the government expects to achieve by 
the expelling of the Armenians from the areas in which they live and their 
transportation to other appointed areas is to ensure that this community 
will no longer be able to undertake initiatives and actions against the gov-
ernment, and that they will be brought to a state in which they will be 
unable to pursue their national aspirations related to the advocating for a[n 
independent] government of Armenia.”  141  
 Talaat stuck to similar themes in conversations with Morgenthau: 
“These people refused to disarm when we told them to. They opposed us 
at Van and at Zeitoun, and they helped the Russians. There is only one 
way in which we can defend ourselves against them in the future, and 
that is just to deport them.”  142  He later drew a direct connection between 
the Armenian relationship with the Russians on the one hand, and the 
Turkish performance in the war: “They have openly encouraged our ene-
mies. They have assisted the Russians in the Caucasus and our failure 
there is largely explained by their actions. We have therefore come to the 
irrevocable decision that we shall make them powerless before this war is 
ended.”  143  After a private meeting with Talaat during the war, U.S. ambas-
sador Morgenthau reported that “he [Talaat] explained his [Armenian] 
policy on the ground that the Armenians were in constant correspon-
dence with the Russians.”  144  Enver was similarly forthcoming with Mor-
genthau: “If the Armenians made any attack on the Turks or rendered any 
assistance to the Russians while the war was pending, [I] will be com-
pelled to use extreme measures against them.”  145  Those words proved to 
be prophetic.  146  
 timing of genocide:  moment of national peril 
 One could reasonably object to the above with the proposition that Enver 
and Talaat were employing justifi catory rhetoric for decisions that had little 
to do with security. If their statements were mere window dressing, how-
ever, then how is one to explain that the timing of the genocide coincided 
with a security emergency for the Ottomans? 
 Indeed, it was only by the summer of 1915 that a clear and coherent 
policy of empirewide killings and massacres even developed. The deporta-
tions, the single leading cause of death of Armenians in World War I, began 
a full seven months after Turkey’s entry into the war.  147  Generally speaking, 
the policy of genocide was instituted only in a period of national peril, 
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between April and June 1915, when the Ottomans were on the back foot in 
the war. As one international relations scholar notes, “The radicalization [of 
Ottoman policy] seems to have occurred in large part in response to the 
Turks’ rapidly deteriorating military situation.”  148  Part of the Turks’ wors-
ening security was down to their own strategic myopia—Enver Pasha, for 
instance, chose the wintertime in 1914–15 to launch an attack on Russia’s 
Caucasus region. Despite some initial success, he lost more than seventy-
fi ve thousand out of ninety thousand men, mainly due to the weather. 
Moreover, the Russian general Yudenich foresaw Enver’s encirclement 
strategy, was prepared adequately, and dealt a crushing blow to Enver’s 
forces.  149  It must be noted, however, that the Russians were aided in consid-
erable part by six Armenian volunteer units, of eight to ten thousand men 
each, who were familiar with the terrain, and were useful as scouts, guides, 
and advance guards. After the Battle of Sarikamish, which effectively ended 
the Turkish fi ght in the Caucasus, the Armenian units received high praise 
from Russian military commanders and even the czar. The loss at Sarika-
mish, and the wider loss in the Caucasus generally, was pinned on Arme-
nians by Enver—even if his own decision-making was largely to blame.  150  
Regardless of culpability for the loss, the bottom line was that “the disaster 
at Sarikamish left just some fi fty-two thousand Ottoman soldiers spread 
over a six-hundred-kilometer front facing the much better equipped Rus-
sia’s Caucasus Army with roughly seventy-eight thousand effective com-
batants.”  151  In addition, immediately after Enver’s failure in the Caucasus, 
the Ottoman army’s campaign in Persia failed. Enver’s brother in law, 
Jevdet Bey, was compelled to withdraw and retreat from Tabriz.  152  The dev-
astating battlefi eld losses in January 1915 planted the fi rst seeds of what 
was to come.  153  As a result of the defeat, and in conjunction with earlier 
desertions, Armenian soldiers were disarmed and Armenian villages were 
massacred by retreating Turk forces,  154  the fi rst set of large-scale massacres 
against Armenians during the war. 
 More generally, the spring of 1915 was a time of considerable danger for 
the Ottoman state, since it faced invasion on three fronts: the British and 
French in the West, at the Dardanelles; the British in the South, in Iraq; and 
the Russians in the east.  155  In February the Royal Navy launched the fi rst 
attack on the Dardanelles. Britain and France had planned an amphibious 
assault, aimed at taking the Dardanelles on the way to Istanbul, establishing 
a “critical supply route to Russia.”  156  Concomitantly, the allies were bom-
barding, and later landing, on the beaches north of Çanakkale. These allied 
movements “led the Unionists to believe that the end of the empire was 
certainly at hand.”  157  Ottoman forces were also compelled to retreat from 
the Suez Canal in early February, while the British Indian Army attacked 
the Ottomans through central Iraq, occupying Basra in November. All the 
while, the weakness and lack of development insofar as the Ottoman 
economy and infrastructure was concerned only exacerbated the status 
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quo, since it meant that provisions from the capital to the periphery declined 
both in quality and quantity.  158  
 March 1915 was a turning point, with the Dardanelles attack in the fore-
ground along with a Russian move toward Van. Concurrent with “the 
British coming up from the south, and the British and French landing at 
Gallipoli in April,” the government prepared to move the capital from 
Istanbul to the east and make a “last stand” in the Anatolian interior.  159  As 
one scholar puts it, “The Ottoman Empire was being pinched in three 
directions at once. The Fourth Army in Syria and the Sixth in Mesopotamia 
were both in danger of being cut off owing to partisan attacks . . . in the 
worst position of all, however, was the Third Army facing the Russians, 
who were advancing against a beaten and battered enemy on both the 
northern (Erzurum) and southern front (Dilman-Van).”  160  These develop-
ments “cast panic into the hearts and minds of the CUP leaders” because 
they reaffi rmed their fears of a “nightmare scenario in which potential 
Armenian disloyalty would pave the way for an Allied incursion into Ana-
tolia.” Consequently, the Special Organization—in charge of irregular 
paramilitary units—was reorganized and expanded to deal with the 
increasing threat.  161  As Suny argues, Ottoman leaders were both fearful 
and angry: afraid of the future of their state and angry “at the perceived 
betrayal metamorphosed into hatred of those who by their nature were 
devious and treacherous.”  162  
 Deportations were a result of this toxic mix of fear and anger. On April 8, 
there were “targeted” deportations from Zeytun and Maras, both sites of 
Armenian uprisings. On April 24–25, the night of the Allied landings at 
Gallipoli, Armenians in Constantinople were arrested and, more important, 
Talaat and Enver issued decrees ordering the reduction of Armenians to 
less than 10 percent of the population in frontier districts and frontline 
areas. On May 2, after the rebellion at Van, the entire Armenian population 
of Van was removed. Later, these relatively ad-hoc measures, gave way to 
“more systematic overtones.”  163  First, the deportees from Zeytun, Maras, 
and Van were rerouted from the original destinations to Urfa and Aleppo, 
before it was decided to send them even further south, to the Syrian desert. 
Then, Talaat issued his famous decree of May 31, which called for the 
deportation of Armenians in the six eastern provinces away from frontline 
areas, to areas at least twenty-fi ve kilometers away from rail lines. In June 
and July, Armenian uprisings behind Ottoman lines led to the deportation 
net being thrown wider still: it now included Samsun, Sivas, Trabzon, and 
the port cities on the Mediterranean, Mersin and Adana.  164  
 The timing of the fi rst deportation orders, and their ensuing escalation, 
lends strong support to the argument that external security considerations 
were a key driving force for the genocide. It was only when the Ottoman 
Empire was on the back foot in the war—after disastrous losses in the 
winter of 1914–15 and the prospect of being pinned between three fronts in 
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March–April 1915—that Ottoman leaders began their policy of “collective 
repression” against their Armenian community. That the timing of this 
escalation so closely coincided with wartime fears of the end of the Ottoman 
Empire draws into sharp question the view that the Armenian genocide 
was unrelated to security concerns. 
 location of deportations:  supply 
lines and allied incursions 
 Talaat stated that “if war is declared, Armenian soldiers will take shelter 
on the enemy side with their arms. If the Ottoman army advances, [they 
will] remain inactive, if the Ottoman army retreats, [they will] form armed 
bands and hinder transport and communication” (quoted in Bloxham 
2003, 163). There is considerable evidence that the Armenians provided 
exactly such support, impeding the Ottoman war effort. The threat of 
Armenian collaboration was especially problematic because they were con-
centrated in locations that alternately posed a threat to Ottoman supply 
lines, or could serve as springboards for landings and incursions by the 
Russians, British, and/or French. As such, even the slightest suspicion of 
collusion was enough to radicalize Ottoman leaders during wartime—the 
stakes were simply too high, and the costs of being insuffi ciently concerned 
too weighty, to contemplate half measures. 
 The geographic logistics of the Ottoman war effort are crucial when 
understanding the roots of the genocide. Erickson sums up the Ottoman 
predicament: 
 The Ottomans were fi ghting the Russians on the Caucasian frontier, and the 
British in Mesopotamia and Palestine. The lines of communication sup-
porting those Ottoman fronts ran directly through the rear areas of the 
Ottoman armies in eastern Anatolia that were heavily populated by Arme-
nian communities and, by extension, by the heavily armed Armenian revo-
lutionary committees. Importantly, none of the Ottoman armies on the 
fronts in Caucasia, Mesopotamia, or Palestine were self-suffi cient in food, 
fodder, ammunition, or medical supplies and all were depending on the 
roads and railroads leading west to Constantinople and Thrace for those 
supplies. Moreover, none of these forces had much in the way of preposi-
tioned supplies available and all required the continuous fl ow of war mate-
rial. The Armenian revolutionary committees began to attack and cut these 
lines of communication in the spring of 1915.  165  
 Rebellious Armenians threatened Ottoman prospects in war because of 
where the war was being fought and where the Armenians were concen-
trated: at the rear of the major fronts the Ottomans were fi ghting on. As Suny 
notes, “The Caucasian front was the longest front for the Ottomans and the 
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most diffi cult to defend and supply. The Ottoman-Russian border stretched 
280 miles, but the zone of fi ghting extended twice that distance, deep into 
Ottoman territory and Persia,” a “frontier region with porous borders.”  166  
 Armenian regions posed special dangers to the empire’s rail system, the 
Ottomans’ “‘Achilles Heel’ because it served almost the entire logistics needs 
of the three Ottoman fi eld armies in the Caucasian, Mesopotamian, and Pal-
estinian theaters of operations (the Third, Sixth, and Fourth armies respec-
tively).”  167  The fact that Talaat’s deportation orders emphasized Armenians 
be resettled “at least twenty-fi ve kilometers away from the Baghdad railway 
lines running to the frontier as well as away from other railway lines” is 
instructive: such a distance would be near impossible to traverse safely in 
one night’s darkness, suggesting that security was a key imperative for 
Talaat’s orders.  168  The region of Dortyol, for instance, was a pressing 
concern both because it was located on the Mediterranean, and thus inviting 
to Allied incursions, and also because it was where the so-called “Berlin-
Baghdad” railway split. Troubles in Dortyol occupied the attention of secu-
rity bulletins and cables from Enver and Talaat in March and April in 1915, 
resulting in the deportation of Armenian communities from Dortyol and the 
nearby Alexandretta, Adana, and Bilan districts. In addition to the rail net-
work, sizable Armenian populations were located on or close to the main 
road links from Sivas to Erzurum, which supplied the Ottoman Third Army 
in the Caucasus.  169  The relative importance of these supply lines increased 
in the aftermath of Enver’s loss at Sarikamish, which moved the front to the 
lowland Urmia region. Urmia lay at the intersection of the Ottoman, 
Russian, and Persian empires, “ground zero in the Russo-Turkish espionage 
and propaganda wars over the loyalties” of Kurds, Armenians, and Assyr-
ians.  170  As such, Ottoman leaders’ deportation orders in the spring of 1915 
could legitimately be seen as securing the “tactical rear of the Third and 
Fourth Armies” in the Caucasus and Mesopotamia/Palestine (see map 2).  171  
 Aside from these general concerns about supply lines and railroads, 
Armenian uprisings in several prominent locations catalyzed Ottoman 
paranoia and fear, as the massacres in Van illustrate. Van was a crucial stra-
tegic location, important for its connection to Russian military plans, as 
well as its ability to rise up militarily based on it being armed and trained. 
It could be used by Russian forces launching into Mesopotamia and inte-
rior eastern Anatolia from Persia, or by the Turkish forces in the opposite 
direction.  172  It was a signifi cant military pivot, and its importance grew 
only after the defeat at Sarikamish. Specifi cally, as the center of gravity of 
the Ottoman-Russian war shifted south from the winter to the spring, the 
Ottoman defeat at Dilman in late April increased the signifi cance of Van, 
which was now “directly in the path opened up by the Russian victory at 
Dilman.”  173  Van had a dense Armenian population, and a signifi cant Arme-
nian Revolutionary Federation presence, one that had established prewar 
connections to the Russian consulate. Demographically, the Armenian 
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population was greater than the Turkish and Kurdish population com-
bined, further increasing its importance.  174  
 In the spring of 1915, the CUP correctly anticipated a massive Allied 
offensive: while Russia was preparing to launch aggressively in the Cau-
casus, the British and French were expected to stage landings at Gallipoli 
on April 25. Turkish commanders had often spoken about the threat of 
insurrection in Van, and when news spread of Armenian collaboration with 
Russian forces, Ottoman forces turned their attention to the region. As pre-
emptive measures, the authorities carried out mass arrests in the Armenian 
parts of Van on April 24, similar to the mass arrests carried out in Trebizond 
on April 19, which immediately preceded the Russian attack on the port of 
Kerasond/Giresun on April 20.  175  These arrests represented the fi rst step in 
the escalation in Van. Along with the arrests, the government demanded 
that the city hand over four thousand Armenian men for the army’s labor 
battalions. Van’s leaders surmised that those men would ultimately be 
killed, since that was the usual fate of Armenians in labor battalions all over 
the empire, and asked that the men instead be used for combat duty, but 
their request was refused. The Armenians then counteroffered with a pro-
posal of handing over four hundred men, with the justifi cation that the rest 
were exempt due to payment of a tax, but Jevdet Bey, now the governor of 
Van province, refused to budge.  176  Concomitant with the mass arrests, the 
Armenian community in Van staged an uprising. On April 20, 1915, four 
thousand Armenian fi ghters fi red at police stations, set alight Muslim 
houses, and set up a barricade behind which they stayed on the defensive. 
An additional fi fteen thousand Armenian refugees soon joined the rebel-
lion. Turkish forces suffered huge losses in trying to stamp out the rebellion 
and infl icted mass casualties of their own. The fi ghting went on for a 
month.  177  
 With their ammunition running low, the Armenians were saved by the 
advancing Russian army, which forced the retreat of the Turkish units. The 
Russians’ advance itself was aided in considerable part by both Russian and 
Ottoman Armenians. Armenian units were especially useful as bands of 
shock troops, as well as guides to the area, and were crucial to the Russian 
advance. The entire episode—from the initial insurrection to the joint inva-
sion of Van—was believed to be a coordinated rather than a random coinci-
dence, even by foreign diplomats on the scene sympathetic to the Armenians. 
This, then, crystallized for the Turkish state the belief that the Armenians 
were traitors against whom strong action would be justifi ed.  178  
 During the conclusive days of the fi ghting in Van, the Ottomans brutally 
followed the Russian line of attack with massacres and deportations. As 
U.S. ambassador Morgenthau cabled in June 1915, “Because Armenian 
volunteers, many of them Russian subjects, have joined Russian Army in 
Caucasus and because some have been implicated in armed revolutionary 
movements and others have been helpful to Russians in their invasion of 
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Van district, terrible vengeance is being taken.”  179  German diplomats also 
backed this interpretation. On May 8, Ambassador Wangenheim cabled 
that “despite efforts by Armenian circles to diminish the signifi cance of the 
riots which have broken out over the past few weeks in various places or 
to put the blame on the measures taken by Turkish authorities, there are 
increasingly more signs that this movement is more widespread than pre-
sumed up to now and that it is being encouraged from abroad with the 
help of Armenian revolutionary committees . . . it cannot be denied that 
the Armenian movement has taken on a worrying character over the past 
few weeks, which has given the government cause to introduce severe 
repressive measures.”  180  As Reynolds notes, “At the same time as the Van 
rebellion was unfolding, the Russians were entering from the east, the 
British pushing on Baghdad from the south, and most ominously, the 
British and French were storming ashore at Gallipoli. The simultaneous 
attacks stretched the wobbling Ottoman army to breaking point.”  181  Van 
was a crucial step in the escalation to genocide mainly because it con-
fi rmed the worst suspicions of the Ottomans, and that too at a strategically 
vulnerable time in the war.  182  One historian of the genocide calls the Van 
insurrection the “turning point” as far as the deportations and massacres 
were concerned.  183  
 Van was not the only geographic area where massacres and deportations 
followed the external security threat. One can also consider Cilicia. At the 
end of March 1915, the Ottomans feared that the Russians would make inci-
sions through eastern Anatolia in a bid to capture the port city of Alexan-
dretta/Iskenderun, because it represented the shortest route to bisect the 
empire and acquire a Mediterranean port. Indeed, the Russians themselves 
had advertised this strategy before the war. The Armenian population in 
Cilicia had a complicated history with respect to inviting outsider interven-
tion to help their cause, and Ottoman authorities claimed that an uprising 
was to be timed to coincide with the Russian invasion. Some historians 
have dismissed those claims as pure propaganda, but Nubar was in contact 
with the British military in Egypt and fl oated the idea of the Armenian 
community in Cilicia being a bridgehead for invading Entente forces. The 
British had asked the Armenians to “revolt to make things more diffi cult 
for the government, and support the British by hindering [the govern-
ment’s] efforts to mobilize.”  184  Cilicia was consequently targeted with mas-
sacres and deportations.  185  
 There was a similar story in Zeytun, where the fear of desertions and col-
laborations fed into the stereotype of Armenians as the “enemy within.”  186  
Before the war even began, there were signs of organized revolt; Armenians 
in Zeytun refused to be conscripted in the Ottoman Army and organized a 
corps of volunteers in order to disrupt Ottoman lines of communication. 
During the war, in May 1915, there was a second uprising in Zeytun, an 
episode which led to the formal introduction of deportation laws on 
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May 27, with the purpose of drawing Armenian populations away from 
strategically important areas.  187  As Enver told Ambassador Morgenthau, 
“We shall not permit them to cluster in places where they can plot mischief 
and help our enemies. So we are going to give them new quarters.”  188  This 
was essentially the fi nal nail in the Armenians’ collective coffi n, since the 
general deportation orders spelled doom for the community. By June, the 
deportations were in full swing across the empire; only 20 percent of 
the deportees would even reach their desert destinations.  189  
 The case of Adapazari, in northwest Anatolia, where the deportations 
began in July 1915, also followed this trend. Enver and Talaat believed that 
an Armenian rebellion was being planned in conjunction with an expected 
Russian landing on the Black Sea. “Talaat’s memoirs, as well as other war-
time publications, offered evidence of escalating guerilla activity on the 
provincial border between Bursa and Izmit, as well as the discovery of 
hidden weapons caches throughout the region. Indeed, several secret tele-
grams confi rm cases of Armenian bandit activity in Bursa and Izmit in 1915 
and 1916,” though it should be noted that these reports were fi led after the 
deportations had already begun.  190  
 That the massacres and violence were proceeding in step with the 
external threat is shown not just by where the violence occurred but where 
it failed to occur.  191  For example, between March 5 and March 17 in 1915, 
there was to be a joint British and French attack on the Dardanelles, to 
relieve pressure on Russia’s forces in the Caucasus. As a preemptive mea-
sure, authorities were given orders to carry out deportations—which, we 
must remember, almost always meant death for the deportees  192  —in the 
region between Constantinople and the new provisional government base 
in Eskishehir. The point was to ensure that the Armenians did not join 
invading forces and conduct reprisal operations against the population 
transfer of citizens, as the Ottomans wished to move their capital from Con-
stantinople given the expected Anglo-French attack. But when the antici-
pated breakthrough did not occur, the population transfer, and attendant 
massacres, also failed to materialize, suggesting that “Armenian policy was 
still contingent on the course of the War, and was not fully proactive or gen-
eral across the empire.”  193  
 Certainly once the genocide achieved its own momentum, it bore less of 
a relationship to an external threat, especially after June 1915. It is also true 
that the cleansing of Armenians served the purpose of creating a more eth-
nically homogenous territory on which to base the modern Turkish state.  194  
Finally, there is little doubt that the Ottoman leadership could have 
arranged for deportations that did not necessarily result in mass death, but 
chose not to, almost assuredly due to a vicious antipathy against Arme-
nians.  195  But these qualifi cations aside, the spread of violence in 1915 shows 
that the escalation to deportations and massacres occurred as preemptive 
measures against a foreign military threat. “High” levels of Russian support 
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for Armenian nationalists resulted in a tougher fi ght for the Ottoman 
Empire, owing primarily to Armenians’ location and potential for insurrec-
tion, as well as angry and emotional leaders bent on vengeance. As German 
ambassador Wolff-Metternich reported after a conversation with Talaat in 
late 1915, “In the districts on the Russian border and near Aleppo, mass 
displacements had been necessary on the grounds of military security. 
A Russian-engineered large-scale conspiracy among the Gregorian Arme-
nians in the border areas and near Aleppo had been discovered. Attacks on 
bridges and railways had been planned. It had been impossible to single 
out any individual culprit from the masses of these people. Only the depor-
tation of the whole could ensure security.”  196  
 Moreover, in addition to the direct effects of collaboration, the indirect 
effects were important for external security too. The very existence of 
Armenian revolts in the empire meant that Turkish forces were often with-
drawn from the front to deal with the uprisings, thus rendering them even 
more vulnerable to the external threat.  197  For example, the rebellion in Van 
forced the Turks to reposition forces from strategically vulnerable cam-
paigns in the Caucasus region and Persia to suppress the insurrection, 
fueling the belief that the Armenians were causing them considerable losses 
in the war.  198  
 When the violence took place, where it took place, and where it did not 
take place—each of these factors supports Enver and Talaat’s claims that 
the Armenian genocide was a product of external security considerations. 
The Ottoman Empire escalated to deportations only at the height of its 
external vulnerability, after battles at Sarikamish and the Dardanelles. Its 
policies were fi rst enacted in those areas most vulnerable to Armenian 
sabotage and collaboration with oncoming Russian forces and were not 
executed where the external threat was deemed less important. The 
Ottoman Empire used a policy of collective repression against its Armenian 
community because of “high” levels of support from Russia, whose men 
often fought alongside or in sequence with Armenian bands, in a war that 
threatened the very existence of the state. Because this war and the Russian-
Armenian alliance closely succeeded the Balkan wars and the Russian-
dictated Mandelstam Plan, which cemented CUP beliefs that the Armenians 
were both a short-term and long-term threat to Ottoman security, the 
Armenians were targeted with genocide. 
 Scholarly consensus supports these views. According to Holquist, when 
it came to the slaughter of the Armenian population, “Russia’s role—both 
in terms of intended and unintended consequences—was greater than that 
of any other party, aside from the CUP itself.”  199  As Bloxham notes, “The 
stereotype of Armenians as proxies of the Great powers in peacetime was 
extended into a stereotype of military collaboration during warfare: the 
‘inner enemy’ and the ‘outer enemy’ were now fully merged in the Ottoman 
mind.”  200  Even those scholars that believe the genocide was “premeditated” 
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concede the importance of the external security angle, as Kirakossian does 
when he writes that the Young Turks “were positive that in the forthcoming 
war the Armenians would become a threatening force in the enemy camp 
and considered it urgent to prevent them from taking unifi ed action.”  201  
 Generally, Western scholars maintain that the deportations and massa-
cres were not an a priori plan of action, but rather a result of a series of more 
limited measures that culminated in genocide.  202  They were instituted 
because of the “mortal danger from without” that the Ottomans faced, in 
combination with Armenian collaboration.  203  Gwynne Dyer, one of the 
foremost historians on the genocide, puts it thusly: 
 there was a genuine, though mistaken, belief among the Ottoman leaders in 
Istanbul that there was a deliberate and coordinated Armenian uprising in 
the East, with Empire-wide ramifi cations. . . . 
 When more work is completed on the period, I believe historians will 
come to see Talaat, Enver, and their associates not so much as evil men but 
as desperate, frightened, unsophisticated men struggling to keep their 
nation afl oat in a crisis far graver than they had anticipated when they fi rst 
entered the war (the Armenian decisions were taken at the height of the 
Dardanelles), reacting to events rather than creating them, and not fully 
realizing the extent of the horrors they had set in motion in ‘Turkish 
Armenia’ until they were too deeply committed to withdraw.  204  
 Armenian historians often claim that the deportations were a result simply 
of anti-Christian nationalism, but they are unable to explain why the Young 
Turks “cast both Muslims (Turkish-speaking or otherwise) and Christians 
in the same sinister light.”  205  There simply does not exist strong historical 
evidence to suggest that before the war broke out, the Ottoman state 
planned for or wished to carry out genocide. In northwestern Anatolia, for 
instance, “CUP policies towards Armenians were intertwined with aims 
that were more operational in nature than ideological. The logic encased 
within state directives from this period emphasizes, above all things, the 
need for security within this critical region.”  206  As Mann sums up, initially 
the policy of forcible deportations “was designed to move potentially 
disloyal Armenians away from the theater of war so that they could not 
interfere with it.”  207  
 Alternative Explanations 
 The main theoretical alternatives to mine cannot explain why the Ottoman 
Empire went from a policy of peaceful concessions to genocide. The reputa-
tion argument would predict more violence earlier in the Young Turks’ 
tenure to establish a deterrent; in this case, the opposite took place. The 
argument for veto points, meanwhile, cannot explain the observed 
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variation because the Young Turks’ increasing centralization of power 
meant that there were fewer veto points to stop their offering concessions—
had they wished for such a course. Under conditions of a low number of 
veto players, the domestic-institutions argument would expect the possi-
bility of concessions to be negated by their incredibility to the secessionists 
due to the absence of veto points. However in this case, the leadership did 
not even consider such a concessionary policy, let alone desire it. 
 The principal competing context-specifi c explanation—that the Arme-
nian genocide was “preplanned” sometime between 1910 and 1912—does 
not stand up to historical scrutiny. Scholars who wish to make this case rely 
on “secret” schemes and speeches given at the CUP congresses in 1910 and 
1911, records for which do not exist. Notwithstanding the CUP’s less 
pluralist nature over time—there was increasing talk of “Turkifying 
Armenians”—this view does not imply an intent to murder an entire 
community.  208  As Bloxham states, “Despite the great deterioration of CUP-
Armenian relations, there is little evidence that a policy physically to 
destroy the community was forged prior to the First World War.”  209  Scholars 
from the “preplanned” camp overstate the consistency of Young Turk 
policy between 1908 and 1915; their repeated efforts to fi nd the proverbial 
smoking-gun evidence of orders for extermination of a people does not 
convince.  210  Moreover, the very notion of a single turning point in the fate 
of the Armenians is problematic from a historiographical perspective, since 
rather than resulting from one decision on a given date, the genocide 
unfolded cumulatively as a process, or “cascading sequence of events.”  211  
“Pre-planned” scholars’ approach tends to be teleological” as Mann notes. 
“Early events, early decisions are too often read back from the ghastly 
known end result.”  212  These analysts employ as a starting point the fi nal 
destruction of the Ottoman Armenian community and works backward to 
locate “violent expressions in the perpetrators’ early speeches and writings, 
treating them as a ‘serious declaration of intent.’”  213  It is diffi cult to accept 
for some that such a far-reaching set of decisions could be made on a rela-
tively contingent basis, without any grand purposes of social engineering 
behind it and affected primarily by the ebbs and fl ows of war, but the his-
torical record suggests that is exactly what happened. 
 The theoretical framework employed in this book goes a long way in 
explaining variation in the Young Turks’ strategy to deal with the so-called 
Armenian question. When they fi rst ascended to power, the Young Turks 
forwarded a more universalist, Ottoman identity for all subjects of the 
empire and dealt with Armenian demands peacefully. The indifferent iden-
tity division, combined with a general optimism about the future of the 
modernizing Ottoman state, allowed for a policy of negotiations and con-




 However, between then and 1915, two major changes occurred from the 
regime’s perspective. First, Armenian demands were now cast in a more 
threatening light—since they were the only main Christian community left 
in the empire, their demands now threatened the ideational basis of the 
new, more narrowly defi ned Turkish nationalism of the empire. That is, the 
identity division between Ottomans and Armenians became “opposed.” 
Additionally, a series of territorial losses changed the erstwhile optimistic 
outlook of the Ottoman leadership to a more insecure one. This meant that 
the prospect of a future Armenian state suddenly assumed graver security 
implications. Second, World War I, and in particular, its alliance patterns, 
which saw Russia against the Ottoman Empire, threatened the very exis-
tence of the Ottoman state. This external threat was given a considerable 
boost, both in reality and in perception, by Armenian nationalists, who 
fought alongside Russian forces. Because the level of third-party support 
they enjoyed was “high,” there were to be no distinctions drawn between 
the Armenian “citizens” and the foreign enemy of Russia. As far as the 
regime was concerned, Armenians and Russians were one and the same. As 
such, when the state’s security was at its bleakest, in the spring of 1915, the 
vicious policy of deportations was instituted across areas of the empire 
deemed most vulnerable to external intervention. 
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c hapter 5 
 Peaceful and Violent Separatism 
in North America, Europe, and 
the Middle East, 1861–1993 
 Can my theory explain secessionist violence, or the complete lack thereof, in 
vastly different regions and eras? To that end, I proceed in three sections. 
 In the fi rst, I turn my attention to the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict since the 
1980s. This confl ict allows a direct comparison of my theory with its primary 
competitor, the reputation argument. As a binational state, one that is a “lib-
eral” democracy no less, Israel would be expected to treat an independence 
movement with little recourse to violence. Given there is no possible ethnic 
group other than the Palestinians that would demand statehood on land 
controlled by Israel, it need not be concerned with establishing a tough rep-
utation against independence movements. My argument would predict the 
opposite, given Israel’s security concerns with the prospect of an indepen-
dent Palestine. Second, despite being one of the most important geopolitical 
disputes today, easily fulfi lling the “intrinsic importance” criterion whose 
use methodologists encourage,  1  students of secessionist violence have 
strangely ignored it. This may be because the Israeli-Palestinian dispute 
may not strike some as obviously “secessionist”—notwithstanding datasets 
on secessionism including both the fi rst and second intifadas.  2  Such a view 
would be wrongheaded, however: the fi ght between Israel and Palestinians 
is over whether the latter can establish a state on territory controlled by the 
former, the very defi nition of a secessionist confl ict. As I discuss below, Isra-
el’s coercive response to Palestinians’ secessionist moment, the fi rst intifada, 
is consistent with my theory’s expectations, when it chose such a strategy 
because of security fears. These fears sprung from its rough neighborhood, 
featuring a history of warfare with its neighbors, and its essentializing of 
Palestinian nationalism, subsuming it under an “Arab” identity. In keeping 
with its “policing” strategy, coercion was relatively low, and Israel addition-
ally offered tactical concessions to moderate Palestinian nationalists, at Oslo, 
that fell well short of statehood. That said, it is important to acknowledge 
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that factors that lie outside the explanatory range of my theory, such as the 
rise of the religious-nationalist settler lobby in Israel, and the Palestinians’ 
ability to manufacture violence despite little third-party support, are also 
important to the development of the confl ict, especially in the last two 
decades. Nevertheless, the issue of security generally looms large when one 
considers Israeli intransigence in the face of Palestinian demands for a state, 
both in the twentieth and twenty-fi rst centuries. 
 I then examine two of the handful of completely peaceful major seces-
sions to occur in the twentieth century, one in 1993 that dissolved Czecho-
slovakia into its constituent units, and the other in 1905 that separated 
Norway and Sweden. It is important, after all, that a theory purporting to 
explain the variation in state response to secessionism is able to offer insight 
on the cases in which the state did not seriously consider violence, let alone 
use it. Methodologists have noted that social science should be “concerned 
not only with cases where something ‘happened,’ but also with cases where 
something did not.”  3  A number of previous chapters showed how my argu-
ment can deal with genocidal violence, as well as less intense forms of coer-
cion, but what about instances in which separatism generated only peaceful 
negotiations and concessions? As I show below, the muted external security 
implications of Norwegian and Slovak separatism facilitated their respec-
tive host states peacefully negotiating their exit from the polity. The “Velvet 
Divorce” that split the Czech and Slovak republics in 1993 was made pos-
sible by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the 
unifi cation of Germany, all of which signaled the changing geopolitics of 
Central Europe. Combined with the relatively muted history of confl ict 
between Czechs and Slovaks, ensuring that there were no deep identity 
divisions between the two, this benign regional environment allowed 
Czech leaders to peacefully acquiesce to Slovak nationalism. Similarly, 
almost a century earlier, the insulation of Scandinavia from traditional 
European power politics, and Norway’s pledge to destroy border forts as a 
condition of its independence, mitigated any threat Sweden might have 
faced from the establishment of a fully sovereign Norway. As a conse-
quence, Sweden and Norway peacefully went their separate ways. 
 Finally, I investigate the U.S.  Civil War, even though it neither took place 
in the twentieth century, nor was it, strictly speaking, ethnic in nature. Nev-
ertheless, the very fact that it does not fi t the profi le of the type of seces-
sionist struggle I discuss in this book makes it a useful litmus test—if my 
argument can account for elements of a dispute that lies outside its original 
scope conditions, we can gain even greater confi dence in its explanatory 
power. As I show below, Union leaders denied Southern independence in 
part based on concerns about the prospect of a geopolitically divided North 
America were the Confederacy to secede. They were further rankled by 
British and French interference in the crisis, which compelled Lincoln to 
escalate to a “militarization” strategy at Bull Run, setting the stage for a 
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larger confl agration. However, the case does not fi t my theory in one impor-
tant sense. Usually, the intensity of coercion is determined by how much 
third-party support is delivered, but in this case, such support had not 
actually materialized. Rather, Union leaders chose to escalate to  preempt 
 third-party support, undergirded by a belief that a more forthright response 
would signal to, especially, Britain that it should not interfere. Figure 5 
summarizes the argument I develop in this chapter. 
 Israel-Palestine: A Unique Separatist Confl ict 
 The Israeli-Palestinian confl ict is by any measure one of the most impor-









































touches on themes as visceral as nationalism, colonialism, territoriality, 
historical memory, religion, identity, and inequity. Though scholars of 
secessionism have generally shied away from studying this dispute, such 
inattention is mistaken. At bottom, I submit, the confl ict is separatist: a 
nationalist group (the Palestinians) under the control of a state (Israel) 
wishes to establish a state of its own on the territory which it inhabits, and 
the state in question has used a variety of methods to ensure this eventu-
ality does not come to pass.  4  This picture is slightly complicated by the fact 
that some of the territory on which the Palestinians live is not fully incor-
porated into Israel “proper,” but for our purposes, this technicality is just 
that. Israel controls and exercises authority over the Palestinian territories, 
and has incorporated them into its administrative web after its victory in 
the six-day war of 1967.  5  In turn, the indigenous Palestinian population 
has carried out a liberation struggle against the Israel, aimed at the cre-
ation of a new state.  6  This makes it a separatist movement in the strict 
sense of the term. As such, theories of secessionist confl ict should have a 
great deal to say about this confl ict, if little about how to solve it, an admit-
tedly daunting task. 
 As it stands, however, the main alternative theory to mine is unable to 
provide signifi cant analytical traction on this dispute. Arguments that 
revolve around internal deterrence and demography would predict 
peaceful concessions from Israel, up to and including a Palestinian state 
possessing military, paramilitary, and police forces. Given it is a binational 
state, comprised almost entirely of Jews and Arabs, Israel should have no 
precedents to fear were it to grant autonomy or independence to the Pales-
tinians. Which ethnic group in Israel, after the Palestinians, will rise up and 
demand a state of their own? Unfortunately for these theories, this state of 
affairs has not materialized. To the contrary, Israel has used varying levels 
of repression to deal with the Palestinian movement and has been unpre-
pared to acquiesce to an independent, Weberian state. Meanwhile, the insti-
tutions argument does explain important elements of this case, providing a 
framework to understand the infl uence of Israel’s religious-nationalist set-
tlers and their political supporters. However, the importance of the far right 
has markedly increased in the twenty-fi rst century. In the immediate after-
math of the fi rst Palestinian intifada, the main object of study here, Israeli 
religious nationalists exercised less infl uence over events, with Israeli 
policy in the hands of centrists: a unity government, followed by a center-
left government led by Yitzhak Rabin. Even these “moderate” elements, 
however, dismissed the possibility of a fully-sovereign Palestinian state. 
The question then becomes: why did this “liberal” democracy, with no 
other ethnicities in its midst that would conceivably rise and demand state-
hood, not allow for the creation of an independent Palestine? 
 Consistent with my theory, Israel’s coercive strategy of “policing” in 
response to the fi rst intifada was conditioned by its lack of trust that its 
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external security would not be violated by the creation of a Palestinian 
state, were it to come to fruition. This lack of trust related to its rough neigh-
borhood, one of the most militarized in the world,  7  in which it has been the 
victim of Arab state aggression, especially early in its life as an independent 
state. In combination with this collective memory of confl ict with Arab 
neighbors, an essentializing logic that subsumed Palestinian nationalism 
under the rubric of general Arab hostility to the state ensured that Pales-
tinian identity is necessarily seen as “opposed” to Israel’s founding Jewish 
nationalism. Together, Israel’s confl ict-prone environment and calcifi ed 
view of Palestinian/Arab identity rendered it incapable of acquiescing to 
an independent Palestine. Simply put, Israel feared that granting a Pales-
tinian state would result in further security problems for it. Given this logic, 
it was advisable to repress Palestinians in the present, pay the limited but 
rising reputational costs associated with such policy, and live to fi ght 
another day. 
 That said, we should be careful to ascribe Israeli behavior only to external 
security concerns, especially in the last two decades, a period in which my 
argument has more limited explanatory power. The rightward turn in 
domestic politics in Israel since the 1970s, and its acceleration since the 
mid-1990s, is organized around the related desire for colonizing land in 
“Judea and Samaria,” or the West Bank, which also helps explain its stri-
dent reaction to Palestinian nationalism. This increased prominence of the 
Israeli far right has added an ideological and religious dimension to a ter-
ritorial confl ict, and made Israeli leaders from both the right and left loathe 
to yield even slightly in negotiations with Palestinians. Such domestic 
developments lie outside the bounds of my theory. My theory also strug-
gles to explain Israel’s “militarization” strategy in the second intifada. 
I would expect such a strategy only under conditions of at least “moderate” 
third-party support, but Palestinian groups had little material backing from 
external powers in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, I maintain that even in the 
twenty-fi rst century, concerns about security are one of the prime drivers of 
Israeli intransigence on the question of a Palestinian state. 
 There are two questions organizing this case. First, how do we classify 
the Israeli response to the Palestinian quest for statehood, especially in the 
immediate aftermath of the fi rst intifada? Second, to what extent was this 
response determined by external security considerations? Before we get to 
these questions, however, we must go slightly further back in time. 
 territory,  nation, and state in israel-palestine 
in the twentieth century 
 It was at the end of World War I that European countries sliced Arab lands, 
previously under the control of the defeated Ottoman Empire, into colonial 
trusteeships called “mandates.” Each of these mandates, including Palestine, 
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witnessed a general national awakening.  8  Unlike the others, however, 
the Palestinian national movement had to contend with competing claims 
to the same land. The movement for Jewish nationalism, known as Zionism, 
considered the ancient Kingdom of Israel the most apposite location for a 
modern Jewish state and inspired waves of migration, leading to an increase 
in the Jewish population, from 24,000 in 1882, or 5 percent of the population 
of Palestine, to 85,000 by 1914.  9  Palestinian concerns escalated in 1917, 
when the Balfour Declaration—bearing the name of Foreign Secretary Bal-
four, who had written in a confi dential memo in 1919 that “Zionism, be it 
right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present 
needs, in future hopes, of greater import than the desires and prejudices of 
the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land”—privileged Jewish 
over Arab nationalism. As a consequence, Palestinians would turn their 
attention to convincing the colonial power to abandon the commitment to a 
Jewish national home.  10  
 Between 1921 and 1929, Jewish land possessions, settlements, and busi-
nesses multiplied in Palestine. The Jewish community, known as the Yishuv, 
increasingly appeared as a protostate: it had an elected national assembly, 
an armed defense force, an institutional architecture related to agricultural 
collectives, waves of new immigrants, and banking. The community’s 
highly skilled human capital, urban nature, ideological homogeneity, and 
fi nancial and political support from abroad additionally stood it in good 
stead. By contrast, Arabs in Palestine had no such support, nor had they 
built internal institutions to the same extent. Moreover, the leaders of the 
Palestinian national movements were drawn from only a narrow sliver of 
the elite and were internally divided. Palestinians simply fell short of 
achieving the level of cohesion and political advancement of the Jewish 
community, with even the revolt of 1936–39 marked by fragmentation.  11  
 The 1930s saw substantial immigration into Mandatory Palestine by 
European Jews escaping Nazi persecution, while Hitler’s genocide during 
World War II deepened and broadened support for Zionism among both 
Jews and non-Jews.  12  Meanwhile, Jewish militant groups successfully 
attacked British targets in Palestine, forcing Britain to transfer its mandate 
to the UN in 1947. In November of that year, the UN General Assembly 
passed resolution 181 dividing Palestine into two states, one Arab and one 
Jewish. The Yishuv accepted the plan, but the Arabs’ representatives, along 
with Arab states, rejected it. The basis of this rejection was that Jews were a 
third of the population and owned less than 10 percent of the land, and yet 
were awarded 56 percent of Palestine, including territory which was 45 per-
cent Arab.  13  
 This state of affairs led to two separate but related confl icts: one between 
the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, and the other between the nascent state of 
Israel and independent Arab states. The former began almost immediately 
after the passage of Resolution 181, with Arab offensives repelled by the 
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superior Jewish forces. By March 1948, about 75,000, mostly urban middle-
class Palestinians fl ed the violence and chaos. More would follow with a 
Jewish offensive in the spring, with entire towns and villages being impelled 
to escape by episodes such as the Deir Yasin massacre. In all, between 
250,000 and 350,000 Palestinians were expelled or fl ed in this fi rst phase of 
the war. On May 14, the state of Israel was established, which led to fi ve 
Arab states waging war on the Jewish state. Israel decisively won the war 
the next year, by which time the total number of Palestinians that had 
become refugees reached about 700,000—representing about 60 percent of 
the Palestinian population. Israel meanwhile controlled 78 percent of Man-
date Palestine, about half more than it was allotted by Resolution 181. Egypt 
won the Gaza Strip on the southern Mediterranean coast, while Transjordan, 
which would become the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan later that year, 
took over the West Bank.  14  
 The year 1948 represents a watershed moment in Palestinian history; the 
massive refugee outfl ow as a result of war is known as  naqba —catastrophe. 
Before the war, Arabs had constituted a majority in the area between the 
Jordan River and the Mediterranean, making up approximately 1.4 million 
out of 2 million people, and were a majority in fi fteen of the sixteen subdis-
tricts of Mandatory Palestine. By the end of the war, half had fl ed or been 
expelled, and about 150,000 Palestinians remained in Israel. As Israel’s 
“new historians” working with archival evidence opened in the 1980s 
showed, “most Palestinians left because they were forced to do so either by 
direct Israeli attacks on their cities and villages or due to conditions of 
extreme insecurity.” Indeed, it was known to Zionist leaders even in the 
1920s and 1930s that the creation of a Jewish state within Mandatory Pales-
tine, required the wholesale “transfer,” or expulsion, of Arabs.  15  
 Palestinians had become a Diaspora nation overnight: 10 percent were in 
the East Bank, 39 percent in the West Bank, 26 percent in Gaza, 14 percent in 
Lebanon, 10 percent in Syria, and 1 percent in Egypt. From the Israeli per-
spective, too, 1948 was a key moment, cementing the importance of external 
security in national narratives. After all, what could be more traumatic for a 
state’s collective memory than a multipronged assault immediately on 
gaining a state, one created less than three years after Nazi death camps at 
Auschwitz, Majdanek, and Jasenova were closed? The confl icts affi rmed for 
Israel the “myth in which the Jews are in existential danger of annihilation 
and must be ready to fi ght in the wars that are imposed on them against 
their will.”  16  
 The 1960s and 1970s saw an increasing indigenization of the Palestinian 
cause, with the birth of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
especially symbolizing control of the movement being wrested from Arab 
states by Palestinians.  17  Israel’s borders and regional environment, mean-
while, continued to be marked by danger. As a result of the Six-Day War 
of 1967, when Israel routed the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and 
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seized control of the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai 
Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria, a further 
250,000–300,000 Palestinians became refugees.  18  The 1967 war represents a 
critical juncture in the Israeli state’s approach to land. It marked the point 
at which “revisionist Zionism,” or the political movement aimed at incor-
porating the entire ancient Land of Israel, gained greater legitimacy 
domestically, and “set the stage for a war of position over the shape of the 
state.”  19  Indeed, in many ways, Israel’s victory in 1967 was a poisoned 
chalice, summed up in a memorable exchange. After the victory, Prime 
Minister Eshkol held up a “V”-sign, only to be chastised by his wife: “Have 
you gone mad?” He replied: “No, this is not a V sign in English. It is a 
V sign in Yiddish!  Vi Krishen aroys ?” The phrase translates to “How do we 
get out of this?”  20  
 For their part, groups such as the PLO used terrorism and “fedayeen” 
raids from bases in Jordan—until September 15, 1970, when Jordan’s army 
began a move to crush them, expelling the PLO entirely by the next year—
as well as Lebanon, whose southeast was so completely in the PLO’s hands 
that it was referred to as “Fatahland” in Israel.  21  Israel’s sensitivity to these 
cross-border attacks was evinced in its full-scale invasions of Lebanon in 
1978 and 1982,  22  from which the Israeli military did not disengage until two 
decades later. In addition, Egypt and Syria, eager to reclaim lost territories 
in the Sinai and Golan Heights respectively, attacked it in 1973, catching 
Israel unaware and leading to the Yom Kippur War.  23  These border troubles 
helped cement the notion of vulnerability within sections of the Israeli body 
politic, which would have severe consequences for Palestinian nationalists 
two decades later, when their hopes for a sovereign state were denied. 
 the first intifada and israel’s policing strategy 
 When the fi rst mass uprising in Occupied Palestine took place in the late 
1980s, the PLO’s leadership in Tunisia, along with Israel, was caught by 
surprise, and indeed threatened by the prospective development of an 
alternative, local, and younger leadership of the national movement.  24  The 
Palestinian intifada began early in December 1987, when an IDF vehicle 
crashed into a van transporting Palestinian workers back to Gaza, killing 
four and injuring seven. Rumors spread to the effect that the collision was 
deliberate. Matters were compounded when Israeli forces opened fi re on 
demonstrations after the funerals the next day. In response, the Palestinians 
staged a national uprising, the intifada, one that constituted their seces-
sionist moment. It was an almost entirely homegrown movement that 
began as a series of protests and demonstrations against “unbearable” eco-
nomic conditions. Conversely, the Palestinian territories saw considerable 
sociopolitical development, including a burgeoning of civic institutions 
that formed the institutional backbone of the intifada, such as trade unions, 
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professional associations, students’ committees, charities, newspapers, 
research institutes, and women’s groups.  25  
 Several reasons explained the timing of the uprising.  26  First, both the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank suffered major economic slumps in the 1980s. 
Between 1981 and 1985, per capita GNP fell almost 2 percent annually in 
Gaza and 0.7 percent annually in the West Bank. Second, Israel’s control 
and occupation of the territories became more enveloping. For example, 
twenty-fi ve hundred settlers in Gaza, constituting 0.4 percent of the popu-
lation, controlled 28 percent of state land, and on average, West Bank set-
tlers used twelve times as much water as Palestinians did. Third, Israeli 
policies predictably placed Palestinian development subordinate to Israel’s 
economic needs, with the territories operating effectively as a “slave 
market” for the Israeli economy. Fourth, settlements expanded at pace, 
with the Jewish population in the West Bank almost doubling between 1984 
and 1988, from thirty-fi ve thousand to sixty-four thousand. More generally, 
there existed an “all-pervading element of humiliation” resulting from “the 
protracted state of political subjugation and economic dependence, and the 
day-to-day realities of military occupation [which] meant a continuous 
trampling of the basic rights and dignity of the inhabitants.”  27  As Israeli 
historian Benny Morris sums up: “The rioters of December 1987 and the 
years that followed wanted to get rid of the Israeli occupation and to 
better their economic conditions. Most Palestinians certainly regarded 
independence and the establishment of their own state as a further, major 
objective.”  28  
 Palestinians threw stones at soldiers and tanks and boycotted jobs in 
Israel; shopkeepers stopped accepting Israeli goods and paying taxes and 
were eventually even joined by Palestinians in Israel.  29  Rioting fi rst began 
in Gaza’s refugee camps and spread to camps in West Bank, before it 
extended into towns in both Gaza and the West Bank.  30  Though emanating 
from the ground up, this movement soon coalesced around an umbrella 
organization named United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) 
that coordinated Palestinian political activities in the territories, before 
giving way to PLO leadership by the summer of 1988.  31  The main decision 
maker—the “single most important national symbol and arbiter of Pales-
tinian politics”—leading the movement at this point was Yasser Arafat.  32  
Importantly, Palestinians mostly refrained from violent methods in the inti-
fada, both because doing so would play into Israeli hands but also to retain 
global sympathy as the oppressed party.  33  
 The intifada represented Palestinians’ secessionist moment. The state’s 
response was a policing strategy. It used relatively soft coercion while 
also making tactical concessions, all the while ruling out complete state-
hood, or anything approximating it, for the Palestinians. This strategy 
was undergirded by Israel’s lack of faith in its future security should a 
militarized Palestine come into fruition, colored by its history of warfare 
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with its Arab neighbors and its essentializing of Palestinian identity, 
reducing it to “Arab.” 
 Israel’s calibration of coercion was typical of policing: it used mass 
imprisonment, torture, and other coercive methods of interrogation, but 
did not escalate repression to a point where substantial casualties resulted.  34  
It “gradually introduced police-style riot-control techniques and equip-
ment, deployed nonmilitary measures such as cutting of the telephone lines 
and economic restrictions, and created special undercover units to hunt 
down the uprising’s most extremist factions.”  35  Though there was a mass 
infl ux of troops in the territories, and shoot-on-sight orders during some 
curfews, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin instituted his “beatings policy,” 
which called for the intensive use of clubs and sticks to break up riots. The 
idea behind this strategy was that broken bones were better than dead 
bodies and funerals, which provided further opportunities to riot and 
meant bad publicity abroad. However, while the policy did achieve its goal 
in keeping the number of dead relatively low—roughly a thousand in fi ve 
years—many thousands of Palestinians were seriously injured, and many 
became handicapped. Israel’s most favored coercive measure was arrest 
and detention, imprisoning 1,000 people for every 100,000 Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza. As a comparison, the fi gure for the United States, 
widely considered to have an unusually high incarceration rate, is 426. For 
Northern Ireland it was 120, for South Africa 240, and for the Soviet Union, 
at the apogee of the gulag era, 1,423.  36  
 Alongside the use of coercion, the intifada forced Israel to hold talks with 
Palestinian negotiators, which were held both in public in Madrid and in 
secret in the Norwegian capital of Oslo, culminating in two accords, signed 
in 1993 and 1995. Israeli concessions in these agreements were limited to rec-
ognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
In addition, the accords created some institutions of self-government, 
in the form of the Palestinian Authority, in 60 percent of Gaza and 17 per-
cent of the West Bank.  37  Such granting of limited autonomy can be seen 
as tactical concessions to “moderates” embedded within a larger policy of 
denying the Palestinians a future state, a balance typical of policing strate-
gies. Indeed, it would be a serious mistake to conceptualize Israeli conces-
sions at Oslo as a deal or process that was to pave the way to a Palestinian 
state, despite hopeful rhetoric at the time. According to a Palestinian aca-
demic, Oslo was a “very brutal political compromise” and there “wasn’t 
any indication formally or informally that the accord was leading to a two-
state solution.”  38  As one diplomat told me, “we were naïve” at Oslo.  39  
 That Oslo was not seen as laying a path to a Palestinian state is attested by 
the fact that in its aftermath, Israel built settlements and roads that divided 
Palestinian land; tightened restrictions of travel between the West Bank, 
Gaza, and East Jerusalem; and disallowed a “safe passage” between these 
territories,  40  rendering the possibility of a Palestinian state more unlikely. In 
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interviews, Israeli researchers, journalists, and activists consistently main-
tained that the question of a Palestinian state at Oslo was a bridge too far 
and had never been seriously contemplated or envisioned by the Rabin gov-
ernment. Rather, in this perspective, the aim of the accords was considerably 
less ambitious: the creation of a framework within which trust could be built 
between the parties, culminating in Palestinian self-determination by the 
end of the decade, and preparing the Israeli public for the endgame with 
gradual steps.  41  As several interviewees reminded me, it had been illegal for 
Israeli citizens to even talk to a PLO member until Oslo; the idea of a Pales-
tinian state was simply unthinkable for the Israeli leadership. Notably, major 
concerns such as borders, the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees, the 
division of Jerusalem, and Israeli settlements were not negotiated in the 
accords. Instead, these so called fi nal status issues—“landmines waiting to 
be blown up” in one evocative phrase  42  —were left for a time when greater 
confi dence and trust existed between the Israeli state and its Palestinian 
interlocutors. As one study puts it, Oslo “frontloaded benefi ts for Israel and 
backloaded them for Palestinians” and “did not provide much sense of 
urgency to Israelis to take the steps necessary for Palestinians to achieve 
those backloaded benefi ts, or even reassure Palestinians that they would 
actually materialize.”  43  As such, it is diffi cult to make the claim that Israeli 
concessions at Oslo signaled the creation of a state. 
 The bottom line is that in response to the Palestinian secessionist moment, 
Israel responded with a policing strategy, using a mix of soft coercion, cen-
tering on beatings and imprisonment rather than killings or massacres, as 
well as tactical concessions that fell considerably short of statehood. This 
Israeli strategy of policing represents a puzzle for existing accounts of sepa-
ratist violence. Reputation-based arguments would predict that a state such 
as Israel, with no other national group in its midst that could conceivably 
demand independence after the Palestinians, would be happy to make sub-
stantial concessions, including independence. Arguments centering on veto 
points also fail to explain Israeli strategy, since at the time Rabin led a 
center-left government that had the support of left-wing and Arab parties 
in the Knesset. That such a coalition was unable to even contemplate sig-
nifi cant autonomy or statehood speaks to a wider unease with the concept 
in the Israeli body politic. 
 palestinian nationalism and 
israeli external security 
 I argue that a major factor that stood behind Israeli reluctance to grant a 
state, or anything close to one, in the aftermath of the fi rst Palestinian inti-
fada were concerns about external security. Consistent with my theory, 
Israel could not trust that a sovereign Palestine would not create problems 
for its security in the future, given fi rst its militarized history with 
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neighbors and, second, deep identity divisions between Palestinian Arabs 
and Israeli Jews. 
 Security-based fears of a Palestinian state have generally been important 
for the center right (Likud) and center left (Labor) mainstream parties and 
leaders in Israel. As Rabin said in a major speech to the Knesset in 1992, 
“When it comes to Israel’s security, we will not concede a thing. From our 
standpoint, security takes precedence over peace.”  44  Both traditional par-
ties in Israel have been “deeply opposed to Palestinian nationalism and 
denied that the Palestinians had a right to national self-determination” and 
“unconditionally opposed to the establishment of an independent Pales-
tinian state.”  45  Israel’s insistence that Palestinians not win their own state, 
according to scholars, is rooted in “enormous anxiety,” guarding against 
“further misfortune,”  46  conditioned as it was by Arab states’ aggressions 
against it early in its life, as well as centuries of persecution of European 
Jews. For the larger Israeli security establishment, its surrounding Arab 
population have “represented fi rst and foremost a military threat.”  47  As 
insiders put it, “Israel’s national security policy has been predicated on the 
assumption that the nation faces a realistic threat of both politicide (destruc-
tion of a state) and even genocide. Six wars, numerous major confronta-
tions, and ongoing violence, from low-level terrorism to massive rocket 
attacks, have been basic features of Israel’s external environment. A sense 
of nearly unremitting Arab enmity prevails, of a confl ict of unlimited hos-
tility and objectives. . . . National security issues in Israel are commonly 
addressed in existential terms.”  48  
 In the Israel-Palestine case, both “trip wires” to state coercion are set 
off: not only does Israel live in a dangerous neighborhood, by one metric 
the second-most militarized region during the twentieth century,  49  but it 
also has deep identity divisions with the Palestinians, based on a history 
of confl ict and a collective essentialization that subsumes Palestinian 
identity under a general Arab one. As my theory would expect under 
such circumstances, the state cannot countenance independence for sepa-
ratists, lest the new state threaten its security in the future, either directly 
or in consort with other regional states. Israel’s behavior against the Pal-
estinians is consistent with this expectation. The mainstream of the Israeli 
body politic views the creation of a Palestinian state as an apocalyptic 
threat, despite the massive gulf in capabilities dividing the two entities. 
According to one veteran Israeli journalist, security is the main issue 
when it comes to Israeli stubbornness against the Palestinians—despite 
no Arab army having confronted Israel for years, the sense of fear from 
Arab hostility is “very high.” For the Israeli right wing and even center, 
the prospect of a Palestinian state “is a direct threat on Israel,” since orga-
nizations such as Hamas are thought to be primed to take over the West 
Bank and launch missiles at Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport on their 
ascent to power.  50  Other journalists agreed with this sentiment, noting 
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that “most of the public feels concessions will end in specifi c disasters for 
Israeli lives and families.”  51  
 This fear of a Palestinian state results partly from Israel’s primordialist, 
essentialist understanding of Arab identity, through which both peaceful 
and violent Palestinian mobilization is subsumed under a larger feeling of 
victimization by its neighboring Arab states. As current Israeli prime min-
ister and longtime opponent of Palestinian statehood Benjamin Netanyahu 
wrote, to make sense of the national movement, “it is necessary to go 
beyond the pretense that 1967 and the ‘occupation of the West Bank’ are the 
starting point of ‘resistance’ against the Jews. The Arab war against the 
Jews is in fact as old as this century.”  52  Similarly, former Israeli prime min-
ister Golda Meir famously remarked that “it was not as though there was a 
Palestinian People in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian People 
and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. 
They did not exist.”  53  Moshe Feiglin, a Likud politician, incredulously 
reacted to the very notion of a Palestinian. “‘Palestinians’? Do you know 
about a nation without a history? How can a nation exist without history? 
They are Arabs. They identify with a big Arab nation, and there are many 
Arab tribes.”  54  As a result of Palestinian identity being folded under a wider 
Arab rubric in this way, Israel’s assessment of the risks of a future Pales-
tinian state rest on the security threats it has faced from Arab states in 
the past. 
 Evidence for the claim that security was the main driver of Israel’s refusal 
to concede a state can be found at the Madrid talks that preceded the Oslo 
negotiations, where Israeli hawks pressured Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, 
insisting “that the West Bank was an important buffer between itself and 
Jordan, and a Palestinian entity, let alone a Palestinian state, would repre-
sent a military threat to Israel’s existence.”  55  Though Shamir and Likud 
were was soundly defeated by Rabin’s Labor and other left-leaning parties 
in 1992, the two “differed more in style than substance”  56  when it came to 
negotiating. Rabin’s strategy at Oslo was to go only so far as to grant admin-
istrative control to those territories unimportant to Israel’s security, as well 
as “retain fi nal military control throughout the  whole  of the occupied terri-
tories.”  57  Indeed, security issues were the “hardest nuts to crack” in the 
Oslo negotiations according to contemporary reports, with one Labor 
Knesset member warning that “the negotiation is not just a perpetual fes-
tival of Israeli gestures. It’s based on give and take, and in this case, give 
and take means they accept our terms as far as security arrangements are 
concerned.”  58  That security was the overarching Israeli concern during 
Oslo is also revealed by the fact that, against tradition, Rabin assigned 
major negotiating responsibilities to serving generals in the IDF; this reli-
ance on serving offi cers was a “natural” outcome when, as one retired 
offi cer put it, “problems of security are so predominant in any of the nego-
tiations.” Besides, for the broader Israeli public at the time, “the sight of 
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IDF offi cers rather than politicians shaping the peace accord is reassuring. 
The average Israeli will judge peace with the Palestinians by one criteria—
personal security—and ‘the public feels better if security arrangements are 
negotiated by generals rather than by [Deputy Foreign Minister] Yossi 
Beilin.’”  59  
 In consonance with this theme, Benjamin Netanyahu, then leader of the 
Likud Party in opposition, claimed that “Palestinian autonomy, although 
not a Palestinian state, was something that he could accept and even sup-
port on the condition that it provided for exclusive Israeli responsibility for 
security, external borders and foreign relations,” which was not the case 
with the agreements then.  60  When Netanyahu gained power in 1996 after 
severely criticizing Oslo and promising to undo the accords, one anony-
mous government offi cial was blunt about the changes in the offi ng: “The 
whole world can jump up and down, but there is no way to achieve a Pal-
estinian state under Likud. This is the red line.”  61  As the  Financial Times 
noted in 1996 after Netanyahu and Arafat visited the White House, “The 
underlying problem is that the Israeli prime minister does not accept the 
principles behind Oslo. . . . He believes security requires a buffer of occu-
pied land insulating the Jewish state from its Arab neighbors.” As a conse-
quence, “he has told his supporters at home he will go no further along the 
route charted by the Rabin and Peres governments which was leading to a 
Palestinian state.”  62  Sure enough, with Netanyahu’s election “the Oslo pro-
cess effectively came to an end.”  63  
 Indeed, more than most, Netanyahu—the dominant fi gure in Israeli poli-
tics over the last two decades—personifi es the views connecting a history 
of confl ict with Arab neighbors to predictions of security problems an inde-
pendent Palestinian state will pose. The same year he was elected leader of 
Likud, Netanyahu published a book in which he “viewed Israel’s relations 
with the Arab world as one of permanent confl ict, as a never-ending 
struggle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness.” Compro-
mise with the PLO “was completely out of the question because its goal 
was the destruction of the State of Israel. . . . The PLO was ‘constitutionally 
tied to the idea of Israel’s liquidation.’” The very title of the chapter on the 
PLO in Netanyahu’s book  A Place among Nations speaks volumes: “The 
Trojan Horse.” He wrote that it was “all too easy for anyone familiar with 
Israel’s terrain to imagine, precisely as Arafat promises, that a PLO state 
implanted ten miles from the beaches of Tel Aviv would be a mortal danger 
to the Jewish state.” For Israel to secure its cities, it must militarily control 
essentially all the territory west of the Jordan River. “To subdivide this land 
into two unstable, insecure nations, to try to defend what is indefensible, is 
to invite disaster. Carving Judea and Samaria out of Israel means carving 
up Israel.”  64  
 We can fi nd evidence of the centrality of Israel’s dangerous neighbor-
hood and history of confl ict not just in its refusal to grant a state, but also in 
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its specifi c demands during negotiations with the Palestinians. For instance, 
while Oslo divided Palestinian sovereignty into several sectoral and geo-
graphic zones, Israel controlled security not just for Israeli areas, but also 
for the “mixed” zones—the so-called Area B—while Palestinians were 
given control of security in Area A only, about 3 percent of the landmass of 
the occupied territories.  65  More tellingly, throughout the Oslo process, Isra-
el’s view of a future Palestinian state entailed an Israeli military presence in 
the Jordan valley as well as a Palestinian state that would be demilitarized.  66  
In my interviews, Israeli journalists and former negotiators emphasized 
that a demilitarized Palestinian state was a sine qua non for the Israeli body 
politic to even consider territorial concessions. These interviewees were 
often puzzled when I even brought up the question of demilitarization, 
given how “obvious” Israeli demands were on this issue relative to thornier 
issues, such as Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements.  67  In this view, the pres-
ence of another Arab army in the West Bank is a red line for Israel’s security, 
given the Jordan Valley’s importance to Israel historically. Importantly, this 
insistence that Palestine be demilitarized is not just deeply but also widely 
felt, with both left and right subscribing wholeheartedly to it. For instance, 
at the infamous failed accord of Camp David under the supervision of Bill 
Clinton, Ehud Barak of the Labor Party ostensibly made “the most far-
reaching Israeli concessions ever made”—but still insisted that an indepen-
dent Palestinian state be demilitarized and that Israel control a “thin strip” 
of the Jordan valley for security purposes.  68  
 For their part, Palestinian interviewees, including journalists covering the 
Oslo talks as well as negotiators and scholars, made clear to me that their 
side was well aware of Israeli resolve on this question. In their telling, the 
Palestinians felt compelled to agree to nonmilitarization as a signal of 
assurance to the Israelis that they were interested only in gaining a state 
and not using it to fi ght wars, happy to delegate their future border security 
to international actors.  69  In this telling, a Palestinian army would be of little 
use in a confl ict against the militarily superior Israelis or any of the major 
Arab states.  70  As such, it was smart strategy to put their future security in 
the hands of outside actors—“bear-hug the international community to 
provide security” in one Palestinian analyst’s words—and reassure Israel 
of its peaceful intentions in the future to the extent possible.  71  
 Doubtless, the idea that the Palestinians must assure Israel of its secu-
rity in order to win a state justifi ably appears “twisted logic” to some.  72  Is it 
not the case that the Palestinians are a stateless minority oppressed by a 
powerful state enjoying a regional nuclear monopoly as well as the 
unfl inching backing of world’s only superpower? How can an actor so 
weak assure a state so strong? Such a viewpoint, reasonable as it is on the 
surface, ignores the difference between absolute and relative power. As a 
regional hegemon, Israel is assuredly more powerful than, and continues to 
assert dominance over, the Palestinian nation. However, as IR scholars 
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point out, states care deeply about not just absolute power but also relative 
power. Were the Palestinians to win a state, Israel’s security environment 
would become more challenging, at least marginally. An independent Pal-
estine would still be vastly weaker than Israel, but because of the military, 
economic, demographic, and institutional benefi ts of statehood (chapter 1), 
it would have caught up relatively. More importantly, even if the leaders of 
an independent Palestine were solely interested in peaceful relations with 
Israel, the thorny question of nonstate actors and militant groups, using 
such a state as a base for attacks, would be left unanswered. As such, Pales-
tinian statehood represents an adverse shift in the balance that would be 
unpalatable for a state like Israel, which having fought numerous interstate 
wars and nonstate actors, is consistently obsessed with maintaining its 
security. 
 Indeed, the tragedy from the point of view of common Palestinians is 
that there is only so much they, and their leaders, can do to placate Israel. 
Israel’s history of confl ict with Arab states in its early years of statehood, 
which Palestinians bear little responsibility for, has had signifi cant path-
dependent effects, leaving Israel suspicious of any changes in the regional 
balance of power.  73  Such rapid changes in the balance of power, as I argue 
in this book, inhere in any separatist demand. Palestinian negotiators seem 
to be aware of this dynamic; their relative comfort giving up claims to an 
army in negotiations—as opposed to their strident stance on issues such as 
Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements—are explicitly aimed at providing 
assurance to Israel. Nonetheless, there are elements of independence that 
the Palestinians simply cannot negotiate away, such as internal sovereignty 
and the existence of “hard” international borders, which necessarily reduce 
Israeli security. As one Israeli peace activist told me, even if the threat of 
Arab armies from Iraq, Jordan, or Syria crossing the Jordan River through 
the West Bank is largely “fantastical” today thanks to a peace agreement 
with Jordan and the geopolitical weakening of Iraq and Syria, the threat of 
“military terrorism,” that of militant groups inside an independent Pales-
tine, such as Hezbollah, showering Israel with rockets and mortar fi re 
remains. This leads to the belief that holding on to the West Bank as a secu-
rity buffer is “worth it,” given the alternatives.  74  Even the prospect of inter-
national forces, including troops from the United States, being stationed on 
the border as a “trip wire” would not satisfy this insecurity, since Israel 
prefers operational fl exibility to handle its own security, which interna-
tional border forces would limit, and sound public and technical relations 
with the United States, which might be threatened by the presence of 
American forces on their border.  75  
 For mainstream Israeli leaders, then, concerns about external security led 
to a refusal to grant the Palestinian national movement a state in the 1990s. 
Conditioned by wars both at its birth and early in its life as a state, Israel 
saw its surrounding Arab populations as implacably hostile to it. Given it 
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saw Palestinians as Arabs fi rst and foremost, it should not surprise us that 
Israel feared the security consequences of a new “Arab” state on its border. 
As such, Israel sought to ensure the lack of meaningful territorial conces-
sions to the Palestinians under its control. It further stipulated that to the 
extent that Palestinians enjoyed any autonomy, they would not exercise 
sovereign control of their borders, nor would they be allowed an army, 
meaning that even if a Palestinian “state” were to somehow come to frui-
tion, it would still lack some of the core elements of widely accepted defi ni-
tions of the modern, Weberian state. These demands reveal a great deal 
about dominant Israeli concerns with the prospect of a Palestinian state: its 
future external security. 
 since the first intifada and oslo 
 Since the failed Oslo process in the 1990s, Israel has become even more 
wary about the security consequences of territorial loss. In interviews, 
Israeli journalists, academics, and activists, even those from the left, have 
emphasized the unhappy experiences after concessions elsewhere, including 
the Sinai, Lebanon, and Gaza. From this perspective, the state has already 
experienced a proverbial trial run of an independent Palestine, after the 
withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the results of which were not encouraging: 
an increase in rocket attacks from the territory. As Benny Morris noted, 
“Israel’s leaders quite naturally feared that a similar unilateral pullout from 
the West Bank would be followed by a far more dangerous rocketing of the 
state’s main population centers, Jerusalem and the greater Tel Aviv area. 
It is today clear that no Israeli leader will initiate a pullout from the West 
Bank—unilaterally or in agreement with the Palestinians—before the IDF 
acquires the technological capability to protect its population centers from 
short-range missile attacks.”  76  My interviews revealed just how widely 
pervasive the view that transferring control of territory only invites more 
aggression is in Israel today, rendering the traditional “land for peace” 
equation dicey from the Israeli perspective—how can they be sure, given 
their history, that conceding land will actually lead to peace?  77  Overall, the 
right wing’s views that “they want to destroy us, they want to fi nish us” are 
very popular today.  78  Indeed, on the eve of the 2015 elections, two-thirds of 
Israelis strongly or moderately agreed with the claim that “no matter which 
party forms the next government, the peace process with the Palestinians 
will not advance because there is no solution to the disagreements between 
the sides.”  79  In 2010, 80 percent of Israeli Jews believed that “the Pales-
tinians have not come to terms with Israel’s existence and would destroy 
Israel if they could” and 74 percent agreed that “there will be no change in 
this position even if a peace agreement is signed.”  80  
 Alongside Israeli fears, Palestinian frustration has also increased mani-
fold since Oslo. This is because the empowering of the religious-nationalist 
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settler lobby within Israel in the last two decades has added an ideological 
dimension to an already complicated territorial confl ict, pushing the 
country toward “fanaticism and radicalism”  81  and making concessions 
even less likely. Right-wing religious nationalism has risen in Israel since 
the 1967 war and even more so since the 1977 elections—partly a conse-
quence of a more politically active community of lower-class Sephardic 
Jews. Included in this group are mainstream rightwing parties such as 
Likud and the National Religious Party, as well as radical nationalist par-
ties such as Tehiya, Kach, Moledet, and the National Union Party in the 
2000s.  82  In recent times, this religious-nationalist camp has “through dif-
ferent political parties, far exceeded its proportionality” in the Israeli 
Knesset.  83  They view the Jews as the chosen people, the rightful owner of 
the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. That is, they are 
advocates of so-called Greater Israel, precluding territorial concessions to 
the Palestinians, who are considered aliens in this land, untrustworthy, and 
the sworn enemy of Israel and the Jewish people. This “subculture,” equal 
parts religious nationalism and racist fanaticism, was born out of Israel’s 
successes in the 1967 war, which included the conquest of the West Bank—
known as Judea and Samaria to the adherents of this subculture—which 
convinced “many Orthodox rabbis and teachers that they were living in a 
messianic era and that salvation was at hand.”  84  
 This rightward turn has been responsible for one of the primary impedi-
ments toward a solution of the Palestinian-Israeli confl ict: the issue of set-
tlements. The Israeli policy of establishing Jewish settlements in occupied 
territories began in earnest by the Labor government after the 1967 war, 
was accelerated considerably since 1977, when Likud came to power,  85  and 
has shown precious little signs of abating, up to the present day. As such, 
Israeli leaders’ decisions on how to deal with Palestinians are not just con-
ditioned by Israel’s checkered relationship with its Arab state neighbors, as 
my theory would predict, but also by a fear of crossing an increasingly 
vocal and racist coalition in domestic politics.  86  Naftali Bennett, a rising star 
within the far right movement and one with serious chances to become 
prime minister soon, put it simply in 2012: “There are certain things that 
most of us understand will never happen: ‘The Sopranos’ are not coming 
back for another season, and there will never be a peace plan with the Pal-
estinians. . . . I will do everything in my power to make sure they never get 
a state.”  87  
 The right-wing and settler lobby made a show of strength after Oslo, 
when it did “everything within their power to obstruct the spirit and letters 
of” the accords.  88  According to interviews with both Israeli and Palestinian 
journalists and researchers, the open-ended nature of the agreement, with 
fi nal-status issues kicked down the road, left considerable time and space 
for spoilers from both sides to dent and possibly extinguish the potential of 
a Palestinian state.  89  Israeli settlers considerably quickened their takeover 
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of Palestinian land as a preemptive measure, their population doubling in 
the territories during the 1990s.  90  From eighty thousand before Oslo, the 
number of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza today is half a million. Jewish 
settlements in the aftermath of Oslo created “facts on the ground,” meaning 
that while the fi nal status of a Palestinian state was suspended midair, so to 
speak, the territory on which such a state would be organized was taken 
over. These settlers were given political backing by right-wing Israelis, 
including those from secular parties such as Likud’s Ariel Sharon, both in 
and out of government. Most damagingly, an Israeli settler named Yigal 
Amir assassinated Rabin in late 1995—a “knockout blow” to the peace pro-
cess.  91  Amir’s murderous act ended the life of the one Israeli leader from 
the center left with the gravitas and standing to stand up to the settler 
lobby—Rabin had served in Israel’s war of independence and led it to dra-
matic victories in the 1967 war—and thus ended any possibility of mean-
ingful Israeli concessions toward a Palestinian state, even a demilitarized 
Bantustan version of it. Between the security-motivated views objecting to 
Palestinian independence, personifi ed by Netanyahu, and the religious-
nationalist angle, personifi ed by Bennett, arguably more important than 
security concerns since the turn of the century, the prospects for Palestinian 
statehood seem very grim indeed. Even more unfortunately, the unique 
nature of the confl ict means that the option usually considered by restive 
minorities second-best to independence—assimilation in the host state, or 
in this case, a “one-state solution” where Palestinians enjoy rights as full 
citizens of a binational state—is also not on the cards. 
 the second intifada and israel’s 
militarization strategy 
 Within this general context of Israeli fears and Palestinian frustration, 
another uprising erupted in the early 2000s. The collapse of the Oslo pro-
cess led to an impasse that forced Bill Clinton to convene a summit with 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at 
Camp David in 2000. The summit was a failure. Later that year, Ariel 
Sharon, the Likud leader of the opposition, visited the Temple Mount, 
which provoked demonstrations that day and the next. These demonstra-
tions marked the beginning of the second intifada: once more, the Pales-
tinians rose to “shake off” the Israeli occupation. Israel’s response to 
the second intifada, a “militarization” strategy, is a failed prediction of 
my theory, which would only expect such an escalation in the presence 
of “moderate” third-party support, which the Palestinians lacked in this 
instance. 
 The second intifada saw more violence than the fi rst, with the IDF 
adopting a “more hard-line approach,” closer to a militarization strategy 
than policing.  92  The casualty rate of the second intifada was double that of 
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the fi rst.  93  In the earlier episode, the IDF’s central message was that “there 
is no military solution to the intifada, only a political solution,” while in the 
second, it preferred “exacting a price.” Security forces killed more than a 
hundred Palestinians in the fi rst month alone, the large majority being 
unarmed civilians.  94  “By the second week it had opened fi re with all the 
weapons in its arsenal: in addition to using snipers, it shot missiles from 
Apache helicopters on demonstrators and their buildings, and it fi red from 
tanks on Beit Jallah and Ramallah in response to small-arms fi re on Giloh 
and Psagot.” Such force “would have been more appropriate in a war 
against a standing army but was totally out of place against stone-throwing 
civilians.”  95  Indeed, Israel viewed the second intifada much more as a war 
than the fi rst. It used air power to a considerable extent, and then launched 
a number of “invasions” of West Bank towns, resulting in signifi cant num-
bers of civilian casualties.  96  This calibration of violence had support from 
Israeli society, which in fact demanded even more forceful action.  97  From 
the Israeli perspective, “this was war, not a case of a nation seeking to over-
throw its oppressors, end its occupation, or struggle for liberation.”  98  As a 
result, casualties soared: “The fi rst 18 months of the second intifada, ending 
February 2002, witnessed nearly as many deaths (1,136) as the 69 months of 
the fi rst intifada (1,265).”  99  
 My theory would expect that the increasing intensity of the Israeli 
response between the fi rst and second intifadas, from policing to militari-
zation, would be due to differences in third-party support for the Pales-
tinians. While we have sound reasons to believe that certain elements of 
the Palestinian movement, especially Hamas and Hezbollah, enjoyed 
fi nancial and military aid from hostile regional powers, such as Iran or 
Syria,  100  my interviewees stressed the nonimportance of third-party sup-
port in explaining Israeli behavior in the second intifada. Respondents 
emphasized that to the extent that the involvement of third-parties was 
invoked by the Israeli leadership, it was a public relations tactic more 
than a whole-hearted belief in the perils of regional involvement.  101  
Instead, there were three main considerations when explaining the 
harsher Israeli response in the second intifada. First, the movement it was 
responding to was itself deadlier: while Palestinians staged a peaceful 
movement in the late 1980s, mostly throwing stones and Molotov cock-
tails, the second intifada was considerably more violent, led by Hamas 
and featuring suicide bombers within Israel “proper.”  102  Second, there 
were differences in domestic politics.  103  The reaction to the fi rst intifada 
was in the hands of a unity government and a center-left government, 
while in the second intifada, it was the right-wing Likud Party led by the 
hawkish Ariel Sharon that was mostly in charge.  104  Third, there was 
already an Israeli security presence in the territories in the fi rst intifada, 
while the second was more akin to an “invasion,” with Israeli tanks and 
troops moving in to Palestinian cities and towns.  105  As such, the form and 
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function of Israeli policy in the second intifada was signifi cantly different 
from what occurred a decade prior. 
 While my theory can explain Israel’s choice of coercion over concessions 
in the second intifada, it fails when explaining the intensity of coercion. 
Specifi cally, the conspicuous absence of “moderate” third-party support in 
explaining Israeli escalation from policing to militarization is a drawback 
for my argument and serves as a reminder of the necessarily imperfect fi t of 
general models to specifi c empirical contexts in social science. That said, 
even unmet expectations can sometimes prove constructive for scholars, if 
theoretically useful answers can be found for the argument’s failed predic-
tion. In this case, one clear lesson is that the intensifi ed lethality of rebel 
violence resulting from higher levels of third-party support, pushing gov-
ernments to escalate from “policing” to “militarization,” can be just as 
easily produced from other sources. For instance, the Palestinian Authority 
“accumulated tens of thousands of guns during the 1990s,” which were 
used in the second intifada,  106  signifying that vast increases in material 
capabilities can be generated from within under some circumstances. 
Second, the failed prediction shines a light on the importance of the splin-
tering of the Palestinian movement, similar to the role factionalization 
played in Indian Punjab in the late 1980s (chapter 3). The factionalization of 
the Palestinian movement generated incentives for various organizations to 
increase violence, unlike when the movement was relatively unifi ed in the 
fi rst intifada.  107  Finally, Palestinian militants also adjusted tactics, employing 
suicide bombing more regularly than ever before. During the 1990s, there 
was an average of three suicide attacks per year, which increased to over 
twenty a year during the second intifada.  108  These developments in con-
junction meant that the Palestinian movement had a level of lethality that a 
movement in other circumstances may have required “moderate” third-
party support to reach. 
 Overall, my theory has a great deal to say about the Israeli-Palestinian 
dispute. Confronted by the fi rst intifada, the Israeli state responded by 
refusing to countenance an independent, Weberian state on the Palestinian 
territories, adopting relatively light coercion to keep in check a movement 
enjoying “limited” third-party support, and making tactical concessions to 
“moderates” that fell well short of statehood. Consistent with my argu-
ment, this “policing” strategy had its roots in Israel’s militarized history 
with its neighbors and its deep identity divisions with Palestinians, who it 
considers no different to the “Arabs” that it fought over decades, leaving it 
fearful of the security consequences of a new state on its borders. These 
security fears, exacerbated by Palestinian militant violence aimed at inde-
pendence, continue to dominate to the present day and render the prospect 
of a Palestinian state, in control of its borders and security, an exceedingly 
unlikely prospect. However, developments that lie outside the explanatory 
range of my theory—such as the rise of the religious nationalist settler 
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lobby in Israel, and the ability of Palestinian movement to generate signifi -
cant violence in spite of no signifi cant third-party support—have also 
played an important role in the continuation of violence, especially in the 
aftermath of Oslo. Most important, my theory cannot explain why the 
second-best option usually available to ethnic groups denied indepen-
dence, that of assimilation in the host state, is denied to the Palestinians. 
This implausibility of a one-state solution, alongside Israel’s rejection of 
“two states for two peoples” partly due to security fears, has created the 
perfect storm of pessimism and despair that so pervasively mark the Israeli-
Palestinian relationship. 
 Peaceful Secessions in Northern and Central Europe 
 Completely conciliatory responses by states to separatist movements, where 
the center is prepared to relinquish territory during peaceful negotiations, 
are quite rare in international politics. When they do occur, such “negotia-
tions and concessions” strategies often result in the ethnic group expressing 
satisfaction with the state’s concessions, as in contemporary Quebec or 
Scotland. In exceptional circumstances, however, the ethnic group will con-
tinue pressing demands for an independent state in the face of concessions, 
in which case a peaceful split should occur. 
 I expect these peaceful splits, and peaceful responses to secessionism by 
states more generally, under a relatively narrow set of conditions: only 
when governments do not foresee security troubles, from either regional 
rivals or the newly created state, in the future. Such a positive prognosis of 
the state’s external security would require residence in a relatively pleasant 
neighborhood as well as a lack of deep identity divisions between the two 
actors. Historically, these conditions are most likely to obtain in the com-
fortable, optimistic, post-security regions of North America and Western 
Europe in the twenty-fi rst century, which is why we see, for instance, Britain 
not consider violence against Scottish secessionism nor Canada against the 
Quebecois. The question posed in this section is: to what extent did these 
conditions match those in Czechoslovakia at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury and Scandinavia at the beginning of it? The relative paucity of the non-
violent strategies in the empirical record increases their importance when 
evaluating any theory of separatist confl ict; if my argument has trouble 
accounting for these cases, we should have serious doubts about its 
plausibility. 
 In Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Divorce, external security considerations 
were taken off the table, creating the conditions under which Czech leaders 
could concede territory unworryingly. For one thing, the regional security 
environment underwent dramatic changes in the lead-up to the secession, 
with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
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unifi cation of Germany. For another, the Czechs had little to fear from an 
independent Slovak state, given the relatively warm historical relations 
between the two groups; identity relations were at worst “indifferent.” 
Additionally, the Czechs handsomely won the separation agreement, which 
granted them a massive preponderance of military power. Given their 
economy was much weaker than the Czechs’, the Slovaks could not have 
plausibly closed that gap. With military and security considerations side-
lined, the focus turned to economic and diplomatic issues. On these mea-
sures, the Czechs were only too happy to let the Slovaks secede, since they 
believed, correctly, that the Slovaks would dilute their reform agenda and 
shift their desired focus away from Western Europe and Western institu-
tions more generally. Thus the Czechs acquiesced to Slovak demands for 
separation eagerly and peacefully. 
 Similarly, my theoretical argument sheds lights on two main aspects of 
the Scandinavian case. First, the region enjoyed an extremely and atypically 
benign security environment, which rendered future security threats less 
important, thus opening up space for a potential peaceful response. Second, 
the Swedes only took coercion against Norway off the table in 1905 once 
they were assured of a demilitarized zone along the new international 
border and the destruction of the latter’s forts, speaking to their concerns 
about a future dyadic threat. 
 the velvet divorce:  czechoslovakia splits in 1993 
 The Velvet Divorce in the former Czechoslovakia, which birthed the 
Czech and Slovak republics, was by no means inevitable, given that the 
ethnic divisions in the state were not as pronounced as others in the region.  109  
But the Slovaks, or at least their political representatives, argued for and 
demanded greater freedom and autonomy once communism collapsed in 
the late 1980s. The Czechs did not get in their way. When the breakup did 
occur, offi cially on midnight of January 1, 1993, it was a completely peaceful 
outcome; “virtually painless” and without “a nose being bloodied.”  110  
 This peaceful split could have occurred only in an environment of min-
imal external threats, where border changes were almost meaningless for 
security. Indeed, that is precisely where the Czechs found themselves in the 
early 1990s. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the unifi cation of Ger-
many, and the end of the Cold War rendered the region’s environment 
wholly benign. Additionally, the Czechs had little reason to fear an inde-
pendent Slovak state. The relatively warm relations between the two ethnic 
groups over the previous century resulted in muted identity divisions, 
especially compared to other ethnic dyads in the region. As such, when the 
Slovak leader Vladimír Mečiar used his electoral victory in 1992 to press for 
(at least) a confederal state, Václav Klaus and the Czechs were only too 
happy to acquiesce to a split. 
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 The Czechs and Slovaks shared a common history to the extent that both 
republics were part of the Habsburg Empire that collapsed at the end of 
World War I. There were, however, signifi cant differences in the ways they 
had been controlled: the Czech lands were more loosely governed from 
Vienna, while the Slovaks were strictly ruled by the Hungarians. There 
were signifi cant differences in the social and economic makeup of the 
regions too. The Czech region was a thriving, industrial region which con-
tributed nearly 70 percent of the Habsburg Empire’s industrial output, 
while the Slovak region was generally organized along more feudalistic 
lines, where a rural economy dominated. Largely as a consequence of these 
historical differences, the Czechs were known for their “urbane and secular 
culture,” whereas Slovaks practiced a “deeply religious (mainly Catholic) 
brand of nationalism.”  111  The Czechs developed a society with full literacy 
by the nineteenth century that contained an industrial working class and a 
bourgeoisie that evinced cultural, social, and intellectual capital. The Slo-
vaks, on the other hand, were more impoverished and agrarian, and often 
pejoratively described as “economically and politically primitive.”  112  
 When the Habsburg Empire collapsed in 1919, the independent state of 
Czechoslovakia was born. Almost immediately, there was cause for con-
sternation for the Slovaks. The fi rst would-be president of Czechoslovakia, 
Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, signed an agreement in Pittsburgh in 1918 that 
promised a considerable degree of autonomy to the Slovaks, including the 
provision of their own Diet, administration, and the use of Slovak as a lan-
guage of instruction in schools as well as offi cialdom. Unfortunately, the 
Pittsburgh Agreement, as it came to be known, was never implemented.  113  
 Twenty years later, the republic’s life came to an abrupt end, when Nazi 
Germany occupied the Czech lands. The Slovaks enjoyed a brief period as a 
nominally independent state under the stewardship of a fascist priest 
named Jozef Tiso. The taste of independence was never forgotten in Slo-
vakia, providing the impetus for a drive to greater autonomy and freedom 
in later decades.  114  It is noteworthy for our purposes, however, that the 
Czechs and Slovaks never fought one another during the war, though they 
were technically on different sides from 1939, when Nazi Germany occu-
pied Bohemia and Moravia, until 1944, the year of the Slovak uprising. This 
lack of violent confl ict paved the way for muted identity divisions down 
the road. 
 After the war, the state was reunited as Czechoslovakia and brought 
under the ambit of the Soviet Union. Under communism, the Slovak lands 
especially saw Soviet-style industrialization, with the introduction of heavy 
steel and armaments factories. Politically, the state lay securely within the 
sphere of infl uence of the Soviets, who crushed various uprisings and revo-
lutions, most brutally in 1968. The so-called Prague Spring of 1968 was 
important also because of its impact on intra-Czechoslovak institutions and 
relations. In the lead-up to 1968, the Czechs and Slovaks were working on 
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plans to make the state a federation, with one central government and two 
republican governments, one for each ethnic group. Up to that point, the 
Slovaks had a state government but the Czechs did not, lending credence to 
the Slovak belief that the central government was, in fact, a Czech enter-
prise. A similar structure was prevalent with respect to the Communist 
Party: there was a Slovak wing and a central wing, but no specifi c Czech 
wing. The reforms being discussed at the time would have created a Czech 
state government as well as a Czech wing of the Communist Party. The 
Soviet invasion changed those plans, at least in part: the plans for revamping 
the state went through, but party reforms were squashed. Following the 
late 1960s, Czechoslovakia formally became a federal state.  115  
 The communist era was notable for cementing the status of the Czech 
region as more preeminent than Slovak lands. “During 42 years of com-
munist rule, everything went through Prague,” leading to a Slovak sense 
“of being at the end of the line, not at the front of the line.”  116  By the late 
1980s, Eastern Europe was thrown into turmoil by the domino-like revolu-
tions that evicted the Soviet presence in the region. The Czechoslovakian 
manifestation was the Velvet Revolution of 1989, led by playwright turned 
dissident, Václav Havel, which released the Soviet shackles from Czecho-
slovakia. It is to that period we now turn. 
 from velvet revolution to velvet divorce 
 After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the newly free Czecho-
slovak state went about instituting a series of economic reforms, making 
the country more promarket and capitalist. These reforms affected Czech 
and Slovak societies unequally. The more educated and economically 
advanced Czechs benefi ted greatly from the market-oriented direction of 
the new state, while the Slovaks disproportionately suffered. By the early 
1990s, the unemployment rate in the Czech lands was amongst the lowest 
in Europe—only 3 percent—while in Slovakia it was about four times 
higher. Growth rates in the Czech regions were higher than those in Slo-
vakia too. The uneven nature of the impact of economic reforms was the 
primary stumbling block in Czech-Slovak relations and eventually caused 
the dissolution of the state.  117  
 Such an outcome was not foreordained, however. There was an air of 
optimism after the fi rst elections in postcommunist Czechoslovakia in 1990. 
The recently imprisoned dissident Václav Havel led a new federal govern-
ment. The main winner in the Czech lands was the Civic Forum, and its 
sister organization, Public against Violence, dominated the vote in Slovakia. 
The state governments in the Czech lands and Slovakia were led by Petr 
Pithart and Vladimír Mečiar, a former communist.  118  After the 1990 elec-
tions, the state promised to address many of the main Slovak complaints as 
they pertained to the institutional makeup of the state. Havel, who held 
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considerable sympathy for many Slovak grievances, held negotiations with 
Slovaks on the formation of new federal and republic constitutions. But his 
promises would not go far enough for Slovaks, who felt that Prague was 
not suffi ciently helpful in dealing with its economic crisis.  119  Polls showed 
that the feeling was mutual for the Czechs, and both ethnic groups thought 
that the state behaved more favorably toward the other ethnic group. In 
January 1992, for instance, 52 percent of Slovaks believed that the federal 
government benefi ted the Czech nation while 41 percent of Czechs believed 
the same about the Slovaks.  120  
 Levels of general dissatisfaction with the political and economic status 
quo began to grow more acute by 1992. By May, three-quarters of the 
Czech population and 86 percent of Slovaks were unhappy with the overall 
political situation. This created space for populists to confl ate ethnic with 
economic concerns, particularly in Slovakia.  121  Mečiar, especially, held the 
Czechs responsible for the lack of development and growth in Slovakia, 
and favored a more personalist, statist form of government and economic 
expansion, perhaps predictably, given his communist background. These 
competing visions to choose from—a promarket, pluralist policy favored 
by the Czechs and a more nationalistic and ethnically defi ned state favored 
by the Slovaks—set the stage for the 1992 election. Mečiar sought to exploit 
nationalistic sentiment in Slovakia with an economic populist message,  122  
though he was careful not to campaign on a platform of independence, 
keeping his goals ambiguous.  123  
 The elections proved to be Slovaks’ secessionist moment and paved the 
way for the separation of the state.  124  In Slovakia, Mečiar’s party, now 
named Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, after Public against Violence 
had been disbanded, won 37 percent of the vote for the Slovak parliament 
and 33.5 percent of the vote in the federal parliament. In total, Mečiar’s 
party won 74 out of 150 seats in the Slovak parliament. “We need a politi-
cian like this right now,” said one voter in Bratislava. “Meciar is a tough 
guy. He can defend us. Things must be put in order vis-à-vis the Czechs. 
They must stop getting a better deal.”  125  Notably, no parties that were 
allied with major Czech parties won more than a negligible percentage of 
the vote. In the Czech lands, meanwhile, the Civic Democratic Party, led 
by the promarket reformer Václav Klaus,  won similar totals, with 30 per-
cent of the vote for the Czech legislature and 34 percent for the federal 
parliament. 
 After winning in their respective regions, Klaus and Mečiar began nego-
tiations. Mečiar pushed for a separate constitution for the republics, which 
would take precedence over the federal constitution. Indeed, Mečiar had 
demanded a separate constitution for the Slovaks as far back as September 
1991.  126  Moreover, the very fact that Klaus was the leader of the Czechs 
made Mečiar even more intransigent, since a large proportion of Slovaks 
held Klaus personally responsible for the economic reforms that had 
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damaged their region. Klaus, however, refused Mečiar’s solution, arguing 
that such a step would invalidate the unity of the country. 
 The pair exercised considerable infl uence on events after the election, 
without input from wider institutions such as parties or interest groups.  127  
This lack of popular participation was signifi cant because by most accounts, 
support for a complete split, if gauged in a referendum, would have been 
around 30 percent at the most, and probably closer to 20 percent.  128  As one 
voter said, “I voted for Mečiar. Lots of people voted for Mečiar. But they 
defi nitely did not vote for a split.”  129  Indeed, polls showed that small major-
ities in both regions favored a solution other than secession, though a 
majority of Slovaks did desire greater distance from the Czechs, possibly in 
a confederal state.  130  However, this opposition to the split was mostly silent, 
with civil society not deeply established and formal mechanisms for dis-
sent not in place. As such, common people against the split resigned them-
selves to their lack of infl uence and delegated all decision-making to Klaus 
and Mečiar.  131  Both Klaus and Mečiar had personal agendas too, eager to 
exercise power and be “masters of their own domain.”  132  
 Though the negotiation took place between “two tough-minded guys,” 
it was carried out in a “calm, civic way.”  133  At bottom, the issue was that 
each side’s most preferred option for the future direction of the state—the 
Czechs preferred a strongly centralized unitary state, the Slovaks a loose 
confederation—were directly opposed. However, each side’s second-most 
preferred option was the same: the dissolution of the state.  134  A strategy of 
“negotiations and concessions” saw the two leaders reconcile themselves 
to a split, pledging to ensure its peacefulness. The timetable for dissolu-
tion was laid out in advance, with three agreements signed on July 23, 
August 26, and October 6, each of which dealt with the particulars of the 
divorce.  135  Finally, the Czechs and Slovaks peacefully separated at midnight 
on December 31, 1992. Hilde’s succinct summation of the divorce is well-put: 
“The problem of fi nding a new model for the common Czech and Slovak 
state, while at the same time reforming not only the economy but the whole 
of society away from the socialist model, proved to be too heavy a burden.”  136  
 external insecurity:  conspicuous by its absence 
 There were a number of reasons the split between the Czech and Slovak 
ethnic groups was as peaceful as it turned out. One central factor was the 
benign regional environment that the state found itself in.  137  In the lead-up 
to the Velvet Divorce, external security considerations were simply not a 
signifi cant part of the calculus of the main players, especially on the Czech 
side.  138  As Kraus notes, “The sense of euphoria surrounding the altogether 
unexpected collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War tempo-
rarily eliminated any sense of external threats to Czechoslovakia.”  139  Inter-
views of former diplomats; political offi cials; Czech, Slovak, and Western 
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academics; and other observers of the region unanimously confi rm that 
security issues were neither discussed by the principals nor a major con-
cern during the negotiations to split the country.  140  
 There were two elements that encapsulated the shifting geopolitics of the 
region. First, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the entry of a unifi ed Germany into NATO, and the signing of the Maas-
tricht Treaty brought about a pervasive optimism in the region, and espe-
cially in central Europe. For this region, the dominant notion that suffused 
this period of European integration was that outside threats were dimin-
ishing and that there was little reason to worry about borders.  141  In Czecho-
slovakia, Soviet troops as part of the Warsaw Pact were removed in a matter 
of months—unlike in places such as Poland, where the process took years—
supplementing the feeling of the “return to Europe” that was the main 
driver of Czech behavior. With the Czechs’ erstwhile major threat, the 
Soviet Union, no longer on the map, alongside the unifi cation of Germany, 
the Czechs’ security environment represented a sea change.  142  Three-fi fths 
of their borders were suddenly with German-speaking Europe, with which 
the Czechs felt a closer cultural affi nity, as well as buffers in the form of 
Slovakia and Ukraine between it and the still-transitioning Russia. In fact, 
the environment had changed to such an extent that the major threat the 
Czechs faced from the east involved further unrest in, and disintegration 
of, the Russian state, following the putsch attempt against Yeltsin, rather 
than a military assault from it.  143  Unlike in 1919, when the Czechs actually 
believed they were too small to survive in Europe on their own, there were 
no such concerns in the 1990s.  144  
 To the extent that any party was even slightly concerned about the 
external implications of separation, it was the Slovaks, not the Czechs. The 
active and anxious 600,000-large Hungarian minority in the Slovak lands, 
combined with the revanchist rhetoric of Hungary, whose leader loudly 
proclaimed that he was the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians—that 
is, Hungarians in both Hungary and Slovakia—and a dispute over a dam 
on the Danube, all constituted cause for concern, but certainly not to the 
Czechs.  145  To the contrary, Havel and Jiří Dienstbier, the Czech foreign min-
ister, believed so strongly in their external safety that they momentarily 
believed NATO would follow the Warsaw Pact into oblivion: the continent 
was safe, aside from the threat of instability from breakup of Soviet states.  146  
Perhaps the most revealing measure of how sanguine the Czechs were 
about the security environment were the drastic cuts in its armed forces: 
before the divorce, the united state had a military of 200,000, while the 
independent Czech Republic’s army was a tenth of that size.  147  
 Second, and relatedly, the Czechs were eager to turn to the west politi-
cally, economically, and socially. A senior Foreign Ministry offi cial put it 
simply as the divorce was being fi nalized: “Eventual membership in the 
European Community is the No. 1 foreign policy objective of the Czech 
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Republic.”  148  Czechs saw themselves as integrated members of Western 
European culture—as one American diplomatic offi cial reminded me, 
Prague is further west than Vienna—and saw Slovaks as closer to Russia.  149  
A split would leave most of the Czech Republic bordering German-speaking 
Europe, while Slovakia would continue to share 90 percent of its borders 
with other Visegrad group states (Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary).  150  
More important than social-cultural divisions, the Czech leadership, espe-
cially the so-called Chicago school economist Klaus and his promarket 
allies, saw their future in the EU and in Western institutions and markets 
more generally.  151  Slovaks, at least those such as Mečiar, saw them them-
selves tied to Russia, not least because of signifi cant gas and oil imports 
from there,  152  and were more skeptical of Klaus’s “shock-treatment” market 
reforms. 
 This goal of “Returning to Europe,” was, according to Czech scholars, 
not conducive to an escalation of political violence.  153  For their part, Western 
institutions such as NATO organized training programs for military, civil-
ians, and parliamentarians, and extended aid.  154  As part of these efforts, 
NATO extended assurances to the new states about their future security, 
especially regarding territorial defense.  155  Former NATO offi cials with 
extensive experience in Eastern Europe told me that the peaceful dissolu-
tion of Czechoslovakia “would have been a different story had both institu-
tions [NATO and EU] maintained closed doors. . . . If we didn’t have those 
institutions, I don’t think it would have ended up like it did, they were 
necessary but not suffi cient conditions for such a [peaceful] transition.”  156  
While one should not overstate the role of NATO—a former U.S. ambas-
sador to Slovakia with extensive experience in Czechoslovakia before the 
split told me that “we weren’t pushing them to join NATO” due to concerns 
about the reaction in Russia,  157  and some Czech leaders, as mentioned, 
thought NATO was on the way to being obsolete—it is fair to say the pull 
of the European Community, and European institutions more generally, 
rather than NATO specifi cally, exercised a signifi cant infl uence on the 
Czech leadership. 
 While the general regional security environment was unthreatening, 
what made the Velvet Divorce truly possible was the complete lack of 
dyadic threat a future Slovak state would pose to a future Czech one. For 
one thing, Slovakia would lack the capabilities to mount a serious threat to 
the Czechs, given the particulars of the separation agreement. Specifi cally, 
discussions in the lead-up to the divorce suggested that federal assets 
would be distributed territorially—in this case, possession was 100 per-
cent of the law—while all other assets would be divided in a 2:1 ratio 
favoring the Czechs, in proportion to their population advantage. From a 
military point of view, this would be wholly benefi cial to the Czechs, since 
80 percent of military assets were located on their territory.  158  Additionally, 
it was not just quantity but quality of hardware that was crucial. At the 
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time of the separation, “roughly 95 percent of all Czechoslovak combat 
aircraft were still deployed in Czech lands, and the only planes based in 
Slovakia were some obsolete MiG-21s. All the federal army’s antitank heli-
copters were deployed in Bohemia, as were 70 percent of its main battle 
tanks and armored combat vehicles, including all modern ones. Moreover 
the Czech Republic was well protected by a mix of short-, medium-, and 
long-range air defense missiles, whereas Slovakia was only partly cov-
ered.”  159  The reason for this lopsided nature of military installments was 
that the Czechs were closer to the East-West dividing line in the Cold War, 
and as such, the best and most modern forces, equipment, and bases were 
stationed there. Slovakia would also have to start from scratch with respect 
to creating a defense ministry and a military command and organiza-
tion.  160  These terms were not especially appealing to the Slovaks, but they 
could object little under the circumstances.  161  Nor could they easily make 
up the difference in capabilities, given that their economic strength was 
well behind that of the Czechs, and the gap between them was only 
expected to grow after independence.  162  The only military advantage the 
Slovaks had over the Czechs was a more-than-proportionate share of the 
offi cer corps of the army,  163  but even here, the Slovak advantage was miti-
gated. During the split, many Slovak offi cers elected to stay in the Czech 
Republic, typifi ed by one Slovak offi cer explaining that, “I am neither a 
good Slovak nor a bad Slovak. I’m an army offi cer. My wife and children 
are Czech. It makes no sense for me to return to Slovakia.”  164  This position, 
shared by many of his colleagues, left the Slovak army, according to a 
former NATO offi cial, with “the B-team in terms of offi cer corps.”  165  
 More important than the imbalanced terms of divorce was the muted 
identity division between the Czechs and Slovaks. There was no history of 
violent confl ict between the two ethnic groups, no bloodthirsty calls for 
revenge for crimes past.  166  A  Washington Post  editorial captured this notion 
when it noted that “having had a very different history, Czechs and Slovaks 
will proceed differently from the way Serbs and Croats did. Yugoslav-style 
mayhem is not the danger in Czechoslovakia.”  167  Almost all my inter-
viewees cited a lack of historical enmity and violence between the Czechs 
and Slovaks, especially relative to other ethnic dyads in the region, as the 
primary cause of the peacefulness of the split.  168  In fact, by the standards of 
Eastern Europe, the two ethnic groups had fairly cordial relations. They 
were briefl y on opposite sides during World War II, when the Czech lands 
were occupied by Nazi Germany, while Slovakia was an independent state 
for the duration of the war under fascist Jozef Tiso, who hoped to win terri-
tory in the eventuality of a Nazi victory, but Slovaks’ uprising in 1944, 
which cost sixty thousand lives, “cleansed their soul.”  169  More important for 
our purposes, there were no mass atrocities akin to the Yugoslavian Croat-
Serb dyad during or after the war. That type of intense, inter-ethnic hatred 
simply did not exist in the Czech-Slovak case.  170  As one Slovak nationalist 
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said in the run-up to the 1992 elections, “Our sovereignty movement is like 
a grown-up son moving out and looking for his own apartment. It doesn’t 
mean he is angry with his parents. But he just wants to speak in his own 
name, have his own identity.”  171  Journalists reported that the general mood 
characterizing the 1992 election was “of passive anger rather than hys-
teria.”  172  This relatively muted history of confl ict translated into identity 
relations that were at worst “indifferent,” resulting in a sanguine outlook 
on the future by Czech leaders. The warm relations between the two inde-
pendent republics since, stretching to over two decades, confi rms the Czech 
prognosis.  173  
 Thus, when it came to both military capabilities and intentions, the Czechs 
had little reason to believe the Slovaks would prove a security problem in 
the future. Combined with the benign regional environment, this meant 
that security considerations were relegated to a tertiary—if that—concern 
for the Czechs, and economic and cultural considerations came to be domi-
nant.  174  My interviewees were unanimous that economic considerations are 
what drove the split for both sides: Klaus and the Czechs wanted “shock 
treatment” economic reforms, while Mečiar wanted a more gradual shift 
from a command economy. The Czechs felt that Mečiar and the Slovaks 
would slow the pace of reform. With that in mind, Czech leaders such as 
Klaus were not just tolerant of Slovak secession, but positively eager. They 
believed that economically speaking, they would be better off without the 
Slovaks than with them. They would no longer have to subsidize Slova-
kia’s weaker economy to the tune of $1 billion annually, about 7 percent 
of the national budget.  175  As Kramer notes, “Klaus’s determination to 
consummate the split as rapidly as possible in 1992 was based in part on 
his judgment that attempts to retain a unifi ed state would merely cripple 
his economic program and make Slovakia even more of an economic 
burden.”  176  The institutional makeup of the state, with ample veto points 
in the legislative process, shared equally between Czechs and Slovaks, jux-
taposed with the election results that gave right-of-center reformers power 
in one region but a former communist in another, meant that “almost no 
form of cohabitation [was] feasible.”  177  Moreover, the Czechs felt, correctly 
as it turned out,  178  that Mečiar’s authoritarianism would be problematic for 
admission to European institutions, and that this goal could be achieved 
more rapidly going alone. As a  Financial Times report summarized, “The 
likelihood is that the western Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, freed 
of the need to subsidize the economically weaker Slovakia, will now move 
faster on economic and other reforms. Such policies should allow them 
to fulfi l the preconditions for membership of the E[uropean] C[omission] 
while Slovakia, with its ineffi cient heavy industries, risks sliding backwards 
economically.”  179  An infl uential Prague weekly,  Respekt , printed a head-
line that captured the prevailing attitude: “Alone to Europe or together to 
the Balkans.”  180  
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 For the Czechs, then, Slovak demands for separation, far from repre-
senting a threat, were an opportunity to pursue political and economic 
goals that might not have been possible otherwise. To describe their 
response as sanguine would be understating it; they positively welcomed 
the chance to separate, once the Slovaks had set the process in motion. But 
this outcome was possible only because security concerns were taken off 
the table, in turn due to assessments of Slovak capabilities and intentions in 
the future. The existence of a benign security environment and the muted 
identity divisions between the two ethnic groups meant that the state could 
peacefully negotiate secession. 
 In addition to muted external security considerations, however, there 
were other factors at play that allowed for a peaceful split. Some interviews 
emphasized the importance of the Czech leadership and its enlightened 
character, especially when it came to Havel—“if he was [Slobodan] Milo-
sevic, you would’ve had confl ict”—and how drastically it differed from 
contemporary Eastern European politics.  181  These interviewees empha-
sized that, unlike in other parts of Eastern Europe, such as Poland, the 
revolution in Czechoslovakia was led by intellectuals based in Prague cof-
feehouses. These enlightened leaders yearned for democracy, “the institu-
tionalization of freedom” in their words, and sought to build “a democracy 
without adjectives.”  182  It is important, however, not to overstate the case 
for enlightened leadership playing a decisive role in the peacefulness of 
the split. Havel served more as a “guiding light” or a moral force and had 
“almost no infl uence” on actual events in 1992.  183  He did not get along with 
Klaus, who ensured that Havel was shunted from the negotiations. Addi-
tionally, he was considerably more popular in the Czech lands (and the rest 
of the world) than he was in Slovakia, whose heavy armaments industry 
suffered considerably from his dictum that the state, after the collapse of 
communism, would no longer be an exporter of arms.  184  Unlike Havel, the 
two personalities directly involved, Mečiar and Klaus, were not especially 
enlightened. Mečiar, while not a full-blown fascist, had rightist, “proto-
authoritarian” leanings; according to Western diplomatic offi cials, he was 
“a nasty piece of work” with a background in intelligence services. Mean-
while, Klaus, who in retrospect was just as authoritarian and nationalist 
as Mečiar, was an “egomaniac” similar to Donald Trump, according to 
a Western diplomatic offi cial.  185  The main difference between the two was 
that the people behind Klaus were not as uniformly authoritarian as those 
behind Mečiar.  186  Regardless, the decision makers involved in the split had 
more nationalistic, authoritarian tendencies than the coffeehouse intellec-
tuals that led the Velvet Revolution. 
 A factor probably more important than the leadership involved was the 
neat dividing line between the two groups, their “clear, undisputed fron-
tiers” in Martin Bútora’s words.  187  Several interviewees commented that 
there were “historical” borders between the Czech and Slovak lands; there 
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was no “fi ght for the furniture.”  188  Additionally, there were few ethnic 
enclaves left over, with Czechs being 1 percent of the population in the 
Slovak lands and Slovaks making up 4 percent of the population in the 
Czech lands. As such, there was no fear about the fate of conationals left 
behind an enemy state’s borders,  189  a fear much more strongly prevalent in 
the former Yugoslavia. The absence of these fears, and security fears more 
generally, allowed Czech leaders to accept territorial loss with little trepida-
tion, signing off on the country’s Velvet Divorce less than half a decade 
after its Velvet Revolution. 
 separation in scandinavia:  norway-sweden in 1905 
 After spending nearly a century together, Norway and Sweden separated 
into independent nation-states in 1905. Norway had been loosening the 
knot that bound the two for decades, and the early twentieth century saw it 
untied. Notably, it was a completely peaceful event. Though there was, tem-
porarily, a threat of military action by the Swedes, King Oscar and his gov-
ernment decided against the use of force, and Norway gained its statehood 
in a negotiated settlement. The separation is generally considered to be one 
of the very few cases of peaceful secession in the twentieth century.  190  
 While several idiosyncratic factors facilitated the peaceful dissolution of 
the Norway-Sweden union, limiting the number of generalized lessons we 
can draw from it, the case forms important material to test my argument 
because we have so few cases of a state employing a “negotiations and con-
cessions” strategy against secessionism. Can my theoretical claim, that 
states will adopt peaceful methods against separatists only when they are 
unconcerned about future war, be sustained given the evidence from events 
in Scandinavia in 1905? For instance, we would have cause for concern if 
Sweden’s peaceful response to Norway’s demands for independence took 
place amidst intense interstate rivalry or a militarized history between the 
two peoples. To the contrary, as I detail below, the muted nature of geopo-
litical competition in the region, along with Norway’s pledge to demilita-
rize its border and raze its forts, helped create the structural conditions—a 
sanguine sense of external threat—under which Sweden felt assured acqui-
escing to territorial loss. 
 The story of the Norway-Sweden union began in 1814, after the Napole-
onic wars. For more than four centuries, Norway had been part of Den-
mark, but that arrangement came to an end when Denmark foolishly 
dragged the union into the Napoleonic wars and declared war against 
Sweden. Norway consequently had to face an onslaught from a much 
stronger Sweden, which it did a fair job of repelling, despite worse military 
equipment and training. At the same time, Sweden lost a third of its terri-
tory to Russia in 1809, including Finland, setting off panic in Sweden about 
its vulnerability. The Swedes deposed their king and joined the alliance led 
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by Britain and Russia, which defeated France in 1812. In return for its help 
in victory, Sweden’s two great power allies agreed that Sweden should get 
compensation for its loss of Finland. Relatedly, Sweden’s military threat-
ened Denmark and requested that Norway be handed over to it. Owing to 
its weakness, Denmark agreed and gave Norway to Sweden by the Treaty 
of Kiel on January 14, 1814.  191  
 As was standard practice in the high politics of warfare and territorial 
exchanges in contemporary Europe, nobody had bothered to ask Norway 
whether it wished to be part of this union. This was especially important 
because the timing of the transfer took place just as nationalism was begin-
ning to take root and spread on the European continent.  192  Norway would 
have much rather been independent, or at the very least enjoyed more 
autonomy than it did under Denmark. Negotiations to that end led to a 
standoff, which in turn resulted in a short, sharp military battle, in which 
Sweden asserted its superiority. Along with military dominance, Sweden 
also enjoyed the support of Russia and Britain. Mindful, however, of main-
taining goodwill with the people it aimed to assert sovereignty over, 
Sweden pressed for a negotiated settlement early in the confl ict, and 
Norway fi nally relented. On August 30, 1814, the union between Sweden 
and Norway was established by the Treaty of Moss, with its designated 
head of state the king of Sweden.  193  
 Union wasn’t easy. It took until 1875 for the two political units to share a 
common currency and coinage. Their bodies of law were distinct, despite 
sharing ancient foundations. Their economies were so similar that their pri-
mary trade partners were other states in Europe, not each other. The two 
units had a common foreign policy, it is true, as well as cooperation in areas 
such as railroads, communication, and shipping, but most other instru-
ments and levers of power were located at the state level, including legal 
supremacy, budgetary decisions, trade policy, citizenship, civil service, 
ministries, and the courts.  194  That said, autonomy had limits, given that 
“the acts of the Norwegian parliament would require approval of the 
Swedish King-in-Council.”  195  Overall, Norway resisted attempts aimed at 
greater political integration, such as plans for a confederal legislature in the 
1850s or closer cooperation in 1871.  196  Most important, the two units 
retained independent militaries.  197  This would have important conse-
quences when push came to shove at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, as we shall soon see. 
 the prelude to dissolution 
 The main issue dividing Norway and Sweden was the former’s lack of 
separate consular services, and more generally, where constitutional and 
legal control of diplomatic and consular offi cials within the union would 
lie. Norwegians believed that their shipping and trade interests were 
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misrepresented by Swedish consuls, who were biased in favor of Sweden,  198  
an important concern given Norway’s “growing merchant marine, which 
by the late nineteenth century was far larger than Sweden’s and heavily 
engaged in the carrying trade between foreign ports. There were differ-
ences as well between Norwegian and Swedish trade policies, especially 
when Sweden in 1888 established protective tariffs while Norway con-
tinued to favor free trade.”  199  The issue was not just economic but also sym-
bolic, given foreign affairs was the area in which Sweden exercised power 
over Norway most clearly.  200  
 Matters escalated in 1892. The Norwegian minority government, led by 
the Conservative Party and Emil Stang, reached an agreement with the 
Swedes on the larger question of representation in foreign policy. The deal 
would leave the nationality of the foreign minister undefi ned—but assumed 
to be Swedish—and would make him responsible to a union council fea-
turing three Norwegians and three Swedes. The compromise, however, 
was not satisfactory to the so-called pure wing of Venstre Party, the most 
radical party in Norway at the time. Venstre leaders such as Wollert Konow 
and Carl Berner unequivocally rejected the agreement. The Storting, Nor-
way’s legislature, passed a resolution that proclaimed “Norway’s right to 
safeguard its foreign affairs in a constitutionally adequate manner.” Stang 
interpreted the resolution as a vote of no confi dence and resigned, and in 
his place the Swedish King invited the radical Venstre to form the new gov-
ernment led by Johannes Steen. Upon assumption of power, Steen and the 
radicals, supported by the moderates and the conservatives, passed a reso-
lution in the Storting that asserted its right to legislate on a Norwegian con-
sular system, voted in a law for separate consuls, and appropriated 
budgetary funds for their functioning. Such a unilateral move was 
anathema to King Oscar, who was aware that the Swedish cabinet would 
resign if he countenanced the developments taking place in Norway. The 
king predictably vetoed the resolution, which in turn led to resignations 
from Steen and his fellow ministers, kicking off a three-year political crisis 
that lasted until June 1895.  201  
 What helped end the crisis was the threat of military action by Sweden. 
In February 1895, the Riksdag, Sweden’s legislature, almost unanimously 
rejected Norway’s consular service demands. More ominously, the king 
called a meeting of the Secret Committee, which had last been brought 
together during the Crimean war. Military supplies for unspecifi ed pur-
poses were voted for, and we know now that the Swedish General Staff had 
detailed plans prepared for moves against Norway. It was evident that 
Sweden was sending a message, and by June 1895, Norway received it. The 
Storting, in a lopsided 90–24 vote, called for a reopening of negotiations on 
the matter.  202  
 There is little doubt that Norway’s relative military backwardness was 
the main cause of its retreat.  203  With the memory of its acquiescence to 
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perceived Swedish bullying in sharp relief, Norway went about modern-
izing and improving its military capabilities. More attention, and money, 
was budgeted for the army. The navy was updated, including the purchase 
of warships. Norway also built fortresses along its southeastern border 
with Sweden and stockpiled munitions.  204  
 norway and sweden go their separate ways 
 A crisis remarkably similar to the one from 1892 to 1895 took place in 
1905, but with a dramatically different result: Norway’s independence. 
 Just as in the 1890s, the main issue was whether Norway would enjoy 
separate consular representation. There was initial promise in working out 
a compromise between the two hardened positions, as Sigurd Ibsen, son of 
the well-known playwright, put together a plan for separate consular estab-
lishments under one single diplomatic staff for two kingdoms. A joint com-
mission was put into place—itself an advancement after Norway’s 
insistence in the mid-1890s that there was nothing to negotiate—and there 
was genuine promise in the commission’s deliberations. It all came crashing 
down, however, when Swedish premier E. G. Boström played spoiler by 
inserting six clauses in a prospective agreement that would have confi rmed 
Norway’s dependent position in the union in 1904.  205  
 On February 7, 1905, the Joint Cabinet recognized the failure of the nego-
tiations, and the Norwegian coalition government, which had been elected 
on a platform to negotiate, was disbanded. According to one contemporary 
observer, Norwegian anger was widely palpable, and citizens were “united 
with a determination to repudiate every Swedish encroachment.”  206  In mid-
March, a new coalition government led by Christian Michelsen took charge 
and displayed its resolve immediately. The Storting once again passed a 
resolution calling for the establishment of a separate consular service, 
knowing full well that the king, as in 1892, would veto it. Sure enough, he 
did, and in a prearranged move, the entire Norwegian cabinet resigned en 
masse. The king refused to accept the mass resignations, since a replacement 
government could not be formed.  207  The Norwegians went ahead with their 
fi nal step, which included the Storting unanimously resolving to dissolve 
the union, owing to “the king’s ceasing to function as king of Norway.”  208  It 
was a bold and provocative step, Norway’s secessionist moment. 
 At this juncture, Sweden faced a choice: to use coercion or not. Norway 
had, after all, just unilaterally declared itself free of the Swedish king’s sov-
ereignty. Sweden did temporarily consider military action to keep the union 
alive, but thought better of it. Crown Prince Gustav summed up the pre-
vailing attitude in Sweden, arguing that “Sweden should herself propose a 
divorce rather than to be, so to speak, kicked out of the union.”  209  The Rik-
stag followed suit and accepted the dissolution of the union, so long as 
Norway met four conditions.  210  
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 Two of these conditions had more to do with Sweden’s pride than any-
thing else: it demanded that Norway hold a plebiscite on the question of 
independence—to ascertain that it was truly what the people wanted, and 
not merely a product of the machinations of politicians—and that Norway 
submit itself to bilateral negotiations without any reference to the unilateral 
actions taken earlier. The third related to organizing a conference that dealt 
with the logistics of the separation, including access to transfrontier water-
courses and guarantees for the unimpeded migration of the nomadic 
Lapps. The fourth was the most important, and most interesting for our 
purposes. It called for the demilitarization of the border zone up to ten kilo-
meters, as well as the destruction of all the Norwegian forts on the border.  211  
Ultimately, Norway came to accept each of these demands, and though 
hard feelings lingered on both sides, there was also a great deal of relief. By 
the fall of 1905, the disunion was fi nal, and Norway was an independent 
state, all down to Sweden adopting “negotiations and concessions” as a 
strategy at Norway’s secessionist moment. 
 sweden’s sanguine summation of its security 
 This case highlights and illustrates certain important aspects of the theory 
I proffer in this book. First and most important, a completely peaceful 
secession such as the Norway-Sweden dissolution could take place only in 
a very benign security environment. The region was not a battleground for 
power politics; as Parent puts it, “Sweden and Norway generally stayed 
out of world politics, and world politics generally returned the favor.”  212  
Throughout the nineteenth century, Scandinavia was involved in “very 
little international confl ict . . . from 1864 to 1914, Sweden and Norway were 
not involved in any notable international incident; the union hardly had a 
foreign policy.”  213  For the most part, Sweden assumed a position of neu-
trality in intra-European affairs.  214  As such, it is reasonable to assert that 
Sweden had little to fear from rapacious European powers when it came to 
the security consequences of losing substantial territory. Moreover, in the 
same year as the disunion, the great powers’ focus was on other matters, 
most notably the fallout from the Russo-Japanese war as well as burgeoning 
colonial rivalries in Morocco.  215  The overall external environment, from 
Sweden’s perspective, was benign, thus affording it greater latitude in its 
dealings with Norwegian nationalism. 
 Second, it is instructive that Sweden did not reconcile itself to a peaceful 
split until after it attained guarantees regarding the status of the forts 
Norway had constructed on the border. Lindgren describes the forts’ 
importance, noting that “their thin line of guns and masonry walls pointed 
directly into Sweden from the sea on the south to almost the sixty-fi rst par-
allel north of Hamar. They barred Swedish armies from a direct attack on 
Oslo and could be breached only by fi erce fi ghting and heavy losses of 
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men.”  216  Indeed, one contemporary media report conveyed that the destruc-
tion of Norway’s forts was the central Swedish concern during negotia-
tions.  217  The Swedish demand to raze the forts directly stems from the 
commitment problem that makes granting statehood such a thorny propo-
sition: a host state needs to be confi dent that the separatists will not turn its 
new guns on it for it to consider concessions that could ultimately lead to 
letting go of its territory. 
 On the other hand, while confi dence that its future security would not be 
violated set the stage for Sweden’s response, there were additional causes 
for the peacefulness of the split. One factor unique to the Scandinavian case 
was the relatively weak political and administrative ties between the two 
units, which made the split more acceptable than it otherwise would have 
been. More important, the fact that each side had its own military was cru-
cial in Sweden acquiescing to territorial loss. The was because as scholars 
almost unanimously point out, Sweden did briefl y consider military action 
to keep the union alive, but backed off, in part owing to little chance for 
long-term military and political success.  218  It is important to underscore 
why exactly Sweden’s prospects for military success were not assured. As 
mentioned above, Norway spent the decade before the 1905 crisis revamping 
and modernizing its military capabilities. It raised loans to build its two 
fi rst ironclad warships and constructed additional forts on its coasts. It also 
budgeted more money for annual military purchases and stockpiled muni-
tions. By strengthening its defenses before moving for disunion, Norway 
ensured that an invasion by Sweden would not result in an easy Swedish 
victory. While helpful to its cause in the immediate term, this military 
strength would have posed a problem for Norway’s demands for indepen-
dence had it not been accompanied by credible assurances that Sweden 
would not fall victim to it in the future. Norway had to thus reassure 
Sweden, explaining its decision to destroy its forts along the border. 
 The American Civil War 
 Perhaps no secessionist war has been studied as much as the U.S. Civil War. 
It is the only confl ict in this book that has entire academic journals dedi-
cated to its study.  219  Interestingly, despite this attention, and notwith-
standing some notable exceptions, little research has focused explicitly on 
the role of external security in the U.S. Civil War. This probably has some-
thing to do with the paucity of international relations specialists among the 
vast legions of scholars who have studied the confl ict. It is not as if the 
question is immaterial or uninteresting; when I fi rst began researching 
the material for this book and presenting my fi ndings to scholarly audi-
ences, I would regularly hear from American (and American-based) ques-
tioners: does your theory have anything to say about our Civil War? 
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 The fi ner details of the U.S. Civil War have been more than adequately 
addressed in the voluminous literature devoted to it. Of particular concern to 
me is fi rst, why the North did not let the South secede, and second why 
Lincoln changed his preferred policy of dealing with Southern secessionists, 
from advocating patience and a blockade, to a military strike at Bull Run in 
the summer of 1861.  220  The escalation to a “militarization” strategy, taking 
place between April and June of 1861, necessitated both sides raising massive 
armies—a million men for the unionists, 400,000 for the Confederates—and 
laid the groundwork for a long, bloody war.  221  In other words, understanding 
this decision holds great import for understanding why the Civil War devel-
oped as it did, or even why a civil war erupted in the fi rst place. 
 As I argue below, one of the main reasons Northern leaders could not 
countenance the Confederacy was that they were concerned about the 
future balance of power on the American continent if their state divided, 
and were especially wary of an expansionist Britain taking advantage of 
competition between the Union and an independent Confederacy. Though 
there were assuredly other factors responsible in Lincoln’s refusal to let the 
south secede, external security was foremost amongst them. Furthermore, 
when it comes specifi cally to Lincoln’s escalation at Bull Run, recent IR 
scholarship has shown that its timing was aimed at forestalling British rec-
ognition of, and material support to, the Confederacy. The mere threat of 
third-party support, rather than its delivery, prompted Lincoln to escalate, 
an interesting application of my theory. 
For our purposes, this case is signifi cant because it shows the power of 
my argument for explaining events and processes in unlikely situations, 
which in turn can lead to greater confi dence in the underlying mechanisms. 
Strictly speaking, the U.S. Civil War was neither ethno-nationalist in nature 
nor did it take place in the twentieth century, which goes against the grain 
of other confl icts studied in this book. However, if external security consid-
erations, including fears of the future balance of power and third-party 
support behind the secessionists, were operative in an episode that looks 
superfi cially different to the others under investigation, we can be more 
secure that, in general, internal policies are often determined by events and 
phenomena outside the state. The U.S. Civil War is generally thought to be 
the product of slavery, political economy, and “state’s rights,” but the evi-
dence suggests that foreign relations and external security had an impor-
tant role to play in the crisis. 
 the secessionist crisis  and its escalation 
 The United States was less than one hundred years old when it plunged 
into a secessionist crisis in the second half of the nineteenth century. Unlike 
all the episodes of secessionism covered in this book, the U.S. Civil War was 
not strictly ethnically based. Indeed, the United States was probably at its 
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most homogenous, ethnically speaking, on the eve of its Civil War.  222  That 
said, its similarity to other crises covered lies in its decidedly regionalist 
nature; it is sometimes hard to tell when region-based grievances end and 
where ethnic-based grievances begin, given ethnic groups’ proclivity to 
gather within certain territories.  223  
 In this particular case, the regional divisions that marked the country 
were primarily economic, and later, social. The South’s was a primarily 
export-based economy, the Northwest grew and supplied food, and the 
Eastern and Middle States constituted the country’s commercial and manu-
facturing base.  224  This economic regionalism resulted in a “natural” diver-
gence of interests: the South opposed tariffs, given its reliance on trade, 
while the North and West supported them. The South was against the use 
of public funding to expand transportation and communication networks, 
the landlocked North naturally disagreed. The South did not favor central 
banking, as opposed to the North, which housed the centers of capital.  225  
 Most of all, the people of the North had very different views on slavery 
than those of the South, and these differences had only been widening since 
the beginning of the century.  226  As the United States aggressively expanded 
its territory at a dizzying rate—from 890,000 to 3 million square miles of 
land, and a sixfold population increase between 1790 and 1850—the ques-
tion of whether slavery would be expanded to the new territories suddenly 
brought tension to the fore.  227  Would the United States be a country that 
had legal slavery or not, and if so, to what geographic extent would it be 
legal? 
 The 1860 election brought into sharp relief the different values, interests, 
and ideologies of the two parts of the country.  228  The Republican candidate 
for president, Abraham Lincoln, was understood to oppose slavery, the 
exact issue with which Southern separatism was inextricably bound up. 
Southern states deemed Lincoln’s election the last straw, their collective 
sentiment captured well by one Georgia editor: “The election of Lincoln is 
merely the confi rmation of a purpose which the South had hoped would be 
abandoned by the opponents of slavery in the North. It is a declaration that 
they mean to carry out their aggressive and destructive policy, weakening 
the institution at every point where it can be assailed either by legislation or 
by violence, until, in the brutal language of [Senator] Charles Sumner, ‘it 
dies like a poisoned rat in its hole.’”  229  
 Southern nationalism did not exist as anything other than opposition to 
the North—cultural affi nity and shared practices notwithstanding—but 
given the import of the slavery issue, it need not have.  230  The economic 
implications of slavery and abolition were considerable enough; as one 
contemporary writer noted, “It was not safe to trust eight hundred million 
dollars’ worth of Negroes in the hands of a power that says we do not own 
the property, that the title under the Constitution is bad, and under the law 
of God still worse.”  231  The people in slaveholding states were determined 
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to defend slavery and “force the Yankees to recognize not only their rights 
but also their status as perfectly decent, respectable human beings.”  232  
Simply put, if slavery was not welcome in the Union, then the Union was 
not welcome in the South. 
 When elected, Lincoln claimed that he did not wish to eradicate slavery 
where it existed, only that he would not permit its expansion, but this did 
not convince the South, nor did it address the South’s biggest grievance, 
which was the Northern refusal to return fugitive slaves.  233  Southern whites 
could not fathom a world in which black Americans were free: there were 
far too many of them to deport, and the idea that they could physically stay 
in their midst while not being servile was anathema.  234  These differences 
meant that, functionally speaking, only two out of three goals—peace, 
union, and abolition—could be reached simultaneously. The South chose 
slavery over union, when on March 4, the six most southern states voted to 
secede.  235  A civil war seemed to be in the offi ng when Southern soldiers 
fi red on and took over Fort Sumter in South Carolina in April. At this seces-
sionist moment, the North had to decide whether it valued peace more than 
the Union. 
 the northern response 
 Abraham Lincoln had some decisions to make.  236  Lincoln cared, or 
seemed to care, a great deal more about the union than abolition. In other 
words, his priority appeared to be maintaining the territorial integrity of the 
United States, not necessarily fi delity to particular principles. “My para-
mount objective,” he said, “is to save the Union and it is not either to save or 
to destroy slavery. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because 
I believe it helps save the Union, and what I forbear, I forbear because I do 
not believe it would help to save the Union.”  237  At another point, Lincoln 
was explicit about his hierarchy of preferences: “My paramount object in 
this struggle  is  to save the Union, and is  not  either to save or to destroy 
slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing  any  slave I would do it, 
and if I could save it by freeing  all  the slaves I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that.”  238  
 Indeed, Lincoln’s antislavery stance did not extend into warm feelings 
for American blacks. Lincoln had been a career “colonizationist,” which 
meant that he favored deporting masses of emancipated slaves to other 
parts of the world because, as he told a delegation of Negroes in 1862, “it is 
better for us to be separated.”  239  His reasoning was that “We have between 
us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. 
Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this physical difference 
is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your [black] race suffers very 
greatly, many of them by living among us, while ours suffer from your 
presence. In a word we suffer on each side. If this is admitted, it affords a 
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reason at least why we should be separated.” This was perhaps an unsur-
prising position for a politician who believed of blacks that “not a single 
man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours.”  240  
 The bottom line is that secession would not be allowed. Lincoln’s imme-
diate response to Southern secessionism was marked by caution,  241  
employing a wait-and-see policy on how to deal with the crisis in general 
and the Southern assault on Fort Sumter in South Carolina in particular. 
Republicans in the North were internally divided on these questions, with 
four positions taking hold: hardliners wished for a more coercive response 
from Washington, moderate Republicans emphasized the law-and-order 
aspects of Southern secessionism, “conciliationists” argued that the North 
should grant certain concessions so that the forces of disunion would be 
weakened in the less polarized states of the Upper South, while a nontrivial 
minority supported peaceful disunion.  242  In the early months of 1861, con-
gressional Republicans mainly supported the conciliatory position, hoping 
to internally divide the South.  243  Lincoln had to balance fi rmness and mag-
nanimity; he had to encourage Southern unionism while not providing fur-
ther fuel for secessionists, all the while keeping his own party united and 
focused. His main objective in the early stages of the crisis was to play 
for time.  244  
 Lincoln displayed this moderate strain in his inaugural address. He reit-
erated that he had no intention of threatening slavery in states where it was 
already legal, that the government did not have the ability to stamp it out 
even if he personally wanted to, and that his utmost concern was main-
taining constitutional rights and laws, such as the return of fugitive slaves, 
collecting import duties, delivering mail, and defending public property. 
He claimed that such actions would not represent taking the fi ght to 
Southern secessionists, but rather constituted self-defense. He closed mem-
orably: “In  your hands, my fellow countrymen, and not in  mine , is the 
momentous issue of civil war. . . . You can have no confl ict, without being 
yourselves the aggressors, with  you , and not with  me , is the solemn ques-
tion of “Shall it be peace, or a sword?”  245  
 Meanwhile, by the end of February, the seceded states had taken over 
most federal property, had a written constitution, and a government.  246  Lin-
coln’s policy continued to be characterized by patience, believing that if he 
supplied enough rope to the secessionists, they would hang themselves,  247  
summing up his strategy thusly: “The power confi ded to me will be used to 
hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the govern-
ment, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be neces-
sary for these objects, there will be no invasion—no using of force against 
or among the people anywhere.”  248  Indeed, Lincoln continued to be concil-
iatory, and even softened the stance outlined in the inaugural address.  249  
These words, forswearing the use of force, represent Lincoln’s initial 
response to Southern secessionism, characterized by caution and prudence 
PEACEFUL AND VIOLENT SEPARATISM
205
within a law-and-order framework, and form the baseline against which 
we can judge later deviations from it. 
 disallowing secession and escalation: 
the british connection 
 Republicans grew increasingly impatient across the North. More cru-
cially, supplies at the captured Fort Sumter were running low, and the more 
immediate question became whether to evacuate the fort or to attempt sup-
plying it with provisions, almost assuredly baiting an attack.  250  In addition, 
by March, the fi rst Confederate tariff went into effect, lowering import 
duties and directly challenging Lincoln’s inaugural pledge to “collect the 
duties and imposts.”  251  By late March, onlookers were becoming anxious: 
when, and what, would Lincoln decide? His military advisers had sug-
gested evacuating the fort, and fi ve of his seven cabinet advisers concurred, 
including his closest adviser, Secretary of State William Seward.  252  Evacua-
tion was not such an easy call, however, because of the symbolism inherent 
in abandoning a fort “in the principal city of the most radical secessionist 
state,” South Carolina.  253  As time went on, the division became increasingly 
partisan.  254  
 By early April, Lincoln opted for resupplying the fort, which had predict-
able consequences: it came under attack, and on April 14, it was abandoned. 
Many historians consider the attack on the supply expedition to Fort 
Sumter as the beginning of the Civil War, but this emphasis is probably 
overstated. The three months following the Fort Sumter attack have been 
deemed a “phony war,” with both sides committed to essentially defensive 
military strategy, more hold than take. One important development in this 
period, however, was the formal institution of blockade by Lincoln, on 
April 16, a policy that had been much discussed.  255  
 It is Lincoln’s change of heart by late June, however, that really changed 
the trajectory of the confl ict. Now, rather than advocating stalling and delay, 
Lincoln chose a more aggressive strategy. On June 25 and 29, Lincoln sum-
moned his war council for a pair of meetings, organized to authorize an 
invasion of the South.  256  This escalation—from a purely defensive strategy 
resembling policing to a more aggressive militarization—would set the 
stage for the long, brutal war that was to follow. The question is: what 
caused it? More generally, why were Lincoln and his advisers against 
Southern secession? 
 While there were a number of factors that contributed to the Union disal-
lowing the South’s secession, concern about external security is an under-
appreciated one. Specifi cally, a divided America would shift the balance of 
power on the continent toward Britain. Suspicions abounded that the 
British, given their strategic location in Canada and the Caribbean, would 
be favorably predisposed to a division of the United States and a 
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reconfi guration of the balance of power on the continent.  257  In Seward’s 
words, “The new confederacy, which in that case Great Britain would have 
aided into existence, must, like any other new state, seek to expand itself 
northward, westward, and southward. What part of this continent or of the 
adjacent islands would be expected to remain in peace?”  258  This eventu-
ality, of an expansionist Confederacy locking horns over territory with the 
rump Union, would leave only one winner, geopolitically speaking: Britain. 
As one historian states, “British leaders welcomed the prospect of the per-
manent division of the vast territory of the United States between two 
nations” because it would eradicate the threat of American expansionism to 
Mexican independence and British rule in Canada.  259  Another scholar 
argues that it was a “popular” belief amongst the American leadership that 
Britain “would welcome the South into the family of nations as a strategic 
move designed to divide America and permit England to expand both 
above and below the republic” while encasing “the Union with a stronger 
Canada to the north and a Confederate friend to the South.”  260  The suspi-
cion was mutual: Britain considered the United States an aggressive, expan-
sionist power and held particular distaste for Seward, “a chauvinistic 
supporter of Manifest Destiny” and “foremost, an American imperialist,” 
who longed for the annexation British Canada.  261  
 Notably, the interpretation that Britain wished for a divided America for 
its geopolitical purposes was widely shared, with the Russian ambassador 
to London claiming that “at the bottom of its heart, [Britain] desires the 
separation of North America into two Republics, which will watch each 
other jealously and counterbalance one the other. Then England, on terms 
of peace and commerce with both, would have nothing to fear from either; 
for she would dominate them, restraining them by their rival ambitions.”  262  
As one historian notes, “In the earlier years of the war the collapse of the 
Union seemed at fi rst fi ght to offer considerable advantages and opportuni-
ties to Great Britain,” including “the most effective and permanent solution 
of all Britain’s diffi culties of defense and diplomacy in America. Palmerston 
himself had held up the prospect of ‘the Swarms [separating] from the 
Parent Hive’ as the one real consolation for an ultimate acquiescence in 
American expansion.”  263  In other words, the Northern leadership was 
acutely aware of the deleterious consequences of territorial loss for its 
future security, especially with regard to the future balance of power with 
Britain, and just as my theory would predict, acted to prevent a change in 
borders. 
 Consistent with this theme, there is good reason to believe that when 
escalating Northern strategy at Bull Run, Lincoln was guided by external 
factors relating to Britain and its relationship to the Confederacy. In partic-
ular, Lincoln and his advisers were concerned with the prospect of Euro-
pean, and especially British, recognition of the Southern separatists, which 
would strengthen the rebels’ resolve and possibly lead down the slippery 
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slope to military aid. Indeed, according to Poast, “Lincoln and his cabinet 
considered the possibility of British recognition to be  the primary threat 
facing the United States with respect to the secession crisis.” Furthermore, 
“key members of Lincoln’s cabinet believed and/or received credible infor-
mation that exercising force against the South could forestall such recogni-
tion” while “failure to act might lead the Europeans to perceive  de facto 
 Southern independence.”  264  If this argument is accurate, it suggests that 
external conditions were not just operative in Lincoln’s calculus, but cen-
tral to it. 
 To understand why the prospect of British recognition of the Confed-
eracy so concerned Lincoln and advisers, it is necessary to fi rst appreciate 
British incentives for supporting the South. Southern independence would 
not just shift the geopolitical balance of power in favor of Britain. The 
British also stood to gain economically from supporting the Confederacy, 
mainly due to its reliance on Southern cotton. Under normal conditions, 
the British, owing to their antislavery stance, could reasonably be expected 
to support the North over the South, and there was considerable evidence 
initially that Britain would side overwhelmingly with the forces arrayed 
against the slave trade—reportedly, Prime Minister Palmerston had read 
 Uncle Tom’s Cabin  three times and was vehemently antislavery.  265  However, 
Northerners themselves, including Lincoln, diminished the role slavery 
played in the crisis, so as to not alienate signifi cant numbers of racist 
Northerners, as well as Unionists in the South and the border states of 
Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri.  266  This rhetorical strategy—
emphasizing the sanctity of the Union and the need for law-and-order, 
rather than race or slavery as the guiding principles of Northern policy—
unwittingly let the British off the hook; no longer did they have to choose 
between moral and strategic considerations.  267  After all, if the Unionists 
themselves claimed the crisis was not about slavery, then the British were 
free to support the South over other principles, such as states’ rights,  268  as 
well as crasser, instrumental reasons. 
 These instrumental reasons boiled down to one issue: cotton. More than 
one-sixth of Britain’s population relied on the textile industry—“Lancashire 
depends on South Carolina,” in the words of the editors of  The Times— and 
over one third of its exports were directly tied to cotton.  269  American cotton 
fi rst gained a larger share of the European market than Indian cotton in 
1796, providing higher yields and proving easier to yarn, and cemented its 
dominance through the nineteenth century.  270  Southerners were not just 
aware of British dependence on their cotton, but eager to use it as leverage. 
This view came to be known as the “King Cotton” thesis and enjoyed wide-
spread acceptance and popularity, including among “operatives, manufac-
turers, merchants, government agents, prime ministers, all.”  271  In the words 
of South Carolinian James H. Hammond, “Without fi ring a gun, without 
drawing a sword, should they make war on us we could bring the world to 
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our feet. The South is perfectly competent to go on, one, two, or even three 
years without planting a seed of cotton. . . . What would happen if no cotton 
was furnished for three years? I will not stop to depict what every one can 
imagine, but this is certain: England would topple headlong and carry the 
whole civilized world with her, save the South. No, you dare not make war 
on cotton. No power on earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is king!”  272  
In December 1860, a week before South Carolina declared secession, Texas 
Senator Louis T. Wigfall agreed, boasting that “I say that cotton is King, and 
that he waves his scepter not only over these thirty-three States, but over 
the island of Great Britain and over continental Europe.”  273  Part of the 
South’s leverage came from the domestic political economy of both Britain 
and France, since each had substantial numbers of workers tied up in the 
textile industry, and these workers were “restless and rebellious and easily 
persuaded to revolution.”  274  More than 80 percent of Britain’s cotton supply 
emanated from the South and by May 1861, the South cut off cotton exports 
to Britain aside from Southern ports to demonstrate its standing. Luckily 
for Britain, it had a year’s supply in surplus, but the message was sent: 
“The vital interests of their empire would come into play in about a year’s 
time: Lancashire’s cotton mills could not run without cotton.”  275  
 These geopolitical and economic incentives for Britain to support the 
South caused Lincoln and his confi dantes, particularly Seward, to cast a 
wary eye across the Atlantic. They were apprehensive about the potential 
of Britain recognizing the Confederacy, both because it would provide 
legitimacy to the rebels and because it would open the doors for more 
explicit, material support, conceivably tipping the material balance in the 
South’s favor.  276  For instance, were the British to recognize the Confederacy, 
it would gain access to British ports and the right to negotiate military and 
commercial treaties. 
 As such, Lincoln and Seward’s overarching objectives during the seces-
sionist crisis were to prevent diplomatic recognition of Confederate inde-
pendence by European powers and to limit any form of European support 
for the Confederacy, material or otherwise.  277  As Seward wrote to U.S. Min-
ister in Britain, Charles Adams, “The agitator in this bad enterprise [seces-
sionism], justly estimating the infl uence of the European powers upon even 
American affairs, do not mistake in supposing that it would derive signal 
advantage from a recognition by any of those powers, and especially Great 
Britain. Your task, therefore, apparently so simple and easy, involves the 
responsibility of preventing the commission of an act by the government of 
that country which would be fraught with disaster, perhaps ruin, to our 
own.”  278  Seward also vociferously emphasized to diplomatic representa-
tives from other great powers, especially Britain, to not interfere in the 
crisis, to the point that his warnings were dismissed as “the rantings of a 
demagogue than as pleas for restraint and vision to preserve world 
peace.”  279  In correspondence to the U.S. minister in London, Seward wrote 
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that “I have never for a moment believed that such a recognition could take 
place without producing immediately a war between the U.S. and the rec-
ognizing power.” At another point he warned that “British recognition 
would be British intervention to create without our own territory a hostile 
state by overthrowing this Republic itself,” adding parenthetically that 
“when this act of intervention is distinctly performed, we from that hour, 
shall cease to be friends and become once more, as we have twice before 
been forced to be, enemies of Great Britain.”  280  To the U.S. minister in Paris, 
he struck a similar tone: “Foreign intervention would obligate us to treat 
those who yield it as allies of the insurrectionary party and to carry on the 
war against them as enemies.”  281  Regardless of their reception, Seward’s 
ideas, and his message to diplomatic offi cials in London, were clear: “Every 
instruction you have received from this department is full of evidence of 
the fact that the principal danger in the present insurrection which the Pres-
ident has apprehended was that of foreign intervention, aid, or sympathy; 
and especially of such intervention, aid, or sympathy on the part of the 
government of Great Britain,” adding that “foreign intervention, aid, or 
sympathy in favor of the insurgents, especially on the part of Great Britain, 
manifestly could only protract and aggravate the war.”  282  Meanwhile, 
Northern concerns about British support and recognition were matched by 
Southern obsession with securing it, for the same reasons that it was 
opposed by the Unionists: it could potentially tip the balance. Historians 
consider European recognition of Southern independence the “paramount 
Confederate foreign policy goal,” or “the Confederacy’s chief objective in 
foreign affairs,” especially during the fi rst two years of the war.  283  
 This, then, was the international context in the spring and summer of 
1861, with Northern decision makers aware that Britain would sooner or 
later have to pick a side.  284  Within that period, there were indications that 
Britain was indeed moving toward recognizing the Confederacy. First, the 
British pledged neutrality in the confl ict, which despite appearances, was 
not necessarily innocuous behavior: Charles Sumner, chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, classifi ed the proclamation as “the 
most hateful act of English history since the time of Charles 2nd.”  285  Neu-
trality so offended the North because it granted coequal belligerent status 
to the South—as opposed to “rebels” or “insurgents,” which is how the 
North preferred to refer to the Confederate states. As Seward said to 
Richard Lyons, British minister to the United States, “to us, the rebels are 
only rebels, and we shall never consent to consider them otherwise. If you 
wish to recognize their belligerent character, either by addressing an offi cial 
declaration to us, or by your actions, we shall protest and we shall oppose 
you.”  286  In addition, neutrality, and its attendant belligerent status, 
bestowed on the Confederacy advantages, including the right of its vessels 
to confi scate enemy goods, the right of entry to British ports with prizes 
from privateering, and the right to borrow money and buy material for its 
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armed forces as combatants rather than bandits.  287  Neutrality, the Unionists 
complained, “awarded stature and credibility to the Confederacy,” and was 
perceived as “the fi rst step in a process leading to recognition of Southern 
independence.”  288  Additionally, the method and timing of the declaration 
of neutrality—the day of Adams’s arrival in England, May 13, and without 
consultation, as had been previously agreed—was cause for chagrin.  289  As 
Adams delicately put it after his arrival, “The action taken seemed, at least 
to my mind, a little more rapid than was absolutely called for by the 
occasion.”  290  
 Second, British foreign secretary Russell announced a concert between 
Britain and France, pointedly without consulting the U.S. government, to 
arrange for a unifi ed position on the question of neutrality, raising the 
specter of a joint European intervention in North America by two states 
that already had considerable stakes on the continent. Indeed, France did 
not attempt to hide its eagerness to intervene in some way: Napoleon III 
wished for a stronger foothold in North America, and given the presence of 
not one but two civil wars on the continent—Mexico was also in the midst 
of internal confl ict, and was more vulnerable to foreign intervention given 
its indebtedness to European states—the time seemed ripe. France also had 
more reason to be concerned about the effects of a blockade: it received 93 
percent of its cotton from the South, with the corresponding fi gure for 
Britain at 80 percent.  291  The announcement of a joint policy did not please 
Union offi cials. As Seward put it to Adams on June 19, “When we received 
offi cial information that an understanding was existing between the British 
and French governments that they would take one and the same course 
concerning the insurrection which has occurred in this country, involving 
the question of recognizing the independence of a revolutionary organiza-
tion, we instructed you to inform the British government that we had 
expected from both of those powers a different course of proceeding.”  292  
 Third, Russell himself had agreed to meet representatives from the 
Confederacy and hear their case for recognition, albeit in an unoffi cial 
capacity, on May 4.  293  This meeting greatly angered Union offi cials; in a 
dispatch written by Seward but watered down by Lincoln and fi nally pre-
sented to Russell by U.S. minister in Britain Charles Adams, the British 
were told that even unoffi cial contacts with Confederate representatives 
would be cause for the termination of all diplomatic contact with 
London.  294  Seward wrote to Adams, noting fi rmly that “intercourse of any 
kind with the so-called commissioners is liable to be construed as the rec-
ognition of the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would 
be none the less hurtful to us for being called unoffi cial, and it might be 
even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what 
points might be resolved by it.”  295  
 It was under these circumstances that Lincoln decided to go on the offen-
sive, abandon his previous policy of patience and caution, and launch an 
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invasion of the South. As Poast argues, for Lincoln and his cabinet, “staving 
off foreign intervention required taking aggressive measures against 
Southern forces.”  296  The evidence for the claim that Lincoln’s escalation 
was catalyzed by the prospect of British interference is that, fi rst, Lincoln’s 
advisers who supported aggressive measures were cognizant of the threat 
of foreign recognition and explicitly cited it as a cause for more forthright 
policy in their communications on the issue. For instance, in April, Attorney 
General Edward Bates noted in his diary that the Union should choose 
aggression because the Southern states “warm up their friends and allies, 
by bold daring, and by the prestige of continued success—while we freeze 
the spirits of our friends everywhere, by our inaction and the gloomy 
presage of defeat.” The week before the attack on Manassas, he wrote to a 
friend, and once again, raised the importance of signals sent and received 
in foreign capitals: “Foreigners do not understand why we should allow a 
hostile army to remain so long almost in sight of the Capitol, if we were 
able to drive them off.” Similarly, General Scott argued that a more offen-
sive strategy would aid in forestalling recognition of the Southern govern-
ment abroad.  297  
 Second, the historical record shows that the British themselves would 
have been “impressed” with more aggressive action against the South. 
After a June 17 meeting with Seward, British minister Lyons wrote a letter 
to Russell in which he commented on the slow pace of Northern action—“if 
the advance is to go on the same rate, it will take about half a century to get 
on to Florida.”  298  The particulars of the meeting that led to this letter are 
suggestive. Given the widespread British belief that the use of force by the 
Union would command more respect across the Atlantic, and given that 
this letter was written immediately after meeting Seward, who “no doubt 
calculates upon the effect which may be produced upon the governments 
of Europe by the events of the Month,” according to Lyons, it is conceivable 
and perhaps even likely that Seward left the meeting all the more convinced 
that more aggression would quell the prospect of British recognition. 
 Third, while we lack direct knowledge of Lincoln’s thinking in the run-up 
to Manassas—primary evidence for Lincoln’s thoughts and beliefs is often 
found in the diaries of John Hay, his private secretary, but between May 12 
and August 22, Hay did not write anything because “the nights have been 
too busy for jottings”  299  —we do have on record his reaction to the conse-
quent defeat at Bull Run. Meeting with Senator Orville Browning after the 
defeat, Lincoln reported feeling “melancholy” on account of the fact that 
“they [Britain and France] were determined to have the cotton crop as soon 
as it matured” and that the British were “now assuming the ground that a 
nation had no right, whilst a portion of its citizens were in revolt, to close 
its ports or any of them against foreign Nations.” This deep concern over 
the foreign reaction to the defeat at Bull Run was cause for Lincoln’s con-
sternation for at least a year. Thus while we do not have direct evidence 
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connecting foreign intervention and the attack at Manassas in Lincoln’s 
mind, the circumstantial evidence is, at the very least, broadly suggestive 
that the signals sent to foreign capitals was one of the main reasons for 
choosing a more aggressive policy vis-à-vis the South.  300  Unfortunately for 
the Union, their forces were routed at Bull Run—“‘Bull’s Run’ should be 
known as Yankee’s Run,” in Palmerston’s memorable words. Yet despite 
the defeat, and further inquiries of the possibilities of formal recognition, 
the British did not change their position that the South had not yet won 
independence, and thus recognition would be imprudent.  301  
 I do not mean to suggest that the threat of foreign intervention was the 
 only  factor driving Lincoln and his cabinet to the attack at Manassas. It is to 
say, however, that the external security implications of Southern seces-
sionism were certainly operative in the decision-making calculus of fi gures 
such as Lincoln and Seward at this important juncture. Union offi cials were 
concerned about how British and French recognition could further aid the 
cause of the Confederate independence, an eventuality unacceptable to the 
Union’s future external security due to the intense power competition it 
would lead to on the continent, and instituted an escalation of Northern 
policy, with one eye fi xedly gazing across the Atlantic. This escalation led, 
in part, to a serious confl agration that claimed almost a million lives, but 
would keep the country united. 
 To the extent that Lincoln and his advisers were concerned about the 
prospect of a more evenly divided North America, whereby the United 
States would be one of two or even three equal powers rather than the 
regional hegemon, my theory can account for Northern opposition to 
Southern secessionism. Where the U.S. Civil War departs from my theory is 
that in this case, the host state opted for a harsher response against seces-
sionists to  preempt foreign support, rather than as a reaction to it. Further-
more, this case also draws into question my insistence (chapter 1) that 
material support, particularly in the form of arms and training, is more 
important than fi nancial support and certainly more important than diplo-
matic or political support. Indeed, this episode demonstrates that under 
certain conditions, the promise or execution of “mere” diplomatic support 
can be seen as the fi rst step on a slippery slope that ends in full-blown coop-
eration and can result in as aggressive a response as any other. This inter-
esting application of my argument in a case of secessionism that was neither 
strictly ethnic nor in the twentieth century therefore lends it greater cre-
dence overall, while also drawing into question the precise role of third-
party support. 
 In this chapter, I have endeavored to considerably broaden the sample of 
cases examined. I have shown that the lack of external security concerns, 
both dyadically and regionally, allowed Swedish and Czech leaders to treat 
Norwegian and Slovak separatism respectively with peaceful concessions 
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that ultimately led to secession in both cases. Conversely, serious concerns 
about what an independent Palestine would mean for its security have 
impelled Israel to use coercion against Palestinian nationalists. Even in the 
nonethnic case of the U.S. Civil War, worries about British aid to Southern 
secessionists resulting in an independent, expansionist Confederacy forced 
Union leaders to escalate at a crucial time in 1861. 
 The reputation argument would expect peaceful concessions in both the 
Sweden-Norway and Czechoslovakian cases, but for different reasons than 
mine: those states were both binational, leaving no other potential groups 
to deter. However, in my investigation, I was able to uncover little evidence 
of reputational concerns among Swedish or Czech leaders. Moreover, the 
problem with relying on binationalism is made clear when one considers 
the Israel-Palestine case and U.S. Civil War, where this argument would 
expect peace, in complete contradiction to events. 
 The veto-points argument explains important elements of the Velvet 
Divorce and Israel-Palestine cases: in the former, concessions to Slovaks 
were made more credible by the fact that the entire spectrum of the Czech 
body politic was behind them, while in the latter, Israel’s notoriously 
divided internal politics have meant right-wing parties can stall conces-
sions, especially in the aftermath of Oslo. It is less immediately clear what 
this argument can do to explain Swedish concessions to Norway and the 
U.S. Civil War, given that both saw highly centralized decision-making 
result in opposing reactions: peace in Scandinavia, war in North America. 
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 Conclusion 
 Security and Separatism in the Contemporary World 
 The Minsk agreements strain to contain violence in eastern Ukraine between 
Russia-backed separatists and government forces; Malay-Muslims in 
southern Thailand continue their armed struggle for independence, often 
enjoying sanctuary in Malaysia, Chinese leaders sternly warn a novice Amer-
ican president against even hinting at U.S. support for Taiwanese statehood; 
and against all odds, the Palestinians persist in their fi ght to win a state. 
Nationalist movements aimed at independence, and states’ often-violent 
suppression of such efforts, continue to be a regular feature of international 
politics. Interestingly, not all secessionist demands lead to violence—as 
evinced by the Velvet Divorce separating the Czech Republic from Slovakia, 
or the dissolution of the Scandinavian union between Norway and Sweden 
in 1905. Governments sometimes respond to separatism with negotiations 
and political concessions, even if they do not grant outright independence, 
avoiding the untold human suffering of civil war. At other times, they may 
resort to violence, but calibrate it to relatively low levels. At yet other times, 
states respond to separatism with genocidal repression. 
 Two decades after scholars, impelled by the horrors of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, fi rst began devoting systematic attention to secessionist ethnic 
confl ict, I remained deeply curious: what explains separatist violence? Why 
do some separatist movements encounter a state prepared to concede terri-
tory, while others result in them fi ghting tooth and nail? To address this 
puzzle, I focused on the state more than the secessionists, since the former’s 
material capabilities, and attendant leeway for action, is signifi cantly wider 
than the latter’s. I have argued that when confronted by an ethnic group 
seeking independence, a state’s response is determined by the external 
security implications of secessionism. 
 Specifi cally, whether a state coerces separatists rests on whether it fore-
sees war after the prospective border change, either against the newly 
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seceded state or existing rivals. In turn, whether a state fears future war 
depends on the identity relations between it and the seceding ethnic group, 
which guide its estimate of whether the new state will fi ght it after indepen-
dence, as well as war proneness of the regional environment, which helps it 
assess whether it will face predation from existing states. The possibility of 
future war worries states because they would face it as a relatively weaker 
actor; secession would have adversely affected its position in the interna-
tional balance of power. The balance with respect to the ethnic group would 
shift against the state because of the military, economic, demographic, and 
institutional benefi ts of statehood that would accrue to the separatists. The 
balance with respect to existing rivals would shift against the state because 
of its loss of territory and population. Such shifts render secession unpalat-
able from the state’s perspective, impelling it to coerce the separatists. Con-
versely, a confi dence that it will be free from interstate confl ict is a necessary 
condition for the state to adopt concessions, up to and including the 
granting of full independence. Such sanguinity about its security frees the 
state from conceptualizing border changes in wary or apocalyptic terms, 
and opens up the possibility for it dealing with the separatist movement 
peacefully. 
 If a state decides that it will use coercion, we are still left with the ques-
tion of how much violence the state employs. “Coercion,” after all, can 
mean anything from beating protestors with clubs to mass rapes and ethnic 
cleansing. In my argument, third-party support for the separatists deter-
mines the precise level of coercion, for both material and emotional rea-
sons. The transfer of the “technologies of rebellion,” especially the provision 
of military aid, training, and fi ghters, appreciably changes the capabilities 
of the separatist movement, forcing the state to escalate in its attempt to 
defeat it. Moreover, when separatists become tied to external rivals of 
states, they become susceptible to pathological levels of violence, fueled by 
a sense of collective betrayal among both leaders and security forces. 
 External security, then, drives whether, and how much, states coerce sep-
aratists. Such an argument stands in direct contrast to existing scholarship 
on the question of separatist violence, which exclusively focuses on factors 
within the state, such as its political institutions or demographic profi le. In 
turn, shining this light on the geopolitical implications of secessionism can 
prove useful to policymakers keen on avoiding, or at least mitigating, the 
gruesome violence that often accompanies the separation, or attempted 
separation, of states. Indeed, properly understanding the factors that cause 
some governments to address secessionist demands on the battlefi eld, as 
opposed to the negotiating table, is crucial to peace building. Such an 
understanding would allow interested parties to pursue strategies designed 




 Policy Implications of an External Security Theory of Separatist Confl ict 
 Although the international community is often reluctant to interfere in civil 
confl icts because of concerns about political and legal sovereignty,  1  my 
research suggests that the roots of fi ghting within countries often lie out-
side their borders. This implies that the international community can play a 
signifi cant role in these confl icts by allaying the fears of states facing sepa-
ratist movements and reassuring them of their security. 
 For instance, the international community can make the shift in the bal-
ance of power attendant with secessionism more palatable to the rump 
state by providing it defensive guarantees and pledging protection from 
its military rivals in the future. If the potential for external attack is what 
truly motivates decisions to react violently against secessionists, amelio-
rating such fears could translate to less violence and fewer deaths. The 
international community can tie the promise of security guarantees to 
good behavior in its dealings with the minority, as part of an explicit quid 
pro quo. For instance, if the United States had promised Pakistan consid-
erable military aid and a security partnership in 1971 to help it ward off 
the threat it perceived from India in return for a more measured and less 
violent policy against the Bengalis, we may never have witnessed the 
genocide that we did. Of course, counterfactuals are fraught with analyt-
ical danger, but the example is meant to be illustrative rather than conclu-
sive: the impulse should be directed toward assuaging the fears of the 
state experiencing secessionism. Along those lines, a further implication is 
that as a secessionist confl ict brews in a particular country, the interna-
tional community must restrain that state’s geopolitical rivals. These rivals 
must be encouraged to make explicit and credible guarantees that they 
will not join forces with the secessionists in any meaningful way, either 
today or in the near future. This will aid in placating the state and make it 
less fearful of “encirclement,” which often drives the most vicious of 
responses. It helps the Scots, for instance, that their secessionist moment 
has arrived at a time of historically unprecedented geopolitical calm for 
Britain, and that they are not explicitly allied to any of its rivals, such as 
Russia or China.  2  
 My research, then, is highly relevant to policymakers who wish to curtail 
civil violence. In a nutshell, I suggest that the international community 
must leverage the externally fueled motivations of central governments 
repressing secessionists.  3  It also implies that, as with most confl icts, the 
time to contain the violence is before it actually erupts: by guaranteeing the 
security of the state in the future, the international community can protect 
the potential victims of the state in the present. Indeed, diplomacy can often 
move slowly—too slowly—once a confl ict has broken out to do much good 
in the short term. The Rwandan genocide famously lasted only ten weeks. 
More perversely, any hint of help from the outside world during a confl ict 
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can, rather than help, ramp up the deadly violence a population faces, as 
chapters 2–5 showed. Outside intervention aimed at reducing violence has 
to walk a tightrope: it must be targeted at the state’s leaders, without giving 
the impression that it “sides” with the secessionists. Such a fi ne balance is 
easier struck before hostilities have commenced. 
 The overarching lesson of my work is: third-party involvement would be 
most useful in separatist confl icts if it is (a) early, before hostilities have 
taken place; (b) made contingent, such that exhortations for better treat-
ment of ethnic minorities goes hand in hand with security (and possibly 
other) cooperation with the host state, and (c) aimed at dissuading support 
for the movement by global or regional rivals of the host state. 
 Unfortunately, it is unlikely policies based on such analysis will be insti-
tuted. First and most obviously, states intervening in separatist confl icts 
have relatively little to gain by expending political, economic, or military 
capital for humanitarian ends. Conversely, states which intervene for irre-
dentist or opportunistic reasons have plenty to gain: the dismemberment of 
a rival and possibly the aggrandizement of territory. As such, if interven-
tion does arise in separatist disputes, it is unlikely to be aimed at the safety 
and security of the minority at risk; rather, it is more likely to be precisely 
the type of intervention that intensifi es violence. 
 Second, even if the international community could be convinced to inter-
vene on behalf a separatist minority at risk for purely humanitarian rea-
sons, it would be diffi cult to convince it to promise benefi ts for, rather than 
threaten action against, the states poised to coerce the movement. Providing 
security guarantees or military aid to such states could easily be perceived 
as being held for ransom, with the state holding a metaphorical gun to its 
minority’s collective head, demanding alliance benefi ts in return for not 
shooting. Why reward such behavior? On the other hand, recent research 
has demonstrated the benefi ts of outsider powers paying interstate rivals to 
stop fi ghting;  4  if the peace between Israel and Egypt is largely held together 
by the diplomatic equivalent of bribes, it is at least conceivable for such 
measures to succeed in civil confl icts. 
 Overall, then, separatist minorities are likely to have their troubles exac-
erbated, not mitigated, by outside powers. Contemporary South Asia, 
where half this book’s empirical material was drawn from, serves as an 
example. Two of the disputes discussed in chapters 2 and 3 have heated up 
recently: Kashmir and Balochistan. Kashmir has been site of widespread 
mobilization since 2009, refl ecting a groundswell of dissatisfaction with the 
Indian state that, for many locals and observers, recalls the mood in the late 
1980s. Tensions escalated further still in the summer of 2016, when Indian 
security forces killed Burhan Wani, a Hizbul Mujahideen “commander” 
known more for his social media presence than any military exploits. The 
resulting rallies and protests have seen the heavy deployment of pellet 
guns by Indian security forces, killing more than a hundred Kashmiris and 
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blinding over a thousand.  5  Newspapers have been shut down. Kashmir 
seems primed for exploding, leaving behind the relative two-decade calm 
brought by India’s brutal counterinsurgency from 1991 to 1995. Most dam-
agingly from the perspective of my argument, Pakistan’s desire to wrest 
control of it shows little abating. Pakistan’s support of militant groups such 
as Laskhar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, as well as incidents of cross-
border terrorism in Mumbai in 2008, or Pathankot and Uri in 2016, signals 
to the Indian state that in Jammu and Kashmir, it is not just facing a sepa-
ratist movement, but also a long-running interstate confl ict. In other words, 
the toxic mix of a separatist dispute supported by “high” third-party sup-
port appears a distinct, and worrying, possibility. 
 Balochistan, meanwhile, continues to see a simmering low-level war, 
featuring the Pakistani state’s security forces and intelligence agencies 
against Baloch nationalist groups, such as the BLA. Recent developments 
are foreboding. The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has publicly 
stated that his country will begin to support the Baloch movement more 
heavily, marking a signifi cant shift in their relationship (previously, most 
of the Baloch foreign support emanated from Afghanistan or, some allege, 
the Soviet Union). An Indian national, which India claims is a retired naval 
offi cer but Pakistan alleges is a spy working for India’s Research and 
Analysis Wing (R&AW), was recently arrested in Balochistan. One vivid 
illustration of India’s increasing forthrightness in the province is its 
granting Brahumdagh Bugti, an exiled leader of a Baloch nationalist orga-
nization, a passport and possible asylum. Such increased support spells 
trouble for Baloch nationalists as well as the Baloch population more gen-
erally, at least insofar as the heavy hand of the Pakistani state is concerned. 
Human rights activists and Baloch leaders might justifi ably claim that 
Pakistan is already quite vicious toward its Baloch citizens. My only point 
is that it could assuredly get a lot worse—just ask the Bengalis—and 
indeed will most likely do so, at least if the present trajectory of Baloch-
Indian bonhomie continues. 
 Flaws of an External Security Theory of Separatist Confl ict 
 Few scholars or writers are ever completely satisfi ed with their work. I am 
no different: this book and the arguments contained within it suffer from 
some important fl aws. Theoretically, my argument has a perilous depen-
dence on the plausibility of the claim that meaningful concessions, in the 
form of signifi cant autonomy, will hurt the state because the minority, 
rather than being satisfi ed with its gains in self-government, will keep 
demanding more. A skeptical reader may believe instead that far-reaching 
reforms could successfully “buy off” the ethnic group to the extent that it 
never advances further claims. In such a world, my argument that coercion 
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is “rational” in the face of externally threatening secessionists breaks 
down. Under these circumstances, it would be less costly to transfer mean-
ingful power to the separatists, short of independence, wash one’s hands 
of the problem, and obviate the considerable costs of repression—costs 
especially relating to popularity and legitimacy in the eyes of the restive 
ethnic group. While I believe that my claim that minorities will only use 
autonomy to press their case harder in the future has sound theoretical and 
empirical basis,  6  I can concede that not all readers will fi nd such a logic 
compelling. 
 A second drawback to the argument is that it proposes fears of future war 
as only a suffi cient condition for states violently blocking separatists. Since 
external security concerns are not a necessary condition for state coercion, 
there exist other pathways to violence, possibly many of them, which lie 
outside the bounds of the theory. My argument would be consistent with a 
separatist movement being treated with violence for reasons other than 
external security; an observer might fi nd such a consistency dissatisfying. 
My rejoinder to such concerns would be to point out the cumulative and 
slow-moving nature of scholarship. I aim to shed light on separatist vio-
lence but I cannot, and do not, claim to provide all the answers. Important 
research before mine has specifi ed certain mechanisms through which we 
witness separatist violence, and given the signifi cance of the topic, scholars 
will continue to chart how the outbreak of secessionism leads to death and 
destruction. My goal is, at best, to be part of this conversation; if future 
work theorizes separatist violence in ways that can comprehensively 
account for all or even almost all of its cases, I would be thrilled. 
 It would be less cause for celebration if my argument was falsifi ed. The 
most direct evidence that would contradict my argument would be signifi -
cant concessions granted to separatists by a state in a war-prone region of 
the world or by a state that has a deep antipathy toward the seceding ethnic 
group (or both). Given I argue that a rough neighborhood or opposed iden-
tity relations are suffi cient conditions for coercion, peaceful concessions in 
the presence of either factor would be an unequivocal falsifi cation of my 
theory. A minority rising against the state and securing, without a fi ght, 
signifi cant autonomy or perhaps independence in regions such as contem-
porary Asia, Africa, or the Middle East would constitute such falsifying 
evidence. For example, if the autonomous region of Puntland declared 
independence from Somalia without inviting a violent response—such as 
that faced by Somalilanders in their bid to secede from Somalia decades 
ago—my argument would be fl atly contradicted. 
 Less damaging for the argument in a technical sense, but still cause for 
concern, would be a secure state, confi dent in its belief of future invulnera-
bility, disallowing major reforms toward autonomy or independence. Such 
an occurrence would not technically falsify the theory since I claim only 
that sanguinity about the future is a necessary, not suffi cient, condition for 
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peaceful measures. A state resisting separatism for reasons other than 
external security is consistent with my argument. Still, it would raise ques-
tions for my theory if, for example, Spain continues on its trajectory of 
denying Catalan independence. As a wealthy country embedded in the 
most peaceful web of institutions in interstate history—the European Union 
and NATO—Spain has absolutely no reason to fear a border change: its 
neighborhood is secure, and its relations with the Catalans, while not cor-
dial, hardly feature the deep divisions that foretell future war. Spanish vio-
lence against a Catalan movement aimed at independence would be 
especially surprising from my perspective. On the other hand, the Spain-
Catalan case is an awkward one: it is not clear that Catalonia has even had 
a secessionist “moment,” in that the desire for separatism has been inferred 
from an election with murky, ambiguous results,  7  a far cry from, say, the 
Awami League’s performance in the 1971 elections. More important, the 
case is relatively idiosyncratic because Catalonia has been granted so much 
autonomy previously—thanks to policies in the post-Franco era more con-
sistent with my argument—that there is not much autonomy left to give: 
there are few viable concessions other than independence.8 Perhaps if there 
was still some institutional “slack” left between autonomy and indepen-
dence, the Spanish state could offer it, and the Catalans could accept—an 
equilibrium my theory would expect. Absent that slack, which would make 
the issue “divisible,” the situation between the Catalans and the Spanish 
state seems at an impasse: Catalonia is not satisfi ed with the Spanish state 
but also does not seem eager to press its case for full independence, while 
Spain appears intransigent even if such an unequivocal demand was forth-
coming. Regardless, the case is an interesting one for various theories of 
separatist confl ict to contend with. 
 Extensions of an External Security Theory of Separatist War 
 How might the arguments contained in this book be extended? The most 
obvious arena that might be illuminated by my theory is the phenomenon 
of ideological civil wars. Such civil wars do not feature actors disputing the 
boundaries of the state, as their secessionist cousins do. Rather, ideological 
civil wars pit one group or organization against another that disagree 
intensely about who should be in power in the state, or what direction the 
state should take—secular versus theocratic or right wing versus left wing, 
say. The central distinction lies in border changes not being implied in ideo-
logical civil wars, while such cartographic adjustments are intrinsic to sepa-
ratist demands and their ensuing violence. Indeed, that border changes are 
inherent to separatist civil wars, but not ideological civil wars, is what orig-
inally convinced me that there is necessarily a geopolitical component to 
the former that requires theorizing. 
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 Of course, ideological civil wars do not exist in a geopolitical vacuum 
either, but I believe the interaction of external concerns and state strategy in 
ideological civil wars is hazier. From the perspective of a government facing 
them, the most important difference between ideological and separatist 
movements is that making signifi cant concessions to the latter necessarily 
weakens the state, imperiling its future security. By contrast, ideological 
movements’ goals are not zero-sum with the security of the state. It is per-
fectly plausible for a right-wing government to concede to left-wing mobi-
lization and for the state’s material capabilities to remain unaffected, or 
even increase. As such, if one is chiefl y concerned with maintaining the 
security of the state as a unit in the international relations system, the choice 
of concessions versus coercion when dealing with ideological movements 
is not as cut-and-dried as it is in the case of separatist wars. 
 Things become slightly clearer if one examines the question not from the 
perspective of “the state” at large, but rather a specifi c regime. Abandoning 
the unitary-actor assumption provides an analytical prism through which 
one can see a closer facsimile of my logic at work in ideological wars. For 
instance, a right-wing government facing left-wing demands might see 
concessions in similar, apocalyptic terms that a state sees border changes: 
their very existence could be threatened.  9  Perhaps conceding to ideological 
opponents sows the seeds of one’s own demise by bestowing on them 
important resources, à la the commitment problem. What if a left-wing 
movement takes the inch of concessions I give them as a right-wing govern-
ment and transforms it into a mile, in a process that ultimately ends with 
my head on a stake? Such fears are much more likely to be prevalent in 
authoritarian states, where being in, and then losing, power can be a life-
and-death issue. In constitutionally democratic states, by contrast, a secular 
government, say, is unlikely to consider concessions to a religious move-
ment as threatening its very physical existence. 
 The upshot is that if one is to gingerly and carefully extend to ideological 
confl icts my fundamental logic that the fear of the future drives coercion in 
the present, the extension should be restricted to authoritarian states. For 
Bashar-al-Assad, concessions to opponents probably do result in a slippery 
slope ending with his death, while Barack Obama’s concessions to congres-
sional Republicans need not be seen in such weighty terms. We should, 
then, see authoritarian states react “disproportionately” to the demand for 
ideological reforms, echoing how separatist-wary states behave in my 
theory.  10  
 What about the second leg of my argument, concerning third-party sup-
port? The effect of this variable should work in largely similar ways across 
both separatist and ideological civil wars. Certainly the materialist implica-
tions of foreign backing for rebels should be consistent to both types of civil 
wars: the transfer of “technologies of rebellion” makes the rebel movement 
stronger, in turn driving up the violence required to defeat it. 
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 However, the “transferability” of the emotional effects of third-party 
support are more questionable than its materialist implications. There is no 
doubt that regardless of ethnic or identity attachment, leaders and security 
forces do not take kindly to insiders seeking and receiving support from the 
state’s rivals. On the surface, then, a left-wing government taking on right-
wing rebels should be as offended by third-party support as a state dealing 
with separatists would. Nevertheless, I maintain that there is a subtle yet 
seminal difference in how the suspicion of third-party support manifests 
itself on the ground in war zones and even the halls of power during sepa-
ratist confl icts. Simply put, there is no ideological equivalent for racism—
specifi cally the racism that confl ates domestic citizens with foreigners 
based on ascriptive characteristics. Racism allows for leaders and security 
forces to see particular populations, say Christian Armenians or Kashmiri 
Muslims, as congenitally tied to neighboring or regional states, fueling the 
view that “they are all the same”—a belief that often results in gruesome 
violence. It is harder, though not impossible, to generate such essentialist 
beliefs in ideological confl icts. Note that this does not necessarily imply the 
expectation that separatist civil wars will feature more brutal violence 
than ideological ones more generally.  11  A right-wing government may well 
commit horrifi c violence against a left-wing movement, as dictators in Latin 
America did throughout the Cold War, but for distinct reasons than 
“betrayed” states in my theory. I claim only that if third-party support is 
forthcoming in either type of war, it is likely to result in more extreme bru-
tality in a separatist war than in an ideological one. 
 In addition to ideological civil wars, my argument can be extended to the 
issue of state-minority relations more generally. As other scholars have 
pointed out, groups deemed an “internal enemy” in a larger fi ght against 
external forces are often vulnerable to state repression.  12  Recent events even 
in ostensibly liberal democracies, from Brexit to the election of Donald 
Trump, to say nothing of the fate of sectarian minorities in places such as 
Syria, have demonstrated the latent and actual dangers posed to ethnic 
minorities in a time of global tensions. When states convince themselves 
that they are in the midst of a civilizational fi ght to the death, as several 
states have in the aftermath of 9/11, large groups of their citizens caught on 
“the wrong side” of those battles are uniquely vulnerable. It is revealing, 
for instance, that even the putatively progressive candidate in the U.S. elec-
tion, Hillary Clinton, only considered two roles for American Muslims in 
her public rhetoric: possible terrorism suspects or potential informants 
against terrorism suspects. Groups that are “securitized” in this way can 
become potential targets for state coercion. From the perspective of my 
argument, it would not be surprising to see Western states take even more 
stringent measures against their Muslim populations in the coming decade, 
especially given the congealment of an us-against-them view of Islam and 
Muslims in the West. 
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 Directions for Future Research 
 I hope that writing this book opens up several avenues for further inquiry 
on separatist confl ict, civil war, and ethno-national violence. First, theories 
of secessionist violence explain the phenomenon with reference to state-
level variables, such as national demography, institutions, or security 
threats. What such a lens occludes is the consideration of microlevel pro-
cesses, such as why one neighborhood may suffer more violence than 
another in the same city, or why rebel commanders in similar villages with 
similar backgrounds may behave differently. While civil war research more 
generally has moved in asking such microlevel questions, scholarship spe-
cifi cally focused on separatist violence could benefi t from such attention. 
 Second, future research could examine the importance of what I call 
“ethnic hostages.” All states and geographic regions contain ethnically 
mixed populations. Often, two states (or two regions within a state) will 
each host groups that the other feels some attachment to or responsibility 
for. For example, Slovakia may care deeply about the fate of ethnic Slovaks 
in Hungary, while a Hungarian leader could evince a similar concern with 
her coethnics in Slovakia. Research for this book has convinced me that 
such enclaves play an underappreciated role in secessionist confl ict, espe-
cially if they are similarly sized. Primarily, they seem to serve a deterrence 
function, similar to nuclear weapons: I will refrain from victimizing your 
people in my country if you do the same with my people in yours. Such 
ethnic hostages can therefore help keep the peace between regions and 
states during crises. The corollary is that if such a “balance of ethnic hos-
tages” is threatened, say by large-scale migration in one of the regions, con-
fl ict may become more likely. Carefully and precisely charting the systematic 
effects of ethnic hostages, before and during secessionist confl ict, should be 
of interest to scholars of separatism and ethno-national politics more 
generally. 
 Third, and building off my perspective that “basic” IR principles such as 
the balance of power and the commitment problem need to be imported 
into studies of separatism, I would be curious to learn about the alliance 
strategies of separatists in ethnically heterogeneous states. To what extent, 
and under what circumstances, should one expect coordination, coopera-
tion, or competition between different ethnic communities demanding 
independence from the same state? The long tradition of alliance politics 
has recently made its way into the study of civil war more generally;  13  a 
further step along these lines would be to examine patterns of alliance 
making by groups in multiethnic states facing the same “enemy”: the cen-
tral government. 
 Fourth, and most ambitiously, it would be a unique achievement if a 
scholar could aggregate various levels of analysis into a comprehensive 
explanation of ethno-nationalist violence. At present, studies of ethnic 
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violence exist, broadly speaking, at three levels: communal and local vio-
lence, civil war, and interstate war. The explanatory variables emphasized 
by these families of theories depends on the corresponding arena: scholars 
of communal violence focus on electoral incentives or the relative abun-
dance of civic organizations;  14  civil war researchers highlight state-level 
variables, such as its physical or political geography, institutions, or demo-
graphic profi le;  15  and scholars working on interstate violence point to the 
importance of macrohistorical ideologies, such as nationalism.  16  Is there a 
common process at play across these arenas? Or is it a bridge too far for any 
one theory to account for ethno-nationalist violence in such varied con-
texts? Perhaps it is, but enterprising scholars should attempt to do so 
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 144 . Interview with Mills Kelly.  
 145 . “Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia hasten to protect rights,”  Christian Science Monitor , 
09/03/1992; “Hungary: Harsh words,”  The Economist , 10/31/1992.  
 146 . Interview with Sharon Wolchik.  
 147 . Interview with Jan Eichler.  
 148 . “Sorting out foreign ties, minority needs,”  Christian Science Monitor , 12/24/1992.  
 149 . Interview with anonymous U.S. diplomatic offi cial and with Ondřej Ditrych.  
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